Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 132 Records
-
1978 (12) TMI 137
Investigation of company’s affairs in other cases ... ... ... ... ..... Govt. under section 235 member or members who, though aggrieved, are unwilling to move the Central Govt. or unable to fulfil the requirements of section 236 and hence unable to move the Central Govt. members who approach the Central Govt. under sections 235 and 237(b) and are aggrieved by the rejection of their applications a company which wants an investigation but is unable to have a special resolution passed. These are some illustrations of persons who would be able to move the court u/s. 237(a). It is, therefore, not as if the scope of the remedy enacted by this provision would be unreasonably curtailed or would become illusory by reading into the section an implied limitation to exclude persons having no manner of interest or concern with the company, from availing of it. For the above reasons I uphold the preliminary objection raised by the respondent to the maintainability of the petition and dismiss the petition in limine. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
-
1978 (12) TMI 136
Transfer to Shares – Power to refuse registration and appeal against refusal, Powers of Court to rectify register of members
-
1978 (12) TMI 134
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... are being misappropriated by Shri Harminder Singh Bala and his associates. In view of my aforesaid discussion, I hold that no ground for ordering the advertisement of the petition has been made out, and, consequently, I decline this prayer. Before parting with the judgment, I may say that a large number of judicial decisions were cited on either side by the learned counsel for the parties, but I have purposely refrained from making reference to those judgments as I have decided the limited question raised before me on the facts of the instant case, and in this situation, no useful purpose would have been served in burdening this judgment by referring to those decisions. Whatever has been said in the judgment is for the limited purpose of deciding the question of the advertisement of the petition at this stage. It may, however, be made clear that the petitioners, if they so desire, would be at liberty to lead evidence and to prove their case for the winding up of the company.
-
1978 (12) TMI 133
Powers of Court to rectify register of members, Contracts in notified areas illegal in certain circumstances
-
1978 (12) TMI 132
Accounts – Annual accounts and balance sheet ... ... ... ... ..... were not ready for laying at the annual general meeting and the annual general meeting was adjourned by an appropriate resolution after transaction of some business to a subsequent date for laying of the accounts, the adjourned meeting must be deemed to be a continuation of the earlier annual general meeting and not a new meeting. In that view of the matter also the instant prosecution has no legs to stand upon. In the result, this application succeeds, the rule is made absolute and the proceedings pending against the petitioners and others in Case No. C-1663 of 1977 in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, are quashed. We may add in this connection that Mr. Ghosh submitted before us that he is still of the same view which he had when he made his submissions in Criminal Revision Case No. 965 of 1978 but he made the submissions in the instant case strictly on the instructions of the Assistant Registrar of Companies, West Bengal. A.N. Banerjee, J. mdash I agree.
-
1978 (12) TMI 107
... ... ... ... ..... ispute between the assessee and the FCI would be necessary. In this regard the registered letter dt. 12th Jan., 1973 addressed by the FCI., to the assessee in reply to his letter dt. 7th Jan., 1973 and the assessee s letter dt. 14th Aug., 1972 to the Food Corporation are all necessary papers that have to be looked into. We, therefore, remit this matter back to the ITO who will re-examine the same in the light of the above materials and decide the issue afresh in accordance with law. It is pointed out that even the amount of Rs. 2,012-25, which represented amount transferred from Branch to Head Officer in relation to the transaction with the FC would also fall under the same claim i.e., under the settlement. This claim will also be examined by ITO. We, therefore, set aside the order of the AAC on this particular point and remit the matter back to the ITO for fresh disposal after examining the materials mentioned above. 7. In the result, the appeal is treated as partly allowed.
-
1978 (12) TMI 105
... ... ... ... ..... must be close proximity between the transfer of the assets and the income produced. The present is a case which falls directly within the ratio of Prembhai Parikh rsquo s (8) decision. The income which arose to the minors arose to them by virtue of their admission to the benefits of the partnership firms and has to close proximity to any assets transferred directly or indirectly to them. 10. In the light of the above we have no hesitation in holding that there are no transfers at all in the present case of any assets from the assessee to any one, much less any minor children. In the absence of even a single transfer there is no question of cross-transfers leading to indirect transfer of assets even if an indirect transfers of assets could be presumed there is absolutely no proximity in the light of Prembhai Parikh rsquo s (8) between the share income of the minors and any presumed transfer. No interference is called for which the orders of the AAC. The appeals are dismissed.
-
1978 (12) TMI 103
... ... ... ... ..... tal Representative submitted that the rooms were well-equipped having air-conditioners etc. and there is also a common swimming pool in the apartment lsquo Usha Kiran which all the tenants including the assessee s employees could use while there. According to the learned Departmental Representative, this clearly showed that the building in question was a guest house. 13. We have considered the submissions. Even according to the AAC, the guest house register shows that only primarily the assessee s employees occupied it. It was clarified by the learned counsel that other persons who occupied were employees of the associate companies and the assessee had levied charges from them. Looking to the aforesaid position, we consider that the apartment maintained though it was well furnished etc. could not be considered to be, as far as the assessee is concerned, a guest house and, therefore, the case is not hit by the provisions of s. 37 (4). The assessee is entitled to the deduction.
-
1978 (12) TMI 102
... ... ... ... ..... ent on the death of Venkattammal was also filed before the WTO. The same amounts were also shown in 1968-69. It is after noticing this that the Tribunal had cancelled the penalties for those two earlier years. In this situation, we find that the failure of the assessee to return these sums in the subsequent years was only a mistake and cannot amount to a concealment of wealth. We accept the plea of the assessee that it was a case of mere omission and there was no wilful withholding of the particulars. Normally, an assessee who has already returned these sums in the earlier years would not keep it back from the Department and in the circumstances we hold that it is only by a mistake that these sums were not returned. Moreover, the tax that is sought to be evaded by such omission amounts to petty sums and we, therefore, take it that the assessee has not intentionally omitted these items from the returns. We accept the appeals and cancel the penalties. 5.The appeals are allowed.
-
1978 (12) TMI 98
... ... ... ... ..... ad treated himself only as a creditor and hence the property should be considered as his separate property cannot be accepted. This is for the simple reason that there could be no question of his treating himself to be a creditor of the HUF which was then in existence. The fact that subsequently in the books of the assessee HUF the account of Sathappa Chettiar was debited with the amount, which had been drawn from him for the purchase of the estate, cannot, in our view, alter the situation. This is because when once the property had become that of the assessee HUF there could be no change of its character by reason of any entry being made by way of adjustment in the books. For the above reasons, we hold that Grove Estate should be considered as belonging to the assessee HUF and consequently the income arising therefrom is to be considered as the income of the assessee HUF. We accordingly set aside the orders of the AAC and restore those of the ITO. 9. The appeals are allowed.
-
1978 (12) TMI 96
... ... ... ... ..... re was clearly for a non-business purpose. 6. The learned counsel for the assessee submitted that the legal expenses incurred for transferring route permits in connection with purchase of buses, i.e., in defending suits, was an admissible deduction as per the decision of the Madras High Court in CIT vs. Raman and Raman Ltd (4). Inn our view, the assessee being a motor transport operator the purchase and sale of buses have really to take place during the course of the business of the assessee. The expenditure was incurred by the assessee in connection with ensuring that the purchasers get route permits etc., transferred without undue difficulty. This expenditure incurred as an owner-cum-trader would be an admissible deduction looking to the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (1). The decision of the AAC is, therefore, in order. 7. The result is that the appeal of the assessee is allowed and the appeal of the Department is dismissed.
-
1978 (12) TMI 95
... ... ... ... ..... a permanent character . In Corpus Juris Secundum vol. 41 page 304, it is stated that mdash In a legal sense, the word house is more comprehensive, but it is not limited to a structure designed for human habitation and may mean a building or shed intended or used as a habitation or shelter for animals of any kind, a building in the ordinary sense or any building, edifice, or structure enclosed with walls and covered, regardless of the fact of human habitation. 7. From The authorities cited above it is obvious that depending on the context the term house is equivalent to and interchangeable or synonymous with building. In Board s Circular referred to above stated that exemption under s. 5(1)(iv) is available for all kinds of houses, whether restriction as to the user. In the background of the judicial authorities and the Board s Circular cited above, we have no hesitation to hold that the appellant is entitled to the exemption claimed. 8. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
-
1978 (12) TMI 94
... ... ... ... ..... arta, the author of the trust, the result would be the same because, in clause (4) of sub-sec. (3) any relative of a member of the author HUF is included. Undoubtedly, the daughter-in-law and the grand sons are related to P.S. Kandasamy Mudaliar, who is a member of the H.U. F. 10. Thus, the view taken by the lower authorities is correct and does not call for any interference. 11. Regarding the claim for relief under s. 80 G in respect of donation of Rs.10,0001 claimed to have been made by the assessee to Little Flower High School, Salem, it was urged that Pushpanathar Building Fund is not a different entity and that the same could be established if a further opportunity is given. We think that the assessee should be given a further opportunity to establish the claim for relief under s. 80G in respect of the above donation. We direct the AAC to consider this question afresh. 12. In the result, ITA No. 946/77-78 is treated as allowed in part and ITA. No. 947/77-78 is dismissed.
-
1978 (12) TMI 93
... ... ... ... ..... it could be considered as the normal expenditure of the deceased. We are therefore of the opinion that sub-s. (2) of s. 9 would apply to the above gift with the result it could not fall within the mischief of sub-s. (1) of s. 9. We, therefore, direct the deletion of Rs. 5,000. 12. The next contention is as regards the inclusion of the value of the share of the lineal descendants. It has been held by the Madras High Court in Devaki Ammal s case(9), that s. 34(1)(c) of the ED Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and hence unconstitutional. In view of the above decision there is no sanction in law for aggregating the value of the estate of the lineal descendants. We, therefore, hold that the Asstt. Controller was not justified in adding Rs.3,08,687 computed by him as the value of the lineal descendant s share. The same has to be deleted. 13. We direct that the assessment be modified in accordance with our above finding. In the result the appeal is allowed in part.
-
1978 (12) TMI 92
... ... ... ... ..... ion, such transfer took place on that day. It was stated by the departmental representative that the previous year in which such transfer took place was the period from 1st May, 69 to 31st March, 1971. That being the position, recomputation of income should have been made by the ITO under s. 155(5) on or before 31st March, 1975. But, as already stated orders were passed recomputing the income on 27th March, 1976. There can be no doubt at all that the orders having been passed beyond the period prescribed therefore, could not be considered as valid. The AAC was thus justified in cancelling the orders. 5. In view of the above finding, it become unnecessary for us to consider the question raised by the assessee in the cross objections as to whether there was a transfer of the concerned plant and machinery when the assessee s business was converted in to a partnership business. 6. In the result, the appeals are dismissed and the cross objections are also dismissed as infructuous.
-
1978 (12) TMI 91
... ... ... ... ..... ake according to the Revenue, is allowing the interest paid to M/s Mehta Co. as a deduction as the money borrowed was not utilised for the business of the appellant. The appellant s contention is that the money borrowed from Mehta Co., was advanced to M/s Khadder Kodi Beedi Co., and it was in the course of the appellant s money-lending business and the interest paid to M/s Mehta Co. should be deducted against the interest receipts from M/s Khadder Kodi Beedi Co. The mistake sought to be rectified is not a glaring, obvious and self-evident mistake. The mistake has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points on which there may be conceivably two opinions. Since the mistake sought to be rectified is a debatable issue, it cannot be termed as a mistake apparent from record and amenable to the rectification-jurisdiction of the ITO. The rectification orders passed by the ITO cannot, therefore, be legally sustained. 8. In the result, both the appeals are allowed.
-
1978 (12) TMI 90
... ... ... ... ..... Consequently, there is no extinguishment of any rights in the shares held by the assessee in the company. The learned Judicial Member by way of illustration has pointed out that if s.45 is so interpreted, the assessee will get the benefit if he gets even a paltry amount of rupee one from the liquidator and the whole benefit will be lost if nothing is received from the liquidator, and hence s.45 cannot be interpreted in this manner. If any sum is received from the liquidator, then the case will fall under s. 46(2). So, the illustration pointed out by the learned Judicial Member does not appear to be appropriate while considering the question under s. 45. However, the illustration may be of no avail when the Gujarat High Court and Madras High Court have held that s.45 excludes transfers without consideration. The point is answered in the negative and against the assessee. 10. The appeal may be posted before the Bench which ordinarily heard the same for passing the final orders.
-
1978 (12) TMI 89
... ... ... ... ..... when the assessments were made. It cannot, therefore, be stated that no material in support of the claim for exemption was available at the time when the ITO made the assessments. The decision relied on by the learned Departmental Representative cannot, therefore, be applied to the facts of the present case. We, therefore, hold that notwithstanding the returns filed by the appellant, it is open for him to contend that there is no liability to capital gains on the import entitlement certificates. 11. The next question for consideration is whether there is liability to capital gains on the sale of the import entitlement certificates. This issue is now decided by the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Addl. CIT vs. Sheik Mohideen(7). In view of the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court cited above, there is no liability to capital gains on the profits arising on the sale of the import entitlement certificates. 12. In the result, both the appeals are allowed.
-
1978 (12) TMI 88
... ... ... ... ..... nclined to agree with the view of the Accountant Member, that in such a case s. 188 would be applicable and it would come within the mischief of the phrase referred to above. I also agree with the Accountant Member that the significance of the said phrase has also been considered by the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court and I have already added what in may opinion the phrase would cover. In other words, where the assessee claims dissolution of the old firm and even supports it with a deed but in fact it is found to be sham, such a case would come under s. 187 and, therefore, it would not come under s. 188. While in the case of genuine dissolution of a firm even if one or more of the partners in the old firm are found in the new firm succeeding to old firm s. 188 will apply. In the light of the above I agree with the views expressed by the learned Accountant Member and hold that the assessment in this case has to be made under the provisions of s. 188 of the Act.
-
1978 (12) TMI 87
... ... ... ... ..... ance can be placed on them. 8. The declaration was made by the appellants father in June, 1970. No material is placed to doubt the genuineness of the declaration of the appellants father. The partnership deed was executed on 30th Nov., 1972. The ITO required evidence to be produced only on 28th March, 1977. The partnership deed had come into existence very much from to 28th March, 1977. Hence, there is no basis for the contention that the recitals in the declaration and the partnership deed are not worthy of credence. If the declaration and the partnership deed are accepted, then it follows that ancestral funds have been invested as capital by the appellants in the partnership firm M/s. Shilpe Electricals and the appellants are partners in that firm representing their respective HUF. In the circumstances, the share income from the partnership firm should be assessed only in the status of HUF and not in the status of individual . 9. In the result, both the appeals are allowed.
|