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Case Laws
Showing 181 to 200 of 211 Records
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1979 (11) TMI 31 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... he dissolution of the firm and made profits by the use thereof. The compensation which the business had to pay to Sham Nath for the use of his assets as well as by way of interest on amounts invested by him in the firm would be a deductible outgoing in the hands of Shambhu Nath. We are, therefore, of opinion that the conclusion of the Tribunal should be upheld in the facts and circumstances of the present case though not exactly mentioned by the Tribunal. The assessee , an old man, appeared in person and pleaded that on account of his present straitened financial circumstances, he was not able to engage a counsel. At our request, Mr. Anoop Sharma appeared as amicus curiae and put forward the case on behalf of the assessee. We wish to record our appreciation of the assistance rendered by Mr. Anoop Sharma in this case. For the above reasons, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the applicant. There will be no order as to costs in this reference.
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1979 (11) TMI 30 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Delayed Return Before 1-4-1962, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... h the infringement took place. This principle is unexceptionable and in fact has recently been laid down by the Supreme Court also in the case of Brij Mohan 1979 120 ITR 1. But in the present case no controversy as to whether the provisions of s. 28 are applicable or the provisions of s. 271 should apply can survive. The question has already been settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Jain Brothers 1970 77 ITR 107 (SC). If s. 271(1)(a) applies as held by the Supreme Court then we are unable to find any logic or statutory provision which would justify the applicability of the terms of s. 28 by reference to the period of default as has been done by the Tribunal. It appears to us that the matter is already covered by the decision of this court. We do not see any reason to differ from that decision. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us, as already mentioned, in favour of the applicant and against the assessee. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 29 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessment, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... ership has come to an end on account of the death of one out of the two partners of the firm, nevertheless the firm would not be deemed to have ceased to exist. In our opinion, the provisions of s. 187 of the Act are not attracted in the instant case. The question as to whether, if there is a dissolution of partnership as provided by s. 42 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, the provisions of s. 187 of the Act are attracted, does not really arise in this case because, as held by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Seth Govindram Sugar Mills 1965 57 ITR 510, s. 42(c) of the Indian Partnership Act can be applied only where there are more than two partners. It is not, therefore, necessary to answer the third question referred to us. For all these reasons, our answer to the first two questions referred to us is in the negative and against the revenue. The answer to the third question is not necessary in the circumstances of the case. Parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1979 (11) TMI 28 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a in substance though not in form was not one of the modes of return made to the family because of the investment of the family funds in the business or whether it was a compensation made for services rendered by the individual coparcener. There is nothing to show that the investment by the family and the enjoyment of the salary by the karta, Bhai Trilochan Singh, had a nexus. The amount of salary enjoyed was considerable and amounted to Rs. 17,250 in that year as compared to the total investment of Rs. 22,800. There are also findings by the Tribunal of long specialised experience acquired by Trilochan Singh in the manufacture of the particular type of machinery. Considering these circumstances, we are in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that the salary enjoyed by Trilochan Singh was his individual income and was not the income of the assessee-family. We, therefore, answer the question referred in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 27 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Return, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... directing the issue of the notice under s. 274 before the assessment is completed and that it is not necessary that the notice under s. 274 should itself be issued by then. But, in the present case, even this controversy does not arise. The Tribunal has found that the notices under s. 274 had been issued on November 20, 1963, itself, that is, on the same date as the assessment. The assessee had not challenged the validity of the issue of the notices as subsequent to the assessment before the AAC nor were any facts brought to the notice of the Tribunal to show that the notices had not been factually issued before the completion of the assessment. In these circumstances, the Tribunal s finding that the provisions of s. 275(1) had been complied with has to be upheld. We, accordingly, answer the second question in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. Both the questions are, thus, answered in favour of the applicant, i.e., the revenue. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Provision For Gratuity ... ... ... ... ..... uarially, under the agreement with the labour arrived at in this year. The second question is merely a variation of the first. It appears to proceed on the basis that merely because it was a provision, it cannot be allowed as a deduction. We do not consider that this manner of considering the scheme of allowances or deductions is justified under the Act. The Allahabad High Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. ITO 1978 112 ITR 1038, has pointed out that the claim for gratuity would be admissible if based on actuarial valuation, even if no provision had been made in the account books. In the present case, there is already a provision. This is an a fortiori case. Section 40A(7) introduces further aspects for consideration in this context. But it was not in force in 1971-72, and we do not think it necessary to go into it. The result is, the second question is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Rs. 500.
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1979 (11) TMI 25 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he amounts of salaries enjoyed by Bhai Sardar Singh were much larger than the investment of the family in the shares of the company. This tends to show that the salaries were more towards the services rendered and the expertise extended by the karta to the company as an individual, than as a return on that investment. It could not, therefore, be said that because of the holding of 100 shares in the company by the family the karta was being allowed salary. The Supreme Court has, thus, in the case of Palaniappa Chettiar v. CIT 1968 68 ITR 221, held that when there was no real connection between the investment of the joint family funds and the appointment of the karta as a director of the company, the remuneration paid to him could not be held as earned by any detriment to the joint family assets. The same was, therefore, not treated as the income of the HUF. In view of the discussion above, we answer the question referred in the affirmative. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 24 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ther the original agreement between the parties had undergone any modification is a question of fact. If it is the case of the assessee that the two parties had agreed that subsequent to August 31, 1960, the advances should carry no interest, it is for the assessee to plead such an agreement and to prove it. There is no correspondence between the parties and no resolution of the companies produced to support any such theory of modification of the original agreement. Mr. P. N. Monga wants us to infer all this from the mere fact that in the books of account no interest has been taken into consideration we also find ourselves unable to accept his contention that in the circumstances it should be held that no interest had at all accrued to the assessee after August 31, 1960. For the reasons above mentioned we answer the question referred to us by saying that the entire interest of Rs. 6,000 was assessable as the income of the assessee-company. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 23 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Income Escaped Assessment, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... n a decision that no part of the amount was taxable in the hands of the assessee. Subsequently, no fresh information has come into his possession. There is nothing whatsoever to show that he had received any information either in the case of the present assessee or otherwise as a result of which he had reason to believe that the view taken by him was wrong. This is a simple case where, on a reappraisal of the very same material, which he had earlier obtained, the ITO thought of taking a different view and initiated the proceedings. The action of the ITO was clearly without legal warrant in the light of the well-settled position regarding action under s. 147(b). For the above reasons we answer the first question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. As already stated, in view of the answer to the first question in the affirmative, an answer to the second question is not necessary and we decline to answer the same. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 22 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Company, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... Bengal Immunity (1955 6 STC 446 AIR 1955 SC 661, has no relevance to the instant reference cases because of the particular provisions contained in the Act itself relating to the applicability of the definitions under the I.T. Act to it. In my opinion, therefore, the decision of this court in Tax Cases Nos. 54 and 55 of 1974 Heckett Engineering Co. v., CIT 1979 120 ITR 417 (Pat) applies squarely to the question referred at the instance of the assessee. It has, accordingly, to be answered in the affirmative, viz., that the Income-tax Tribunal was justified in holding that the provisions of the C. (P.) S.T. Act, 1964, were applicable to this case for the assessment years in question. In the result, both the questions, one referred at the instance of the assessee and the other referred at the instance of the department are answered in the affirmative. Since both the parties have failed in achieving their point, there will be no order for costs. NAGENDRA PRASAD SINGH J.-I agree.
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1979 (11) TMI 21 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... continued with a change in its constitution. On this finding the declaration given that the firm continued up to 11th March, 1964, when it was dissolved as required by s. 184(7) in Form No. 12 was not correct. Section 184(7) read with Form No. 12 contemplates a continuation of registration for a part of the year when the firm stands dissolved but there is no question of continuation of registration for a part of the year when the firm continues after a change in its constitution which is not evidenced by an instrument of partnership. In such a case an application for registration has to be made in accordance with the new instrument of partnership. It is on this ground that the order of the Tribunal confirming refusal of recognition or continuation of registration for a part of the year can be upheld. For the reasons given above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business, Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... constitute business, as already seen, there must be something in the nature of trade, commerce or adventure or something akin to it. In the present case, we are unable to hold that merely subletting the property could be taken to be a business. If the assessee had taken a number of premises on the same basis and had let them out to the tenants, possibly the question would have to be considered in the larger context. Even a firm could earn income from Other sources . On the facts here, we do not consider that the Tribunal had committed any error in holding that the activity of the assessee could be brought only within the scope of the head Other sources . The result is that questions Nos. 1 and 2 referred to are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and question No. 3 is answered in the sense that the assessee was not carrying on any business, profession or vocation but only deriving income under the head Other sources . There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 19 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erally taken it into account. The question is not referred to us as to whether the amount of advance tax is deductible for the purpose of computation of penalty. We, therefore, give no opinion on this contention and it will be open to the learned counsel to take up the contention before the Appellate Tribunal, if it is otherwise permissible in law, when the matter goes to the Tribunal for disposal conformable to the judgment of this court. For the reasons above mentioned, we answer the first question in the negative by saying that the Tribunal was not justified in reducing the penalties. The second question is answered in the affirmative by saying that the Tribunal was justified in retaining the penalty under s. 271(1)(a) of the I.T. Act, 1961, but that it should have retained the penalty in the manner provided in s. 271(1)(a). The third question is also answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. As the assessee has failed, he will pay the costs of this reference.
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1979 (11) TMI 18 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... the suitor must seek his remedy against the legal adviser and, in the meanwhile, must suffer so far as the limitation aspect is concerned. However, where the position of law is such that even a skilled person might have made a mistake, the rights of the client should not be forfeited. The confusion that was created in the present case was by the demand notice which the ITO issued in pursuance of the penalty orders. It was mentioned in the notice that if the assessee felt aggrieved by the penalty orders made under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act, he could file appeals before the AAC. The assessee was thus plainly misled, though it could also be said that had he exercised greater diligence he could have discovered that the proper forum before which the appeal could lie was the Appellate Tribunal. Since the confusion was not entirely the making of the assessee and the blame should as well, to an extent, go to the ITO, I agree that the delay in the present case deserved to be condoned.
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1979 (11) TMI 17 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... come of the trust was utilised for charitable purposes. This contention had not been taken at any earlier stage. The only explanation given by the assessee for not complying with the condition of s. 11(2) was that it had purchased a property known as Rama Vilas . This acquisition has now been found to be irrelevant in the context of the provisions of the statute. Therefore, the assessee cannot be allowed to fall back upon the investment in agricultural land at this stage. The result is that the question referred to us is answered in the negative and against the assessee. The learned counsel for the assessee, however, contended that the authorities have not so far considered that to the extent of 25 of the income the assessee could accumulate in accordance with s. 11(1)(a). The question referred to us does not cover this aspect. Thus, we do not think it proper to go into it and we would only leave it to the assessee to urge it, if necessary. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 16 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Assessment, Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... s being the position of a return filed under s. 139(5), we feel no difficulty in holding that a second revised return can be filed under s. 139(5) correcting omissions or wrong statements made in the first revised return, for, the first revised return filed under s. 139(5) would, in law, be a return under s. 139(1) also. The result of filing a second revised return would be to extend the period of limitation for purposes of s. 153(1)(c). In taking this view, we are mindful of the prevalent practice of filing more than one revised return, which the department has been accepting consistently, and also of the difficulty in which the assessee would be placed in case they are unable to correct bona fide mistakes or omissions in the first revised return. We, accordingly, answer both the questions in the affirmative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The department is entitled to its costs, which is assessed at Rs. 200. Counsel fee is assessed at the same figure.
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1979 (11) TMI 15 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... lers. It is well settled that it is not for us to see the adequacy or inadequacy of the material but so long the relevant material is there before a notice is issued, this court in writ jurisdiction cannot hold that the notice issued is without jurisdiction For the reasons recorded above, we do not find any merit in this petition and the same is hereby dismissed. The authorities below shall proceed further with the reassessment proceedings in accordance with law. However, nothing said herein about the bogus transactions would entitle the authorities to draw any support as the case is only at the notice stage and it is for the assessee to satisfy the authorities on merits that no case is made out for reopening the assessment. At this stage, the learned counsel for the petitioner makes an oral prayer for the grant of a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. No case is made out for the grant of the requisite certificate. Leave is declined. S. S. DEWAN J.-I agree.
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1979 (11) TMI 14 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... nder section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act. A reading of the above averments clearly goes to show that the name of the petitioner finds mention in the statement of Inder Singh that the transactions entered into by M/s. Tola Singh Sohan Singh were bogus transactions and in fact no loan was advanced. It is, therefore, idle to contend that the ITO had no relevant material on the basis of which he could have reason to believe that the income in question has escaped assessment. This contention is, therefore, without any merit. No other point has been pressed before us. For the reasons recorded above, there is no merit in this writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. The ITO may now proceed with the reassessment in accordance with law. The learned counsel for the petitioner has made an oral prayer for the grant of a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. No case is made out for the grant of the requisite certificate. Leave is declined.
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1979 (11) TMI 13 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r. PC, 1973, it has been rightly confiscated to the State. In B. Ram Lal. v. State, AIR 1954 All 758, it was observed by their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court as under (p. 762) It is in the public interest that the property that the offender acquired through the commission of an offence should be taken away from him. It is a reasonable restriction that a person should not be allowed to retain in his possession the property acquired by him through commission of offence. Nobody can claim a right to hold a property, the possession over which has been acquired by him through the commission of an offence. The real owner, in the present case, seems to have remained behind the screen and has not come forward to claim the property. No other point is urged. For the reasons stated above, I find no merit in the appeal of the Revenue, the order of confiscation of the property in question to the State as recorded by the learned Special Judge is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 12 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... on the agreement between partners to share the profit or loss of business carried on by them. There may be more than one partnership deed during a given period, the latter one superseding the terms of the agreement under the former ones. They must, therefore, be examined for determining whether the profits of the accounting year had to be distributed between the partners in accordance with the last agreement alone or also under the former agreements. In the instant case, it was, therefore, necessary for the Tribunal to find out the effect of the partnership deed dated June 30, 1970, on the superseded deed dated September 8, 1969. This has not, at all been done. It is, therefore, neither convenient nor conducive to accuracy that opinion should be hazarded on a question not duly submitted before the Tribunal nor properly dealt with by it. In the result, question No. 1 is answered in the negative and questions Nos. 2 and 3 are left unanswered. There will be no order as to costs.
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