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Showing 121 to 140 of 187 Records
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1978 (8) TMI 67 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Capital Gains Tax, Income Tax Act, Sale Proceeds, Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... e I. T. Act, 1961, although the case of Chunilal Prabhudas 1970 76 ITR 566 (Cal) was cited in the same as it was cited in CIT v. Bird and Co. (P.) Ltd. 1977 108 ITR 253 (Cal) and none the less it was held by a Division Bench of this court that the goodwill of a business is both a fixed and a capital asset. Accordingly, we reject his main argument. There is also no merit in his other argument. Even if no cost is incurred in building up the goodwill of a business it is still a capital asset for the purposes of capital gains and the cost of acquisition being nil amount, the entire sale proceeds relating to the goodwill must be brought to tax under the head capital gains . It being now well settled that the goodwill of a business is a capital asset, vide the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Devidas Vithaldas and Co. 1972 84 ITR 277, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1978 (8) TMI 66 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Any Service, Business Expenditure, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... e and in favour of the revenue. Question No. 3 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. In respect of Mangilal Sethia and Mangilal Bhikamchand, the question No. 5 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. Assessment year 1964-65 Question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. Question No. 2 is answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. Question No. 3 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. In respect of Mangilal Sethia and Mangilal Bhikamchand, the question No. 5 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. Assessment year 1965-66 Question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. Question No. 2 is answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. Question No. 3 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. The reference is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. BIMAL CHANDRA BASAK J.-- I agree.
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1978 (8) TMI 65 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Capital Expenditure, Expenditure Incurred, Sugar Factory ... ... ... ... ..... . What we are concerned with is the nature of the expenditure and not the recipient of the amount spent. The money may not have reached the pockets of the lessor but so far as the assessee is concerned it incurred the expenditure for the purpose of obtaining a capital asset. Without proper registration of the deed of lease the rights of the assessee could not be said to have been perfected under the Transfer of Property Act and the Indian Registration Act. It would at best be an inchoate right enforceable by the assessee by invoking the doctrine of part performance if the assessee had obtained possession of the property without the execution of the deed. However, we are not concerned with that aspect of the matter inasmuch as the assessee chose to register the deed and in fact incurred the expenditure. For the reasons, as above, we answer the question referred in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BIMAL CHANDRA BASAK J.--I agree.
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1978 (8) TMI 64 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Depreciation And Development Rebate, Indian Company ... ... ... ... ..... rsed the decision of the AAC and restored the decision of the ITO on the above question. At the instance of the assessee, the following question has been referred to us in each of the above cases under s. 256(1) of the I.T. Act, 1961 Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the difference in the rupee value of the machinery calculated with reference to the devaluation of the rupee was part of the actual cost of the plant and machinery for the purposes of allowance of depreciation and development rebate ? In Kirloskar Electric Company Ltd. v. CIT (I.T.R.C. Nos. 65 to 68 of 1975 decided on August 3, 1978) Since reported in 1978 115 ITR 907 (Kar) , where in similar circumstances a similar question had been referred to us, we have answered it in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Following the said decision and for the reasons mentioned in those cases, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No costs.
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1978 (8) TMI 63 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Amount Due From Company, Bad Debt ... ... ... ... ..... t giving a finding that the scheme was in operation, has relied upon its contents in order to come to the conclusion that there was a ray of hope of recovery. The question as referred to us assumed that the facts as mentioned by the Tribunal on the basis of which it came to the aforesaid conclusion are not in controversy. In fact they are. In the circumstances, we are unable to give a definite answer to the question referred to us. In a similar situation the Supreme Court in CIT v. Greaves Cotton and Co. Ltd. 1968 68 ITR 200 directed the Tribunal to rehear the matter. This was followed by the Madras High Court in B. Muniappa Gounder v. CIT 1976 102 ITR 787. In our opinion, the interests of justice in the present case requires that we should follow the same course. We, therefore, return the reference unanswered with a direction that the Tribunal will rehear the appeal and decide it in the light of the above observations and in accordance with law. We make no order as to costs.
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1978 (8) TMI 62 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... ustifying a claim for exemption under s. 84 were also fulfilled in the first year. It was emphasised that there was no material to support the claim. Neither of these two facts have been found to be present in our case. It has not been suggested that there is no material to calculate or compute the claim. It is evident that the assessee made the claim for the first year because it felt that it was allowable for that year. In other words, for the first year, there must have been profits, else the question did not arise. The assessee was not claiming carry forward. For these reasons, this case is not helpful. In our opinion, the Tribunal was justified in allowing the claim. We, therefore, answer the questions referred to us as follows Question No. 1.-In the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. Question No. 2.-In the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1978 (8) TMI 61 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Profits Tax ... ... ... ... ..... to this Supreme Court authority, the position is that the notice under s. 11(1) must be issued within one year of the end of the chargeable accounting period and the assessment must be made within four years thereof. Learned counsel for the revenue stressed many aspects which were virtually the reproduction of the minority opinion expressed by Hidayatullah J. in the aforesaid case. Since the majority decision is binding, it is unnecessary to dilate upon those various aspects. In this view, it is unnecessary to deal with the question whether the making of the regular assessment after 20 years was within reasonable time. In view of the answer to the first question, this question, which in the reference is split into two questions, has become merely academic. We, therefore, answer the first question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department and the other question is returned unanswered. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs.
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1978 (8) TMI 60 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Delay In Filing Application, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... Act. The effect of the ITO s order refusing to condone the delay in the filing of the declaration in Form No. 12 is refusal to assess the firm as a registered firm. If the assessee claims that it was not liable to be assessed as an unregistered firm but was entitled to be assessed as a registered firm, the claim relates to the status under which the assessee is assessed within the meaning of cl. (c) aforesaid. The assessment order itself could be appealed against on the ground that the assessee was assessed in a wrong status. Since the main reason was the refusal to condone the delay which led to the assessment as an unregistered firm, the same could be questioned in an appeal under cl. (c). The order refusing to condone the delay was hence appealable to the AAC under cl. (c) as well. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1978 (8) TMI 59 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ot apply in the assessment year we are considering. There is no question of any deemed transfer or application of legal fictions and all that we are concerned with is whether by the declaration made and by his act, can the assessee be said to have transferred the shares to the joint family and, further, whether such transfer could be regarded as a transfer made to or for the benefit of the wife and the minor children. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Goli Eswariah s case 1970 76 ITR 675 and by our High Court in Damodar Krishnaji Nirgude s case 1962 46 ITR 1252 (Bom), that the act of impressing separate individual property as joint family property in the manner as was done by the assessee cannot be regarded as a transfer. If that is so, we must hold that the decision of the Tribunal was right and, accordingly, we answer the question referred to us as follows In the negative and in favour of the assessee . The revenue will pay to the assessee the costs of the reference.
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1978 (8) TMI 58 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Capital Expenditure, Capital Or Revenue Expenditure, Preference Shares ... ... ... ... ..... , whereas a shareholder has no such right. Apart from that the scheme of the Companies Act and in particular the forms and contents of its balance-sheets are extremely rigid and, in our view, by reason of the specific compartments in such accounts if is not possible to convert an item of capital into an item of loan as has been suggested on behalf of the assessee. In the instant case, it is the assessee who is claiming a relief or advantage by way of an allowable deduction in respect of an expenditure incurred by it. Therefore, it is strictly for the assessee to establish that the expenditure in respect of which deduction is being claimed is not an expenditure in the nature of a capital expenditure and the assessee cannot claim any benefit of ambiguity or doubt in its favour. For the reasons stated above, the reference is disposed of in favour of the revenue. Both the questions referred are answered in the affirmative. There will be no order as to costs. BANERJI J.--I agree.
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1978 (8) TMI 57 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Penalty Proceedings, Valid Notice ... ... ... ... ..... on which he could reasonably feel satisfied that proceedings under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act were warranted. The letter shows that the ITO had the day book and ledger on the basis of which he could reasonably come to the conclusion that the total sales were of the order of Rs. 1,82,906.58 as against the figure Rs. 1,63,439.52 furnished by the assessee in its trading account as its sale proceeds. The ITO issued the notice under s. 142(1) of the Act only for the purpose of completing the order of assessment. The issue of such a notice on February 24, 1971, asking the assessee to produce the documents mentioned therein on March 9, 1971, would not in any way make the proceedings initiated on February 27, 1971, on the basis of the day book and ledger of the assessee already produced before him, invalid. The action taken by the ITO under s. 271(1)(c) of the Art on February 27, 1971, cannot, therefore, be considered as bad in law. The question referred to us is answered accordingly.
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1978 (8) TMI 56 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Unquoted Shares, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... grieved by the award of the Land Acquisition Officer made a reference, as provided, to the District Judge (sic). No one has, however, argued that the provisions contained in the Land Acquisition Act as to the determination of the compensation on the market value, are not applicable to the District Judge while hearing the reference. Learned counsel stressed that s. 16A of the W.T. Act contemplates reference to a valuer. Rule 1D is not binding on the valuer. There is, thus, an exception to the universal application of r. 1D. That maybe so. But that is because of the statutory provision of law and not any general principles of law. Since the aforesaid decision of this court is binding on us, we need not elaborate the various aspects argued before us in detail. The question of law referred to us for our opinion is answered in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner of Wealth-tax is entitled to its costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1978 (8) TMI 55 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
City Compensatory Allowance, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... nal expenditure necessitated by the high cost of living at big cities like Kanpur, the Explanation added by the Finance Act of 1975 becomes applicable. The emphasis in the Explanation is that the allowance should be granted to meet personal expenses at the place where the duty is to be performed. The allowance in the present case was not granted with reference to the nature of the duties but exclusively with reference to the place of posting. It was granted to meet the personal expenses necessitated by the extra high cost of living at, inter alia, Kanpur. In view of the Explanation such an allowance cannot be treated as deductible under cl. (14) on the ground that it was granted to meet expenses wholly, necessarily and exclusively incurred in the performance of the duties. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. As no one has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (8) TMI 54 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Cash Credits, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ly. Section 68 was entirely inapplicable. In our opinion, s. 69 was applicable to the facts of the case. The Tribunal was in error in holding that s. 68 was applicable. The Tribunal did not answer the defect pointed out by the assessee in the course of arguments before it that if s. 69 were to apply then on the merits there will be some difficulty in including it in the income for the year 1970-71. The assessee s argument was that the income could be includible under s. 69 only for the assessment year 1969-70. The Tribunal has, however, not given any finding on this aspect. This finding is also not the subject-matter of the question referred to us. We, therefore, leave the question open. In the result, we answer the question referred to us by holding that s. 69 was applicable to the facts of the case and the Tribunal was not justified in upholding the addition for the assessment year 1970-71 on the basis that s. 68 applied. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
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1978 (8) TMI 53 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Articles Intended For Personal Use, Precious Metals, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... tones, etc. It is in this context that the court observed that imitation stones and imitation jewels were taxable while ornaments consisting of pure gold and set with stories were jewellery . In our case, there is no material distinction between jewellery and ornaments in the context that one is studded with precious stones and the other is not. This case is distinguishable. In Ganeshilal and Sons v. Commr. of ST 1971 27 STC 150 (All), this court interpreted the word jewellery occurring in the sales tax notification to include ornaments studded with precious stones. This case is also not very helpful because it interpreted the notifications issued under the Sales Tax Act which were differently worded. In the result, the second question is answered in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. In this view, it is not necessary to decide the first question. The same is accordingly returned unanswered. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
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1978 (8) TMI 52 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Deposit In Bank, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... he same amount could not be treated differently in the accounts of the assessee and converted into a loss by deducting therefrom the interest paid to the Government of Uttar Pradesh. The assessee no doubt has succeeded in establishing that there was some connection or nexus between the interest paid to the Government of Uttar Pradesh and the interest earned from the Central Bank of India, such nexus being that both the items of interest were either earned or paid on the said amount of loan but the assessee has failed to establish that it was its purpose or one of its purposes to utilise the amount received on loan for earning interest. It also cannot be said that the assessee has established that the expenditure was incurred solely and wholly for the purpose of earning interest from the Central Bank of India. For the reasons given above the question No. 2 is answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. C. R. BANERJI J.-- I agree.
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1978 (8) TMI 51 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Waiver Or Reduction ... ... ... ... ..... if he was so satisfied, to reduce or waive the amount of interest payable under s. 139(8). However, the question of sufficient cause does not arise for consideration in a case under s. 273A(1)(iii). Under these circumstances, it is obvious that the decision of the Commissioner has been, at least in part, swayed by an extraneous consideration, i.e., extraneous to what he had to consider under cl. (c) of s. 273A(1). Under these circumstances, this special civil application is allowed and the order, annex. F to the petition, being the order dated April 27, 1978, passed by the first respondent, is quashed and set aside. Under the circumstances, the Commissioner is directed to take up for reconsideration the petitioner s application under s. 273A and to determine it afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment. Rule is made accordingly absolute. The Commissioner will pay the costs of this petition to the petitioner. Application allowed.
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1978 (8) TMI 50 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Income Of HUF ... ... ... ... ..... with the question as to who is the assessee. We have already noted that the joint family was never an assessee and it was only the karta who was all the time the assessee in his individual capacity. Therefore, when s. 148 notice of July 30, 1967, was given to the assessee simply, without clarifying that it was with reference to the joint family, that notice cannot be taken advantage of to start proceedings under s. 148 against the Hindu joint family. In Mathura Prasad v. CIT 1966 60 ITR 428 the Supreme Court held that the Tribunal is entitled to reject an application for reference, if the question of law,even though arising from its order, is academic or is concluded by a judgment of the highest court. The Tribunal relied on this Supreme Court s decision to reach the conclusion it arrived at. Therefore, we see no point in directing the reference of the questions to the High Court. In the result, the two income-tax cases are dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1978 (8) TMI 49 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Property Passing On Death ... ... ... ... ..... e No. 4 of 1966 (CGT v. Nagji Dullabhji, decided on 20th November, 1975, by Vimadalal and Desai JJ.-since reported in 1979 118 ITR 804 (Bom)) and with what has been held by us in our judgment delivered today in Estate Duty Reference No. 1 of 1969 (Ramanlal Nagji and Dhirajilal Nagji v. CED-since reported in 1979 118 ITR 785 (Bom)). The case before us in the present reference is indeed stronger inasmuch as in the deed of partnership there is a clear recital indicating the reasons for induction of the new partners, which reason has been accepted by the Tribunal. If there is such clear finding, then the question referred to us is capable of having only one answer, which must be to the effect that there was no gift of the goodwill or of any share of goodwill to Ramesh and, therefore, the 1/6th share in the goodwill could not be added to the estate left by the deceased. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the accountable person.
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1978 (8) TMI 48 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Adequate Consideration, Gift By Deceased, Partnership Deed, Property Passing On Death ... ... ... ... ..... de in the decisions given in Gift-tax References Nos. 3 of 1966 (CGT v. Smt. Lalita B. Shah) and 4 of 1966 (CGT v. Nagji Dullabhji). In the result, we are of the opinion that there was no gift of the 45 share in the goodwill and the other assets to Ramanlal or Dhirajlal, and, if that is so, the provisions contained in s. 10 of the E.D. Act can have no relevance. In this view of the matter, both the questions will be required to be answered in favour of the accountable persons and are so answered. As far as question No. 1 is concerned, we would clarify that the accountable persons have never objected to the 55 share of Nagjibhai in the goodwill and other assets as having passed on his death and being includible in his estate. Therefore, the answers we have given only affect the balance of 45 share which, according to the Tribunal, was hit by s. 10 and which was erroneous in the view that we have taken. The revenue will pay to the accountable persons the costs of the reference.
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