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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 117 Records
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1977 (4) TMI 166
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... ... ..... f section 4(a) of the Act is quite clear and specific. It states that the wholesale cash price will be deemed to be the value for the purpose of assessment of the duty. Wholesale cash price is to be determined in relation to the sale or business transactions of the assessee. It cannot be one wholesale cash price for one party and other for another party for the same period. Ordinarily, the wholesale cash price has to be the same irrespective of the contractual rate. It, as an objective fact, has to be determined by an authority under the Act. In the instant case, it has been found by the authorities that the wholesale cash price for the goods should be the same both for the general trade as also for the bulk purchasers. There is no illegality in this determination. In this view of the matter, I am of the view that it is not possible to interfere with the impugned orders. 8. In the result, this application is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case without costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 165
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... ... ..... 1975, and the hearing had been fixed to 7th May, 1975. The assessee comes from Kantabanji and the interval of four days between the date of communication of the grounds and the date of hearing, in our opinion, was not indeed reasonable. The anxiety on the part of the Commissioner to close the proceeding was possibly to avoid the limitation of three years provided in rule 80 and the limitation was to set in by 26th May, 1975, in the instant case. As a fact, the impugned orders were passed on the last day of limitation. The fact that proceedings had been commenced belatedly is no justifying ground to take away the right of being given a fair hearing to the assessee. 6.. On the analysis presented above, we are of the view that the two impugned orders must be quashed as being without jurisdiction. Both the writ applications accordingly succeed. We, however, make no direction for costs, as the question involved in the matter was contentious. DAS, J.-I agree. Applications allowed.
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1977 (4) TMI 164
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... ... ..... ner had filed the C forms before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner belatedly. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner declined to accept the C forms. Therefore, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the assessing authority for the purpose of finding out whether those C forms could be entertained. As the conclusion of the Tribunal in restoring the matter to the assessing authority for the purpose of considering the entertainability of the C forms is correct, we do not think it necessary to interfere with the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. It was not necessary or proper for the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal to go into the question as to whether the assessee s failure to ask for time was due to negligence or not. This aspect can only be gone into by the assessing authority. As the remand order as such cannot be said to be erroneous, we do not think it necessary to entertain this revision petition. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (4) TMI 163
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... ... ..... estion of law arose out of the order of the Judge (Revisions) dated 9th October, 1972. Sub-section (4) of section 11 of the Act empowers this Court to require the revising authority to refer any question of law which, in the opinion of this Court, arises out of the order of the revising authority and which that authority has refused to state on the ground that no question of law arose. But where an application under sub-section (3) of section 11 of the Act had been dismissed by the revising authority on the ground that the period for making such reference has expired, this Court cannot under section 11 of the Act require the revising authority to refer any question of law to this Court. Hence, the applicant s prayer in this application cannot be granted. In the result, we dismiss this application without prejudice to any other remedy which the applicant may have under law. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Application dismissed.
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1977 (4) TMI 162
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... ... ..... proviso for restricting the scope of the expression rice product only to edibles. If that proviso had stated that it would apply only to edibles, then the contention of the learned Government Pleader would be correct. However, in the absence of any such restriction in the proviso we consider that the proviso cannot be construed as if it related only to edible items. It is common knowledge that even edible items are sometimes used for non-food purposes. Therefore, the way in which the particular product is used is not the criterion but it is the quality of the product that determines its eligibility to come within the proviso. The quality of the present product is such that it falls within rice product . We are satisfied that the Tribunal acted correctly in applying the proviso and fixing the rate at 1 per cent in relation to the product. The tax revision petition is accordingly dismissed. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (4) TMI 161
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... ... ..... in section 7. If no period could be prescribed, then the result would be that the dealer or the assessee would have to exercise the option within a reasonable time. In view of the provisions contained in sub-rule (4-B) itself, it is clear that the rule-making authority also considered the exercise of the option before the assessment as reasonable. We, therefore, consider that it would be reasonable and proper if the exercise of the option was made before the assessment. In the present case, as the assessee had exercised his option even before the assessment, the sales tax authorities were not justified in rejecting the assessee s claim for being brought within the scope of section 7. In our opinion, the Tribunal acted rightly in interfering with the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in so far as he had decided against the assessee on this point. The tax revision case accordingly fails and is dismissed. But, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (4) TMI 160
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... ... ..... ar feature emerging from the omission of sub-rule (4-B) and the decision of the Supreme Court, we consider that, in the present case, the option was rightly exercised by the assessee before the assessment was made. The learned Additional Government Pleader brought to our notice a decision in Deputy Commissioner (C.T.), Coimbatore v. Amirtham Ghee Stores 1978 41 S.T.C. 259 1976 Tax. L.R. 2015. That was a case where the assessee had filed the return under rule 18 as a result of which, it was not possible to exercise the option available under section 7. Therefore, we do not consider that there is anything in the said decision which would apply to the facts of this case. Further the effect of omission of sub-rule (4-B) and the retention of sub-rule (4-A) of rule 15 had not to be considered on the facts of that case. We hold that the order of the Tribunal is correct. The revision petition accordingly fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1977 (4) TMI 159
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... ... ..... gh it is true that it is possible to make an endorsement on the railway receipt without an intention to pass the property in the goods, for which certain decisions were cited before us, we consider that those decisions are not of any assistance in the present case because the contract between the parties is so clear that the goods were ascertained or ascertainable goods and that the property in them got transferred as soon as the endorsement was made. We do not, therefore, think it necessary to go into those decisions. For the reasons discussed above, we are satisfied that the present case falls within section 3(b) read with section 9(1), proviso, and that this State was justified in taxing the said transaction to sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act. In the present case, there is no dispute that the provisions of section 6(2) do not apply. Hence, this tax revision case is allowed and the petitioner will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
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1977 (4) TMI 158
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... ... ..... We are satisfied that the Tribunal is right in holding that the substance is molasses and, consequently, according to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, it is taxable at 25 per cent. The question therefore is answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The tax revision case is dismissed. Since we are informed that this is the first time that this question has come up for consideration, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200. Sri Dasaratharama Reddi seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We have not experienced any difficulty in finding ourselves to be in agreement with the view taken by the Tribunal. It may be that this decision applies to the commodity that is manufactured by several khandasari units. By itself, it is no ground for granting a certificate. We see no substantial question of law and, therefore, we decline to grant a certificate. The request is therefore rejected. Petitions dismissed.
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1977 (4) TMI 157
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... ... ..... disclosed a turnover of more than Rs. 5 lacs. On the basis of these facts the Judge (Revisions) fixed the turnover at Rs. 6 lacs, While fixing the turnover, it appears from his order, he took these facts into consideration. It cannot be said in the circumstances that the fixation of turnover was without any material on the record. It would have been better if the Judge (Revisions) had disclosed the aforesaid materials in the order itself. But, if those materials were on record and had been considered by him, we cannot say that the fixation of the turnover was without any material on record. For the reasons stated above, we answer the reference in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the department. Our answer is as follows On the facts and circumstances of the case, there was material in support of the turnover assessed by the Judge (Revisions). We, however, direct the parties to bear their own costs in this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1977 (4) TMI 156
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... ... ..... d is put together by a process of manufacture. There is nothing to show that by reason of the manufacturing process carried on in a case like this for the purpose of preparing the stiffening material the product is taken out of the category of cotton fabrics as used in item (iia) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. In this view, even though it may not be exempt under the provisions of section 8 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, we consider that it would come within the scope of section 14(iia) of the Central Sales Tax Act and is, therefore, not liable to be taxed under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. As the consequence of the product coming within the scope of section 14(iia) of the Central Sales Tax Act had not been fully considered by the Tribunal, we remand the case to the Tribunal for a fresh consideration of the matter. Subject to the above observation, the tax revision case is allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1977 (4) TMI 155
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... ... ..... under Central Act 26 of 1973. We are, therefore, inclined to agree with the contention of Mr. Mohanty for the petitioner that the steps taken by the Sales Tax Officer to recover the taxes due against the previous mine owners from the petitioner are not warranted by law and since the petitioner has no liability for those dues, no steps for collection of the taxes can be taken against the petitioner. The view we have taken is directly supported by a recent decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Shethia Mining and Manufacturing Corporation Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Central Section(1). 2.. We would accordingly allow both these writ applications, quash the various orders of the tax authorities in the matter of collecting the sales tax dues against the previous mine owners from the petitioner and restrain them from taking any such action in future. In the peculiar facts of these cases, there would be no direction for costs. DAS, J.-I agree. Applications allowed.
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1977 (4) TMI 154
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... ... ..... particular transactions. But from the findings recorded by the authorities it appears that his case was that he could not be treated as a dealer even in those cases where the property in the goods were passed on by him on his own to the purchasers in the absence of the cultivators. The preparation of cash memos without mentioning the name of the purchaser, passing of the title in the goods in the absence of cultivators, the responsibility for shortage and giving advance to purchasers are circumstances which establish that the assessee was a dealer carrying on business on his own account. For the reasons stated above we answer this reference in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the department by saying That, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee was a dealer liable to pay tax in respect of the transactions in dispute. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1977 (4) TMI 153
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... ... ..... 5 35 S.T.C. 50., this court pointed out that to claim the benefit of relief from single point tax on the ground that the sales effected by the assessees are second sales, the assessees need not show that their sellers have in fact paid tax and that it is enough if they show that the earlier sales are taxable sales and that the tax is really payable by the sellers. It is this aspect which requires to be examined by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has only assumed that the goods must have been purchased locally and that they must have been taxed earlier. This is an erroneous approach. It is necessary for the Tribunal to find as to whether the goods were purchased locally and whether the sales effected by the assessee were second sales. On this aspect, the Tribunal not having given a finding, we send the matter back to the Tribunal for consideration of the question afresh. The tax revision case is allowed accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed accordingly.
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1977 (4) TMI 152
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... ... ..... had been completed and become final, the authorities should take powers under the particular provisions of the Act in order to disturb the finality of the said assessment. We are not satisfied that this contention has any merit. There is no dispute that the assessing authority had power to revise the assessment under section 16 of the Act. The mere omission to refer to section 16 of the Act in the communication sent to the assessee does not, in any manner, show that the assessing authority did not act under that particular provision. Taking the letter to the assessee into account, it would be clear that the assessing authority wanted to act only under that provision. In these circumstances, we see no merit in this contention. Tax Revision Case No. 294 of 1974 is partly allowed and 295 of 1974 is allowed. The petitioner will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. One set (in T. C. No. 295 of 1974). T. C. No. 294 of 1974 partly allowed. T. C. No. 295 of 1974 allowed.
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1977 (4) TMI 151
Whether at the time when the appellant was consuming the high speed diesel oil and petrol for its own purposes, was it doing so as owner of these articles or merely as an agent of the Caltex Company?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Carefully perusuing the order of the Commissioner and find that the Commissioner has taken an erroneous view of the law and has drawn legally wrong inferences from the various stipulations contained in the agreement. The Commissioner has also not given effect to well-established legal principles in interpreting the agreement.
Thus unable to maintain the order of the Commissioner which suffers from manifest errors of law apparent on the face of the record. We, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the order of the Commissioner dated May 5, 1970, and hold that the use of the Hispeedol and petrol by the appellant for its own purposes is not exigible to sales tax and the proceedings for imposing sales tax on the appellant are hereby quashed. The appellant will be entitled to its costs throughout.
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1977 (4) TMI 150
Whether the contract of the company with the Union of India for the supply of wagons is in the nature of contract for sale of goods or a works contract?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. This Court held (by majority) that the contract as a whole was a contract for sale of goods and, therefore, the appellants were liable to sales tax on the amounts received from the State of Orissa for the construction of the bus bodies. In reaching at this conclusion the Court paid due regard to the fact that under that contract the property in the bus body did not pass to the Government till the chassis with the bus body was delivered at the destination to be named by the Controller. Till the delivery was made the bus body remained the property of the builder. This clinching circumstance prominently figures in Standard Condition 15 in the instant case also.
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1977 (4) TMI 135
Shares warrants and entries in register of member ... ... ... ... ..... in O.S. No. 658 of 1970 for a sum of Rs. 37,747.21 as against defendants 1 to 17 in that suit. In view of our finding in A.S. No. 141 of 1973, it follows that defendants 1 and 2 are only obliged to receive the amount from the plaintiffs and they cannot seek enforcement of the pledge once over as against the heirs of Raja, namely, defendants 1 to 17 in O.S. No. 658 of 1970. As the suits were heard together it appears to us that the relief granted in favour of the plaintiffs in O.S. No. 7000 of 1969 (A.S No. 141 of 1973) would be sufficient for the disposal of these two appeals. But in any event if the plaintiffs fail to redeem the pledge as directed in A.S. No. 141 of 1973, then defendants 1 and 2 would be entitled to a decree together with proportionate costs as against defendants 1 to 17 in O.S. No. 658 of 1970. O.S. No. 658 of 1970 is dismissed as against the defendants 18 to 20 in that suit but without costs. Each party to bear their respective costs in these two appeals.
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1977 (4) TMI 126
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order, Exclusion of certain time in computing periods of limitation, Liability for fraudulent conduct of business , Power of court to assess damages against delinquent, directors, etc.
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1977 (4) TMI 125
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent, directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... t be continued against the legal representatives of the delinquent director and that the legal representatives could not be substituted in the place of the deceased director. They purported to rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Official Liquidator, Supreme Bank Ltd. v. P.A. Tendolkar 1973 43 Comp. Cas.382. We are unable to understand how the decision of the Supreme Court could be relied upon by the learned judges in arriving at their conclusion. The sentences underlined by us in the passage already extracted by us from the decision of the Supreme Court are clearly against the conclusion of the Calcutta High Court. We are of the view that proceedings initiated against the director of a company under sections 542 and 543 of the Companies Act, 1956, may be continued after his death against his legal representatives to the extent indicated by us earlier in this judgment. The case will now go back to the learned company judge. Bhopinder Singh Dhillon, J. mdash I agree.
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