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1979 (2) TMI 194
... ... ... ... ..... is urgent need for a clear provision. Undeniably, the thousands of undertrial prisoners lodged in Indian prisons today include many who are unable to secure their release before trial because of their inability to produce sufficient financial guarantee for their appearance. Where that is the only reason for their continued incarceration, there may be good ground for complaining of invidious discrimination. The more so under a constitutional system which promises social equality and social justice to all of its citizens. The deprivation of liberty for the reason of financial poverty only is an incongruous element in a society aspiring to the achievement of these constitutional objectives. There are sufficient guarantees for appearance in the host of considerations to which reference has been made earlier and, it seems to me, our law-makers would take an important step in defence of individual liberty if appropriate provision was made in the statute for non-financial releases.
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1979 (2) TMI 193
... ... ... ... ..... h fresh books of the respondent (though in circulation last year) is an avoidable infliction. Therefore, for the nonce, Government books for 'Rapid Reading' will continue in this year's classes. We direct so. Before the next academic year begins, Government will decide, under ss. 4 and 5, on preparing text-books itself or selecting from the private sector. This will be done on or before March 31, 1979. If the decision taken is either way, the books shall be well-stocked by the end of May. We allow the appeal in part and dismiss in part and as a corollary, ing dates and months but governmental processes are often 'paper logged'. 'The fear that the State Government may not be sufficiently conscious of the due priority to be given to the tasks now set before it has persuaded us to issue these time-bound directions. We allow the appeal in part and dismiss in part and as a corollary, order the parties to bear their costs throughout. Appeal allowed in part.
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1979 (2) TMI 192
... ... ... ... ..... Court was not available and, therefore, it could not be noticed. In the said decision the decision in CIT v. L M. Van Moppes Diamond Tools (India) Ltd. 1977 107 ITR 386 (Mad) was followed. The learned counsel for the assessee drew our attention to a decision of the Karnataka High Court in Dr. T. Ramadas M. Pai v. CIT (No. 2) 1978 115 ITR 883. That was a case in which the court was concerned with s. 80L. Though substantially the wording of the said provision is the same as in s. 80T, still, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, the Karnataka High Court decision may not be correct law. We may also add that the Karnataka High Court does not appear to have noticed the definition provision in s. 80B(5) and the Supreme Court decision also was not noticed, obviously because it was not available when they rendered the judgment. The result is that the question referred to this court is answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (2) TMI 191
Whether if the State law had repealed or overruled the provisions of the Central law what will be the position after the State law itself ceases to exist?
Held that:- Since the State Act has now been repealed the question of the prosecution of the appellant hereafter under the State Act does not arise at all, and, therefore, the question of two remedies being open to the prosecution which they may elect at their own option does not arise in this case. The appellant can be prosecuted only under the Corruption Act and the Penal Code and under no other Act at the moment. Moreover, it was obviously wrong to say that the earlier Central Law became violative of Article 14 as soon as the State law was enacted.
A Minister is appointed or dismissed by the Governor and is, therefore, subordinate to him whatever be the nature and status of his constitutional functions.That a Chief Minister or a Minister gets salary for the public work done or the public duty performed by him.That the said salary is paid to the Chief Minister or the Minister from the Government funds.
It is thus incontrovertible, that the holder of a public office such as the Chief Minister is a public servant in respect of whom the Constitution provides that he will get his salary from the Government Treasury so long he holds his office on account of the public service that he discharges. The salary given to the Chief Minister is coterminous with his office and is not paid like other constitutional functionaries such as the President and the Speaker. These facts, therefor, point to one and only one conclusion and that is that the Chief Minister is in the pay of the Government and is, therefore, a public servant within the meaning of section 21 (12) of the Penal Code.
For the reasons given above, we are satisfied that a Chief Minister or a Minister is undoubtedly a public servant as defined in section 21(12) (a) of the Penal Code and the view taken by the High Court on this point was absolutely correct in law. The result is that all the contentions raised by Mr. Venu Gopal, counsel for the appellant fail and the appeals are dismissed.
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1979 (2) TMI 190
... ... ... ... ..... before it to produce an additional affidavit before the appellate authority. It was open to the Appellate Tribunal, if so advised, and if a proper case had been made out, to receive fresh evidence in appeal under regulation 48 of the Appellate Tribunal Regulations and, in the light of such additional evidence received by it, to dispose of the appeal itself. Without following this course, the Appellate Tribunal was not justified in law in setting aside the orders of the Deputy Commissioner and remanding the matter for fresh disposal. This has been pointed out recently by this Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Castle Rock Fisheries 1980 45 S.T.C. 101. (T.R.C. No. 23 of 1978). 3.. We allow these tax revision cases and remit the appeals back to the Appellate Tribunal for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1979 (2) TMI 189
... ... ... ... ..... as it dismissed out of consideration a very relevant and material circumstance, namely, whether the purchases in question could possibly have been made from the Mahe markets as claimed by the assessee. We are impressed by this contention raised by the learned Government Pleader. We think the Tribunal was wrong in ruling out as irrelevant material, what appears to be very vital and crucial, namely, whether the purchases in question can possibly and reasonably be said to have been effected from Mahe. It is then and then alone, that the purchases qualify for exemption on the ground of inter-State purchases. As the entire approach of the Tribunal has been vitiated as a result of this initial mistake made by the Tribunal, we are obliged to set aside the judgment of the Tribunal and to remit the appeal back to the Tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal remitted.
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1979 (2) TMI 188
... ... ... ... ..... tioner. Therefore, it is open to the petitioner to have that error rectified by filing a petition under section 55 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, read with rule 5(9) of the Central Sales Tax (Tamil Nadu) Rules, 1957, which no doubt was not specifically referred to in the rectification petition. The rectification petition having been filed within the period of five years from the date of the order of assessment, it could not be held to be barred by time and the fact that the petitioner had confined W.P. No. 2676 of 1969 for the assessment year 1968-69 alone and not for the assessment year in question, namely, 1967-68, would not prevent the petitioner from getting the error rectified within the time allowed by the rule. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed and the orders of the respondents are quashed and the assessment made on the petitioner by the second respondent is cancelled. The petitioner will have his costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Petition allowed.
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1979 (2) TMI 187
... ... ... ... ..... arned counsel for the assessee referred us to a decision in J.K. Kapur v. State of GujaratA.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1996. under the Bombay Entertainments Duty Act, wherein it was held that a power to reassess must be specifically found in the statute. This is not a case of reassessment, but a case where the reimbursement was considered to have been wrongly granted. The said decision has no application. As the question as to whether the order passed on 17th April, 1974, is proper or not on merits is the subject-matter of remand, we should not be taken as pronouncing on the merits of the said order. The assessing authority, after examining the question as to whether there is any error in the said order, shall pass appropriate orders taking into account the submissions of the assessee. We would only hold now that the proceedings are not without jurisdiction. The revision fails and will stand dismissed. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (2) TMI 186
... ... ... ... ..... ristics of the article may indicate that the article in question is fundamentally different. In the Kerala case 1976 37 S.T.C. 221., it was held that caristrap rayon cord strapping is a different item from articles made out of rayon cloth. These decisions, which we have referred to, disclose the principle in the light of which the decision of this question has got to be considered and approached. The Tribunal, we are afraid, has not chosen to approach this question from the standpoint of the principles in the light of which these decisions have examined the question. It is, therefore, necessary to direct the Tribunal to consider this matter afresh and to render its decision in the light of the principles referred to above. We allow this revision and set aside the order of the Tribunal and send the matter back to the Tribunal for fresh determination in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. No order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1979 (2) TMI 185
... ... ... ... ..... iling an application under section 22 for an assessee begins to run from a date when the order is communicated to him or from the date when he had opportunity of knowing the contents of the order fully. Sri V.D. Singh, the standing counsel, drew my attention to the two decisions of this Court in cases arising under section 33-A(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The provisions regarding limitation contained therein are similar to the present provision in which the view has been taken that the limitation for filing a revision would start running from the date when the order was passed. These decisions are reported in Haji Ghulam Hussain and Sons v. Commissioner, Income-tax, U.P. 1957 31 I.T.R. 231., and Ramgopal Ram Prasad v. Income-tax Officer, Kanpur 1962 46 I.T.R. 529. In view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court referred to earlier, it is not possible to follow these decisions. The revision fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (2) TMI 184
... ... ... ... ..... ence between a tractor and other vehicles is that the tractor merely pulls another item of machinery. Rear dumper as well as pay loader are self-moving machineries with wheels. As they do not pull any other item it is not possible to accept the contention that these fall within the scope of the word tractor and that, even independent of item 55-A, they cannot be brought within the scope of the First Schedule. We are only concerned with the spares of rear dumpers and pay loaders in this case and what applies to the main machinery, i.e., rear dumpers and pay loaders, would apply to these spares also. It would, therefore, follow that the assessment with reference to dumpers and pay loaders as tractors would not be correct. The turnover regarding those items will have to be taxed only at the multi-point rate as no other item in the First Schedule applies to them. The revision is partly allowed. As the success is equal, there will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1979 (2) TMI 183
... ... ... ... ..... ntial character of the iron sheets they still remain iron sheets. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in these decisions and hold that the galvanised iron sheets are merely forms of iron and not iron goods and fall within the ambit of entry 48 of SRO No. 138 dated 28th March, 1963. In this view, the sales tax leviable from the firm on the sales of galvanised iron sheets from 1st April, 1963, to 31st December, 1963, was at 2 per cent only. The view to the contrary expressed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax is erroneous and must be set aside. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Sales Tax Commissioner dated 28th May, 1975, is set aside and it is directed that the firm shall be assessed to tax on the sales of G.I. sheets at 2 per cent for the entire accounting period from 1st April, 1963, to 31st December, 1963. Parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1979 (2) TMI 182
... ... ... ... ..... rge to tax under section 5(1) of the Act, but on account of other provisions contained in the Act the transaction is exempt from tax, such sales though not taxable in the hands of the seller, are taxable at the purchase point under section 6. In order to attract the charge to tax under section 5(1) of the Act, it must be shown that there is a sale by a dealer. If the sale is not by a dealer there is no initial charge at all under section 5(1) of the Act. We, therefore, overrule the decision in Guddad and Sons case(1). Our answer to the question referred to the Full Bench is that a dealer who purchases taxable goods from agriculturist-producers and who thereafter despatches them to a place outside the State of Karnataka except as a direct result of a sale or purchase in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, is liable to pay purchase tax under section 6 of the Act. The cases will now go back to the Division Bench for disposal in accordance with law. Ordered accordingly.
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1979 (2) TMI 181
... ... ... ... ..... inary powers of this Court are there to strike down their illegal action. 18.. It follows therefore that there is no basis for the contention that section 29A is constitutionally invalid. In each of these petitions, the allegations are made against the manner in which the action has been taken against the petitioners. We are not going into them, because, at the enquiry under section 29A, they can point out that a case has not been made out for imposition of penalty and, if they are aggrieved by the orders of the subordinate authorities, there is provision to file an appeal. We have only disposed of the objection regarding the constitutional validity of the provision. It is open to the petitioners to move the concerned authorities that a case has not been made out to invoke the provisions of section 29A of the Act. Subject to these observations and directions, these original petitions are dismissed, but, in the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1979 (2) TMI 180
... ... ... ... ..... section 8(4), read with section 13(3) and (4) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and, therefore, to be invalid to the said extent. We further make a direction that, while considering any application or applications made by the petitioner for obtaining from the appropriate Sales Tax Officer (or any other officer as may be authorised by the Commissioner in this behalf) blank declaration forms in form C, as prescribed under sub-rule (1) of rule 12 of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957, for furnishing them to the selling dealers, the Sales Tax Officer (or any other authorised officer) shall not withhold the issuance of the said declaration forms on the grounds either that the petitioner had defaulted in furnishing the return under the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, or that he was in arrears of tax under the said State Act. Counsel s fee Rs. 200, if certified. The security amount deposited by the petitioner shall be refunded to it. Petition allowed.
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1979 (2) TMI 179
... ... ... ... ..... t from tax as fresh fish under the notification noticed. There will be no order as to costs in these appeals. O.P. Nos. 2185 of 1974, 3892 and 6035 of 1975 and 2006 and 5087 of 1976-E and 4039 of 1977-L These writ petitions assail the provisional assessments. Exhibit P1 is the provisional assessment order for 1970-71. Exemption was claimed in respect of the turnover from frozen meat and fish kept in cold storage. The final assessments are pending in these cases and the counter-affidavit has pointed out that so far no assessment orders have been passed against the petitioners and that the questions raised are purely hypothetical and academic at this stage. The final assessments are pending and the counter-affidavit has assured that they will be passed according to law. As we have laid down the position in the other cases, we do not see any ground to interfere in these writ petitions at this stage. We dismiss these writ petitions with no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1979 (2) TMI 178
... ... ... ... ..... sh 1973 31 S.T.C. 456 (F.B.). The Full Bench held that water pumpsets are connected intimately with agriculture and are commonly used and understood as agricultural implements and that, therefore, they fell under entry 38 of the schedule to the notification dated 1st April, 1960, issued by the U.P. Government. In order that an appliance may be an agricultural implement, the real test was not, it was held, that it should be exclusively used for agricultural purposes, but that it should be commonly so used and that it should be intimately and directly connected with agricultural operations. Applying the Full Bench decision(2), the pumpsets would be agricultural implements, but the assessee will be eligible for the exemption only up to 17th September, 1970. After that date, the exemption having been withdrawn by a specific notification, the turnover would be taxable. The result is that the revision succeeds partially. There will be no order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1979 (2) TMI 177
... ... ... ... ..... But there is nothing in section 32, which imposes any restriction on the exercise of the power by the Deputy Commissioner on account of the existence of this power under section 16. In other words, the two sections are mutually exclusive and give different powers to different authorities. Therefore, if action could be taken under one section, it does not follow that action could not be taken under the other. Where it is possible to act under two provisions, the department may resort to the one instead of the other and it cannot be compelled to proceed under only one of the two provisions. Section 32 provides for the examination of the order passed by a subordinate authority under certain provisions set out therein. So long as the jurisdiction is exercised with respect to an order contemplated by the section, there would be no error in the exercise of jurisdiction. The revision petition accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Petition dismissed.
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1979 (2) TMI 176
... ... ... ... ..... ollowing manner Where an order of assessment is set aside by the appellate authority which remands the case to the assessing authority with certain directions for making a fresh assessment, the assessing authority has subject to the carrying out such directions, the same power as it originally had in making the assessment under section 7 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. But where the order of assessment is set aside by a revisional authority under section 10 of the Sales Tax Act, the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer to make the assessment can be circumscribed by the specific directions given by the revisional authority in that regard. If under the remand order made by the revising authority, the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer to make the assessment has been limited, the Sales Tax Officer will have the jurisdiction to make the assessment only to the extent to which he has been permitted to do so under the orders of the revising authority. Reference answered accordingly.
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1979 (2) TMI 175
Whether after the imposition of the ban on all forward trading in shares with effect from the close of June 27, 1969, the outstanding contracts that had remained to be performed as on that date were permitted to be closed or liquidated under the proviso in accordance with the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the respondent or not?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The true and proper construction of the notification in question it will be clear that the directions issued by the respondent to all its members including appellant No. 2 on June 28, 1969, in regard to their outstanding transactions as at the close of June 27, 1969, were proper and legal and the appellants' stand was clearly erroneous. It cannot be disputed that ample opportunity was given to appellant No. 2 to comply with the directions, but the appellant persisted in his erroneous contention and failed to comply with those directions with the result that the respondent had no alternative but to declare him a defaulter. In our view, the directions dated June 28, 1969, as well as the two resolutions passed by the respondent on July 2, and July 3, 1969, were proper and justified and the appellants' case on merits was rightly rejected by the High Court.
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