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Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 211 Records
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1979 (11) TMI 91 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
A Firm, Application For Registration, Firm Registration, Partnership Deed, Registered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... nt stands negatived by the decisions referred to earlier. As we have already pointed out, there was no application at all before the ITO, and, therefore, the question of applying sub-s. (2) of s. 185 of the Act or extending the principles of natural justice to the assessee did not arise. We are of the view that the Tribunal went wrong in finding fault with the Commissioner s order. Our answers to the two questions are as follows (1) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the ITO was not required to re-consider whether the filing of the declaration in Form No. 12 was an application for registration. (2) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that opportunity was to be provided for removal of the defect in the application for registration (because none did exist) as contemplated under sub-s. (2) of s. 185 of the Act. There would be no direction for costs as the assessee went unrepresented. N. K. DAS J.--I agree.
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1979 (11) TMI 90 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Net Wealth, Waiver Or Reduction ... ... ... ... ..... ditions are satisfied. In Rasiklal s case 1980 121 ITR 219 (Guj), a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court held, in the facts and circumstances of the case, that since the rule of audi alteram Partem had been breached by the failure to supply the reasons in the Commissioner s order, the order must be struck down. Having given our careful consideration to the matter, we have come to the conclusion that the assessee in the present case was not given full opportunity to represent his case. The order also suffers from misstatement of facts as pointed out above. The order is bad also because it does not record the reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at by the authority. In this view of the matter, the impugned order cannot be sustained in law. In the result, we allow the writ petition, set aside the impugned order and direct the Commissioner to decide the application afresh on the lines indicated above. In the circumstances the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 89 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Capital Employed, Deduction In Respect, Manufacture Or Production, Movable Property, New Industrial Undertaking In Backward Area, Profits And Gains
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1979 (11) TMI 88 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Deemed Profit, Profits Chargeable To Tax, Sales Tax ... ... ... ... ..... tax, constituted business expenditure. The assessee had been granted a deduction for this expenditure. Section 41(1) provides for inclusion of any amount which has been allowed as a deductible expenditure, in case the assessee had during the previous year received in cash or in any manner whatsoever, any amount in respect of such expenditure. The assessee had obtained a refund of an amount of Rs. 11,509 and Rs. 18,188, respectively, for the assessment years 1974-75 and 1975-76 in respect of the expenditures incurred by it for payment of sales tax. He had also got a deduction in respect of this amount in the earlier year. This being so, the requirements of s. 41(1) are satisfied inasmuch as the assessee, after incurring the expenditure in payment of sales tax, had received refund of this expenditure. We, accordingly, answer the question in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 87 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Income From Other Sources, Income Tax Return, Individual Income, Levy Of Penalty, Total Income, Unexplained Investments
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1979 (11) TMI 86 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Capital Or Revenue Expenditure, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... warrant the treatment of the expenditure incurred as capital expenditure. The finding that the expenditure was with a view to obtain an enduring advantage is not a finding of fact. It involves a proper interpretation of this concept laid down in judicial decisions which has been interpreted, as has already been referred to, in several decisions. The conclusion, therefore, raises an interpretation of law and we are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Shri Verma that on this question also the finding of the Tribunal should be treated as a finding of fact. For the reasons discussed above, we answer the second question referred in the assessment year 1961-62 as well as the question referred in the assessment year 1962-63, in the negative and by saying that sums of Rs. 23,600 and Rs. 17,771 did not constitute capital expenditure but were allowable in the computation of the business expenditure of the assessee. As neither side has succeeded, we make no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 85 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Capital Or Revenue Receipt, Capital Receipt, Mercantile System ... ... ... ... ..... ws the mercantile system of accounting and that being so, interest which accrued for this year alone could be taxed as income of the year. The case of the assessee that this amount was not taxable since it was received for acquisition of its capital asset and was hence of capital nature, was without substance. The amount of compensation received for the property acquired was certainly of capital nature, but the amount of interest received for delay in payment of compensation did not partake of the same character. It was clearly a revenue receipt. The Tribunal was, thus, right in holding that the interest was chargeable to tax, and further that the amount of interest which related to the year under consideration alone was taxable in this year. We, therefore, answer all the three questions in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the department. The CIT is entitled to his costs, which we assess at Rs. 200. The counsel s fee is also assessed at the same figure.
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1979 (11) TMI 84 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Dissolution Of Firm, Income Tax Act, Interest In Firm, Partner In Firm, Tax Liability, Wealth Tax Act
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1979 (11) TMI 83 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Assessment Proceedings, Assessment Year, Income Tax Act, Reassessment Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... ite of repeated notices, the respondent had not produced its account books for 1957-58. All these facts were held to be germane to the formation of the belief of the assessing authority that part of the turnover of the respondent had escaped assessment to tax. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the letter of Satish Chandra, one of the partners of the assessee-firm, and the report of the Board of Experts, which materials had come into possession of the ITO during the course of assessment proceedings for 1966-67, were germane to his forming a belief that the assessee s income for the assessment year 1965-66 had escaped assessment. He thus acted well within the ambit of s. 147(b) and, that being so, we agree with the view taken by the Tribunal. Our answer to the question referred, therefore, is in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The respondent-CIT is entitled to get his costs which we assess at Rs. 200 and counsel s fee in like amount.
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1979 (11) TMI 82 - DELHI HIGH COURT
House Property ... ... ... ... ..... ective in operation and its operation was extended to even cases of pending litigations. Dealing with what normally should be considered the proper function of an Explanation, the Allahabad High Court in the case of Shamin Ahmad Alvi v. Azizul Rahman Khan, AIR 1974 All 354, observed that the same is to make plain or elucidate what is enacted and not to add or subtract from it. It was further observed that the fundamental general rule is to construe an Explanation according to its own terms having regard to its context and setting. In this view of the matter, we are inclined to agree with the contention of the assessee that the Explanation introduced with effect from April 1, 1976, to s. 26 of the I.T. Act was clarificatory in nature and sought to set at rest the ambiguity in the provisions contained in s. 23(2) and s. 26 of the Act as referred to above. We, therefore, answer the question referred in the affirmative. No order as to costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1979 (11) TMI 81 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Employed, Industrial Undertaking, Per Annum, Provision For Exemption ... ... ... ... ..... ords per annum cannot be understood as contrasted with any broken period. It is also a well-settled principle of construction that in construing a provision for exemption or relief, it should be liberally construed. The reason behind this rule of interpretation is that the administrative authorities or the courts should not whittle down the plenitude of the exemption or relief granted by Parliament, by laying stress on any ambiguity here or there. The proportion contended for had already been worked out in taking the assets proportionate to the period of user. It was not, therefore, necessary to carry the same idea even in working out the 6 . If this proportion was intended even in relation to 6 , then more appropriate words as those found in the rules would have been employed, especially when the Act was recast in 1961. The question referred to us, accordingly, is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. He will be entitled to costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1979 (11) TMI 80 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... is the totality or the cumulative effect of all the facts and circumstances that would be the prime guiding factor to decide the aim and object of the expenditure, be it capital or revenue. Where the expenditure has a direct nexus, connection or relation to the carrying on of or conducting the business of the assessee, it must be regarded as an integral part of the profit-making process. In such a case, it must be held to be a revenue expenditure. Where the purpose and object of the expenditure is to acquire an asset or right of an enduring nature or permanent character, it is a capital expenditure. On a consideration of the entire facts and circumstances, we hold that the expenditure in the present case is revenue in character and not capital. For all the reasons stated, our answer to the question is in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee holding that the payments in question are allowable deductions being revenue in character. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 79 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Advance Tax ... ... ... ... ..... because of the amendment made in s. 216 whereby instead of in any of the first three instalments the expression in either of the first two instalments was substituted. That being so, it could not be said that the assessee reduced the amount payable in any such third instalment. Thus, in our opinion, the charging of interest under s. 216 is not automatic as contended by the counsel for the revenue. It is discretionary and for the exercise of discretion the ITO is required to examine the matter from the view-point as to whether the estimate filed by the assessee was in fact an underestimate. Of Course, in so far as ss. 215 and 217 are concerned, the charging of interest thereunder is automatic. In view of the above discussion, we answer the question referred in both the references in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The assessee is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 200 and counsel fee in like figure. The costs shall be of one set only.
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1979 (11) TMI 78 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Income Tax, Sales Tax ... ... ... ... ..... necessary for us to make any further comment about the decision except to say that the said decision does not cover the problem now before us. In the said decision, the amounts were actually received by the assessee for the purpose of incurring certain expenses on behalf of its constituents. Therefore, at the point of receipt, they were not treated as trading receipts they were accountable to third parties. Only when appropriated they became income. In the present case, they were trading receipts, even in the year of receipt, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Chowringhee Sales Bureau P. Ltd. v. CIT 1973 87 ITR 542. The transfer to the profit and loss account in this case is bereft of significance. Therefore, the Allahabad High Court s decision would have no scope for application to the facts before us. The result is, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1979 (11) TMI 77 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Legal Representative, Property Passing ... ... ... ... ..... voluntary act. The amount of pension granted to the widow of the deceased employee by the trustees of the employer-company, who had an absolute and uncontrolled discretion in the exercise of the powers in regard to the payment of pension, was held by the Chancery Divison in In re J. Bibby and Sons Ltd., Pensions Trust Deed Davies v. IRC 1952 2 All ER 483, to be not exigible to estate duty. The pension was held to be not property within s . 2 of the Act of 1894 and the widow had no beneficial interest since she had no enforceable right to the pension, the same being a gratuitous provision by the company without any bargain or agreement between the company and the deceased employee. For all these reasons, our answer to the question is in favour of the accountable person holding that the compensation amount of Rs. 74,960 was not property passing on the death liable to estate duty under the Act. The accountable person will have his costs of this reference. Advocate s fee Rs. 300.
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1979 (11) TMI 76 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Additional Tax On Urban Assets, Business Premises, Exemption From Additional Tax ... ... ... ... ..... on in Wealth-tax Reference No. 17 of 1977, we answer the questions referred to for our opinion in Wealth-tax References Nos. 10, 11, 14, 15 and 16, 18 of 1977 15 and 16 and 21 and 22 of 1978, and 1, 3 and 4, 5 and 6 and 7 of 1979, and question No. (ii) in Wealth-tax Reference No. 19 of 1977, in the affirmative, i. e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Now we advert to question No. (i) in Wealth-tax Reference No. 19/ 1977. The learned counsel for the department fairly conceded that the Full Bench decision of this court in Pritam Singh v. Asst. CED 1976 103 ITR 661, covers the subject-matter of question No. (i) against the revenue and refrained from contesting the decision of the Tribunal in regard to the subject-matter of question No. (i). The answer to this question would obviously be in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. The references are disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. B. S. DHILLON J.--I agree.
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1979 (11) TMI 75 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Adventure In The Nature Of Trade ... ... ... ... ..... away some of the vacant land, it would not make any difference. Reliance was placed on certain decisions in this behalf. We should not enter into this aspect of the matter because, as we have noted above, neither the AAC nor the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal considered the nature of the transaction with reference to the changed circumstances and the subsequent conduct of the assessee. They were merely guided by the initial intention of the assessee when the property was purchased and regarded it as conclusive. That view is erroneous in law as we have shown above. In our opinion, therefore, the proper course for us would be to remit the case to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to determine the nature of the transaction with reference to all the facts and circumstances obtaining in the case and in accordance with the observations we have made above. For the reasons, stated above, we return the question unanswered and in the circumstances of the case make no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 74 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Chargeable Profits, Indian Company ... ... ... ... ..... the I.T. Act, and the Act, we are inclined to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Mohan Meakin Breweries Ltd. s case 1979 118 ITR 300. We may point out, has been observed in Mohan Meakin Breweries Ltd. s case, that the High Courts of Madras, Bombay and Kerala have held the same view. The Gujarat High Court took a contrary view as regards the interpretation of the provisions of s. 80M but the said view was not sustained by the Supreme Courtin Cloth Traders P. Ltd s can 1979 118 ITR 243. As would be observed, the provisions of r. 1(viii) of the First Schedule of the Act have to be interpreted so as not to include the quantum of dividend only but the category of the dividend. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in deciding the question and we accordingly decide this question against the revenue and in favour of the assessee in the affirmative. There will be no order as to costs. S. S. DEWAN J.--I agree.
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1979 (11) TMI 73 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Assessee's Appeal, Natural Justice ... ... ... ... ..... . Moreover, even if the department s ground ultimately succeeds on merits, the assessee will not be adversely affected and will not be in a worse position than if it had preferred no appeal at all. For the above reasons, we are of opinion that the Appellate Tribunal erred in not permitting the department to raise this contention regarding the disallowance of interest by the AAC. It will be seen at once that we cannot answer the first question as referred to us as it involves a decision on the merits of the allowance of Rs. 2,77,691 made by the AAC which the Tribunal is yet to decide. We can only answer the two questions referred to us by saying that the Tribunal was not justified in allowing the relief of Rs. 9,28,000, in the case of the assessee, by precluding the department from agitating the disallowance of interest to the extent of Rs. 2,77,691 and that the Tribunal should have entertained this ground and then disposed of the appeal in the light, of its decision thereon.
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1979 (11) TMI 72 - DELHI HIGH COURT
In Part, Income Of HUF ... ... ... ... ..... e, inter alia, of optical goods which was not entirely divorced from the old optical goods business of the HUF. It was further not brought out that any of those coparceners had acquired any specialised technical skill which could be termed the result of his gains and learnings analogous to those envisaged by the Hindu Gains of Learnings Act of 1930. So far as devotion of personal efforts, time and expertise by the coparceners, there was nothing unusual. An HUF does not work in vacuum. It is its members who operate it and its business, and put in their time, labour and skill for their success. That is the normal incident and expectation of an HUF. In the present case, the four coparceners have done nothing more. In the totality of these circumstances, there is no escape from the conclusion that the business income from the partnership business belonged to the assessee-HUF. We answer the question referred in the negative. No order as to costs. Question answered in the negative.
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