|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 110 Records
-
1978 (10) TMI 138
... ...
... ... ..... orrect amount of tax on the facts disclosed by the assessee after negativing the untenable legal plea. In Agricultural Implements Dealers Syndicate, Morena v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1971 27 S.T.C. 227 1970 M.P.L.J. 976. , a Division Bench of this Court held that merely putting forward a legal plea in the return does not amount to making a false return. We fully agree with this view. As earlier stated, to make section 43(1) applicable, falsity should be in the disclosure of facts required to be stated in the return and not in taking a legal plea. 5.. For the reasons given above, we answer the questions referred to us as follows Question No. (1) The Tribunal wag not justified in holding that the assessee had deliberately furnished a false return within the meaning of section 43(1) of the M.P. Act. Question No. (2) The Tribunal was not justified in its conclusion that the assessee was liable to any penalty. There shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1978 (10) TMI 137
... ...
... ... ..... ) used the expression assess and not proceed to assess . It was contended by the assessee in Sales Tax Officer v. Sudarsanam Iyengar and Sons 1970 25 S.T.C. 252 (S.C.). that the expression proceed to assess was not the same as assess and, therefore, unlike in the cases cited for the department, the assessment under rule 33(1) had to be completed within the period of limitation. This contention was totally rejected by the Supreme Court. The court said that the expression assessment was comprehensive enough to denote the entirety of the proceedings taken in respect of it. The ambit of that expression could not be limited to a final order of assessment. (para 5) 8.. We are of the opinion that, in the light of the decisions to which we have referred, the view taken by the learned Judge cannot be sustained. We allow this writ appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned Judge and direct that O.P. No. 4526 of 1975 will stand dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
-
1978 (10) TMI 136
... ...
... ... ..... assessees, there shall be deemed to be a sale by the assessees to the agent and there would be no privity of contract between the assessees and the foreign buyer and it would amount to a case of sale for export to a local agent. The Tribunal will have, therefore, to analyse each transaction and come to a conclusion whether the export sale was by the assessees or by the agent in his own right. The Tribunal did not also have the benefit of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mod. Serajuddin v. State of Orissa 1975 36 S.T.C. 136 (S.C.)., which came much later than its order. The Tribunal will now dispose of the cases on merits and in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mod. Serajuddin v. State of Orissa 1975 36 S.T.C. 136 (S.C.). The tax revision cases are accordingly allowed and the order of the Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal for fresh disposal in the light of the observations made above. But there will be no order as to costs.
-
1978 (10) TMI 135
... ...
... ... ..... ught to be contended by the learned Additional Government Pleader. We are therefore of the view that, in the peculiar circumstances, the Appellate Tribunal can have and, in our view, has, the requisite power to find out whether any register, record, account book or document produced before it is genuine so as to find out whether the assessee is entitled to certain concession or benefit under the Act. It is pertinent to observe at this stage that the assessee had already produced the relevant bills under which Manohara Wines had purchased the disputed stock from Ajantha Wines, and the learned Additional State Representative, after verification of such records, was satisfied that in respect of the disputed stock sales tax had already been collected. This factor cannot lightly be ignored and the assessee directed to suffer tax when he is legitimately not liable to submit to the levy. In this view, we accept the order of the Tribunal and dismiss the tax case. Petition dismissed.
-
1978 (10) TMI 134
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ies or the political party and nothing more. It can neither be described to be business necessity nor a commercial expediency . The answer so given by the Division Bench is very widely worded. If the taxpayer is able to establish a nexus between the donation and the business, the donation would be held to be for the purposes of the business and allowable under s. 37(1). It is, in our opinion, incorrect to say that in every case a donation to an official fund or a political organization would not be an allowable expenditure under s. 37(1). Having given our anxious consideration we are of opinion that the Division Bench deciding Akodiya s case 1975 101 ITR did not correctly appreciate the findings of the Tribunal and did not apply correct principles in reaching its conclusion. With great respect, we differ from the view taken in that case. For the reasons given above, we answer the question referred to us by the Tribunal in the affirmative. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
1978 (10) TMI 133
Whether interest on moneys borrowed for investment in shares is allowable expenditure under s. 57(iii) when the shares have not yielded any return in the shape of dividend - We accordingly answer the question referred to us in favour of the assessee and against the revenue
-
1978 (10) TMI 132
Whether the amendment of item 30 in Schedule B to the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Act, invalid?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. No "deeming" provision could be brought to our notice, as there is none, to show that the notification issued by the erstwhile State Government of Punjab could be deemed to be one issued by the new Government of the Union Territory. For many other purposes there are "deeming" provisions in Central Act 31 of 1966, e.g., sections 59(1), 74(1) and 92. But no provision is to be found to show that by a legal fiction the first notification of intention issued by the erstwhile State Government could be deemed to be a notification issued by the new Government. The argument thus presented by Mr. Anand must be rejected.
-
1978 (10) TMI 124
Payment for exported goods ... ... ... ... ..... the Reserve Bank for entering into such a transaction of consignment sale involving the payment of commission to the consignee which is a necessary incident of such a transaction. We are supported in this view by the observations of a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in Krishnaswamy v. Government of India, AIR 1970 Mys. 3, with which we are in respectful agreement. In the light of the above discussion it must follow that the Appellate Board was not right in its conclusion that the appellants had contravened the provisions of section 12(2) of the Act, in having failed to obtain the prior permission of the Reserve Bank for payment of commission at 3 to their consignees in the foreign country. The appeals are, therefore, allowed and the impugned orders holding the appellants guilty of contravention of section 12(2) and levying penalty against them under section 23(1)(a) of the Act are hereby set aside. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in these appeals.
-
1978 (10) TMI 123
Company – Membership of, Shares – Power, to issue of at discount, Power to comprmise or make arrangements with creditors and members, Winding up – Avoidance of transfer, etc., after commencement of
-
1978 (10) TMI 111
... ...
... ... ..... with respect to any matter relating to the petitioner and M.B. India Ltd. In our opinion, therefore, the petitioner and M.B. India Ltd. are not inter-connected undertakings within the meaning of clause (vii) of Expln. 1 to section 2( g)(iii)( c) of the Act. Therefore, they are not inter-connected undertakings and since the total value of the assets of the petitioner is much less than 20 crores of rupees it is not an undertaking to which Port A of Chap. III applies. As such it is not obliged to get itself registered under section 26 of the Act. The order under challenge, therefore, is manifestly illegal and erroneous and cannot be sustained. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned order is quashed. Further, the respondents 1, 2 and 4 are directed not to require the petitioner to get itself registered under section 26 of the Act as also not to take any penal action against it for not getting itself so registered. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1978 (10) TMI 110
Compromise and arrangement, Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... e company if it becomes necessary to raise a loan or encumber any of the fixed assets sanction of this court will be obtained by the new board. The new board of directors will also take appropriate directions from the court in the matter of working of the scheme. Before the expiry of the period of stay now granted it will be open to the new directors to move for extension of stay under section 466. The new board will engage all the staff and workers in the employment of the company on the date the application to wind up was filed. If any of them does not come forward to work, the new board will take appropriate orders from the court to remove them. The staff, workers and other employees of the company will not be eligible for any emolument by way of salary, wages or otherwise for the period from the commencement of the winding up till the company restarts its business. Subject to the above directions, Application No. 272 of 1978 is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1978 (10) TMI 95
... ...
... ... ..... advance-tax instalment. All the other requirements of s. 214 having been satisfied, the Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to interest in respect of the excess of advance-tax so paid by it. In view of this factual finding, that the payment, though belated by two days, was accepted by the Department as payment of advance-tax instalment, the conclusion that the assessee was entitled to interest does not give rise to any question of law and accordingly in our opinion question No.2 is not required to be referred to this Court . The above ratio squarely applies to the instant case. Here also the Department has accepted the payment as advance-tax and this is clear from the assessment order. Hence the assessee is entitled for the interest under s.214 in respect of the excess of advance-tax so paid. The CIT was not justified in withdrawing the interest granted to the assessee under s. 214. Accordingly, we cancel the order of the CIT. 4. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
-
1978 (10) TMI 92
... ...
... ... ..... se, the apparent state of affairs is that Miss Indu Khurana joined the assessee firm as an independent partner by investing a sum of Rs.10,100 which she received as gift from her mother. The above gift was accepted as genuine by the Department. Her share of profit in the assessee firm was at no stage transferred to the account of her mother, Smt.Kamala Khurana. On the other hand, She invested the accumulated profits in her account in other firms when she became partner and in all those firms she was accepted as a genuine partner. As against the above facts, there is no material on record to show that Miss Indu Khurana was a benamidar of her mother and that her share of profit in the assessee firm actually belonged to Smt. Kamala Khurana. In view of the above facts, we have no hesitation in upholding the order of the AAC accepting the genuineness of the assessee firm and directing the ITO to grant registration. 9. In the result, the appeal filed by the Department is dismissed.
-
1978 (10) TMI 89
... ...
... ... ..... ere is no litigation amongst the landlords and the tenants it is pertinent to note that the entire building is occupied by tenants and, therefore, the value has to be done by adopting rental method. 15. The value of gold ornaments because of the audit objection was rectified by the WTO by his order by his order under s. 35 and the value was taken at Rs. 3,000. Therefore the order of the WTO cannot be said to be erroneous or prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. Therefore, we hold that the CWT was not justified in resorting to s. 25(2) of the WT Act. 16. Regarding the Income-tax refunds there is much force in what Shri Shah stated because having regard to R. 20(A), the refunds cannot be included in the net wealth of the assessee. Therefore, we find that there is no justification for the CWT to issue a notice to the assessee and, therefore, the order passed by the CWT deserves to be set aside and it is hereby set aside. 17. In the result the assessee s appeal is allowed.
-
1978 (10) TMI 86
... ...
... ... ..... Rs. 639.45 Total Rs. 15,686.00 . Rs. 15,700.00 The above account clearly shows that the only accretion in this accounting period is interest in savings bank of Rs. 639.45. There are no deposits which fell for consideration in this accounting period. We agree with the AAC that the use of the term deposit in post office savings bank is not, looking to the facts erroneous and in any event since no credit is to be considered in this year, we are of the view that the amount of Rs. 15,700 cannot be added in making the assessment and the AAC was justified in deleting the same. 14. One more ground is against the deletion of interest received by the assessee s wife from various banks. She seems to have investments for several years and we agree with the conclusion of the AAC that there is no warrant for including the amount of Rs. 1,281 as interest in the hands of the assessee. 15. The result is that the appeal of the Department is dismissed and the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
-
1978 (10) TMI 84
... ...
... ... ..... le or purchase of the commodities themselves. We are therefore of the opinion that the payments were made voluntarily and the assessee only constituted a conduit pipe for the collection of the above amounts. The amounts cannot therefore be added to the assessee s income. The AAC has only followed the order of the Tribunal referred to in para 3 supra, to which one of us was a party. The facts of that case are exactly similar to the facts of the instant case. The Supreme Court in the case of CIT, West Bengal, vs. Tollygunge Club Ltd.(2) laid down the general principles relating to the collection of the amounts earmarked for charities. Applying the principles laid down in that case it is clear that the amounts collected by the assessee were impressed with an obligation in the nature of trust for being applied for charities and therefore did not become part of the income of the assessee. We, therefore, uphold the order of the AAC. The appeal of the Revenue fails and is dismissed.
-
1978 (10) TMI 83
... ...
... ... ..... e as being of a capital nature. It still retains its quality of revenue expenditure. The finding in the instant case is not that the assessee has made any addition to the shop. The finding, on the other hand, is that the assessee might have made some structural changes also do not create a capital asset or bring into existence an advantage of enduring nature. The assessee must have made structural changes to make the shop more useful for purposes of its business. There is no finding that the lease in favour of the assessee was perpetual lease so that the advantage acquired by him by structural changes could be said to be of enduring nature. In the instant case the assessee was admittedly not the owner but only the lessee. The principles laid down in the above decision would squarely apply to this case. In these circumstances we are of the opinion that the expenditure claimed is revenue in nature and we direct that the same should be allowed. In the result the appeal succeeds.
-
1978 (10) TMI 80
... ...
... ... ..... ing a provision like s. 47(v) with regard to capital asset but not for stock-in-trade. It is only as a matter of abundant caution, therefore, that s. 47(v) is enacted, though with regard to stock-in-trade a similar provision would be operative by the very nature of the transaction and the holding of the assets. For this reason also we hold that the transaction cannot be treated as same as stock-in-trade of the business. 10.With regard to the shares, the assessee always treated them as his investment. Only one instance of a sale of share over a period of decade was indicated. Even the present transfer is an acquisition of the shares on the nationalisation of general insurance. The assessee could not have continued to retain these shares any more. On facts, we cannot, therefore, hold that the assessee was a dealer in shares or that he held the shares as stock-in-trade in such a business of dealing in shares. Here also we agree with the AAC. The Departmental appeal is dismissed.
-
1978 (10) TMI 78
Capital Asset, Agricultural Land ... ... ... ... ..... f the Legislature making a motion that Government can specify any village or town to be a township and exclude it from the Panchayat area. Thus even a Town Panchayat is essentially a rural self-government institution. Thus there is no room for the application of ejusdem generis doctrine in including panchayats which are a distinct genus or category in the term any other name and to classify the same as a municipality with its different variations as spelt out in section 2(14)(iii)(a). In the light of the aforesaid, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that Musiri which is a Town Panchayat, is not a municipality within the meaning of section 2(14)(iii)(a) and, therefore, transactions of land situated in Musiri as long as it is agricultural land cannot be subject to levy of capital gains tax. We would accordingly delete from the assessment as made the sum assessed as capital gains before allowance of deduction at Rs. 79,160. 18. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.
-
1978 (10) TMI 76
... ...
... ... ..... tually filed the return on 31st Jan., 1976. All these facts would indicate that the assessee had no mens rea in not submitting the return in time. There is no evidence on record to hold that the assessee had deliberately withheld the tax by making a delay in submitting the return. On the ratio of the decision of the Madras High Court in V.L. Dutt, vs. CIT (1), though the explanation given by the assessee may, be said to be prima facie unreasonable, it is not open to the ITO to levy penalty unless it is established that the assessee had acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct, contumacious or dishonest or acted in conscious disregard of his obligation. There is no material to indicate that the assessee had delayed the submission of the return either in deliberate defiance of law or in conscious disregard of his statutory obligations. Hence, we hold that penalty it not justifiable in this case. Accordingly, we cancel the penalty and the appeal is allowed.
|
