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Showing 81 to 100 of 117 Records
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1977 (4) TMI 37
Whether the felts manufactured by the respondents are "woollen fabrics" within the meaning of Entry 21 in the First Schedule to the Act?
Held that:- No one could possibly be in any doubt in respect of these items if the term was so pervasive, and there was no reason for singling out these specific objects. On the contrary, the mention of these items suggests that the word `Fabrics' in Entry 21 has been used to mean woven material in which sense it is popularly understood, and blankets, rugs and shawls etc., have been specifically included in the entry out of abundant caution of indicate that "woollen fabrics" in Entry 21 means not only woollen garments but also woollen material used as covering or for similar other purposes. We therefore find no reason to take a view different from that taken by the High Court holding that the respondent's products were not "woollen fabrics" - appeal dismissed.
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1977 (4) TMI 36
In The Nature, Purchase And Sale, Revenue Loss, Trade Loss ... ... ... ... ..... of the amount which was actually spent by him. The Punjab High Court held that such excess was income in the hands of the assessee and assessable to income-tax. But in the present case the assessee never claimed deduction of loss on the basis of the sale of shares being an adventure in the nature of trade. The transaction in shares was not in the line of the business of the assessee. Hence, the above decision has no application to the present case. For the reasons stated above, we answer both the questions referred to us against the assessee and in favour of the department. Our answers are as follows 1. The assessee was not entitled to depreciation on the 1/6th share in S. B. Sugar Mills, Bijnor. 2. The Tribunal was justified in holding that the loss of Rs. 3,90,750 arising on sales of shares of M/s. Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. was loss of capital nature. The department shall be entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs 200. Counsel s fee is also assessed at the same figure.
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1977 (4) TMI 35
Immovable Property, Movable Property ... ... ... ... ..... aforesaid observations cannot, in our opinion, be understood as laying down the proposition that a partner cannot bring his immovable property as his contribution to the stock or capital of the firm except by means of a registered instrument of transfer. As a result of the foregoing discussion, our answers to the questions referred to us are in favour of the assessee and as follows (1) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the business assets consisting of the Grand Hotel could be transferred to the partnership only by a registered deed, and that in the absence of such deed the building remained the individual property of Shri K. D. Pandey. (2) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the entire value of the building was assessable in the hands of the assessee, individual. The assessee will get his costs from the revenue. Advocate s fee is assessed at Rs. 200.
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1977 (4) TMI 34
Provisional Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... rt the view we have taken, namely, that a house may consist of more than one self-contained dwelling unit and that if there is unity of structure, the mere fact that such self-contained dwelling units are occupied by different persons, will not make that house into several houses. In the light of the foregoing discussion our answer to the question referred to us is partly in favour of the assessee and partly against it and is as follows The house properties bearing Municipal Nos. 92 and 92-A, Darbhanga Castle (but not house No. 17/33, Mahatma Gandhi Marg) occupied as residences by different members of the Hindu undivided family together constituted one house belonging to the assessee-family and as such were exempt from wealth-tax under section 5(1)(iv) of the Act, but the house bearing Municipal No. 17/33, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Allahabad, was not so exempt. As the assessee has partly succeeded and partly failed, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in this reference.
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1977 (4) TMI 33
Assessment Order, Assessment Proceedings, Reassessment Proceedings, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... e belief and is, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the officer. That distinction between a change of opinion unsupported by subsequent inforination and a change of opinion based on information subsequently obtained is manifest in this case. That apart, Smt. Arundhati Balkrishna had preferred an appeal against the original assessment order under which the entire wealth-tax assessed was to be collected from her. Therefore, it is not a case of reopening based on mere change of opinion. If it is a case of mere change of opinion on the same set of material or facts, the Wealth-tax Officer would have had no jurisdiction to act under section 17(1)(b) of the Act. Though the learned judges in Kalyanji Mavji s case 1976 102 ITR 287 (SC) had not expressed any final opinion on what was observed by Chandrachud J., referred to above, they were inclined to agree with the view expressed by him. We, therefore, answer the question in the negative and in favour of the department with costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 32
Tax Credit Certificates ... ... ... ... ..... hed by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. In Sidhramappa Ansdannappa Manvi v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1952 21 ITR 333 (Bom), a decision on a debatable point of law is not a mistake apparent from the record. These decisions are quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in T. S. Balaram, Income-tax Officer v. Volkart Brothers 1971 82 ITR 50 (SC). If a statutory provision is capable of two interpretations, taking one such interpretation cannot give rise to an error apparent on the record even if one is of the view that the other interpretation was more correct in the context. On the above conclusions, I hold that exhibit P-8 (in both cases) is illegal and ultra vires. I quash the same. In the circumstances, the order in appeal (in both the O. Ps.) could have no legal effect of confirming exhibit P-8. The original petitions are disposed of as above. No costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 31
Capital Expenditure, Collaboration Agreement, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... e held that even if the agreement in question amounted to an outright purchase of the business, the payment was not related to any specified sum which was agreed upon by the parties as purchase price of the business and, therefore, the amount paid can be treated as a revenue expenditure. We are of the opinion that the said decision has no scope for application here. We are not concerned with the acquisition of a business. We are concerned with the terms of the agreement by which the assessee has the benefit of technical know-how, which benefit it could use for eternity, as it were. Under these circumstances, we consider that the amounts disallowed by the Income-tax Officer were rightly disallowed as capital in nature and that the Appellate Tribunal was wrong in confirming the allowance as made by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. We answer the question in the negative and against the assessee. The Commissioner will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500, one set.
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1977 (4) TMI 30
... ...
... ... ..... efore, the Wealth-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were right in holding that what has been done is merely to make a provision and the making of such a provision would not constitute a debt within the scope of section 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The Tribunal as a matter of fact nowhere in its order considered this question apart from stating in paragraph 3 that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to whom the assessee next moved in appeal has agreed with the Wealth-tax Officer s view that the amount in question would not be a debt owed on the valuation date . It has not gone into the question as to whether the provision in question can be treated to be a debt at all owed by the assessee to the daughters so that it may qualify for deduction under the provisions of section 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. Under the circumstances, we answer the question referred to this court in the negative and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 29
Advance Tax, Assessed Tax, Interest Payable By Government, Regular Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... y interest on the excess amount of advance tax deposited would arise only up to the date of the first or original assessment and not the date of a fresh assessment or modification of the assessment to give effect to the decision of the appellate or revisional authority. We are unable to accept the submission of Shri Upadhya that we should follow the ruling of the Calcutta High Court in Chloride India s case 1977 106 ITR 38 (Cal) in preference to the ruling of the Bombay High Court in Sarangpur Cotton Manufacturing Co. s case 1957 31 ITR 698 (Bom) and the rating of this court in Sir Shadilal Sugar Mills case 1972 85 ITR 363 (All). We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Bombay High Court and this court. Hence, the petitioner s claim for interest on the excess amount of advance tax deposited must fail in the circumstances of this case. In the result we dismiss this petition. But, in the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 28
Deduction From Total Income, Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... uld be available for the year 1963-64 also. The Tribunal held that as the assessee had started manufacture and production of articles prior to April 1, 1958, relevant for the assessment year 1958-59, the benefit under section 84 would only enure up to the assessment year 1962-63 and would not be available for the assessment year 1963-64. This court held that the manufacture and production of lathes and bench grinders could alone be taken into consideration for the purpose of applying section 84(7) and that the undertaking had not begun the manufacture and production of articles on any commercial scale before 31st May, 1958, and hence the first year of production being 1959-60, the assessee could claim the benefit of section 84 for 1963-64 also. This judgment also supports the conclusion which we have arrived at. For the reasons mentioned above, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the revenue. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1977 (4) TMI 27
Assessment Year, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... e of material facts, before the Income-tax Officer himself in the assessment proceedings and, if unsuccessful there, before the Appellate Officer or the Appellate Tribunal or in the High Court under section 66(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The existence of such alternative remedy is not however always a sufficient reason for refusing a party quick relief by a writ or order prohibiting an authority acting without jurisdiction from continuing such action. While the High Court previously had the freedom to issue a high prerogative writ notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy, it is now precluded from doing so because article 226(3) provides, no petition for the redress of any injury referred to in sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) of clause (1) shall be entertained if any other remedy for such redress is provided for by or under any other law for the time being in force . C. W. P. No. 2810 of 1975 is, therefore, dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 26
Income Escaped Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... e, in my view, is a fatal infirmity of the impugned notices. Consequently, it must be held that the impugned notices having been issued without the condition precedent having been complied with they are without jurisdiction and void. This point of Dr. Pal, therefore, succeeds. As I am disposing of this rule on this single point, I make it clear that I am not deciding any other question involved in this application. In the result, this application succeeds and the rule is made absolute. There will be a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent to forthwith recall, cancel and withdraw the impugned notices for the assessment years 1953-54, 1954-55, 1955-56 and 1956-57, all dated the 10th May, 1966, the notice for the assessment year 1957-58, dated the 18th February, 1966, and for the assessment years 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960-61, all dated the 20th January, 1967, and to forbear from giving effect thereto in any manner whatsoever. There will be no order as to costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 25
Female Member, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... apply only in the course of assessment so as to see whether the family continues to own the same properties which it owned in the earlier years. Section 171(2) cannot be held as giving any right to any member of the joint family which he or she did not have under the personal law governing the parties. We have indicated that the wife or the minor daughters of a Hindu coparcener would not be entitled to a share on a partition of the properties of the joint family and they would have only a right to maintenance, for which proper provision would be made in the course of any partition that takes place. Where there is no scope for partition, there is no possibility of making a provision therein. We are, therefore, of the view that the answer to the questions raised in the present case are so patent that there is no need to direct the Tribunal to state a case and refer the aforesaid questions for decision of this court. The petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1977 (4) TMI 24
Question Of Fact, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... hich was declined by the Tribunal, vide order dated June 20, 1972. This led to the filing of the present petition. A perusal of the said order shows that the Tribunal, after properly instructing itself respecting the presumption under section 271(1)(c) of the Act and taking into consideration all the materials available on the record, held that the assessee had failed to rebut the presumption and to show that the failure to return the correct income did not arise from any fraud or any gross or wilful neglect on his part. As held in Basant Lal Om Parkash v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1972 83 ITR 356 (Punj), a case for the imposition of penalty has to be decided on the material on record and it is essentially a question of fact whether in a certain case a penalty is called for or not. We are, therefore, of the opinion that from the order of the Tribunal, no question of law arises. The petition is accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs. SANDHAWALIA J.--I agree.
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1977 (4) TMI 23
Educational Institutions ... ... ... ... ..... order dated March 28, 1977 (annexure I to Civil Misc. Application No. 3486 of 1977) is also vitiated by the same error and is also clearly unsustainable. In the result, we allow this petition partly and quash the order of the Income-tax Officer dated October 16, 1976 (annexure VII to the writ petition) and the assessment order made by the Income-tax Officer on March 28, 1977 for the assessment year 1974-75 (annexure I to Civil Misc. Application No. 3486 of 1977). We further direct the Income-tax Officer to consider afresh the question whether the petitioner comes within the ambit of section 10(22) of the Act and to decide afresh the petitioner s application for refund of income-tax. If the Income-tax Officer holds that the petitioner does not come within the ambit of section 10(22) of the Act, it will be open to him to make a fresh order of assessment against the petitioner for the year 1974-75. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 22
HUF Partner In Firm, In Part, Net Wealth ... ... ... ... ..... not in the narrower sense of an individual. The next question which has been raised is as regards the methodology of valuation of an interest of the assessee who represents the H.U.F. in a partnership firm. It was argued that sub-section (2) of section 4 authorises the framing of a rule only in the context of section 4(1)(b) and that if the interpretation canvassed on behalf of the assessee was upheld and the assessee, did not include a person who was liable to payment of wealth-tax in his capacity as a karta of H.U.F., the revenue could not take recourse to the rules framed under subsection (2) of section 4. In the view that we are taking, this controvesy will not survive for we are taking the view that section 4(1)(b) would be attracted even to such cases. We, therefore, answer questions Nos. (2), (3) and (4) in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue in both the matters and we direct that the assessee in each matter will pay the costs of the reference to the revenue.
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1977 (4) TMI 21
Priority Industry, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... struction, manufacture or production of any one or more of the articles or things specified in the list in the Fifth Schedule, there shall be allowed a deduction from such profits and gains of an amount equal to eight per cent. thereof, in computing the total income of the company. (Underlining ours). The section uses the expression such profits and gains which shows that the profits and gains of the particular industry specified in the Fifth Schedule are to be taken into account for the purpose of arriving at the percentage of deduction spoken of in section 80E. This aspect of the construction of this provision is covered by two decisions of this court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. L. M. Van Moppes Diamond Tools (India) Ltd. 1977 107 ITR 386 (Mad) and in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Lucas-TVS Ltd. (No. 2) 1977 110 ITR 346 (Mad) to which one of us was a party. Following the said decisions, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No costs.
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1977 (4) TMI 20
Income From House Property, Urban Land Tax ... ... ... ... ..... he Bombay Finance Act, 1932, as amended subsequently, was not land revenue so as to be eligible for deduction under section 9(1)(v)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which corresponded to section 24(1)(vii) of the Act. Though some doubt has been cast on this decision by the Supreme Court in New Piece Goods Bazar Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1950 18 ITR 516 (SC), this part of the decision is not in any way affected by the later pronouncement of the Supreme Court. In fact, the Supreme Court itself, at page 523 of the above decision, has observed that municipal taxes do not stand on the same footing as land revenue, thereby showing that land revenue cannot be the same as urban land tax under consideration. We are, therefore, satisfied that the Tribunal was wrong in upholding the assessee s claim under section 24(1)(vii) of the Act. The question is answered in the negative and against the assessee. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee, Rs. 500.
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1977 (4) TMI 19
... ...
... ... ..... ntified in accordance with its ascertainable data. The liability to pay tax on undisclosed income is also a present liability. It may become payable when it is discovered and brought to tax or it may become payable when it is disclosed under section 68 of the Finance Act, 1965, or otherwise disclosed. The liability is always there and is quantified either in the regular course under the Income-tax Act or under the said scheme as laid down by section 68 of the Finance Act. All the ingredients of a debt are present in such a case. For the reasons as stated above we respectfully follow the Delhi High Court and hold that the tax paid by the assessee pursuant to a voluntary disclosure under section 68 of the Finance Act, 1965, after the valuation date is deductible in computing the net wealth of the assessee under section 2(m) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. The question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. DEB J.--I agree.
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1977 (4) TMI 18
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ness expenditure and an allowable deduction. In the view we take, it is unnecessary to refer to a large number of decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the assessee and the learned standing counsel. In the light of the foregoing discussion, our answers to the questions referred to us are as follows 1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the payment to the minor, Virendra Bahadur, under the agreement dated August 24, 1963, is not a legitimate business expenditure and an allowable deduction except to the extent of reasonable interest on the amount invested by him in the assessee s business. 2. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there was material before the Tribunal to conclude that the payment by the assessee of a share of his profit to the minor, was not a diversion of income by an overriding or paramount title, but an application of the assessee s income. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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