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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 131 Records
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1976 (9) TMI 51
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... ... ..... , perhaps a record in the history of the Tribunal, the Advocates were making continued efforts to find out the latest case law relevant to the propositions as they developed during the course of arguments. We are thankful for the valuable assistance provided by them. Similarly, Shri Ghanekar, Deputy Commissioner (Legal) was equally pain-staking. Obviously a strenuous effort and study had been put in for advancing the arguments as he did. The same were very analytical. Shri Dandekar, Sales Tax Officer (Legal) advanced arguments based mainly on some of the basic principles of jurisprudence a commendable theoretical effort. We are thankful to Shri Ghanekar also for the assistance. It may be noted that the arguments reached a very high judicial level. If assistance of this type is available, then the task of the Tribunal of properly laying down the law in the developing branch of sales tax would be greatly facilitated. The Second Appeals will now be heard by the referring Bench.
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1976 (9) TMI 50
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... ... ..... nder s.5 (1)(iva) to the extent of Rs. 1,50,000. In this regard, we have held in a large number of cases, following our earlier order in the case of Smt. Christine Cardoza in W.T.A. Nos. 185 and 186/Bang/1972-73 dt. 25th Jan., 1974 that the deduction u/s. 5(1)(iva) had to be given in the hands of the individual owners to the extent of their share in the estate and it had not to be given while valuing the total value of the estate before determining the share of each of the shareholders whether it be a firm or association of persons. Following that order, we hold that the assessee is entitled to exemption u/s 5(1)(iva) to the extent of Rs. 1,50,000 and that the same shall not be given while computing the value of the three estates as has been done by the Wealth-tax Officer. We accordingly allow the appeals and direct the Wealth-tax Officer to recompute the value of the assessee s share in the estates and then give the exemption to the full extent in the hands of the assessee.
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1976 (9) TMI 49
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... ... ..... cuted whereby the lands comprising of the estates where specifically allotted to each member of the family but execution of this deed was not necessary for excluding the three estates from the assets of the H.U.F. The use of the expression that it was necessary and expedient that these estates should be divided among them by metes and bounds so that each of them may enjoy his share of the estates in severality in the deed of 1973, does not mean that in the eye of law, three estates had still remained joint and belonged to the H.U.F. as a coparcenary property. In our opinion, therefore, the order of the Commissioner cannot be sustained. We hold that the properties comprising the three estates did not belong to the H.U.F. on any of the three valuation dates having been partitioned by a partial partition prior to these dates. The orders of the Wealth-tax Officer were therefore correct and they are restored and the order of the Commissioner is set aside. The appeals are allowed.
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1976 (9) TMI 48
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... ... ..... s. 4,757 which was allowable either for staff welfare or for entertainment expenditure incurred before 28th Feb., 1970. Similarly he also found that staff welfare and entertainment expenditure incurred in H.O. amounted to Rs. 894, which was also allowable expenditure. He, therefore, allowed deduction for these items. The finding of the A.A.C. is perfectly in order on this issue. These were incurred by the assessee for the purpose of its own staff. Thus those expenses incurred by it were incidental to its business and they are allowable. The entertainment expenditure incurred by the assessee for the purpose of its own business upto 28th Feb., 1970 were also an allowable expenditure. Consequently there is nothing wrong with the order of the A.A.C. while he allowed the expenditure at Rs. 5,443 of staff welfare and entertainment upto 28th Feb., 1973 to the assessee. We therefore, maintain this finding of the A.A.C. 14. In the result, these two departmental appeals are dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 47
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... ... ..... ason for restricting the addition to Rs. 1,65,000 or the basis for working out that figure. It was held that the assessee gave complete address of Smt. S. Agarwal with a request to summon to her and the other parties, but the Income-tax Officer did not so. It was therefore, held that the assessee s explanation even if not very satisfactory, no material had been brought by the Income-tax Officer on record to justify an inference that this amount represented any undisclosed investment made by the assessee. In the opinion of the Appellate Tribunal, the assessee s explanation was quite reasonable and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was right in deleting the disputed additions. 6. It would appear that the Appellate Tribunal recorded its findings on an appreciation of the material which was on record and those findings do not give rise to any question of law. The questions suggested, therefore, cannot the referred to the High Court and this reference application is dismissed.
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1976 (9) TMI 46
P or P medicines - Demand ... ... ... ... ..... by the Supreme Court in N.B. Sanjana v. The Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2039 at page 2048) 1978 (2) E.L.T. (J 399), in order to attract Rule 10, it is necessary that some amount of duty have been assessed and that the said amount should have been actually paid or there should have been a nil assessment. In the present case neither was any amount of duty assessed and paid earlier nor was there a nil assessment at any earlier point of time in respect of the medicines in question. Hence Rule 10 has no application to the present case which falls clearly within Rule 10A under which there is no time limit for recovering the excise duty payable to the Central Government. Thus the petitioner s contention that the impugned demand is barred by time has no substance. 15. Both the contentions urged by Sri Kacker fail and we dismiss this petition. 16. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs in this petition.
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1976 (9) TMI 45
Valuation - When goods are substantially sold to related persons and partly to independent buyers
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1976 (9) TMI 44
Penalty - Short levy - Recovery of - Applicability ... ... ... ... ..... by the department, although short-levied under the latter s belief that the special procedure contained in Section E-III aforesaid was applicable. The error was detected sometime in July 1968 and that is why proceedings were held for levying the normal duty. In other words, the proceedings were meant to collect duty at the normal rate minus what had already been paid and that is exactly what would amount to a case of recovery of duties short-levied. Rule 10, therefore, squarely embraces these petitions and the demand not having been made within three months from the date on which the duty was short-levied, the case of the department is time-barred. On that account, the proceedings for the recovery of the duty itself, apart from the position of the penalty, are legally untenable. In the result, the petitions succeed and are accepted and the impugned orders are quashed. The petitioners will have their costs of the proceedings before me. Counsel s fee Rs. 100/- in each petition.
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1976 (9) TMI 43
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the sum of ₹ 2,70,000 is not includible in the estate of the deceased under section 10 of the Estate Duty Act ?
Held that:- In the light of the finding that the deceased transferred six-sevenths share in the business in favour of the sons and retained only one-seventh share, no question can possibly arise for the inclusion of the said six-sevenths share or of the amount of ₹ 2,70,000 in the estate of the deceased. The transfer of ₹ 2,70,000 by the decased in favour of his sons was not in cash but was by means of book entries. The transfer of that amount was a part of the scheme, as stated above, to transfer six-sevenths share in the business in favour of the sons. There was no absolute transfer of ₹ 2,70,000 in favour of the sons but the transfer was made subject to the condition that the sons would use it as capital, not for any benefit of the deceased donor but for each of them becoming entitled to one-seventh share in the business. No benefit of any kind was enjoyed by way of possession or otherwise by the deceased under the gift of the subject-matter of the gift. Whatever benefit was enjoyed by the deceased subsequent to the date of the gift was on account of the fact that he held one-seventh share in the business, which share he retained throughout and never parted with. No extra benefit was also conferred under the deed of partnership upon the deceased although some extra benefit was conferred upon two of the major sons in the form of remuneration because of their active and full participation in the business. Keeping in view the position of law discussed earlier, it is plain that the facts of the case would not fall within the ambit of section 10 of the Act.
Agree with the High Court that the question referred to by the Tribunal should be answered in favour of the accountable persons and against the revenue
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1976 (9) TMI 42
Capital Gains Tax ... ... ... ... ..... opyright and trademark which are created by personal efforts and would not apply to other capital assets like the import licence. This submission is not borne out by the judgment. In fact if the judgment is read in full it would be clear that the question posed before the court was in wider form, namely, whether the idea of capital gain should necessarily be connected with the idea of cost in terms of money in the creation and acquisition of the capital asset. It is this question that was considered by the court and answered against the revenue having regard to the language of section 12B(2)(ii). The provisions of the Income-tax, Act, 1961, in so far as this point is concerned are identical. It follows that the said decision would apply to the transfer of the licence here also which did not involve any cost to the assessee in its acquisition. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (9) TMI 41
Best Judgment Assessment, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... tax v. Brij Bhushan Lal Ramesh Kumar 1976 102 ITR 430 (Punj) and by this High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. K. S. Reddy 1976 103 ITR 822 (AP). Therefore, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, we hold that the value of the materials supplied by the railway authorities cannot be taken into consideration for estimating the net income for the assessment years 1964-65 to 1967-68. Hence, the Tribunal was justified in law in giving directions to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the value of the materials supplied by the railway authorities should not be taken into consideration for estimating the net income for the assessment years 1964-65 to 1967-68. The question referred to the High Court for its opinion is, therefore, answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Commissioner of Income-tax will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee. Advocate s fee, Rs. 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1976 (9) TMI 40
Income Tax Act, Tax Due By Firm, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... espect of the partners of the firm who jointly own the partnership property that has to be furnished. Since the property jointly belongs to the partners, each individual partner must have a clearance certificate in his favour before the partnership property can be registered. Under these circumstances, the decision of the respondent herein that the income-tax clearance certificate must be furnished in respect of each of the partners and not merely in respect of the firm as a whole was correct. This writ petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. The rule is discharged. We may, however, observe that, in spite of our decision as above, it will be open to the petitioner-firm to deposit or otherwise satisfy the demand of the income-tax department as regards the tax liability of one of the partners of the firm, who is in arrears of tax, and once that is done, it will be open to the respondent to issue the necessary tax clearance certificates. There will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (9) TMI 39
Industrial Company, Processing Of Goods ... ... ... ... ..... ansformation and remain static, does not by itself mean that they are not subjected to any process at all during the period of storage. We have already held that the processing of goods need not lead to manufacture of new article. Preservation by refrigeration is a well-known method for keeping edible things in good condition for temporary periods. But for refrigeration it would not be possible to keep things in edible state for a long period of time. During the period when they are kept in the cold storage they are subjected to the process of refrigeration. This being so, the assessee-company would be an industrial company as defined in section 2(7)(d) of the Finance Acts of 1966 and 1967, and, therefore, entitled to the concessional rate of tax. We, therefore, answer the question referred in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 200. Counsel fee is also assessed at the same figure.
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1976 (9) TMI 38
Court Fee, Income Tax Act, Reference To High Court ... ... ... ... ..... the Income-tax Act was not made under that section simpliciter but was made under that section read with section 18 of the Surtax Act. This is also shown by the title of this petition which is In the matter of section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as applied by section 18 of the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 . In Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners of Howrah v. Shalimar Wood Products (Private) Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1691 their Lordships of the Supreme Court pointed out that when by an enactment the provisions of another enactment are made to apply to the former enactment with the modifications mentioned in such former enactment, the provisions so modified are not the statutory provisions as occurring in the Act which is made applicable but are different provisions altogether. For the reasons mentioned above, I, therefore, hold that the Taxing Master was right in the view which she took, and I, accordingly, dismiss this chamber summons with costs fixed at Rs. 150.
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1976 (9) TMI 37
Capital Asset, Capital Gains Tax, Compulsory Acquisition ... ... ... ... ..... We have already extracted the provisions of section 2(4A) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and it would be found therefrom that consumable stores are not included within the meaning of the term capital asset . The learned counsel for the assessee submitted that in the respective cases there were consumable stores which should be excluded, in any event, from the computation of capital gains. This is a matter which should have been taken up at the stage of the appeal before the Tribunal and we do not find it possible to allow the assessee to raise this contention at this stage. The point as to whether consumable stores have to be excluded has not been raised before the Tribunal and, therefore, the matter does not arise out of the order of the Tribunal. For the foregoing reasons we answer the second question in each of the references in the affirmative and against the assessee. The Commissioner will have his costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 250 in each of the references.
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1976 (9) TMI 36
Carry Forward, Set Off ... ... ... ... ..... language, it is clear that the set-off or carryforward of loss under sections 71 and 72 succeeds the computation of profits and gains of the business and does not enter into the computation of profits and gains of the business itself. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was entitled to the rebate of 8 per cent. on the sum of Rs. 2,45,431. As we have pointed out already, the Income-tax Officer set off a part of the unabsorbed depreciation also against the aforesaid amount. When the Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed the appeal preferred by the assessee, no further controversy arose in that behalf before the Appellate Tribunal and, therefore, we are not expressing any opinion on this aspect. Under these circumstances, we answer the question referred to this court in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 500 (Rupees Five hundred only).
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1976 (9) TMI 35
Export Promotion, Profits And Gains, Sale Proceeds ... ... ... ... ..... the receipt by way of subsidy and the receipt by way of the profits due to the sale of import entitlement are directly referable to the export of the cycle rims made by the assessee and consequently they can be said to be profits and gains derived from the export of cycle rims even on the basis of any theory of proximity. Secondly, by virtue of the fact that the amount of profits and gains derived from the export have to be ascertained only in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and not independent of it, in view of the provisions contained in section 2(5)(d) of the Finance Act, 1966, and rule 2(2) made by the Central Board of Direct Taxes pursuant to section 2(5)(d), these two receipts have to be treated as profits referable to or derived from the said export. Under these circumstances, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee is entitled to its costs. Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 500.
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1976 (9) TMI 34
Household Expenses, Levy Of Penalty, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... d deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars in order to conceal the income. In these days of high prices, even an ordinary man cannot live on Rs. 2,000 a year. Even the total emoluments of a class IV employee comes to about Rs. 3,000 per annum and here is an industrialist whose firm s annual turnover, though runs in crores of rupees, yet he wants the revenue to believe that he only spent Rs. 2,000 on his household. Rather, the Income-tax Officer has estimated his household expenses at Rs. 6,000 per annum on the ridiculously low side. Such industrialists spend more than Rs. 500 a day but the Income-tax Officer has estimated his household expenses at Rs. 500 a month. Such a concealment of income is creating imbalance in our economy. If the income-tax is paid honestly, I do not think any other tax is required to be levied on the citizens. For the reasons recorded above, the reference is answered in the affirmative in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. No costs.
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1976 (9) TMI 33
Bona Fide, Estate Duty, Levy Of Penalty, Settled Property ... ... ... ... ..... acted both section 12(1) and paragraph 19(b). Paragraph 19(b) refers to trust while no such trust is mentioned in section 12 of the Act. Consequently, having regard to the use of the expression trust in paragraph 19(b), which will necessarily restrict the scope of section 12 which itself does not use that expression, we are of the opinion that paragraph 19(b) of the form also cannot be construed to require the accountable person to give the value of the property deemed to pass under section 12 of the Act as part of the assessable estate. Under these circumstances, we are clearly of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding that to the facts of this case section 60(1)(c) of the Act was not attracted. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to this court in the affirmative and in favour of the accountable person. The accountable person is entitled to his costs from the Controller of Estate Duty, Madras. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 500 (Rupees five hundred only).
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1976 (9) TMI 32
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... ... ..... find out the point of distinction between the two. When the statute merely uses the expression fruit-bearing tree , there is absolutely no scope for a fine distinction between a fruit-bearing tree and a nut-bearing tree, when the tree admittedly bears fruits, on the basis as to whether it is the fruit which is more valuable or the nut that is more valuable. Under these circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the Tribunal was in error in concluding that a cashew tree is not a fruit-bearing tree, but only a nut-bearing tree and, therefore, the lands of the respondent herein would not come within the scope of the word tope as defined in section 2(y) of the Agricultural income-tax Act. Consequently, the tax revision case is allowed and the order of the Agricultural Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is set aside, with the result that the order of the Assistant Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax dated January 24, 1970, is restored. There will be no order as to costs.
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