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Showing 181 to 189 of 189 Records
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1979 (2) TMI 9
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... had disclosed all the primary materials before the ITO who came to the conclusion that synthetic resins come within the scope of the term petrochemicals . The learned counsel for the assessee has invited our attention to the definition of the term petrochemical in the Condensed Chemical Dictionary (8th Edn.) revised by Gessner G. Hawley. According to that dictionary, the meaning of that term is an organic compound for which petroleum or natural gas is the ultimate raw material The learned standing counsel did not dispute that for manufacturing synthetic resins, petroleum or natural gas is the ultimate raw material. We do not see how a mere change of opinion on this point by the ITO, even if it be on the basis of a circular issued by the CBDT or the memorandum issued by the Commissioner, he (the ITO) could reopen the assessment under s. 147(b). As the answers to the above questions are self-evident, we decline to direct the Tribunal to refer them and dismiss these petitions.
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1979 (2) TMI 8
Exemptions, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... rt of the profit-making apparatus of the assessee. That the assessee had obtained exemption from r. 7 of the Preservation of Private Forests Act or that the trees had been cut and removed together with roots, leaving no trace of the stumps behind, do not appear to us, in the circumstances, to make any difference. Nor are we guided in making the assessment by consideration of the profit motive of the assessee, which as pointed out in Vishnudatta Antharjanam s case 1970 78 ITR 58 (SC), is not material for deciding the issue. All things considered, we think, the view taken by the Tribunal was correct. In the result, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee and question No. 2 in the negative, i. e., against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. We make no order as to costs. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the court will be communicated to the Tribunal, as required by law.
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1979 (2) TMI 7
Estate Duty, Estate Duty Gift, Gift ... ... ... ... ..... , because it is the exact amount that was received from the chit fund that was brought into the firm. The deceased in this case was identifying himself with some kind of an interest in the contribution to the chit fund, because it was he who took credit for the commission due in respect of the chit transaction and remitted only the balance. The gift clearly comes under the provision of s. 10. There was some reference during the course of the arguments as to whether the entire sum of Rs. 10, 122 could be subjected to tax or whether any part of, it could be excluded. The exclusion envisaged was in respect of the interest component or the profit component in the deposit. However, the accountable person has not filed a reference on that aspect and, therefore, we do not think it proper or necessary to go into that question in the present reference. The result is that the second question is answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue., There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (2) TMI 6
Estate Duty, Property Passing ... ... ... ... ..... eiling at Rs. 39,450 as against Rs. 61,650, the proportionate value of Rs. 1,35,980 as taken by the Asst. Controller. The Tribunal has not considered the question of valuation perhaps because of its conclusion that the deceased was not the owner of the land in excess of the ceiling limit. As it is now found that the deceased continued to be the owner of the land, the question of valuation will have to be gone into by the Tribunal in disposing of the appeal. The Appellate Controller has referred to the provisions of s. 22 as impinging on the value of the lands. However, in the question as it is before us, it is not necessary for us to go into the question whether section 22 applied and what effect it had on the point of valuation. The Tribunal will have to consider it in the light of the facts and in accordance with the law. The question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee is Rs. 500.
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1979 (2) TMI 5
Advance Tax, Interest, Refund, Regular Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... pealable. Since a fresh order is an appealable order, it does not follow that the expression regular assessment occurring in s. 214 need be given a different meaning than what is contained in the definition in s. 2(40). Section 214 of the 1961 Act allows interest only up to the regular assessment which could only mean in the context of the section original or first assessment made by the ITO. Therefore, the above three decisions will not help the contention of the petitioners learned counsel. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that under s. 244, which applies to the case, the petitioners present claim cannot be granted and that even on the basis of s. 214, their claim for interest cannot be acceded to. We, consequently, uphold the decision of the Commissioner and dismiss the writ petitions. Since there has been no settled law on this aspect of the matter in so far as this court is concerned, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in both the writ petitions.
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1979 (2) TMI 4
New Industrial Undertaking, Relief ... ... ... ... ..... ation if it is entitled thereto. For the two earlier years also, similar considerations have been applied by the court, although there is no Explanation nor the figure of 20 to be borne in mind. All these aspects have not been determined by the Tribunal in its order from which the reference arises, and all these aspects will be required to be gone into. The question referred to us is a very general question to which cannot be given a very simple answer. We answer it as follows The Tribunal was, it appears to us, in error in taking the view that it took, namely, that the utilisation of the building belonging to the Pereiras by the assessee in its new industrial undertaking made no difference to the availability of the benefit under s. 15C of the Act of 1922 or s. 84 of the Act of 1961. The Tribunal is required to reconsider the question in accordance with the points indicated earlier in this judgment. The parties, however, are directed to bear their own costs of the reference.
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1979 (2) TMI 3
Technical Know-how Fees ... ... ... ... ..... throw light on the relationship between the parties as to how the manufacture would be carried on after the expiry of the agreement. The decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Ciba of India Ltd. 1968 69 ITR 692 has been followed in CIT v. Lucas-TVS Ltd. (No. 1) 1977 110 ITR 338 (Mad), and the present case also does fall within the scope of the decision of the Supreme Court. In our opinion, in the present case, the assessee had only a licence for a limited period for making use of the technical knowledge of the foreign company with the right to use the patent, etc., and by reason of this agreement, the Indian company did not acquire any kind of assets or an advantage of an enduring nature which would introduce a capital element into the consideration. The result is that the question referred to us is answered as follows The whole of the technical aid fee is liable to be allowed as a revenue expenditure. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsels fee Rs. 500 one set.
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1979 (2) TMI 2
Deduction Of Interest, Finding Of Fact, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... n the latter half of the accounting year, the Commissioner held that the amortisation to be allowed should be restricted to 50 . To this extent he was of the opinion that the order of the ITO was prejudicial to the Revenue and required modification. The officer was directed to modify his order accordingly. On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal allowed the appeal, reversed the order of the Commissioner and restored that of the ITO. It referred the question of law under s. 256(1) of the Act. The question of law has been directly covered in favour of the assessee by the recent judgment in ITR No. 56 of 1976 (CIT v. B. M. Edward, India Sea Foods, Cochin 1979 119 ITR 334 (Ker) FB ). Following the said judgment, we answer the question in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and the seal of the court will be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, as required by law.
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1979 (2) TMI 1
Delay In Filing Return, Delayed Return Before 1-4-1962, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... the assessment year 1967-68, which represented interest, was assessable to tax under the Income-tax Act and the remaining portion of such annual repayment, which represented capital, was not assessable to such tax. Our answer to the question referred to us in I.T.R.C. No. 163 of 1975, is as follows On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the amortised interest of Rs. 16,24,030 of the Zamindari Abolition Bonds was not income liable for income-tax for the assessment year 1968-69, but the Tribunal should have held that that portion of the annual repayment received or receivable by the assessee during the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1968-69, which represented interest, was assessable to tax under the Income-tax Act and the remaining portion of such annual repayment which represented capital, was not assessable to such tax. In the circumstances of these references, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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