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1977 (6) TMI 44
... ... ... ... ..... s. (5) of s. 185, an ITO can refuse registration to a firm only where an application for initial registration has been made s. 184 makes distinction between initial registration and mere continuation of registration for subsequent years. It seems that the provisions of sub-s. (5) are not attracted where a declaration for continuation of registration under s. 184(7) has been furnished. 10. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the ITO wrongly refused continuation of registration to the assessee firm under s. 185(5). It is not the case of the Department. that registration was cancelled under s. 186(2). In fact, no notice as contemplated under s. 186(2). In fact, no notice as contemplated under s. 186(2) was ever served upon the assessee. In these circumstances, we are unable to endorse the order of the AAC. 11. In view of the above discussion, we direct the Department to allow continuation of registration to the assessee for this year. 12. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1977 (6) TMI 43
... ... ... ... ..... s entitled to succeed on this point. To give an answer to question (a) posed by us above in the earlier part of our order, we have to discuss questions at (b), (c) and (d). After such a discussion our answer is that the ITO was not justified in taking action under s. 147(a). The assessee is therefore entitled to succeed on all the points. We direct accordingly. 19. When the assessment made on the assessee itself is not according to law and even on merits the additions were un-sustainable, having been based on factious grounds, the assessee cannot be inculpated of having committed offence of concealment of income within the meaning of s. 271(1)(c) of the IT Act, 1961. The levy of penalty of Rs. 10,000 on the assessee for the offence of concealment of income is therefore, unjustified. We accordingly delete it. 20. In the result both the appeals are allowed. 21. Except the grounds dealt with above, all the other grounds taken in the memo of appeals were not pressed as withdrawn.
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1977 (6) TMI 42
... ... ... ... ..... matter is taken out of the purview of s.154. as a general proposition this is unassailable. But it does not take into account the factual context of this case. The situation here is not so simple as made out by-Shri Manjani. The basic fact is the assessee carries on business at Hapur. This falls within the jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court. The decision off the Allahabad High Court cited supra was delivered on16th Sept., 1976. It was not stated before us that the Allahabad High Court has taken a different view in the matter in some other case or has taken any other step, such as constitution of a larger Bench to review this decision. The result, therefore is, so far as the area falling within the jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court is concerned, the issue is settled and there cannot be, conceivably, two opinions in the matter. 5. In the result, the ITO is directed to charge tax at 55 per cent by rectifying his original orders under s.154. the appeals are allowed.
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1977 (6) TMI 41
... ... ... ... ..... re than once in a year, it can be legally presumed that every man cannot be acquainted with the provision of amended law immediately after its amendment. The amendment which provides for payment of admitted tax before filing the appeal was introduced in the Act with effect from 1st Oct., 1975 and the assessee, in this case, filled the appeal on 6th Feb., 1976. Therefore, it could note considered that the assessee was not in a position to be acquainted with the technicality of changed law within four or five months of the amended provision coming into force. Having regard to totality of the circumstance we are of the view that there was reasonable cause in this case for delayed payment of admitted tax and the AAC should have exempted the assessee from operation of the provisions of the amended law in consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case. We, therefore, direct the AAC to entertain the assessee s appeal and decide the same on merit. 7. The appeal is allowed.
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1977 (6) TMI 40
... ... ... ... ..... and plant. It would be reasonable to assume that the word ship in s. 33 has the same meaning as in s. 32. The meaning attributable to that word in s. 32 being made clear by the Rules, we have to come to the conclusion that these three boats are ships. 6. In order to see the adequacy of the reserve created, we should not consider the three boats together. Each boat is a ship. We have to consider whether each of then taken separately would be entitled to the rebate. We find that one boat is valued at Rs.70,000 approximately. The development rebate allowable in respect of this boat would be Rs.28,000. The reserve required would be Rs. 21,000. Since there is in existence a reserve of Rs.22,0000 it is adequate for the purpose of allowance of the rebate in respect of the ship costing Rs.70,000 approximately. 7. We will, therefore, direct the ITO to allow a depreciation of only 10 per cent and development rebate in respect of one ship. 8. The departmental appeal is partly allowed.
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1977 (6) TMI 39
... ... ... ... ..... document becomes a question of law. If a party wants us to read into the document, a clause, sentence or word which is not there and if we do not accede to his request, our failure to accede to his request cannot give rise to a question of law. These are only simply readings of the instrument. If we agree with the Department that this is a question of law, even rejection of arguments of a party based on imaginary facts will give rise to a question of law. So we refuse to refer a question about our finding that there is no void in the loss sharing ratio. No question of law arises out of that finding of ours. 6. Therefore, the application for assessment year 1973-74 is rejected. 7. R.A. Nos. 2 and 3 (Asst. years 1974-75 and 75-76) The questions required to be referred are only consequential to the questions required to be referred for asst. Year 1973-74. So it follows that these two applications have also to be rejected. 8. In the and, all the three applications are rejected.
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1977 (6) TMI 38
... ... ... ... ..... sset can be deducted as a debt but their lordship attention was not invited to the fact that it would create a very strange and anomalous situation if a loan converted into a taxable asset would go into the computation of the taxable wealth but the loan as such cannot be given deduction because it happens to be raised against an asset which is exempted, The purpose behind s.2 (m) (ii) is clear to avoid double benefit to a taxpayer and in the type o case before us such double benefit cannot be available. A taxpayer, however, would certainly not be entitled to the deduction of loan if it has not given rise to or cannot be related to a taxable asset. Holding that on the facts of the case, the A.A.C. misconstrued the provisions of s. 2(m) (ii) of the Act, we allow this assessee s appeal with the direction that the loan of Rs. 11,950, with which the assessee had acquired taxable wealth is an allowable deduction in the computation of taxable wealth in this case. 6. Appeal allowed.
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1977 (6) TMI 37
... ... ... ... ..... o know of the impugned assessments for the first time on 17th Sept., 1969. The limitation in respect of the appeals, therefore, started to run from 17th Sept., 1969. Certified copies of the impugned assessment orders were applied for on 10th Oct, 1969 and the same were ready for deliver on 28th Oct, 1969, 28th Oct, 1969 and 4th Nov., 1969 respectively. Computing the limitation from 17th Sept., 1969 and excluding the time spent in obtaining copies, the appeals were therefore, filed within the prescribed period of limitation of 60 days. The dismissal of the appeals on the ground of limitation cannot, therefore, be sustained. 7. I, accordingly, allow the revision and set aside the impugned orders of dismissal as passed by the appellate authority, and send back the appeals on remand for hearing on merits, according to law after giving due notice to the assessee at its present address. No order as to costs. 8. This judgement will govern Revision Case Nos. 50, 51 and 52 of 1971-72.
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1977 (6) TMI 36
... ... ... ... ..... puted or denied, an appeal to the AAC would lie, for such contention, if it succeeds must result in reduction of penal interest but an assessee has no right of appeal merely against the quantum of penal interest charged. In other words an assessee will have no right of appeal if the contention is that penal interest charged is excessive or should be reduced or should be waived. The view which we are taking on the proper construction of the phrase assessee denying liability to be assessed under this Act occurring in s. 30(1) of the At receive full support from the aforesaid ratio in Jagdish Prasad Ramnath s case. 5. In view of the above observations the issue was appealable on the facts of the case and, therefore, the AAC was wrong in not admitting this point as appealable. I would, therefore, restore the appeal to the file of the AAC on this issue for both the years and direct him to deal with the issue on merits. 6. In the result, both the appeals may be treated as allowed.
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1977 (6) TMI 35
... ... ... ... ..... xt books, encyclopaedia etc. All to indicate that the manufactured items were second, third or subsequent stage products derived from petroleum or natural gas and the same for the said reasons follow within the category of petro-chemicals. In fact, it was accepting such evidence that the Income-tax Officer, in the original assessments, upheld the assessee s contention. Apart from the Board s circular, and the Commissioner s letter, which in no way referred to these items, there is nothing else produced before us to justify any different conclusion. Thus, if for any reason we are to record our findings on merits too, we would unhesitatingly follow the decision of the Bombay Bench of the Tribunal and adopt the reasons given therein and hold that the items manufactured by the assessee in the from of resins are petro-chemicals well falling within item 18 of the 5th and 6th Schedule to the Income-tax Act. 9. In the result, all these appeals deserve to be and are hereby dismissed.
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1977 (6) TMI 34
... ... ... ... ..... herefore, the Income-tax Officer s reasoning that the said Sanna Thippaiah s earnings were sufficient because he could marry the other daughters without loan, and therefore, he should not have taken loan on earlier occasion cannot be a logical inference to disbelieve the version of Sanna Thippaiah. Further the disposal of the sum of Rs. 8,000 by the mother had been explained and it has not gone to the assessee but has gone ultimately to the assessee s brother who was going abroad on foreign tour. At last the only snag in this case is that the assessee could not explain how the funds had been kept by the mother all along. But taking an overall view of the materials placed before me and on an appreciation of the evidence of the statement of the mother as well as the statement of Sanna Thippaiah I find the assessee had on his part discharged the onus of proving the credit by these materials. Hence I hold that the addition of Rs. 8,000 is not warranted. 5. The appeal is allowed.
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1977 (6) TMI 33
... ... ... ... ..... sion of capital between Hayagriv and his minor son Vinod so that the capital of the smaller HUF of Hayagriv is only Rs. 25,000 as against Rs. 50,001 in the case of the family of Narayan. We, therefore, hold that it is not correct to include the salary income of the two partners in the income of the respective Joint Hindu Families. The learned departmental representative pointed out that s. 40 had not been considered by the ITO because he had held that the salaries paid to the two partners were the income of the Joint Hindu families. The point, however, is completely besides the issue before us since we are not dealing with the case of the firm. We are concerned with whether the salary or remuneration received by Hayagriv is his individual income or the income of the HUF. For the reasons before mentioned we have no doubt that it is his individual income and cannot be included in the income of the HUF. It is accordingly directed to be deleted. 15. Both the appeals are allowed.
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1977 (6) TMI 32
Valuation - Cost of mirror frame with cupboards ... ... ... ... ..... e. 3. Considering the manner of sale of cupboards with or without the mirror frames, Government of India observe that the cost of a mirror frame when it is ordered for and sold separately should not be included in the assessable value of a cupboard. 4. The Revision Applications are decided accordingly.
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1977 (6) TMI 31
Cross linking agents ... ... ... ... ..... th formaldehyde and are meant for use of textile mills for processing of textile fabrics. At the time of application on textiles these as low molecular weight precondensates and react with cellulose molecules in the fabrics and have not acquired the state of resin. In the circumstances, they will fall outside the ambit of Entry 15A of the Central Excise Tariff. The result is that the Revision Application is allowed.
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1977 (6) TMI 30
Phenolic moulding powder - Alternate remedy - Natural justice - Disregard of the opinion of the Chemical Examiner - Effect
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1977 (6) TMI 29
Special Stock taking - Tobacco - Deficiency due to natural causes - Extent of losses admissible
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1977 (6) TMI 28
Carry Forward And Set Off, Plant And Machinery, Unabsorbed Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... that sub-section. In our view, the sub-section considered by the Supreme Court is not in pari materia with the provisions under consideration in the instant case and, therefore, that decision is of little help for the present purpose. We are of the view that since the business of the assessee should be deemed to have been in existence in the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1970-71, the unabsorbed depreciation of the past years is available as the depreciation allowance in the relevant accounting year in which the company closed its business, and such allowance can be set off against the sum computed in terms of section 41(2) for the assessment year 1970-71. In the circumstances, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department. A copy of this judgment, under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar, shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1977 (6) TMI 27
Capital Of Company, Computation Of Capital, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... to continue subsequently also, because the reliefs that are given under Chapter VIA are with reference to certain specified kinds of industries or profits, for instance the priority industries or profits of new industrial undertakings, etc., which are in need of encouragement. It is possible that Parliament considered that with reference to such companies they may enjoy the benefit of the computation of capital as under rules 1, 2 and 3 of the Second Schedule to the Act without any adjustment contemplated by rule 4. We find that the view we are taking has also been taken by the Karnataka High Court in Second Income-tax Officer v. Stumpp, Schuele and Somappa Private Ltd. 1977 106 ITR 399 (Kar). We may, however, state that we do not accept, with respect, the entire reasoning of the Karnataka High Court in coming to the conclusion drawn in that case. For these reasons we answer the question against the revenue. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1977 (6) TMI 26
Legal Representative ... ... ... ... ..... assessee is not entitled to claim any deduction in respect of the expenditure of Rs. 58,643 incurred by the assessee in paying off the encumbrance created by the previous owner. In the light of the foregoing discussion, our answer to question No. 1, is that the Tribunal was right in holding that the sum of Rs. 58,643 spent by the assessee did not represent the cost of acquisition of the capital asset within the meaning of section 48 read with section 55(2) of the Act. We also hold on questions Nos. 2 and 3 that the Tribunal was right in holding that the sum of Rs. 58,643 spent by the assessee did not represent the cost of improvement within the meaning of section 48 read with section 55(1)(b) of the Act and that the assessee was not entitled to get a deduction of anything more than what was already allowed by the Income-tax Officer. All the questions are thus answered against the assessee and in favour of the department. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs.
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1977 (6) TMI 25
Assessment Year, Income Tax, Law Applicable, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... ommissioner felt that no reliance could be placed on the entries in the adangal. I, therefore, feel that the question whether the petitioner s holding during the assessment year 1967-68 was above 50 standard acres or not will have to be decided afresh by the Commissioner after giving due opportunity to the petitioner to establish her case that her holding was less than 50 standard acres during that assessment year. The result is that the Commissioner s order so far as it relates to the assessment year 1967-68 and the consequent order of assessment passed by the Agricultural Income-tax Officer for that year will stand vacated. The Commissioner is directed to dispose of the suo motu proceedings in relation to the assessment year 1967-68 afresh after giving an opportunity to the petitioner to substantiate her stand that her holding is less than 50 standard acres. With these directions, the Writ Petitions Nos 1896 and 1898 of 1973 are allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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