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1979 (2) TMI 129
... ... ... ... ..... as getting was of a permanent nature. When I read the second agreement, which is in fact the agreement to be considered for the purposes of judging the issue, the word sale is not there. Taking the totality of the circumstances in my opinion therefore the expenditure is of a revenue nature and is allowable. It need not be mentioned that the main factor which led the learned Judicial Member to hold a contrary view was the mention of the term sale of secret process in the agreement but when the agreement is read as a whole and all the terms and conditions of the same are kept in mind, the inevitable conclusion is that the expenditure incurred did not give a benefit of enduring nature and could not be termed as capital expenditure. Therefore the question referred to is answered in agreement with the order of the learned Accountant Member to the effect that the same is allowable as a revenue expenditure. The matter will now be placed before the Bench concerned for further orders.
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1979 (2) TMI 128
... ... ... ... ..... 970-71 should be followed. The D/R has supported the order of the AAC. 5. We have gone through the orders of the Tribunal both for the asst. yrs. 1966-67 to 1968-69 and for the asst. yrs. 1969-70 and 1970-71 mentioned above. The Tribunal in its order for the asst. yrs. 1969-70 and 1970-71 has not followed the earlier order the asst. yrs. 1966-67 to 1968-69 for the reasons given by it in para No. 8 of its order. The facts and circumstances have remained the same in the year under consideration, and the parties have raised the same contentions. We find ourselves in agreement with the decision of the Tribunal for the asst. yrs. 1969-70 and 1970-71, respectfully following the same we set aside the orders of the Revenue authorities and direct the ITO to exclude the share income of the assessee s wife and his minor son out of the share income of the assessee from the firm M/s. Shiv Narain Karmendra Narain from the assessment of the assessee. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1979 (2) TMI 127
... ... ... ... ..... the ITO is directed to find the correct peak and consider only that amount for taxation, we also similarly direct the ITO to give a fresh hearing to the assessee to establish its case as to whether the various credits as described above came from the rice business and could, therefore, rightly be set off against the addition of Rs. 20,000 as sustained by us also. In case it is established on facts that the credits flowed from the above business, then the ITO will be within his rights not to make any additions if the peak of the credits falls below Rs. 20,000. We may state that the counsel for the assessee did not place any arguments in support of the assessee s claim as was placed before the lower authorities that there were no unexplained credits in its hand. That part of the case can, therefore, not be challenged again either before the ITO or before the AAC in the proceedings to be reconducted in the light of our this order. 7. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1979 (2) TMI 126
... ... ... ... ..... cable to assessment proceedings which were initiated before the law came into force. Again, it has been held that the provisions of s. 249(4) are substantive provisions vide Mohd. Akhlaq Ahmed vs. State of A.P.(2). Consequently, s. 249(4) has no retrospective operation because there is nothing therein expressly saying so. Respectfully following the aforesaid authorities, we hold that the provisions of s. 249(4) should not have been applied by the AAC to the present appeal. We have also taken a similar view in our order dt. 22nd Nov., 1978 in ITA No. 338-339/CTK/1977-78. Hence, we vacate the order of the AAC and restore this appeal to his file for verifying as to whether the notice under s. 143(2) in this case was served prior to 1st Oct., 1975 and, if so, admit this appeal and dispose of the same in accordance with law after giving reasonable opportunities of being heard to the parties concerned. 4. In the result, the appeal may be treated as allowed for statistical purpose.
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1979 (2) TMI 125
... ... ... ... ..... cent was reasonable in this line of business. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case we deem it fair to set aside the order of the AAC as well as the of ITO and restore the assessment to the file of the ITO and with the direction to do the same again in accordance with law and in the light of the above observations after giving a reasonable opportunity to this assessee in a manner however that the income finally assessed by the ITO should not exceed the sum of Rs. 67,397 determined in the order of the AAC which is the subject matter of this appeal. We direct accordingly. 8. The Cross Objection filed by the Department is barred by limitations as it has been filed 4 days beyond the prescribed date. In the absence of any petition for condemnation, we reject the Cross Objection as not maintainable. 9. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee may be treated as allowed for statistical purposes while the Cross Objection filed by the Department is dismissed.
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1979 (2) TMI 124
... ... ... ... ..... of the HUF and the share of the income of the individual members was liable to be assessed in their individual assessments. 16. S. 2 (24) of the IT Act, 1961 defines income and sub-cl. (vi) thereof includes any capital gains chargeable under s. 45 in the income. Since on the ratio of the above decision income could not be assessed in the hands of the family, it follows that capital gains could not be taxed in the hands of the family on the facts of the case. 17. The assessee had raised the question that the AAC had set aside the assessment and directed the ITO for reconsideration by enhancement of capital gains. There are also other arguments put forth by both the sides which we have recorded supra. Since we have held that the capital gains could not at all be included in the income of the joint family and have to be taxed in the hands of the individual members, we do not consider it necessary to consider the other grounds on merits. 18. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1979 (2) TMI 123
... ... ... ... ..... balance did not automatically pass on to his wife and until the amount is credited to Smt. Mohran Devi s capital account, it cannot be said that the interest was paid to the partner. The addition of Rs.1,264. For the reasons recorded by the AAC, we uphold his order on the point of deletion of Rs. 1,264 is deleted. 18. Before parting, we like to record that it is hoped that the litigation connected with the Revenue s appeal comes to an end with the passing of our order. We have spent considerable time in scrutinising and appreciating the evidence in the case and our decision that there was no justification for the ITO to have resorted to the addition of Rs. 2,64,260 and that the AAC rightly remedied the situation, has been the result of appreciation of entire evidence on record and the facts of the case. 19. In the result, the Revenue s appeal is partly allowed as we are restoring the addition of Rs. 678 in respect of ground No. 4. The assessee s cross-objection is dismissed.
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1979 (2) TMI 122
... ... ... ... ..... ount of expenses which would not be deductible in computing the income chargeable under the head profits and gains of business or profession . The scheme in respect of non deduction of expenses of allowances made by a company which resulted directly or indirectly in the provision of any remuneration or benefit or amenity to a Director or to a person who was substantially interested in the company or to the relative of a director or of such person, as the case may be, on one hand and the expenses which resulted directly or indirectly in the provision of benefit or amenity or perquisite to an employee of a company, remained intact. In the ultimate analysis, it was held that the provision of s 40 (c) took precedence over s 40A (5) of the Act. 17. In the result, the assessee fully succeeds in respect of its grounds Nos. 1 and 2. Part agitation in ground No. 3 having been withdrawn, it partly succeeds there. Ground No. 4 is dismissed as withdrawn whereas Ground No. 5 is accepted.
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1979 (2) TMI 121
... ... ... ... ..... Sales Promotion expenses and hence should not have been disallowed. It is submitted that such expenditure is necessary in the course of business and it must therefore be held to represent legitimate business expenditure. Now, there can be dispute with these propositions, but then one has to reckon with s.37(2B) which stipulated that, notwithstanding the fact that the expenditure may have been incurred in the course of carrying on of the business, it would qualify for disallowance if it is in the nature of entertainment expenditure. From the material which has been placed before me I find that the disputed expenditure was incurred at Taj Mahal and Oberoi-Sheraton Hotels, both the which are in the 5-Star classification as expenditure in the nature of entertainment expenditure and it is, therefore, clearly hit by the provisions of s. 37(2B). The disallowance in accordingly upheld. 11. In the result, both the Departmental appeal and the assessee s cross-objection are dismissed.
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1979 (2) TMI 120
... ... ... ... ..... me up for the consideration before the various Benches of the Tribunal. In A.R. Rajagopalan vs. The ITO, I.T.A. Nos. 953 and 954 (Mad) 76-77 Madras Bench of the Tribunal held that the sub-cl. (b) of s. 2(14)(iii) would be effective only from the date of the notification. Similar view was taken by the Ahmedabad Bench of the Tribunal in Chandulal Lallubhai vs. ITO.(1) Same view was taken by the Hyderabad B Bench of the Tribunal in Syed Khadoruddin Ali Khan vs. The ITO.(2). We agree with the above view. Following the above orders, we hold that the notification dt. 6th Feb., 1973 had no retrospective effect and so the sales made prior to the said notification cannot be treated as capital asset within the meaning of cl. (b) of s. 2(14)(iii) and consequently the capital gains arising from the sale of the land prior to the date of notification are not liable to be taxed under s. 45 of the IT Act, 1961. 5. Other grounds raised are not pressed. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1979 (2) TMI 119
... ... ... ... ..... the fact that jurisdiction was subsequently conferred on it...... Now, I think it may be stated as general principle that no party has a vested right to a particular proceedings or to particular forum, and it is also well-settled that all procedural laws are retrospective unless the legislature expressly states to the contrary... This Court was bound to take notice of the change in the law and was bound to administer the law as it was when the suit came on for hearing. Therefore, if the Court had jurisdiction to try the suit when it came on for disposal, it could not refuse to assume jurisdiction by reason of the fact that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it at the date when it was instituted . Respectfully following the above decision, we uphold the finding of the AAC that the assessment was in no way vitiated or invalidated by resort to the provisions of s. 144B. The rest of the order is not relevant to the controversy in relation to s. 144B and is not being reproduced.
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1979 (2) TMI 118
... ... ... ... ..... moulds, the machinery used in the manufacture of parts is useless and as these dies and moulds as well as electrical fixtures are part and parcel of the machinery, the ITO should have allowed the development rebate. The learned departmental representative relied upon the orders of the lower authorities in this regard and submitted that the Revenue wanted to keep this point in dispute alive. He does not dispute that dies are not plant. 7. Since the submission of the learned counsel for the assessee regarding claim of 25 per cent instead of 15 per cent does not arise from the order of the ITO or AAC we are unable to interfere in this regard but as dies are certainly a plant and taking into consideration the law on the point, we will reverse the finding of the AAC in respect of this ground but restrict the allowance only to Rs. 25,146 on account of development rebate as claimed by the assessee in course of assessment proceedings. 8. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1979 (2) TMI 117
... ... ... ... ..... ipt of the letter of the ITO dt. 13 Oct., 1972 that the assessee made enquiries from the arbitrator again to which he referred in his explanation dt. 18th Oct., 1972 and found that profit to his share amounted to Rs. 4,731. It is also stated that an arbitrator had to be appointed to the disputes amongst the partners of the firm M/s. Desh Sewak Foundry and the books of account of the firm after the arbitration went into the custody of one of the majors Shri Rawail singh with whom the assessee was not on speaking terms. Considering all these circumstances and the assessee s various explanation, we are inclined to accept the assessee s explanation that the mistake in not disclosing the share of income from the firm, M/s. Desh Sewak Foundry was not intentional, but was caused through inadvertence. The levy of penalty consequently, on the merits of the case, is not justified and we delete the penalty imposed of Rs. 19,545 and allow the assessee s appeal. 5. The appeal is allowed.
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1979 (2) TMI 116
... ... ... ... ..... ent of the initial onus (as contemplated in CIT vs. I.M. Patel and Co.(2). to establish the assessee s awareness of the statutory obligation under s. 139(1) to furnish by the due date return of total income and in case such onus (qualified by their slight) was formed to have been discharged the existence of reasonable cause preventing the assessee to discharge its obligation within the time allowed by the said provision. In these circumstances two courses are open. Either the ITO s orders may be vacated without prejudice as this expression was understood to mean in Superintendent (Tech. I) Central Excise, I D, Jabalpur and others vs. Pratap Rai(4) or the said orders may just be vacated as proposed by my learned brother. In view of the fact that the first course if pursued to the ultimate end would involve inordinate delay in the finalization of the instant matters, which are basically penalty matters, I concur with my learned brother in the operative part as proposed by him.
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1979 (2) TMI 115
Export - Attempt to export - Confiscation and penalty ... ... ... ... ..... an attempt to export. Section 118(b) of the Customs Act can also have no applications to the facts of this case for the reasons mentioned with reference to Section 113(d). Since the goods are not liable to confiscation on the basis of Section 113(d), the package or any other goods contained in such package, cannot comes within the scope of that provision. 8. Respondent s counsel Shri Chacko submits that it is not sufficient that the goods are covered by a certificate but that they should in fact the exportworthy. That argument might have had come relevance -I would say such relevance - If the department has set up a case to attract Section 113(1) read with Section 50 of the Customs Act. There is no such allegation and these provisions are not invoked. In the circumstances counsel s submission has no relevance to the facts of this case. 9. The impugned orders Exts. P1, P3, P6 and P8 are not aside. The O.P. is accordingly allowed. The parties will bear their respective costs.
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1979 (2) TMI 114
Risers are not exempt ... ... ... ... ..... on to evade duty, the order regarding penalty should be set aside. 3. Government of India observe that Risers are steel melting scrap falling under Item 26 Central Excise Tariff and therefore distinct from the fresh and un-used re-rollable scrap under Item 25 Central Excise Tariff. Therefore the petitioners are not eligible to claim exemption on their products rolled out of steel melting scraps. The contravention of Rule 52A, 173G was established. The order regarding penalty is also correct in law. The order-in-appeal is therefore upheld and the Revision Application is rejected.
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1979 (2) TMI 113
Iron and steel products ... ... ... ... ..... rticularly in the condition in which these were cleared by them. The ratio of the Mysore High Court judgment does not cover a case of this type where the products in question have not obtained a distinct and independent identity apart from being forged shapes and sections. In the circumstances, Government are of the view that the Appellate Collector committed an error while applying the ratio of the Mysore High Court judgment to the facts of these cases. 5. Government further observe that since the forged products were manufactured from duty paid ingots only, these were not eligible for exemption under Notification No. 206/63-C.E, dated 13-11-1963 and accordingly the duty demanded from both the parties by the Assistant Collector was correct. 6. Now therefore in exercise of the powers vested in Government under Section 36 ibid, the impugned orders in appeal passed in favour of both the parties are set aside and the orders passed by the Assistant Collector are hereby restored.
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1979 (2) TMI 112
Plastics - Exemption notification - Connotation of - Trade Notice - Effect ... ... ... ... ..... d because if it is sought to be bent it breaks. Paper is capable of being bent it is flexible. A rubber eraser is capable of being bent slightly it is flexible. 8. It is admitted position that the Petitioners articles are capable of being bent. That being so, they are flexible not rigid. The 1st Respondent must, therefore, be held to have been in error when he held that, because the petitioners admitted that their articles were semi-rigid , the articles had to be classified as rigid and falling outside the purview of the Exemption Notification. 9. Mr. Dalal complained that the petitioners had never based their case upon the ground on which it is now decided. He is right. Therefore, while I make the petition absolute in terms of prayers (a) and (b), I order that each party shall bear and pay its own costs of the Petition. 10. The bank guarantee given by the petitioners pursuant to the order dated 11th December, 1974 to stand discharged after a period of four weeks from today.
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1979 (2) TMI 111
Acrylic fibre - Fiscal statute - Interpretation of - Review by Government of India ... ... ... ... ..... g and the revisional authority has not at all considered how these goods are understood in the trade. Furthermore the views of the Appellate Collector confirm the position that on this aspect two views are possible. If that is the position, then in my opinion the impugned order cannot be sustained. 16. Learned Senior Counsel for the revenue also argued the point that the petition was not properly verified. But I do not think that there is much substance in that contention. The authority of the Factory Manager, who was verified the petition has not been challenged. If it had been, then the authority would have been produced. 17. In the premises, the order dated 14th July, 1977 passed in Revision is set aside and the order of the Appellate Collector passed on the 4th June, 1975 is restored. Government is directed to act in accordance with the order of the Appellate Collector. The Rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1979 (2) TMI 110
Supreme Court decisions - Binding effect - Date of effect - Mistake of law - Writ of Mandamus - Discretionary powers
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