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Showing 141 to 160 of 211 Records
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1979 (11) TMI 71 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Religious Trust, Trusts Act ... ... ... ... ..... rustees as an admissible deduction ? As noted above, the facts, found by the Tribunal were that the assessee is a charitable and religious trust and is governed by the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1922, and not by the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. It could not be shown to us that there is any restriction placed in the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1922, in the matter of payment of remuneration by the trust to the trustees. It was further found and it is not disputed that the Lucknow Diocesan Trust Association manages the affairs of the assessee and this payment was made to them for the services rendered and that it was clearly for the purpose of the trust. On these facts, the Tribunal was right in holding that this amount of Rs. 10,000 was an admissible deduction. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. There shall, however, be no order as to costs since nobody appeared for the respondent-assessee.
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1979 (11) TMI 70 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Company Director, Industrial Undertaking, Limit For Allowance, Salary And Perquisites, Total Income
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1979 (11) TMI 69 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Unexplained Investments ... ... ... ... ..... ome of the assessee. We are not prepared to hold that in so differing from the two authorities below and exercising its own judicial discretion, the Tribunal acted arbitrarily or capriciously. It took into account the complete absence of resources of the asseesee and also the fact that having regard to her age and the circumstances in which she was placed, she could not be credited with having earned any income of her own. It was in these circumstances that, despite the rejection of the explanation as to undisclosed source of income, the Tribunal refused to make an addition of the value of the investment to the income of the assessee. We think, in the circumstances, the Tribunal was right. We answer the question referred in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. A copy of this judgment, under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the court, will be communicated to the Tribunal, as required by law.
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1979 (11) TMI 68 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Exemption From Tax, Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... 315 have held that such rebate is available to each of the partners in addition to the rebate granted in the case of the firm. It is seen from the commentary of Chaturvedi and Pithisaria on Income-tax Law, 2nd edn., Vol. 2, p. 1077, that the department has also accepted the view of the above High Courts. It may also be mentioned that the scheme of ss. 84 and 88 of the Income-tax Act has been subsequently modified and now s. 80A(3) has been introduced specifically prohibiting a double deduction as in the present case. In these circumstances, it is unnecessary to elaborate upon the issue. The above judicial decisions have discussed the matter at length and given effect to the plain language of the section. We agree and we are of opinion that the view taken by the Tribunal was correct. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs in these references. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1979 (11) TMI 67 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Fair Market Value, Immovable Property, Movable Property ... ... ... ... ..... affected persons, if there are any, before the competent authority to cross-examine the said witnesses and also to permit them to lead necessary evidence in rebuttal thereof. The competent authority shall be at liberty also to record evidence about the rise, if any, in prices of the immovable properties in this locality in which the properties under acquisition are situate in the period between l967 and 1974 and permit the transferors and/or transferees to test the said evidence by cross-examination or in any other manner and to lead evidence in rebuttal thereof. The competent authority shall complete this inquiry within three months of the receipt of the record by him and pass appropriate orders in this behalf on a consideration of the newly recorded material before him and in accordance with the correct legal principles. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. Appeals are allowed accordingly with no order is to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 66 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Assessment Year, Previous Year, Trade Loss ... ... ... ... ..... ceding year had not been taken delivery of by the purchaser and had been sold on its account by its agent. Therefore, it should have made the necessary entries in that year itself and there would not have arisen any question of the profit of 1967-68 being inflated as observed by the Tribunal. This mistake certainly could not have been corrected by the assessee itself by reversing the entries in the previous year relevant to the year under consideration and then claiming deduction of the amount as a bad debt or as a trade loss. It could not have been a bad debt and that contention was rightly given up. It could not have been a trade loss either because no such loss occurred to the assessee in the relevant previous year. We, thus, do not agree with the view taken by the Tribunal and answer the question referred, in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 200 and counsel fee in like figure.
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1979 (11) TMI 65 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Profits In Lieu ... ... ... ... ..... does not mean that any other payment which is made by an employer to an employee on personal consideration and without any reference to the terms of employment or to the services rendered by the employee would become profits in lieu of salary within the meaning in this clause. Mr. Bishamber Lal contended that the definition of profits in lieu of salary will take in only amounts which are due to an employee or which are received by him as a matter of right. It is not necessary for the purposes of this case to deal with this aspect of the matter in view of our conclusion already set out that this is not a payment which would fall within the definition of s. 17(3). For the reasons set out above, we hold that the sums of Rs. 9,500 and Rs. 5,000 are not assessable to tax in the hands of the two assessees. The first question is answered accordingly. The second question is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs in these references.
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1979 (11) TMI 64 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Attributable To, Deduction In Respect, New Industrial Undertaking, Profits And Gains ... ... ... ... ..... shares. Neither s. 85K nor r. 20 permits such a deduction. Section 80K contemplates deduction of the entire dividend income, provided that it is attributable to the profits and gains of a company which is entitled to deduction under s. 80J. This being the statutory position, the question of any further deduction from the amount of dividend received by the assessee does not arise. The Madras High Court in the cases of CIT v. Madras Motor and General Insurance Co. 1975 99 ITR 243 and Madras Auto Service v. ITO 1975 101 ITR 589 has held likewise so has the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Union Bank of India 1976 102 ITR 270. The views expressed by these courts have the authority of reason and logic and we are in complete agreement with these views. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs which are assessed at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure.
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1979 (11) TMI 63 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Burden Of Proof ... ... ... ... ..... f the Income-tax Act, 1961, would apply as much to penalty as to tax. Even if penalty is regarded as punishment, a person cannot be punished more than once in respect of the same offence. Hence, penalty for concealment of income cannot be levied once in the hands of the firm and again in the hands of its partners. Similar view was adopted in the decision of this court in Pearl Woollen Mills v. CIT 1980 123 ITR 658. With respect, we entirely concur in the view aforesaid. Once that is so, the case of the assessee is clearly within the ratio of the cases upon which reliance has been rightly placed by Mr. Desai. In view of our answer to questions Nos.(i) and (ii) in I.T. Ref. No. 15 of 1979, we answer the questions referred for opinion in I.T. Refs. Nos. 2, 10 to 14, 16, 17 of 1979 and 38, 39, 40 and 46 of 1978, in favour of the assessees and against the department and dispose of the references accordingly. The parties are left to bear their own costs. B. S. DHILLON J.--I agree.
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1979 (11) TMI 62 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... 55, still there will be an area where the children will be illegitimate to whom the section will have no application. For instance, an offspring of concubinage will still continue to be an illegitimate child and s. 9(2) of the Tamil Nadu Agrl. I.T. Act will not take in such a child. Similarly, the children of a bigamous marriage contracted by a Christian will be illegitimate and those children also will not be covered by s. 9(2) of the said Act. Consequently, taking into account these vital considerations we are unable to agree with the learned Addl. Govt. Pleader that the statutory declaration contained in the amended s. 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, should be invoked for the purpose of construing the scope of the word child occurring in s. 9(2) of the Tamil Nadu Agrl. I.T. Act, 1955. The result is, the two revision cases succeed and accordingly they are allowed and the impugned order of the Commissioner of Agrl. I. T. is set aside. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 61 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Employed, Industrial Undertaking, Per Annum, Provision For Exemption ... ... ... ... ..... is has been done, then the AAC rightly considered it proper to take into account the benefit received from another company by the family. The constitution of the family in the general sense and of the HUF in this case is identical. In arriving at the estimate, it is thus necessary to take into account what has already been taken as benefit and assessed applying the same provision. The circumstances that the two assessable entities are different, cannot affect the quantum of the estimate of the expenses needed by the same set of members constituting the different assessable units. The estimate has to be based only on the needs and not on the categories under which the assessments are to be made or the number of units from whom it was derived. Judged in this light, there is no error in the order of the Tribunal on this point also. The second question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1979 (11) TMI 60 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Company Director, Debt Due, Financial Year, Previous Year, Substantially Interested ... ... ... ... ..... count books. There can no doubt be one set of account books for several sources. But so far as this income is concerned it would not be appropriate to describe it as flowing from the same source from which the other income of the assessee accounted for in K. S. Malik and Sons flowed. This was a separate transaction which the assessee had on capital account with the company and the write-off in respect of this debt in our opinion constituted a separate cause as rightly held by the Tribunal. For the reasons discussed above, we answer the questions referred to us as follows (i) The amount of Rs. 3,83,996 was rightly held as income of the assessee under s. 2(6C)(iii) / 2(24)(iv) of the 1922/1961 Act. (ii) On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the above income was chargeable to tax for the assessment year 1957-58 as the previous year relevant thereto was the financial year. We make no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. Reference answered accordingly.
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1979 (11) TMI 59 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Cause Of Action, High Court, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... learned single judge of the High Court held that as no part of the cause of action for the reliefs claimed arose within the territories of U.P., the High Court could not entertain the writ petition. Similarly, in Abdul Kafi Khan v. Union of India, AIR,1979 Cal. 354, disciplinary proceedings were taken against a railway servant by the authorities in Bihar. A show-cause notice against removal from service was also issued by the authority in Bihar. The writ petitioner challenged those orders by filing a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court. It was held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition merely because the head office of the Railway was located in Calcutta when not even a part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction. These two decisions have taken the same view as we have expressed above. In these circumstances, we dismiss the writ petition as not entertainable by this court. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 58 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Additional Tax On Urban Assets, Business Premises, Exemption From Additional Tax ... ... ... ... ..... y no expenditure laid out or incurred by the assessee which could be allowed as a deduction to any extent. In the question referred, the sum of Rs. 3,00,000 appears presumably because that represented the total figure of discount. But as the point of dispute before the Tribunal related only to Rs. 2,87,500 so far as the assessment year in question is concerned, the amount appearing in the question would have to be substituted by that figure. Besides the question assumes that there was a payment to the subscribers, but there was none. If there was such a payment to the bond-holder, the entry would have been worded differently. In order to get over these errors, we would reframe the question as follows Whether there was any expenditure in the sum of Rs. 2,87,500 and whether it was revenue expenditure. We answer this question in the negative on the first part. The second part does not arise. As neither party succeeded in the reference in full, there will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 57 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... e Duty Act, 1953, in terms does not apply. I entirely agree with the observations made in the said case. As pointed out earlier, by the time the impugned order was made on February 17, 1975, the duty as would have been payable consequent on the order of the Appellate Tribunal, had been more than paid up. There was no question of allowing payment being made in instalments and imposition of interest as a consequence thereof. As indicated earlier, consequent on the decision of this court in the references, the accountable person would be entitled to a refund of a considerable amount. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case it is clear that there was no error in any order which was required to be rectified under s. 61, and the order levying interest, as has been done by the impugned order, is not warranted by the terms of s. 70(2) of the E.D. Act. Accordingly, the order, Ex.E, is quashed and the rule is made absolute. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 56 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Dissolution Of Firm, Income Tax Act, Interest In Firm, Partner In Firm, Tax Liability, Wealth Tax Act
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1979 (11) TMI 55 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Estate Duty Act, Property Passing, Religious Purpose, Transfer Of Property ... ... ... ... ..... exemption of one thousand rupees would not apply to winnings from lotteries. Therefore, the use of the expression not being winnings from lotteries does not in any manner suggest that the other kinds of winnings are brought within the scope of taxation. It would be incongruous to infer a liability to tax from the language employed in a provision granting exemption. The only other contention that was put forward was that the receipt cannot be said to be of a casual or non-recurring nature so as to be completely exempted from assessment. An exemption would be ordinarily necessary only if it is otherwise taxable. Only if there is a charge or its possibility, there would be need to see how far the exemption provision applies. When there is no charge as seen above, there is no need to go into any question of exemption. The result is, we answer the question referred in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1979 (11) TMI 54 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Exclusion, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... sed. The Tribunal held that there cannot be a dispute regarding the proposition that the rules framed under a statute acquire same importance as statutory provisions. It was conceded before the Tribunal by the learned counsel for the revenue that there is no conflict between the provisions of s. 10(13A) of Act and r. 2A of the Rules, framed under the Act. It was found by the Tribunal that in the case of Mr. Justice D. K. Mahajan the revenue granted similar exemption. In a similar case, I.T. Ref. Nos. 85 to 88 of 1979 (CIT v. Justice S. C. Mittal) 1980 121 ITR 503, pertaining to another learned judge of this court, we have answered a similar question, as has been referred to us in this case, in the negative, i.e., against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. For the reasons recorded in I.T. Ref. Nos. 85 to 88 of 1979, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e., against the revenue and in favour of the assessee, with costs. GOKAL CHAND MITTAL J.-I agree.
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1979 (11) TMI 53 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... nt view (Kanga and Palkhivala s The Law and Practice Of Income-tax, seventh edition, volume I, page 5). This will be particularly more so in a case where the opinion of another High Court is in the case of the same assessee and on the same point in identical circumstances for two years and after considering the Birla s case 1971 82 ITR 166 (SC). That apart, there is also the further feature that, even after the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. 1971 82 ITR 166, judicial decisions still show a divergence of view regarding the deductibility of interest payments in connection with the liability to pay income-tax. In these circumstances, we refrain from taking a view different from that taken by the Punjab High Court in the case of the assessee itself for the earlier years and answer the question referred to us in the negative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 52 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... basis of reasons given in the order of original assessment. It would be seen, therefore, that the law laid down in the cases of Anwar Ali 1970 76 ITR 696 (SC), N. A. Mohamed Haneef 1972 83 ITR 215 (SC) and Khoday Eswarsa and Sons 1972 83 ITR 369 (SC), as applicable prior to the insertion of the Explanation to s. 271(1)(c), still holds good and it squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Here penalty was imposed by the IAC solely on the basis of material collected during the assessment proceedings and findings arrived at therein. Those findings certainly can be relied upon in penalty proceedings but on their basis alone the imposition of penalty cannot be sustained. This being the position, we agree with the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal. Our answer to the question referred, therefore, is in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 200 and counsel s fee in like amount.
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