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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 211 Records
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1979 (11) TMI 235
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... ... ..... re . The question remains as to whether they can be treated as small tools or spare parts of machinery and thus as item falling under the head mill stores . It has already been seen above that hardware and mill stores are related items and have something common with each other. Leather washers are certainly used in machinery but it would be difficult to treat them as a tool or a spare part of a machinery and, in my opinion, considering the question from an aspects leather washers do not fall in the category of mill stores. In the result, the revisions are dismissed and the questions referred are answered by saying that leather beltings and leather washers are not taxable as mill stores under Notification No. ST-747/X-950 (22)-67 dated 1st March, 1968, and the revising authority was justified in treating them as leather goods liable to tax at the lower rate of tax. Since nobody has appeared for the respondent-assessee, there shall be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 234
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... ... ..... ton yarn and made them into thread balls, it will cease to be cotton yarn falling within the scope. of serial No. 3 of the Second Schedule. The Tribunal pointed out that the product sold by the aasessee as cotton thread would definitely be used to make the textile or ply. In view of this finding, even on the basis of the narrow construction which the petitioner wants to put on the term cotton yarn occurring in serial No. 3 of the Second Schedule, the turnover was not liable to tax. Consequently, the revision petition fails and it is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 233
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... ... ..... ultra Fires by a Division Bench of this Court in Dawar Brothers, Bhopal v. State of M.P. 1979 44 S.T.C. 286 1979 M.P.L.J. 524. The Sales Tax Officer, therefore, cannot insist on the fulfilment of the condition as provided under the said sub-rule and he has to consider the application of the petitioner for supply of forms on merits. If he comes to the conclusion that the dealer does not require the quantity of forms applied for by him and is of the opinion that lesser number of forms has to be issued to him he has to give reasons for his conclusion. As no final order has been passed by the Sales Tax Officer no direction can be given to him in this writ petition. This petition is, therefore, not tenable and has to be dismissed. 5.. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed subject to the observations made above. There shall be no order as to costs of this petition. The outstanding amount of security be refunded to the petitioner after verification. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 232
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... ... ..... what the intention behind the order issued by the Government was, nor to extend the scope of the Government Order to any other matters, which are not expressly governed by the language of the Government Order. If any such indulgence is to be resorted to by a Statutory body like the Tribunal, the ultimate result will be one of arbitrariness depending upon the whims and fancies of the Tribunal or the economic predilections of the Tribunal, for which there can be no scope in the scheme of our legal system. Under these circumstances, we have no hesitation whatever in holding that the Tribunal went beyond the scope of its powers and, as a matter of fact, unreasonably and unwarrantedly extended the applicability of the Government Order in question to a case to which the terms of the Government Order, neither expressly nor by implication, applied. Hence the tax revision case is allowed and the order of the Tribunal is set aside. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1979 (11) TMI 231
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... ... ..... o visits it for the first time. Such a book, in our opinion, can very well be classified as a book for reading and, therefore, within the exemption. The next item in dispute is the sum of Rs. 11,650. The assessability of this amount was not the subject-matter of dispute before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Its assessability was taken up before the Tribunal for the first time. In Deputy Commissioner (C.T.), Coimbatore v. G. Govindaraju Chettiar 1980 46 S.T.C. 341. (T.C. No. 118 of 1971), the majority decision was to the effect that a point not taken up before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner could not be taken up before the Tribunal for the first time. Following the said decision we hold that the sum of Rs. 11,650 could not have been considered by the Tribunal and its exclusion from exemption, as directed by the Tribunal, is not proper. The result is the tax case revision petition is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1979 (11) TMI 230
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... ... ..... r certain engines were used for agricultural purposes and were sold to agriculturists is a question of fact. If there was no evidence whatever brought upon the record by the applicants to establish these facts, it can hardly be said that the Sales Tax Officer committed an error in determining this fact or that such an error was apparent from the record. For the reasons stated above, we answer the questions referred to us as follows Question No. (1) In the affirmative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessees. Question No. (2) In the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessees and against the department. As the applicants have succeeded with respect to one question and failed with respect to the other, a fair order for costs would be that each party shall bear and pay its own costs of this reference. The applicants will he entitled to withdraw the fee of Rs. 100 paid by them along with their application for reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1979 (11) TMI 229
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... ... ..... xt. The real problem in that case was whether the word textiles was to be understood only in the sense of materials used for wearing apparel, drapery. etc. The dryer felts were meant for industrial use. Their Lordships negatived a restricted use of the expression. The observation was made in such a context. The Supreme Court has in more than one place in the said judgment pointed out that the expression should have to be understood in the popular or commercial sense. The purpose for which the commodity is used is often a guiding factor to determine its character. But, in some contexts, the purpose may not furnish a conclusive answer. Judged by these considerations, the ropes in question cannot by any stretch of imagination be classified as yarn. Under these circumstances, we do not find that there is any scope for accepting the assessee s contention. The revision petitions accordingly fail and they are dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250 one set. Petitions dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 228
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... ... ..... e to take notice of the anomaly that has arisen as a result of the language employed in the provision and rectify the provision in a suitable manner by amending the provision accordingly. We may also make it clear that whatever we have stated does not in any manner govern the case of declared goods, which may have to be considered separately. It was brought to our notice that in a representation to the Board, the assessee had already pointed out that though Rs. 5,00,000 had been taken as an estimate for levying tax under section 7-A, the value of the total purchases during the relevant year came to Rs. 4,27,981.25. It is urged that this figure would have to be taken into account in case the appeal against the order of the Board fails. This is a matter which has to be considered by the Board on verification of the assessee s figures. The Board is directed to do so. The result is, the appeal fails and is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 227
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... ... ..... A. So read, it would be clear that in the present case there was a sale within the State. It may be that due to the constitutional prohibition against taxing an export sale the State Government would not be in a position to tax the sale. But so long as the definition provision read with section 7-A showed that it was only a local sale, it would follow that for the purpose of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 7-A also, it would be a local sale. In other words, as there was a local sale in the State under the provisions of the Act, then section 7-A would not be attracted. The fact that it occasioned the export would be irrelevant in this context. The result is that, in the present case, the assessee was not liable to be taxed on the purchases under consideration and, therefore, we set aside the order of the Board of Revenue in so far as this item of sale is concerned and allow the appeal. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (11) TMI 226
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... ... ..... se the Bench stated that they were in respectful agreement with the said decision. If we hold that the Bench, in the course of further observation, took a different view, it will be uncharitable to the Bench which dealt with the last-mentioned two cases and we will not be construing the judgment of the Bench according to the natural tenor and ordinary language. Consequently, it is clear that all the decisions of this Court have been uniform in holding with reference to section 16(2) of the Act that the use of the word suppression will inevitably indicate a finding that there has been a wilful non-disclosure. This conclusion of ours is fully supported by the dictionary meaning of the words suppression and concealment as we have indicated already. In view of these features, we are satisfied that the order of the Board of Revenue (Commercial Taxes) in this case does not call for any interference whatever and, consequently, the appeal fails and it is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 225
Whether section 81(3) of the Central Act or any portion of it was merely directory?
Whether the signatures in original found on the copies were intended to authenticate the documents to which they were appended and that in the circumstances of that case, the absence of the words "true copy" above the signature of the election petitioner in the copies was not fatal?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The requirement that every copy of the election petition which is intended for service on the respondent should be attested by the petitioner under his own signature is a mandatory requirement and the non-compliance with that requirement should result in the dismissal of the petition as provided in section 94 of the Act. The High Court was, therefore, right in dismissing the petition on the above ground
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1979 (11) TMI 224
Dividend Right to dividend., to be held in abeyance pending registration of transfer of shares
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1979 (11) TMI 223
Power of Central Government to Direct Companies Not to Give Effect to Transfer ... ... ... ... ..... is needless to state that the setting aside of the impugned order would not preclude the government from passing a fresh order under section 108D of the Act after proper investigation and collecting proper material and after following the principles of natural justice by giving the petitioners a fair opportunity of hearing to rebut the allegations. In the result, the petition succeeds, the impugned order dated June 17, 1978, Ex. E to the petition, is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) the interim order dated June 28, 1978, stands vacated and the chairman of the meeting is directed to declare results relating to items 1 and 3 on the agenda of the meeting of June 29, 1978. The chairman is permitted to withdraw the report of the meeting which has been deposited by him in this court. As desired by both sides, I direct that the sealed report be opened by the chairman in the presence of the attorneys of the parties. The respondents to pay the costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 209
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Winding up Application for, Powers of tribunal on hearing petition
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1979 (11) TMI 200
Winding up Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... rt which in turn has been extracted above, in the course of this order, does not satisfy the requirements laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned case to bring home the charge of misfeasance. I do not think that in this case the official liquidator has made out a case for this court to foist the liability on respondents Nos. 2 to 5 for any loss that may have been incurred by the company in liquidation. Even if negligence or act of misfeasance were to be inferred, then it is impossible to quantify the liability when there is a total lack of evidence as to the part played by one or the other of the directors. Therefore, on point No. 2, I hold that the official liquidator has not made out a case of misfeasance against respondents Nos. 2 to 5. As a result of my ruling on points 1 and 2, point. No. 3 should also be held in favour of the respondents. In the result, this application is dismissed. But, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 199
Court Jurisdiction of, Meetings and Proceedings Company Law Boards power to call annual general meeting
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1979 (11) TMI 198
Winding up Power to order public examination of promoters directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... d. Mr. Jain s contention, therefore, that because of the moving of the application for exculpation the order for public examination against the appellant should have been held over has no merit and must be rejected. We may note that the counsel for the respondent had sought to raise the objection as to the limitation with regard to the filing of the appeal. The argument was that this order directing the public examination was passed on August 29, 1972, and that the knowledge of this order was with the appellant because he moved the court on October 7, 1972, to set aside the order while the appeal has been filed in August, 1973. Mr. Jain s contention, however, is that as the appeal is against the order dated July 7, 1973, the limitation should be counted from that date. We have only mentioned these contentions but as we have disposed of the matter on merits, it is unnecessary to decide about the point of limitation. As a result of the above, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 196
Winding-up of unregistered companies ... ... ... ... ..... ondent-firm. In the result, this court directs that the petitioners do advertise the winding-up order in the Deccan Herald within 14 days from today. The respondent-firm shall further file a copy of this order with the Registrar of Firms in Karnataka, Bangalore, within 30 days from today, in accordance with section 445(1) of the Companies Act, 1956. The respondent-firm do file the statement of affairs with the official liquidator as required under section 454 of the Act. The official liquidator shall take all steps to recover the debts and other amounts due to the firm from its debtors in accordance with the details available in the books and records of the firm which he has seized or otherwise taken possession of. The official liquidator shall exercise all the powers under the Act and the Rules thereunder to discharge his duties as official liquidator. The costs of liquidation shall be borne out of the funds of the firm, realised from time to time. It is ordered accordingly.
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1979 (11) TMI 174
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... ... ..... r WT purpose. 9. It cannot be doubted that the Government has not taken the liabilities under the Coal Mines (Taking over Management) Act. 1973, and the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 and the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972. The ld. counsel for the assessee has submitted that the compensation has not yet been paid to Kuardi Coal Co. Ltd. and it is not known when the compensation will be paid and the compensation paid will not be sufficient to meet the liabilities of the company. Under such circumstances the AAC has taken a reasonable view in the matter. Moreover the WTO has himself accepted the position in the case of Smt. Rita Devi Jalan that the shares of Kuardi Coal Co. Ltd. have nil value in view of the nationalisation. A different view cannot be taken in the case of the assessee before us. We, therefore, hold that the AAC has taken a reasonable view in the matter. We, therefore, uphold the order of the AAC. 10. In the result, the appeal is dismissed
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1979 (11) TMI 173
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... ... ..... the ITO should be maintained. 3. The assessee owns a cinema and claimed depreciation at 20 per cent on the assets namely on building, machinery, furniture, electric fans etc., treating them as plant. The ITO has rectified the original assessment order under s. 154 by which he allowed depreciation at different rates as indicated in the earlier paragraph on the various assets. The mistake under s. 154 can be rectified if the same is obvious and patent and no two views are possible. If the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 82 ITR 4 is kept in mind the depreciation allowed by the ITO in the original assessment may be incorrect. But, however this mistake was not patent and glaring and two opinions were possible on this issue. Therefore, such issue cannot be rectified under s. 154 of the Act. The above reasoning is well supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in 82 ITR 50. Accordingly, the order passed by the ITO is set aside. 4. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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