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Showing 21 to 40 of 99 Records
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1977 (12) TMI 130
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... ... ..... is, both the counsel submit that neither the Commissioner nor the Tribunal should have answered the question without any evidence regarding the common parlance or the trade parlance meaning of the term bullion . Both the counsel jointly apply that when the matter goes back to the Tribunal, parties should be allowed to lead evidence in this regard, viz., as to the common parlance or the trade parlance meaning of the term bullion . We have no doubt at all that when the matter goes back to the Tribunal, the Tribunal will allow such evidence to be led. In the result, we answer the question referred to us as follows The Tribunal was not correct in law in coming to the conclusion set out in the question without evidence as to the common parlance or the trade parlance meaning of the term bullion . The matter will now go back to the Tribunal for determination according to what we have stated above. There will be no order as to costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (12) TMI 129
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... ... ..... t from molasses and as such it could not be taxed at 3 per cent. Main controversy raised in this reference is as to whether gur badda is taxable at 3 per cent or 2 per cent. It is admitted by the department that in case it is considered that gur badda is not molasses, the commodity in question was in the relevant year, taxable at 2 per cent only. Accordingly, we refrain from going into the question as to whether gur badda is the same thing as gur. After hearing counsel for the Commissioner of Sales Tax we answer the question referred to us as follows On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the learned Additional Revising Authority was justified in holding that gur badda was not molasses. The result of our answer would be that the assessee s turnover of gur badda would be taxed at 2 per cent only and not at 3 per cent. As no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee we make no order as to costs. Counsel s fee is assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (12) TMI 128
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... ... ..... ons of the notification annexure C, under the principle of promissory estoppel. The argument was that by enacting the Incentive Rules the State Government held out a promise that on proper investment these incentives would be earned by the industry in question. In view of the discussion which has preceded, we find that it is not necessary for us to go into the question of the application of this principle of promissory estoppel. In view of this we allow this writ petition and declare that the petitioners are not bound to pay Central sales tax on their turnover of interState sales for the assessment year 1972-73 on the goods in question. We, accordingly, quash the order passed by the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, respondent No. 1, as found at annexure G. The rule is accordingly made absolute without any order as to costs. In view of the above, necessary adjustment or refund as regards the tax which is already paid by the petitioners shall be made. Petition allowed.
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1977 (12) TMI 127
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... ... ..... nerated by an electrically operated motor or by other means mentioned in item 81 of the First Schedule. That it is made of cotton is not disputed. Counsel suggested that it will not be fabric. We think that anything fabricated out of cotton can be called cotton fabric . This view is supported by the decision of the Kerala High Court in Kesavan and Co. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax 1976 37 S.T.C. 221. We, therefore, dismiss this petition. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (12) TMI 126
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... ... ..... t appeal from the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in regard to a part of it which is against the revenue, once an appeal has been taken from that order by the assessee on points held against the assessee, the revenue can approach the Tribunal for enhancement of the assessment by setting aside the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the revenue which is not really the subject-matter of the appeal. In such a case, the power of the Board of Revenue is taken away. If there is no appeal, the ban under section 34(2)(b) will not be attracted and the Board will be free to exercise revisional power and rectify a mistake committed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and save the revenue. There cannot be a simultaneous exercise of the power by the Board as well as by the Appellate Tribunal. In the light of the above, we set aside the order of the Board of Revenue and allow this tax revision case with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 300. Petition allowed.
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1977 (12) TMI 125
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... ... ..... e applicant himself has chosen to adopt, and we cannot help it. For the reasons set out above, we answer the questions referred to us as follows Question No. (1) In the negative. Question No. (2) The Tribunal was not correct in law in holding that the Sales Tax Officer (VIII), Enforcement Branch, Bombay, could not initiate proceedings under section 15 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, merely on the ground that the original assessment under section 15 of the said Act was passed by the Sales Tax Officer, C Ward, Bombay. The Sales Tax Officer (VIII), Enforcement Branch, Bombay, could have initiated proceedings under section 15 of the said Act had he been validly clothed with jurisdiction or authority to do so. We may make it clear that the Tribunal s finding that he was not clothed with jurisdiction or authority has not been challenged before us and remains unaffected by our judgment. There will be no order as to costs of both these references. References answered accordingly.
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1977 (12) TMI 124
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... ... ..... r may apply to the assessing authority for permission to pay the tax under the section and, on being so permitted, he shall pay the tax due in advance during the year in monthly or prescribed instalments and, for that purpose, shall submit returns in the manner prescribed. The assessee has not appeared to dispute the revenue s contention that in view of the deletion of rule 15(4-B) the assessee should have exercised the option at the beginning of the year and obtained the assessing officer s permission and, the assessee not having done so, is not entitled to claim the benefit under section 7(1) of the Act. We accept the revenue s contention in this behalf and hold that the assessee, not having exercised the option and obtained the prior permission within the year to pay the tax at the compounded rate, is not entitled to the benefit of section 7(1) of the Act. We accordingly allow the tax revision case but, under the circumstances of the case, without costs. Petition allowed.
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1977 (12) TMI 123
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... ... ..... ed by him and when there is nothing to rebut the evidence furnished by him it is not open to the Board of Revenue on that material to say that he has not dicharged the burden cast on him under section 7-A. The approach of the Board is wrong. If the Board felt not satisfied with the particulars furnished by the appellant and if it felt any verification of the information given was necessary it should have called for further particulars or had the information furnished by the assessee verified. Without making any such effort, the Board held that the burden laid under section 7-A on the assessee has not been discharged. We are satisfied that the burden laid on the assessee has been discharged and that the Board has committed an error in revising the order of the Assistant Commissioner. In the result, the impugned order of the Board of Revenue is set aside, the order of the Assistant Commissioner restored and the appeal allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (12) TMI 122
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... ... ..... ver was before the assessing authority and was expressly exempted by him under the original assessment order, it could not be said that that turnover was an escaped turnover. The principle would apply only in cases where the escaped turnover was wrongly omitted or exempted from tax even on the facts existing at the time of the assessment. But the present cases are not cases of that type. On the facts existing at the time of the assessments, the exemptions were properly given. It is on account of what had happened subsequently only, the exemptions granted became invalid. Therefore, we hold that the impugned notices given by the Commercial Tax Officer cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the civil revision petitions are dismissed, but, in the circumstances, without costs. This does not preclude the petitioners from contending before the assessing authority that the turnovers in question are not, as a matter of fact, liable to assessment. Petitions dismissed.
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1977 (12) TMI 121
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... ... ..... ry, it was possible to hold that the neel is a dye and should be taxed accordingly. The Division Bench referred to the various meanings given for the word dye and ultimately was of the opinion that the brightening object like neel could not be treated as an article used for impregnating tissues with any colour and, therefore, cannot be regarded as colouring material. The observations made in paragraph 15 of the aforesaid judgment can, therefore, not be construed de hors of the context in which they were made and are, therefore, distinguishable. 17.. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and hold that colour-powders fall within the term dyes as contained in entry No. 25 of Schedule II, Part II, of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, and are liable to tax at the rate prescribed against the said entry. 18.. The petition shall now be placed before the Division Bench for disposal according to law. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1977 (12) TMI 120
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... ... ..... n was never advanced before the Tribunal. This appears to be the correct position but it is also unnecessary to consider this objection because indisputably if this was not a case of a mistake apparent from the record, the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax had jurisdiction to revise the order. For the reasons set out above, we answer the two questions referred to us in each of the above references in the affirmative. The Tribunal will now proceed to dispose of all these cases in the light of our judgment and after considering and deciding all the other contentions which had been urged before us on behalf of the respondents but on which it did not give any decision by reason of the fact that it upheld the point of want of jurisdiction argued by the respondents. In view of the facts and circumstances of these cases in our opinion, a fair order for costs would be that each party should bear and pay its own costs of each of these references. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1977 (12) TMI 119
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... ... ..... tax required to be collected under this Act in such State or in relation to any process connected with such assessment, reassessment, collection or enforcement of payment as if the tax under this Act were a tax under such sales tax law. Section 9 of the amending Act is a validating section and makes the provisions of sub-section (2A) of section 9 inserted by the amending Act to operate with retrospective effect. It also validates the imposition and collection of penalties levied before the commencement of the amending Act which were invalid by reason of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. In view of the provisions of section 9 of the amending Act, it must be held that the imposition of penalty upon the respondents by the Sales Tax Officer for late payment and non-payment of tax under the Central Act was valid. We accordingly answer the question submitted to us in the negative. There will be no order as to costs of this reference. Reference answered in the negative.
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1977 (12) TMI 118
Whether what is conveniently, though somewhat loosely, called a "compulsory sale" is exigible to sales tax?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The conclusion which therefore emerges is that the transactions between the appellant, M/s. Vishnu Agencies (Pvt.) Ltd., and the allottees are sales within the meaning of section 2(g) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. For the same reasons, transactions between the growers and procuring agents as also those between the rice millers on the one hand and the wholesalers or retailers on the other are sales within the meaning of section 2(n) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. The turnover is accordingly exigible to sales tax or purchase tax as the case may be.
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1977 (12) TMI 109
Winding up Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... 1) of the Companies Act, 1956. It has been further held that it would be open to the liquidation court then to decide how far, under the law, the amount of income-tax determined by the department should be accepted as a lawful liability on the funds of the company in liquidation. At that stage, the winding-up court can fully safeguard the interests of the company and its creditors. In Golcha Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO 1974 94 ITR 11 (Raj.), it was held that the ITO must take leave of the court before issuing notice under section 178 of the I.T. Act. Taking into consideration the ratio decidendi laid down in the above referred rulings, leave is hereby granted to the petitioner to issue notice in connection with the advance tax pertaining to the year 1978-79 (accounting year 1977-78). It would, however, be open to the court, after the tax liability has been quantified, to pass such orders as are deemed fit and proper to safeguard the interests of the company and its creditors.
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1977 (12) TMI 108
Winding up Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... y that section, the claim petition in the present case was filed on behalf of the official liquidator only on 18th August, 1971, whereas the order for winding up had been passed on 19th August, 1966. Under art. 137 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation prescribed for an application is three years from the date when the right to apply accrues Even after giving the benefit of section 458A of the Act and taking into account the period of limitation prescribed by article 137 of the. Limitation Act, 1963, the limitation would have expired even according to the case of the official liquidator that the, claim is based on open and current account, on September 19, 1969. Thus, on the contentions of the official liquidator itself, the application was barred, by time. For purposes of the present case, we need not decide the meaning of the word claim in s. 446(2)(b) of the Act. With these observations, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1977 (12) TMI 93
Deemed public companies ... ... ... ... ..... provides that the provisions of section 23(3) shall apply to a change of name under sub-section (2) as it applies to change of name under section 21. Further, sub-section (3) of section 23 provides that a change of name under section 21 does not affect the rights and obligations of the company or render defective any legal proceedings by or against it, and any legal proceedings which might have been continued or commenced by or against the company by its former name may be continued by or against the company by its new name. A combined reading of the provisions of sections 43A, 21 and 23 leaves no manner of doubt that when a company is converted into a public company, apart from the change in its name, the constitution and the entity of the company is not affected in any other manner and the legal proceedings instituted by its former name can be continued by its new name. Consequently, this petition has no merit and is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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1977 (12) TMI 92
Shares capital Reduction of, Oppression and mismanagement Notice to be given to central government of applications under section 397 and 398
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1977 (12) TMI 91
Winding up Suits stayed on winding-up order, Applicability of Code of Civil Procedure ... ... ... ... ..... n call Upon the party to pay the court-fees. These observations, as we understood, have been made as to the power of the company judge to give directions to the official liquidator before the filing of the petition under section 446(2)(b), namely, the direction that a suit be filed under section 446(2)(a) instead of filing claim petition under section 446(2)(b). Once such claim petition has been properly filed and is maintainable in law, there is no power with the court to direct its conversion into a suit later on. Learned counsel for the appellant referred us to numerous decisions under section 155 of the Companies Act where the company judge may decline to entertain petition in appropriate cases and refer the party to file a suit. There is no analogy in the powers exercised by the company judge under section 155 to the making of any claim petition by or against the company under section 446(2)(b). There is thus no merit in the appeals and the same are dismissed with costs.
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1977 (12) TMI 90
Winding up Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... tion provided is three years from the date when the right to apply accrues. The right to file a claim petition under section 446(2)(b) for a claim enforceable at law on the date of the winding-up order arises on the date when the winding-up order is passed and, therefore, the period of limitation is three years from the date of the winding-up order after giving full benefit of section 458A of the Act. In view of the aforesaid decision, the finding of the learned Additional District Judge on issue No. 4 only is set aside and the claim petition under section 446(2)(b) of the Act is remanded to the learned Additional District Judge for determination of issue No. 4 afresh, in the light of the observations contained above. The order of the learned Additional District Judge is set aside to the extent indicated above and the parties are directed to appear before the learned Additional District Judge on January 16, 1978. Parties are left to bear their own costs of the present appeal.
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1977 (12) TMI 68
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... ... ..... erein. Similar in the Wealth-tax assessment of HUF for the asst. yr. 1975-76 the amount standing to the credit of Shri P.T. Shah HUF in the books of the firm has been included in the net wealth. In the individual assessment of Shri P.T. Shah the interest of Rs. 6,821 has not been included. These fats would clearly show that the Department has treated the amounts standing to the credit of Shri P.T. Shah, HUF in the books of the firm is really belonging to the HUF. On the above facts, it is clear that the interest was paid to Shri P.T. Shah, HUF and not to P.T. Shah in his individual capacity. Hence the Board Circular dt. 11th Aug., 1976 clearly applies to the instance case. The decision relied on by the learned Departmental Representative is one prior to the issuance of the Board rsquo s Circular. Since Board Circular clearly applies to the instant case, the interest of Rs. 6,821 paid to Shri P.T. Shah, HUF cannot be disallowed, under s. 40(b). Accordingly we delete Rs. 6,821.
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