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Showing 21 to 40 of 111 Records
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1978 (6) TMI 150
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... ... ..... ollowing principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions mdash (1)That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party (2)That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice (3)That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. Having heard both sides I feel that on the facts and in the circumstances stated here, the ends of justice will be served by exercising the power of this court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In these circumstances, I quash the complaint filed by the respondent before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Calicut, and proceedings pursuant thereto pending as S.T. 211 of 1977.
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1978 (6) TMI 128
Annual Return – Penalty for not filing ... ... ... ... ..... efault and there should have been a specific averment to that effect in the complaint. In the petition of complaint it is only stated that the accused Nos. 2 to 5 are the officers and directors of the company and in para. 3 there is an averment that the company and its directors are under a statutory obligation to file with the complainant an annual return. This statutory obligation is imposed under sections 159 and 162 of the Companies Act. If all the directors are liable for every default then the expression every officer who is in default becomes redundant and meaningless. As already stated above an officer includes a director . In this connection, the case reported in 1978 CLJ 336 (sic ) lends support to this contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner. In view of what I have stated above on the last two points taken by the petitioner, I hold that the cognizance taken on the basis of such petitions of complaint is bad and accordingly the proceedings are quashed.
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1978 (6) TMI 120
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases ... ... ... ... ..... g director for life. It may be that the petitioner was and is not in a position to file the necessary returns, but he should have mentioned all these in the proceedings taken against him in C.C. No. 249 of 1975. He did not state any of these things before the Magistrate in the proceedings taken against him. He also did not take any steps to get the direction contained in the order passed by the Magistrate by taking appropriate proceedings. When he is threatened again by the Registrar that he will be proceeded against under section 614A(2) he has come forward with this application. I do not think that it can be said that he has acted reasonably and honestly. It follows that even if in the circumstances an application under section 633(2) will lie I am not satisfied that the petitioner acted reasonably and honestly in not complying with the direction given by the Magistrate within the time given by him. This application is, therefore, dismissed, but I make no order as to costs.
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1978 (6) TMI 119
Political contributions – Prohibitions and restrictions regarding ... ... ... ... ..... in the petition of complaint and in his initial deposition taken at their face value, and even accepted in their entirety, do not make out a prima facie case against the petitioners and others under section 293A of the Companies Act. As such, the continuance of the proceedings against the petitioners before the learned Magistrate would tantamount to an abuse of the process of the court and would lead to their unnecessary harrassment. The proceedings, therefore, should not be allowed to be continued and must accordingly be quashed. As we are allowing this application on this ground the other submission regarding the locus standi of the complainant-opposite party to file the complaint need not be gone into. In the result, this application succeeds. The proceedings pending against the petitioners and others in the court of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, in Case No. C/3650 of 1977 are quashed. Thus, the rule is made absolute. S.C. Majumdar, J. mdash I agree.
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1978 (6) TMI 103
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... ... ..... ar and the Block Development Officer filed by the assessee, it is clear that the assessee had marketed agricultural produce and thereby he had earned income from agriculture. If these two sources are taken together having in mind that except a small investment in 1974-75, no further investments had been made by the assessee, the assessee was in a position to invest Rs. 40,000 out of his own source. Accordingly the addition of Rs. 40,000 is deleted. 4. The assessee has contended that the AAC was not justified in allowing deduction of Rs. 8 only for municipal-tax instead of Rs. 895. The assessee has produced copies of municipal-tax receipts from which it is clear that the assessee had paid municipal-tax of Rs. 895 relating to the property from which income has been computed. However due to some mistake, the AAC has allowed a deduction of Rs. 8 only. The assessee has produced the receipts and therefore, the ITO is directed to allow deduction of Rs, 895. 5. The appeal is allowed.
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1978 (6) TMI 100
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... ... ..... nable to accept the Revenue s contention that the fact of some partners having made some disclosure application under Finance (No. 2) Act of 1965 will not prove that the assessee was making some money which was kept outside the books a of account and it was that money which was brought in the garb of cash credits in the books of the assessee. In this connection a reference is invited to s. 24 (11) of the Finance (No. 2) Act 1965, the Delhi High Court in a recent judgment in CWT, Central, New Delhi vs. Shri Virendra Kumar Goel, Delhi (5) has held that protection under s. 24(11) of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1965 extends not merely to the firm but also to the partner. Though the learned Departmental Representative made very valiant effort to persuade us to reverse the order of the AAC but considering the entirely of circumstances of this case, we have absolutely no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the AAC was right in cancelling the penalty. 7. The appeal is dismissed.
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1978 (6) TMI 97
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... ... ..... So far as the other question whether the flat can or cannot be said to be actually occupied by the assessee the use by the parents of the assessee in my opinion cannot be equated to a stranger or friend s occupation. As I have already stated earlier for the application of s. 23(2) if the parents are using the house by sufferance and like any other members of the family, the parents are also residing in the house. The word actually occupied by the owner has to be considered in contrast so the occupation not by the owner but by others either as a result of letting out to them or as a result of accommodating them. But so far as parent s occupation is concerned, it is as much equivalent to the assessee s own occupation as he is not residing because of any special accommodation or as a tenant. In the view of the matter, s. 23 (3) (a) has no application. However, I am of the view that s. 23(2) (i) would be applicable to the assessee. 6. In the result the appeal s is partly allowed.
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1978 (6) TMI 95
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... ... ..... id account. In view of the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court in 63 ITR 273 and the Madras High Court in 77 ITR 84, we consider that the exact nature of the amounts from out of which the minor advanced moneys to the firm should be found. To the extent the advance has been made by the minor out of the accumulated profits to the firm, the interest is includible as per the ratio of the Supreme Court ruling aforesaid. To the extent the advance has been made out of the cash belonging to the minor, the interest cannot be included. We, therefore, set aside the orders of the authorities below on this point and restoratives below on this point and restore the assessment to the file of the ITO with a direction to examine the nature of the moneys advanced in the light of this order and dispose of the assessment in respect of the inclusion or otherwise of the interest in question and in accordance with law. For the purposes of statistics the appeal is treated as allowed in part.
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1978 (6) TMI 94
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... ... ..... s High Court cited above. The Commissioner should have therefore held that there was no error in the order of the ITO. On the other hand he preferred to follow the ruling of the Kerala High Court and had ignored the ruling of the Madras High Court. The ruling of the Gujarat High Court cited by the learned departmental representative is not relevant to the issue before us. In that case the basis for the action by the commissioner of Income-tax under s. 263 was the deduction by the ITO of certain amounts said to have been made wrongly without making proper enquiry. The facts in the instant case are different and the ratio of the ruling of the Madras High Court in 104 ITR 520 referred to above squarely governs this case. For the above reasons we hold that commissioner of Income-tax exceeded has jurisdiction in setting aside the order of the ITO which is in conformity with the above ruling of the Madras High Court. We accordingly quash the order of the CIT. The appeal is allowed.
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1978 (6) TMI 93
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... ... ..... s minor son was separately assessed to IT and the source of capital and other particulars were explained to the ITO City Circle VII(2) on Cl. No.1868-M. He pointed out that for the asst. yr. 1973-74 the minor son s assessment was completed by the said officer on 4th Feb., 1976 and for the asst. yr. 1974-75 on 20th Feb., 1976. It was also pointed out that the sum of Rs. 33,614 was already invested in earlier years and there is no justification for treating the same as the income of the assessee for the year under appeal. We heard the learned departmental representative, who supported order of the AAC. 3. We have perused the copy of capital account of the assessee s minor son. We are satisfied that the assessee s minor son had received gifts from the year 1969-70 onwards from various persons, some of whom are found to be income-tax assessees. We, therefore, see no justification for sustaining the addition of Rs. 33,614 and the same is accordingly deleted. The appeal is allowed.
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1978 (6) TMI 91
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... ... ..... Department has come on appeal before us. 2. After hearing the parties, we see no reason to interfere with the order of the AAC. The point at issue is squarely covered by the decision referred to the AAC. The following rulings also support the assessee s case 1. CGT vs. Hari Chand(2), 2. Addl. CGT, Haryana vs. Kanshi Ram Doongarshi Dass(3). We, therefore, uphold the order of the AAC. The appeal of the Revenue fails and is dismissed.
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1978 (6) TMI 89
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... ... ..... hters were provided by the father Veerappa Chettiar with house properties etc., during his lifetime and that the deed was executed only in consideration thereof and as a family arrangement. This aspect of the matter has also to be examined with reference to the materials and evidence which the assessee may produce before the authorities. In the interest of justice therefore, we set aside the orders of the lower authorities and restore the assessment to the file of the GTO with a direction to redo the assessment afresh in the light of this order. The assessees are at liberty to produce evidence before the GTO in support of their case. Since we have set aside the assessments the contention raised in the departmental appeals with reference to the proportionate estate duty liability in computing the gift will have to be decided afresh in the fresh assessments, if any to be made, and in accordance with law. For purposes of statistics all the appeals are treated as allowed in part.
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1978 (6) TMI 88
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... ... ..... ial on record to support the department s case. The learned counsel for the assessee has drawn our attention to the more important aspect of the case, namely that a major portion of the property under consideration was sold for a sum of Rs. 2,15,000 under deed of sale dt. 21st Aug., 1975 by the assessee to the Tamil Nadu Government Agricultural Graduates Association, Madras and that the assessee had invested the same. Having regard to the fact that the source for the purchase of the above property was found to have been provided by the assessee and having regard to the other facts stated above, we are of the opinion that the Department has not established that Shri Ethirajulu Naidu is the owner holding the property benami for the assessee. We, therefore, reverse the orders of the authorities below and hold that the assessee is the owner of the property under consideration and the income therefrom is property assessable in her hands for both the years. The appeals are allowed.
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1978 (6) TMI 85
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... ... ..... ount which is included by virtue of s. 69A in the assessment for the said assessment year the AAC has only followed the above ruling of the Karnataka High Court. The ruling of the Orissa High Court reported in 108 ITR 403, cited by the learned departmental representative, no doubt supports the stand taken by the revenue, but we prefer to follow the ruling of the Karnataka High Court. 4. In the cross-objections the assessee has raised the contention that the interest-income of Rs. 1,127 did not represent its income. So far as the assessment of this sum is concerned this interest has been actually earned by the assessee on the deposits referred to above. Since this interest-income has been actually earned during the relevant year of account and the assessee has not shown it in the return originally filed, we are of the opinion that the authorities below are correct in respect of this concealment. In the result-both the departmental appeals and the cross-objection are dismissed.
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1978 (6) TMI 83
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... ... ..... 7th Sept.,1977, in the case of CIT vs. Smt Godavari Devi Saraf, held that if a section of an enactment is declared ultra vires by a competent High Court, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has to respect the law so laid down by the High Court and the section that has been declared ultra vires has to be ignored. In the unreported decision of the Madras High Court dt. 28th Nov., 1977, in the case of Controller of Estate Duty vs. Estate of Late S. Palaniappa Pillai (4), by accountable person Smt. Chinnammal Tiruppur (RA No. 49 of 1974) in Tax Case No. 173 of 1974, the Tribunal following the decision of the Madras High Court in Devaki Ammal s (2) case excluded the lineal descendants share from the principal value of the estate of the deceased and this decision of the Tribunal was upheld by the Madras High Court. Following these decisions, we uphold the order of the Appellate Controller of Estate Duty on this point. 4. In the result the appeal of the Revenue fails and is dismissed.
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1978 (6) TMI 80
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... ... ..... ost of the property was Rs. 75,000 and the cost of stamp is stated to be Rs. 7,500. During the year of account the assessee was stated to be under the impression that capital gains assessable to tax did not arise. The assessee had applied for additional compensation and the award was given only on 12th Feb., 1972. The due date for filing the return in this case was 30th Sept., 1970. On 30th Sept., 1970, according to the view held by the assessee, there was no taxable income. The assessee s plea that he was under the impression that the further compensation amount received would be included only in the subsequent assessment year in which it was received cannot be said to be not bona fide. It is also not disputed that the return was filed in this case voluntarily by the assesses. In these circumstances we are not persuaded to hold that there was no reasonable cause for the delay in filing the return. We, therefore, cancel the penalty sustained by the AAC. The appeal is allowed.
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1978 (6) TMI 79
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... ... ..... iven the same meaning for both the sub-cls. (a) and (b), namely that of a mandatory provision. That being so, non-compliance with the provision would certainly mean that an opportunity which is available under the statute to the valuation officer has not been given to him. It would be different thing if he is given an opportunity but he does not exercise that opportunity. But when he has not been given an opportunity at all of being heard certainly it is non-compliance with the provisions of s. 23(3A). Non-compliance with the provision would mean denial of an opportunity to the valuation officer. That being so, an order passed without observing this formality will certainly render the order as one passed without observing the prescribed procedure. Therefore, this being a remedial procedure it has got to be cured and in the light of the same the Judicial Member s view that the matter will have to be sent back to the AAC to comply with the above provision appears to be correct.
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1978 (6) TMI 74
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... ... ..... lts were committed by an assessee, it is for the Revenue to decide whether penalty should be imposed for default under s. 139(1) or 139(2) of the Act or both. In the present case, the learned ITO imposed penalties for default under s. 139(1) of the Act. 12. Apart from it, the assessee after receiving notice under s. 139 (2) of the Act could not file the returns because the information which was required from different place could not be received by that time. The reasons which prevented the assessee from filing the returns within time under s. 139 (1) of the Act also were the same which prevented the assessee from filing the return for the asst. yr. 1975-76 after service of notice under s. 139 (2) of the Act. 13. Looking to the aforesaid facts and entirety of circumstances, in my opinion, there was no justification for the learned A.A.C. to sustain the order of penalty. Accordingly, the impugned orders of penalty are cancelled. 14. In the result, both the appeals are allowed.
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1978 (6) TMI 73
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... ... ..... ase. He also took into account Rs. 40 of the I.T. Rules. He came to the conclusion that the penal interest charged was excessive and accordingly he directed that it should be reduced. He directed that for the period beginning from April, 1973 to the case of the assessment, the penal interest should not be charged. The order of the learned AAC is not an order under R.40. It is not a case of usurping the jurisdiction. He has merely done what under the law he was required to do and was competent enough to do. Moreover, as already stated, the facts stated by the learned AAC and his conclusion have not been questioned by the Revenue. In such circumstances, the Revenue s arguments regarding jurisdiction becomes purely technical and its acceptance would only mean unnecessary prolongation of litigation which is neither proper nor fair. We do not, therefore, think that any interference is called for. We consequently dismiss the Departmental appeal. 11. In the result, the appeal fails.
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1978 (6) TMI 72
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... ... ..... ic mention that the property in question had been set spart for religious purpose and it was specifically excluded from partition. The prayer for exemption under s. 11-A could not be thrown out by the IT authorities merely because of the absence of definite documents creating the trust. Long actual use of the property should also have been considered in coming to the conclusion which has not been done. 5. Consequently, we accept this appeal, set aside the orders of the authorities below and direct the ITO to revise the assessment in the light of the discussion above. We, however, would refrain from passing final order in the matter because the question as to how the income in question has actually been used still requires determination. Under s. 11 only such income from property held under Trust is exempt, if the same is applied to religious or charitable purpose. The ITO would check up how much of the income is actually applied for such purposes and grant relief accordingly.
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