|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 200 Records
-
1979 (1) TMI 196
Form and contents of balance sheet and profit and loss account ... ... ... ... ..... ies in a given year is dividend, and the rest represents the assets of the company. The fund in the hands of the liquidator is one when the fund or a part of it is distributed, the distribution is deemed to take place in the same proportion in which the capital and accumulated profits stood in the accounts of the company immediately before the winding up. The above reasoning makes it clear that the principle of the decision in Burrell case 1924 9 TC 27 1924 2 KB 52 (CA) was got over under the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, by the amendment effected by the Finance Act, 1956, to the provisions of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922. There is no such corresponding amendment to the provisions of the Super Profits Tax Act. In this view again, the reasoning of the Tribunal, following the principle in Burrell case 1924 9 TC 27 (CA), appears to be correct. We answer the question referred in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (1) TMI 195
Whether the appellants would be comprehended in the expression "any person interested in the affairs of the company?
Whether the appellants have become the members of the company or are the creditors of the company?
Held that:- The judgment of the Division Bench dated 16th July, 1976 is set aside and the order of the company judge dated 26th April, 1976 is restored . It may be mentioned that the appellants agree to implement the scheme. They undertake to bring Rs. 3 lakhs as liquid finance for implementing the scheme. The question of the know-how was examined by the company judge who has accepted their fitness to run the business and nothing was pointed out to us to depart from the same. Therefore, viewed from any angle, we see no objection to granting the application of the appellants for substitution/modification as sponsor of the scheme.
-
1979 (1) TMI 194
Whether the appellant has made out any case for the exercise of the power of the Commission under section 13(2) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969?
Held that:- Allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Commission rejecting the application of the appellant under section 13(2), revoke the order dated 14th May, 1976, and remit the case to the Commission so that the Commission may dispose of the application of the Registrar under section 10(a)(iii ) in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. The Commission will give an opportunity to the appellant to file a proper reply in conformity with the requirements of the Regulations and after taking such relevant evidence as may be produced by both parties, proceed to dispose of the application of the Registrar on merits in accordance with law
-
1979 (1) TMI 172
... ...
... ... ..... to s. 271(1)(C) is not held to be applicable, no penalty would be exigible under the main provisions for sec. 271(1)(c). The onus would lie on the Revenue to prove that the assessee is guilty of concealment of income. This would be so in view of the Supreme Court s judgment in Anwar Ali s case(1). In our opinion the onus that would lie on the Revenue cannot be said to have been discharged because only the assessee s legal plea that it is not liable to any tax on capital gains has not been accepted, but that by itself would not lead to the inference that the assessee is guilty of concealment of its income. The legal contention bonafide raised whether it is ultimately accepted or rejected would not provide material for holding that the assessee is guilty of concealment of income. 22. For the aforesaid reasons we hold that no penalty under s. 271(1)(c) is exigible in these cases. The penalties levied for both the years thus cancelled. 23. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
-
1979 (1) TMI 171
... ...
... ... ..... . 1st June, 1974 in the case of Shri Karmendra Narain Agrawal, the question of calculating and levying any penalty under s. 273(b) also did not arise. The learned Departmental Representative, on the other hand, submitted that since the Department was in appeal against the original order of the Tribunal directing the AAC to re-calculate the penalty according to the rates as in force as on 1st April, 1966, the present appeal had been filed. 6. In our opinion, there is no merit in this appeal. It has been found by the AAC as a fact that the assessee s income at the relevant time was below the taxable limit and he was not required to pay any tax. There was, therefore, no question of his submitting any estimate under s. 212(3) or of levying any penalty under s. 273(b) of the Act on him. In the view we are taking it is not necessary for us to deal with the contention as to whether any appeal also lay against the order of the AAC before us. 7. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
-
1979 (1) TMI 166
... ...
... ... ..... er Industries there is no material to suggest that it was machinery being purchased prior to the concern coming into existence. On the other hand it is well known that this company was a very old concern (founded as far back as 1890 sources Kothary s Economic Industries Guide of India 1976). We have referred to the balance of payments which the assessee had to make to acquire new machinery as evidence from the published accounts. The cost of machinery ran to several lacs. In such cases whatever may be the stage at which the machinery is acquired we consider that items of expenditure in a case like this such as guarantee commission would go to constitute part of the actual cost of machinery. Where such expenditure goes to constitute part of the actual cost of acquisition it would follow such expenditure cannot be allowed as a revenue deduction. We accordingly reverse the finding of the AAC and uphold the disallowance as made by the ITO. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
-
1979 (1) TMI 164
... ...
... ... ..... e business carried on by the earlier firm upto 31st Aug., 1974. The firm constituted under the deed dt. 1st Sept., 1974 is a new firm that came into existence by converting the propriety business of Shri I.K. Bhat into a partnership business. On facts, therefore, it is clear that the two firms were different and there was no question of changes in constitution as held by the CIT. We are supported in the view which was have taken by the latest decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Mavukkarai (N) Estate Tea Factory vs. Addl. CIT, Madras-II(1). The learned departmental Representative referred us to the ruling of the Jupiter Foundry and Machines (Knives) vs. CIT Amritsar(2). The facts in that case are different. Moreover the ruling in the Madras High Court cited above are on all fours with the facts of the instant case. For the fore-going reasons, we set aside order of the CIT and restore the order of the ITO accepting the assessee s claim for two separate assessments.
-
1979 (1) TMI 162
... ...
... ... ..... . We now take up the appeal ITA No. 2133/Mds/77-78. Inasmuch as, there was no HUF which was hitherto assessed as undivided prior to the complete partition having taken place on 31st March, 1973, the assessee s case did not fall within the purview of the provisions of s. 171 and the question of the ITO passing an order as contemplated under s. 171 did not arise. The AAC was, therefore, justified in annulling the order passed under s. 171. 7. Coming to the appeal Nos. 503 and 504/Mds/78-79 the AAC has given valid reasons for the conclusion that there was no partial partition as on 31st March, 1971. Therefore, the plea that there was a genuine firm which was in existence for the asst. yrs. 1972-73 and 1973-74, is unacceptable and the AAC was justified in cancelling the two assessments made on the said firm for the asst. yrs. 1972-73 and 1973-74 though the ITO had made the assessments only as a protective measure. 8. The result is that all the appeals of the Revenue are dismissed
-
1979 (1) TMI 161
... ...
... ... ..... ure properly allowable in earning the profits, salary, interest, commission or other remuneration is not to be allowed in determining the taxable total income of the partner. The receipt by the partner is business income for the purpose of s. 10(1), and that being business income expenditure necessary for the purpose of earning that income and appropriate allowances are deductible therefrom in determining the taxable income of the partner . Looking to the aforesaid observations and the facts as set out by us, we find that the expenditure has been incurred for the purposes of earning the share income. The assessee has also disallowed 1/4th of the expenditure as inadmissible. We consider that this disallowance is adequate particularly looking to the disallowances made in the past as also in the immediately succeeding year. We, therefore, hold that the assessee is entitled to the full deduction of Rs. 17,034. The ITO will modify the assessment accordingly. The appeal is allowed.
-
1979 (1) TMI 160
... ...
... ... ..... to state that the notice under s. 142(1) which was issued initially on 19th Oct.,1976 was much prior even to the date of the notice under s. 139(2), which is 1st Nov.,1975. The initial notice under s. 142(1) is, therefore, ab initio void. A subsequent reminder to a notice which is ab initio void cannot cure the initial defect. Since there is no valid notice under s. 142(1) there can be no default and hence the question of making a best judgment asst. under s. 144 cannot arise. I would, therefore, accept the assessee s petition under s. 146 and cancel the assessment and direct the ITO to make a fresh assessment in accordance with law. It is needless to state that the findings of the AAC on the application under s. 146 stand set aside. ITA No.951/Mds/78-79 is, therefore, allowed. 7. Since the application under s. 146 has been accepted and the assessment cancelled to be re-done, the appeal against the quantum becomes superfluous and ITA No.952/Mds/78-79 is accordingly dismissed.
-
1979 (1) TMI 159
... ...
... ... ..... re than at Madras. There is difference between the departmental valuer and the assessee s valuer s report regarding the value of the electrical equipments and water-supply equipments. Taking into consideration the various factors, we agree with the finding of the AAC that the rate of Rs. 280 per sq. metre on an average is quite reasonable for a building at Vellore. The AAC is also justified in taking 7 1/2 per cent for personal supervision as against 5 per cent of the cost taken by the departmental valuer. We also believe the assessee s case that some old materials were also utilised. As such, we confirm the finding of the AAC on the cost of construction. The assessee has not appealed against the relief being not given to the full expenditure based on the assessee s valuer. The effective difference taken by the AAC is very reasonable and hence we agree with the AAC that the assessee is entitled to a relief of Rs. 28,755. 8. In the result, the departmental appeal is dismissed.
-
1979 (1) TMI 158
... ...
... ... ..... rdian of the minors. If the legal guardian chose to discharge his legal obligations in educating his children from other funds certainly it was not necessary for the mother-donor in the present case to insist or even suggest that the educational expenses should be met out of the amounts gifted by her. No lapse can be attributed to the donor for non utilisation of the gifted amounts for educational purpose subsequent to the gift, because in law she had no control over the utilisation of the funds subsequent to the gifts. The fact that the donor had made other gifts at various times and this is the first and only occasion on which gifts were claimed as exempt for the education of the children is yet another circumstance which goes to buttress the bona fides of the claim. We have no hesitation in agreeing with the assessee that it has been established that the assessee is entitled to the exemption under s. 5(1) (xii) of gifts to the extent of Rs. 40,000. The appeal is dismissed.
-
1979 (1) TMI 157
... ...
... ... ..... -agricultural properties, which belonged to the family on the date of her death. 15. The learned counsel for the accountable person contended that the value of such half share be taken as on the date of the infructuous agreement. He suggested that though the document was void, the deceased had become separated. We are unable to appreciate the above contention. There can be no question of the deceased who was a female member, getting severed in status. That is possible only in a case of a co-parcener, which the deceased was not. The position is that the deceased continued to be a member of the HUF and was entitled to a half share in the non-agricultural properties thereof by reason of the provisions of Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, the value of such half share on the date of her death alone has to be included. The plea of the assessee is that such value would be less than the dutiable minimum. This will be as certained by the Asst. Controller. 16. Appeal is allowed in part.
-
1979 (1) TMI 156
... ...
... ... ..... mity with law and not to do anything contrary to the statutory requirement. In a case which arose under the Limitation Act the Supreme Court had occasion to observe as under in the case of Udayan Chinubhai vs. R.C. Bali. Even otherwise in the entire circumstances of the case disclosing sheer indifference perhaps negligence on the part of the Advocate, Shri Bharatinder Singh and no laches, whatever on the part of the appellant we would have been included to condone the delay of 12 days under s. 5 of the Limitation Act . If we look at the entire circumstances of the present case inasmuch as the material on record would go to show that the delay was not occasioned by any recalcitrance on the part of the assessee but had, in fact occurred in the office of the auditor. We consider that the contention of the assessee that no penalty should be imposed is an acceptable one. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order of the AAC. 6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
-
1979 (1) TMI 155
... ...
... ... ..... managerial responsibilities much before the assessee became a partner. With reference to the assessment year now under consideration, he was on the job of manager for almost ten years. In these ten years, he certainly would have acquired the necessary equipment for discharging. The role of a manager satisfactorily. The salary paid to him at the every inception, much before the assessee became a partner, was Rs. 1,000 per month and the increased salary of Rs. 1,300 after a period of several years is only fully commensurate with the responsibilities shouldered by him. We have no hesitation in agreeing with the assessee that the case of the assessee s husband clearly falls with in the terms of the proviso and the provisions of s. 64 (1) (ii) were not applicable to the remuneration paid by the firm to Shri Ranganathan. We confirm the order of the AAC deleting the inclusion of the amount of Rs. 18,000. The appeal is dismissed. The Cross objection is also dismissed as superfluous.
-
1979 (1) TMI 154
... ...
... ... ..... he payment because he was hospitalised in the circumstances stated, is the law to be interpreted that the ITO after hearing him has to give the reply, The facts stated by you may be correct. Yet I shall impose a penalty ? This would only make the hearing under s. 10(3) illusory and, in our opinion, making the provision illusory would lead to an interpretation which would not be reasonable and would also not be in consonance with justice and would be against mandate in the observations of the Supreme Court in Jodha Mal Kuthiala s case as to how statutory provisions of tax laws are to be interpreted. We have dealt with this case at some length since this is the first case of the type which has arisen and the Revenue feels that a point of principle is involved. We would hold that in the present case, no penalty in exigible as there has been sufficient cause for the small delay of about a fortnight in making the payment. The penalty imposed is cancelled and the appeal is allowed.
-
1979 (1) TMI 144
... ...
... ... ..... come-tax return was without reasonable cause. The assessee did file applications for extension of time. These appear to have been misplaced. At least one of the applications which is dated 1st July, 1968 was evidenced by producing the counsel s register. The other applications were filed under certificate of posting and we do not see any reason why the fact of posting the applications should be doubted. The fourth application was filed personally and again, looking to the facts of the case, we do not see why the fact could not be accepted. The circumstances under which the delay occurred had been explained and the explanation was not doubted. Taking an over-all view, we do not think it could be said that the assessee was guilty of conscious disregard of the legal obligations. The default, if at all it was there, was venial default. As in our view the default was for reasonable cause, we hold that the levy of therefore, cancel the penalty. 6. In the result the appeal succeeds.
-
1979 (1) TMI 143
... ...
... ... ..... t establishing on cogent material that the transaction was not genuine and that the amount, in fact, was the assessee s own income introduced in the books of account under the guise of a cash credit. In the present case the assessee did discharge its initial onus in as such as the creditor appeared before the ITO and acknowledged the transaction. The source of the amount was also explained. The authorities below have made no enquiry with regard to the borrowed from Shri Likhiram whose address was give to the ITO. No other material also exists on the record which could suggest that the advance of Rs. 3,000 by Shri Kishanlal was not genuine. We hold that the assessee had successfully established the genuineness of the credit. If any doubt existed with regard to the creditor s capacity, the most that could be done was that assessment proceedings could be initiated in the creditor s case. We delete the addition along with interest of Rs. 210 6. In the result, the appeal succeeds.
-
1979 (1) TMI 142
... ...
... ... ..... ut complying with the provisions of s. 144-B of the IT Act. In Smt. Chandra Prabha Pateria s case (2) we have discussed the authorities cited by the Deptl. Representative and have held that they are not in point. Following our decisions in the above two cases we hold that the Commr. was not competent to revise the order of ITO who had failed to comply with the provisions of s. 144-B of the IT Act while making an assessment. 5. The appeal is allowed and the order of the CIT is set aside. 6. In ITA No. 377 (Jab)/78-79 the AAC dismissed the appeal filed by the assessee on the ground that in view of the order of the CIT passed under s. 263 of the IT Act setting aside the assessment for asst. yr. 1973-74, the appeal had become infructuous. 7. Since we have set aside the order of the CIT., passed under s. 263 of the IT Act, we set aside the order of the learned AAC and direct him to dispose of the appeal according to law. ITA No. 377 (Jab)/78-79 is allowed for statistical purpose.
-
1979 (1) TMI 141
... ...
... ... ..... from the record that the CWT had passed an order under s. 18(2A)of the WT Act before the decision of the AAC in appeal. Whether the AAC can decide an appeal in such a case has been a subject-matter of a decision of the Ahmedabad bench a in the case of WTA vs. Keshavlal Bhalabhai Trust (1). The third member of whom the case was referred after difference to opinion between the Judicial and Accountant Members, held that the AAC was not justified in cancelling the penalty imposed by the WTO, in view of the order of the Commissioner under s. 18(2A) of the WT Act. This Bench of the Tribunal has been following this order and no order contrary to this has been shown to us. 4. Following the decision of the Special Bench and our own orders on the question we hold that in view of the Commissioner s orders rejecting the application for waiver, the order of the AAC cancelling the penalty was bad. 5. The appeal is allowed. The AAC s order is set-aside and the order of the WTO is restored.
........
|
