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1976 (9) TMI 75
... ... ... ... ..... he firm is a separate entity for the purposes of income-tax and cited the decision of the Supreme Court as set out in para 5 supra. There can be no dispute that a firm is a legal entity for purposes of taxation. But as pointed out by the Kerala High Court in the above extract in law a firm is not recognised for all purposes as a separate entity. As pointed out earlier under s.4 of the Partnership Act even one partner can carry on the business of the firm. In this case admittedly the assessee, though as a partner had carried on the business of M/s. Continental Packers in the premises under consideration and the profits of such business are admittedly charged to Income-tax in his hands since all the conditions mentioned in s.22 of the income tax Act, 1961 are satisfied in this case, as discussed above, I hold that the assessee is entitled to the claim made by him in respect of the income from property No. 192, Triplicane High Road, Madras-5. In the result the appeal is allowed.
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1976 (9) TMI 72
... ... ... ... ..... es not comprise hair belting and cotton belting. Barring Item 81, we are left with item 126 of the First Schedule, which refers to conveyor or elevator belts or belting of vulcanised rubber, whether combined with any textile materials or otherwise. Admittedly, hair belting and cotton belting are not rubber products and they have not been sought to be assessed under Item 126 of the First Schedule. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has proceeded to justify the levy of sales tax on these items treating them as goods falling under Item 81 of the First Schedule. In our opinion, the view of the lower authorities is not correct and both items are exempted from sales tax. Hence, we find this point accordingly in favour of the assessee. 8. In the result, the appeals are allowed in respect of the disputed turnovers of cotton and hair beltings and the assessee is entitled to exemption on a turnover of Rs. 4,093.63 at 5 for the year 1973-74 and Rs. 99,987.28 at 5 for the year 1974-75.
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1976 (9) TMI 71
... ... ... ... ..... the assessment cannot be regarded as based on best judgement and penalty cannot be levied in respect of such items. In view of the above judicial decisions, we have to find whether the appellants who had felt a doubt about the eligibility, are not entitled to succeed on the question of penalty as there was no best judgement assessment in both the cases and as the transfer sales have been reflected in the records and accounts books of assesses though they were not included in the reported turnover. Furthermore, the original assessing authority did not include turnover of transfer sales in the original assessment. Evidently, the transfer transactions were alone in the bona fide belief that they were not chargeable to sales tax. Hence we find the point for consideration in favour of the assesses. 7. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the orders of the Appellate Asst. Commissioner are set aside in both the appeals and the penalties imposed upon the appellants are cancelled.
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1976 (9) TMI 68
... ... ... ... ..... tion that the aforesaid findings were not correct. In fact, the aforesaid findings have been given by the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and cannot, therefore, be brushed aside as incorrect. If the appellant wanted to question their correctness, the proper course for it would have been to dony the accuracy of the said findings by an affidavit in accordance with R. 10 of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963. In-as-much as, it has not been done, we proceed on the basis of that the aforesaid findings are correct. That being so, the conclusion reached by the learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the aforesaid basis that the said borrowings were not needed for the purpose of the assessee rsquo s business and that interest paid over and above that charged by it from the sister concerns, was not paid for the purposes of the assessee rsquo s business, is correct and, we, therefore, sustain it. 9. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1976 (9) TMI 67
... ... ... ... ..... ttedly did not place any material on the record of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner in the penalty proceedings and the assessee rsquo s learned counsel has not been able to show anything to us to persuade us to take a different view i.e. that it was probable that the assessee did not effect sales to the tune of Rs. 3,00,000, or that there was no wilful neglect on the part of the assessee in understanding its sales then the sales estimated at Rs. 3,00,000. In conclusion we hold that the charge of concealment to the extent of Rs. 38,566 being the addition as sustained by the Tribunal to the returned income of the assessee stood proved against the assessee. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the minimum penalty Rs. 38,570 (on rounding up) leviable in the case shall meet the ends of justice. We accordingly reduce the penalty as levied by the Inspecting Asst. Commissioner to Rs. 38,570. 12. In the result the appeal is allowed.
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1976 (9) TMI 66
... ... ... ... ..... the sales applied by the Income Tax Officer and confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It is not disputed that the purchases and sales are of depot material only. The assessee does not take forest contracts. In similar cases, the Tribunal has considered a net profit at the rate of 10 as proper and appropriate. (M/s. Ambika Timber Mart, Itarsi vs. Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, Itarsi(1) and M/s. M.L. Patel and Co., Itarsi vs. Income Tax Officer, A-Word Itarsi(2)). 3. On the basis of the above decisions, we reduce the net profit rate to 10 instead of 10.5 as applied by the authorities below. 4. The appeals are party allowed.
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1976 (9) TMI 65
... ... ... ... ..... he transaction and the necessity for expeditious settlement thereof, and also furnishes evidence to the satisfaction of the Income-tax Officers as to the genuineness of the payment and the identity of the payee. From the above it can be seen that a person who has to deal with mostly illiterate party hawkers cannot make the payment by cheques or draft because those people do not have bank accounts. It is, therefore, not possible and practicable to make the payment by cheques or drafts. Even if the payment is made by cheque or draft this will certainly cause genuine difficulties to the payee having regarding to the nature of the purchases and the necessity for expeditious settlement thereof. We are, therefore, satisfied that the assessee could not have made the payment in the manner, laid down in s.40A(3) and the rules framed thereunder. In this view of the matter, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was justified in deleting addition. 7. In the result the appeal is dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 64
... ... ... ... ..... Assistant Commissioner duly considered the effect of Rule 46A in paragraphs 3 and 4 of his order. He held that the evidence produced by the assessee before him was merely supporting in nature inasmuch as the facts had already been pleaded by it before the Income-tax Officer. The explanation given by the karta of the assessee that due to his old age and also the distance between Baitalpur and Ahmedabad, he was unable to produce all the evidence about his business at Ahmedabad in a short time before the Income-tax Officer, was accepted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and under Sub-R. (4) of R. 46A the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had the power to direct the production of documents to enable him to dispose of the appeal. In the instant case, interest of justice has been served in allowing production of additional evidence and we do not see any reason to interfere with the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. 6. This appeal by the revenue is also dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 63
... ... ... ... ..... NEGAT, INCUMBIIT PROBTIO. (The burden of proof lies upon him who affirms and not upon him who denies). They cannot merely sit back on the non-explanation or false explanation of the assessee or the inability of the assessee to prove that what he was saying was correct. In order to impose penalty, the Revenue authority cannot rely on the fact that the assessee is not able to prove his case but, on the other hand, they have to disprove the assessee rsquo s case and in this case, the Revenue has not been able to disprove the assessee rsquo s case and establish by unimpeachable evidence that the alleged suppressed sales resulted in the concealment of income. In the very appropriate but significant words of Justice Shri J.C. Shah as then he was, in order to impose the penalty the Revenue must prove the some thing more and that some thing more the Revenue has not been able to prove. We, therefore, hold that the penalty is inexigible and we delete the same. 3. The appeal is allowed.
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1976 (9) TMI 62
... ... ... ... ..... of the explanation given for the investment. Shortage. Agarwal has placed in some papers in this connection. But they were not before the Income Tax Officer and the Appellate Asstt. Commissioner and we are unable to admit these in evidence and go into the merits of the addition in the light of the same. We are of opinion that both the Income Tax Officer and the Appellate Asstt. Commissioner having regard to the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence produced by the assessee for the investment, treated it as the assessee rsquo s income from other sources and this was fully justified. We, therefore do not direct any fresh investigation of the factual aspect of the addition. We restrict our remand to the Appellate Asstt. Commissioner only to the legal contention viz. that since the return had already been filed for the assessment year in question and remained undisposed of, the proceedings under s. 148 had not been validly initiated. The appeal will be treated as allowed in part.
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1976 (9) TMI 61
... ... ... ... ..... s are exports to foreign countries and there was lesser demands for the items sold. This fact was revealed by the other dealers dealing in the same trade. Nothing adverse was noticed. 11. The statement of Shri. Kalyana sundaram, incharge manager was also recorded by the S.T.I. and in that statement he disclosed that the decline in sales was owing to the fact that the entire sales were to the foreign countries and the export market showed a downward trend because of lesser demand in the international market. It was also stated by him that we have now almost closed our business and are filling nil returns . 12. It is be noted that neither the assessing authority nor the appellate authority observed that there was any history of suppressing sales by the dealer in the earlier years. 13. In the above circumstances, I find it difficult to agree with the decisions of the authorities below. I accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the enhancement made by them. Inform the parties.
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1976 (9) TMI 60
... ... ... ... ..... he term coal including coke and other derivatives . 19. As observed by the Allahabad High Court in the case reported in 13 STC 249, the basic difference between coal and cinder is that coal is a mineral as it is dug out of the bowels of the earth without anything more being done to it. Cinder, on the other had, is not coal because cinder is got only after something has been done to coal namely after coal has been burnt. The Andhra Pradesh High court in the case of P. Chitta Reddi expressed that cinders cannot be said to be coal in the popular sense of the terms, though they may be the end products of coal after a greater part of the energy therefrom has been spent. 20. It is, obvious that direct decisions make it clear that cinder is not coal or coke or other derivatives of coal. The ruling new cited by the learned counsel for the appellant do not induce me to differ with the decision of the learned Financial Commissioner. For the reasons thus stated, the appeal is dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 59
... ... ... ... ..... urn submitted and the turnover shown by the dealer were accepted. In view of the past history of the dealer, it was all the more important for the assessing authority to come to a definite conclusion that there was suppression in sales or defects in the account books of the dealer. In the absence of such a finding it becomes difficult to confirm the enhancement made by the assessing authority only on the ground that the dealer s account books at the time of visit of the Officers of Special Investigation Branch, were lying with the accountant. It is pertinent to note that neither the Inspecting staff nor the assessing authority directed the dealer to produce the account books at any date and time fixed by them. Unless the returns submitted were found incorrect and incomplete, it does not appear just and proper to enhance the turnover arbitrarily. 3. For the reasons stated above, I allow the appeal and delete the enhancement. In other respects the assessment order is confirmed.
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1976 (9) TMI 58
... ... ... ... ..... rnished a false return in s. 43(1) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, necessarily indicates a guilty intention of trying to deceive the Department. Under the circumstances mentioned therein no such intention was found in that case. The word deliberately has not been added in s. 22A as has been done in Madhya Pradesh. Moreover in view of the decisions of the Asstt. CITs in the previous years that the receipts from Western Courts were liable to tax, the plea that the dealer was not aware of the correct legal position so did not include the said receipts in the return for subsequent cannot be accepted as bonafide. 8. When it was finally held in the earlier cases of the assessee that he was liable to pay tax on the sales made by him at Western Courts, he should not have concealed those sales from his return. For the reasons thus stated. I do not find any sufficient ground to disagree with the concurrent finding of the authorities below. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 57
... ... ... ... ..... not a contingent liability but a liability which has statutorily accrued against assessee as at the end of the previous year. He was, therefore, correct in directing to allow the amount as a deduction. We may mention that the case of Chowringhee Sales Bureau P. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax (2) was concerned with the question as to whether a certain receipt constituted the income of the receipt. It was not concerned with the question as to whether the amount claimed as a deduction was allowable or not. This latter question was directly considered in the case of Kedarnath Fute Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax(1). As has been stated earlier both these cases have been explained by the Hon ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of M/s. T. Nagireddy and Co.(3). Respectfully following the above authorities, we hold that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was correct in his decision. We accordingly uphold his order. 9. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 56
... ... ... ... ..... ase of CIT vs. Smt. Binapani Chakraborty, 1976 CTR (Ori) (1) supported the orders of the AAC for both the years. 5. We find that the submission of the learned assessee s Counsel carry enough force. This very issue came for consideration of the Orissa High Court in the case of Smt. Binapani Chakraborty as referred to above wherein by its order dt. 26th Sept., 1975 their Lordships of the Orissa High court held that the word jewellery in s. 5(1)(viii) of the WT Act, 1957, prior to amendment of the provisions and introduction of Explanation I by the Finance Act (No. 2) of 1971 would not take in gold ornaments without precious or semi precious stones embedded on them. Respectfully, following the order of the Orissa High court in the case referred to above, we hold that the AAC was justified in directing exclusion of ornaments of gold or silver from the taxable wealth of the assessee and the order of the AAC does not require any change. 6. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 55
... ... ... ... ..... eads its bona fide belief that it was not aware of this newly cast liability the possibility of its belief cannot in the facts and circumstances of this case ruled out. So if it was honestly not aware of its obligations to voluntarily furnish the return, and that plea seems to be true, there is reasonable cause for failure to furnish the return. After all what we have to find out is whether there is reasonable cause. In any event, the case of Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1) will rescue the assessee from penalty proceedings in a case like this. 6. In the light of this finding that there is reasonable cause, we are not going into the unnecessary questions of law argued before us about the legality of the imposition of penalty and about the period for which default should in the light of s. 148 proceedings be computed. 7. Therefore we find that there was reasonable cause for the failure to file a voluntary return. The appeal is allowed and the penalty is cancelled.
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1976 (9) TMI 54
... ... ... ... ..... hed. The second question is about the finding that there had been no concealment in respect of advances outside the books. This is a mere finding of fact. The third question refers to the double addition to the extent of Rs. 53,831. This was merely arithmetical. Similarly, the last question regarding the interest on the bogus deposits was also a finding of fact. Since all these are findings of facts, no reference could be allowed. The application by the CIT is rejected. 8. The assessee s reference application was not in the proper form, but since it was a curable defect, we have allowed the assessee to file an application in proper form. Three questions had been raised by the assessee out of which only one is a question of law, i.e. Question No. 3, which deals with the point of limitation. But, since we have cancelled the penalty and refused to state a case as required by the CIT, a reference of this question will be academic. So, the assessee s application is also rejected.
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1976 (9) TMI 53
... ... ... ... ..... held that though the question of depreciation may be considered when the income is estimated under the proviso to s. 13 of the IT Act, 1922, yet only depreciation that had been duly worked out and factually allowed in the assessment orders of the earlier years can be taken into account for the purposes of s. 10(2)(vii). As no depreciation was actually allowed for the asst. yrs. 1970-71 and 1971-72, the written down value of the asset in question would be Rs. 60,445. The sale proceed of Rs. 35,000 being less than the written down value, no profit under s. 41(2) was taxable. The addition of Rs. 5,382 is, therefore, deleted. 5. The second ground relates to the charging of interest under s. 139 and s. 271. The learned counsel for the assessee did not address any argument on this ground. Even otherwise, the order of the AAC holding that there is no right of appeal against the charging of interest under s. 139 and s. 217 is correct. 6. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1976 (9) TMI 52
... ... ... ... ..... elief could be sustained. It is not enough that the Income-tax Officer has some materials in his possession for reopening the assessment. It is absolutely necessary that he must bring some of those materials into the report as a result of which the belief that the requirements of s. 147 (a) are satisfied, can be sustained. If the reasons given by the Income-tax Officer are his conclusions themselves and are absolutely barren and bald in nature, we cannot say that any prima facie reason can be spelt out for holding the belief that the conditions in s.147 (a) were satisfied. Authorities are legion for the above proposition that we have endorsed and it would suffice for us to mention the latest Supreme Court decision in the case of Lakhmani Mewaldas (1). In the circumstances, we entirely agree with the assessee that the reopening of the assessment was invalid. Therefore, we do not consider it necessary to discuss the additions on merits. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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