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Showing 21 to 40 of 211 Records
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1979 (11) TMI 255
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... ... ..... We considered a mere or less identical case in P.P.M. Thangiah Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu (T.C. No. 220 of 1977) 1980 46 STC 67 and the arguments addressed in that case cover the contentions taken in the present appeal also. Except for the difference in the figures, there is no difference in the facts. For the reasons stated in our judgment in the said T.C. No. 220 of 1977 (P.P.M. Thangiah Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu 1980 46 STC 67), we hold that the provisions of section 7-A do not apply to the facts here, because these transactions do not satisfy one of the two tests or conditions prescribed in section 7-A. The transactions in the present case, though they are export sales, are inside sales within the meaning of the Act. In these circumstances, section 7-A(1)(b) of the Act was not satisfied and therefore the transactions are not liable to be brought within the scope of section 7-A. In the result, the appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (11) TMI 254
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... ... ..... made on 24th June, 1976, within the period of five years contemplated by the statute. It is only that part of the Board s order which aggregated the turnover assessed under the assessment order dated 27th November, 1970, and the order dated 20th March, 1971, that is now challenged. As the order of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer dated 27th November, 1970, cannot be the subject of revision by the Board of Revenue in 1976, the Board s order in so far as it affected the finality of the said order will be bad. We, therefore, hold that the revision of the Board s order will be restricted to bring to tax the sum of Rs. 30,637.50 under section 7-A. In so far as the order directs the total turnover the order cannot be sustained. The assessee will continue to have the benefit of compounding for this year in accordance with section 7 granted by the order dated 27th November, 1970. The result is, the appeal is partly allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal partly allowed.
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1979 (11) TMI 253
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... ... ..... that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. Sales Tax Reference No. 24 of 1977 It may be pointed out that the additional question No. (2) in this reference has not been pressed by Mr. Kaji on behalf of the assessee, and question No. (1), in the light of the discussion above, is answered as follows Supply of sugarcane by grower-members of the society to the society amounted to purchase of sugarcane by the society. Sales Tax Reference No. 10 of 1976 The question referred to us is answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. Sales Tax Reference No. 8 of 1976 Question No. (1) In the affirmative. Question No. (2) The transactions were transactions of purchase so as to attract the purchase tax. In view of the fact that the position after the decision in the Khedut Sahakari Ginning and Pressing Society s case(1) was not very clear, there will be no order as to costs in all these references. References answered accordingly.
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1979 (11) TMI 252
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... ... ..... support of the said finding. The assessee had charged freight and delivery charges separately from M/s. R.R. Contractors for goods delivered to them which ultimately were sold by them in places outside Madhya Pradesh. In view of this finding relying upon a decision of this Court in Amalgamated Coalfields Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1966 18 S.T.C. 251. the Board held that the delivery of the goods of the value of Rs. 1,80,000 by the assessee to M/s. R.R. Contractors was in the course of inter-State trade and commerce. This also is a finding of fact and no question of law arises. Our answer to question No. (2), therefore, is that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the sale of Rs. 1,80,000 representing the value of the goods supplied to M/s. R.R. Contractors, Indore, should be treated as sales in the course of interState trade and commerce. 6.. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1979 (11) TMI 251
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... ... ..... urnover subject to the condition that when the same raw hides and skins are tanned in the State and sold during the accounting year as dressed hides and skins, the same will not be taxable under entry 7(b). This observation of the Supreme Court is so specific that there is no room for any doubt as to the actual scope of entries 7(a) and 7(b) and how they have to be applied in practice. In view of this, we are clearly of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding that the decision of this Court in L.M.S. Sadak Thamby and Co., Madras-1 v. Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes I, Madras-13 1969 24 S.T.C. 468., must be deemed to have been overruled by the Supreme Court by its decision in the Guruviah Naidu s case 1976 38 S.T.C. 565 (S.C.). If so, there is no controversy that the order of the Tribunal on merits is correct. Under these circumstances, these tax revision petitions fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 250
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... ... ..... s, manufacture or processing of goods would be commercially inexpedient, goods required in that process would fall within the expression in the manufacture of goods . The Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between the process carried out for manufacture and the raw material to be used for the finished goods. According to the provisions of section 8(3)(b) read with rule 13 of the Central Sales Tax Rules, the assessee was entitled to exemption for use by him in the manufacture or processing of goods for sale or in mining or in the generation or distribution of electricity or any other form of power. The local Act, however, restricts the exemption to the goods for use by the manufacturer as raw materials in the manufacture of goods for sale. For the reasons recorded above, we answer the question referred to in the negative, i.e., in favour of the petitioner and against the assessee. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1979 (11) TMI 249
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... ... ..... defines toilet as to dress, attire, comb, etc. Toiletry is defined as performance of the toilet the apparatus of the toilet . In effect, toiletry and cosmetics would be synonymous terms. What are commonly called toilet articles can be regarded as cosmetics and in the age in which we are living many cosmetics would, for a good section of the people, be regarded as essential items of toilet. The question before us is not whether hair-oil is a toilet article. The question is whether it is not an article of cosmetics. In our opinion, there can be no doubt that, in the absence of the use of the word toilet or toiletry in any of the schedules of the Act, cosmetics would include hair-oil. Accordingly, Sales Tax References Nos. 9 and 10 of 1977 are answered in favour of the revenue. We find no force in the contentions raised in the writ petition. The rule is discharged and the petition dismissed. In the circumstances of the cases, there will no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 248
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... ... ..... sub-section (1) of section 7-A of the Act contemplates only one State. The expression used is despatches them to a place outside the State . The word State has been defined under the Act as meaning the State of Tamil Nadu. Therefore, as soon as it is found that there was a despatch to a place outside the State of Tamil Nadu, clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 7-A of the Act would be satisfied. We have already seen that the exception is only in favour of a transaction in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. This is not such a sale. The result is that the present transaction would fall within the scope of section 7-A of the Act and, therefore, it was rightly brought to tax under the said provision. We may make it clear that the present judgment will not in any manner affect the question of the liability to tax or otherwise with reference to the amendment made by Central Act 103 of 1976. The appeal is dismissed with costs, counsel s fee Rs. 250. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 247
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... ... ..... to the question whether lignite fell within the category of charcoal or not. The entry in the Second Schedule or section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act had not to be construed by the learned Judges in that case. We do not, therefore, find anything in the said decision which requires us to take a view different from what we have earlier expressed. We may also point out that the process which goes to the manufacture or making of lignite briquette is the same as employed for the purpose of obtaining coke and that is how the Central Government had understood lignite briquettes as coming within the scope of the term coke used in the Act. We do not consider there is any error in the manner in which it was understood by the communication of the Central Government. The word charcoal has thus to be taken only in its popular sense of carbonised wood or timber. The result is the revision petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 246
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... ... ..... to be immaterial and did not bear in its character as a textile . The uses of textiles in a fast developing economy are so manifold that textiles used even for industrial purposes would fall within the entry. Having regard to this pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it is clear that it is not necessary that for the goods to fall within the expression textiles , they must be used only as wearing apparel. They may be made out of any other material which is woven into a fabric so as to be used even for industrial purposes. The hose was produced before us. It appears to be in no way different from the cloth used for banians. It is only tubular in shape. It falls within the scope of the said expression. The result is, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner rightly exempted the assessee s claim and the Board s order to the contrary cannot be sustained as correct. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (11) TMI 245
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... ... ..... y the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue and when the only point raised in the revision application on behalf of the assessee was conceded on behalf of the revenue, then we fail to appreciate as to how it could be held that any question of law arises out of the order of the Board of Revenue. We are also unable to appreciate as to how the assessing authority can be said to be aggrieved from the order of the Board of Revenue when it had already made a concession in that respect before the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue has remanded the matter to the assessing authority as desired by the petitioner and the assessing authority cannot complain about the order passed by the Board of Revenue. It will, however, be open to the parties to raise such questions before the assessing authority, as may be open to them under the law to be raised before it. In the result, we find no substance in this reference application and the same is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 244
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... ... ..... ligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object of preventing tax evasion. The Supreme Court further pointed out that the reason why no limitation was provided either under section 14(6) or under section 33(6) was that tax evasion by unregistered dealers by reason of the clandestine modus operandi adopted by them and wholesale disregard of the law, was more contumacious in character, more sinister in its effect, both on the lawabiding taxpayers and the collection of public revenue, and more difficult to detect than tax evasion by a registered dealer. In view of this judgment of the Supreme Court, the Tribunal was in error in importing the period of limitation provided in section 15(1) of the 1953 Act into an assessment made under section 14(6) of the said Act. We, accordingly, answer question No. (3) in the negative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1979 (11) TMI 243
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... ... ..... contingencies, (1) where a return had not been filed within the prescribed time, and (2) where one was filed and it was in the opinion of the assessing officer incorrect or incomplete, and that in neither of these cases the jurisdiction of the officer to assess by best judgment arose, but that did not mean that where before an assessment order was made a return was filed, though belatedly, the assessing officer was at liberty to ignore it and make a best judgment assessment. In our opinion, the failure of the Sales Tax Officer in ignoring the returns filed by the applicants is an error which vitiated the said order of assessment passed by him. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessees and against the department. The respondents will pay to the applicants the costs of this reference fixed at Rs. 300. The assessees will be entitled to a refund of the fee of Rs. 100 paid by them. Reference answered in the negative.
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1979 (11) TMI 242
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... ... ..... s that a suitable direction may be issued for stay of the recovery of the amount of tax till the stay application is decided by the Additional Commissioner. The contention on behalf of the department is that if the petitioner approaches the Additional Commissioner for interim stay, the Additional Commissioner would certainly consider the matter on merits. Having regard to all the circumstances, we hereby direct that the Additional Commissioner may dispose of the stay application afresh in accordance with law within three months from today. Learned counsel for the parties are agreed that the stay application may be fixed up for hearing before the Additional Commissioner on 15th January, 1980, and till then no coercive process shall be employed for the recovery of the amount. In view of the fact that the petitioner has agreed to appear before the Additional Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Jaipur, on 15th January, 1980, no notice need be sent to him. Application partly allowed.
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1979 (11) TMI 241
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... ... ..... nown name and not with reference to its use, then the question whether a particular article falls within the said description given in the statute has to be decided without reference to the actual use to which the assessee puts it and even if the use is to enter into the calculation at all, it must be that use to which it is normally put and not the special use to which the particular assessee puts it. Certainly, hand grenades and bicat strips can be used as weapons of offence or defence. We are of the opinion that the abovesaid observation will have no application to the facts of this case, having regard to the fact that the parties entered into a contract giving minute details as to the specifications of the articles to be supplied by the petitioner to Gwalior Rayons Silk Manufacturing Company Limited, and if the articles were to satisfy those specifications, certainly that could not be called firewood at all. Hence, the revision fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 240
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... ... ..... ed by bringing in subsection (2-A) of section 4 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act continues to persist prior to 1st April, 1960. So, in view of the above-noted position, the assessment, which is now sought to be reviewed or made, i.e., for the period 1st April, 1959, to 31st March, 1960, would continue to suffer from the same defect and for the same reasons which have been pointed out by the Supreme Court and thus this assessment would have to be quashed. If the order of assessment is liable to be quashed, as pointed out above, then obviously the initiation of the proceedings for framing those assessments have necessarily to be quashed. Thus, I find that the impugned notice, annexure P-2, which has now been issued to the petitioner to review the assessment with regard to the year 1959-60, is not based on any good law and has to be quashed. I order accordingly. In the light of the above discussion, the petition is allowed but without any order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1979 (11) TMI 239
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... ... ..... respect of packing material could be granted under rule 5(1)(g) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939. It was found that the bills issued did not mention separate price of packing material which was a necessary condition of exemption and, therefore, the statutory exemption under the rule was not attracted. The learned counsel also relied upon the decision of this Court in Bhagwandas v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.(1) This case related to sale of bidis packed in wooden crates and the question was whether there was sale of wooden crates. The distinguishing feature of this case is that there was an agreement that bidis had to be supplied duly packed in crates and the crates did not become useless in the hands of the purchaser. 6.. For the reasons given above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the department. There shall be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1979 (11) TMI 238
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... ... ..... he fact that the assessing authority did not issue the pre-assessment notice as required under the provisions of the Act. The decision of this Court having become final, the revenue cannot now proceed on the basis that the nil assessment order dated 17th October, 1959, is valid, notwithstanding the fact that it has not been preceded by a pre-assessment notice. The Tribunal is therefore justified in holding that the nil assessment order is non est in view of the decision of this Court in the writ petition and in allowing the appeal on the ground that no appeal lay against a non est order. We, therefore, agree with the Tribunal and dismiss the tax case. It is, however, made clear that, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the assessment proceedings should be taken to be pending before the assessing authority and that he is at liberty to continue the proceedings from the stage from which it was found to be illegal. There will be no order as to costs in this case.
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1979 (11) TMI 237
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... ... ..... heard, made an enquiry and passed an order enhancing the assessment. It cannot be said that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. The order passed by the Commissioner was considered on merit by the Board of Revenue in the appeal preferred by the assessee and was upheld. In the circumstances, we are unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee that the Commissioner himself had no power to pass an order enhancing the assessment and he could only cancel the assessment and remand the case for fresh assessment. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to refer to the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the assessee, which are distinguishable on facts. 7.. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, our answer to the question reframed by us is in the affirmative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1979 (11) TMI 236
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... ... ..... d their character as iron and steel goods. However, in the light of the later decision of the Supreme Court, we have to find out whether the galvanised plain sheets fall within the category of steel plates referred in the entry. As we have pointed out, these sheets were previously known only as zinc sheets and merely because a different expression has come to be used it does not mean that they retain the character of iron and steel plates. They are actually materials different from steel plates and their use is also different, and commercially they are different goods. In these circumstances, we are unable to accept the conclusion of the Tribunal as correct. The relevant turnover would be brought to tax at the multi-point rate. We may at this stage point out that the entry has undergone a change. Whatever we have said above does not cover the entry as it is now in the statute. The revision petition is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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