|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 146 Records
-
1979 (3) TMI 26 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Registration Of Firm, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... or the mandatory filing of two appeals or a clear implication to that effect, which we do not find, two appeals were not required and a composite appeal could have been filed as was actually done by the two assessees. We do not wish to express any opinion on the position under the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, and the Rules framed thereunder. Our opinion is based upon the provisions contained in the I.T. Act, 1961, and the Rules and forms provided under that Act. Further, we are restricting our decision to the type of orders with which we are concerned, both of which orders have been passed by the ITO on the same day. Bearing all this in mind, we are of opinion that the Tribunal had come to the correct conclusion on the maintainability of the composite appeal. In the result, the question referred to us is answered as follows In our opinion, composite appeals were tenable and were rightly held so by the Tribunal. The Commissioner will pay to the assessee the costs of this reference.
-
1979 (3) TMI 25 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
A Partner, Firm Registration, One Partner, Partnership Deed ... ... ... ... ..... s done by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in R. S. Nikhera Construction Co. s. case 1978 114 ITR 294. In our opinion, the partnership purported to be constituted by the deed of partnership dated 5th February, 1962, was not a legal partnership and, if that is so, it could not be granted registration. In the result, the two questions referred to us are answered as follows Question No.1--(at the instance of the assessee).--In the affirmative and in favour of the Commissioner. Question No. 2--(at the instance of the Commissioner).--In our opinion, the order of the ITO must be deemed to be one made under s. 185 and hence appealable. There has been partial failure and partial success and although question No. 1, in which the Commissioner has succeeded, was the more substantial question, we have found in favour of the Commissioner on a point somewhat different from the one which had appealed to the Tribunal. Accordingly, we direct the parties to bear their own costs of this reference.
-
1979 (3) TMI 24 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Application For Rectification, Income Tax Act, Rectification Of Mistakes, Reference To High Court, Writ Petition
-
1979 (3) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Deemed Dividend, Income From Other Sources ... ... ... ... ..... nt by Indira and Co. to the assessee cannot be said to fall within the mischief of s. 2(22)(B) of. the I.T. Act, 1961. Accordingly we answer question No. 1 partly in favour of the revenue and partly in favour of the assessee. We hold that the Tribunal was right in holding that the amount of Rs. 75,000 should be treated as deemed dividend and included in the total income of the assessee on proper computation and that it erred in treating the other amount of Rs. 2,00,000 as deemed dividend. Similarly, question No. 2 should also be answered partly in favour of the revenue. The amount of interest paid in respect of only Rs. 75,000 will not be allowed as deduction. As to the balance amount the Tribunal will consider the matter on merits and determine if the same would be a permissible deduction under the relevant sections of the Act. The reference is disposed of accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. C- K. BANERJI J.--I agree.
-
1979 (3) TMI 22 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Levy Of Penalty, Penalty Notice ... ... ... ... ..... has occurred. The case of the petitioner was being transferred from place to place. Till 30th July, 1960, the penalty proceedings were stayed at the instance of the assessee pending the decision of the quantum appeal. Then the case was transferred to Delhi in April, 1958. The papers then came to be transferred to Bombay and thereafter these proceedings were taken. In our view, since no limitation has been prescribed in the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, for completion of the penalty proceedings it will not be possible to hold that the order of penalty becomes vulnerable merely on the ground of delay. These are the only two points raised before us. The non-compliance with the notices under ss. 22(4) and 23(2) of the Act is an admitted position and we do not find any error in the order of the Tribunal dismissing the appeal filed by the assessee. The question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. The assessee to pay the costs of the reference.
-
1979 (3) TMI 21 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Employed, Capital Work In Progress, Income Tax Concession, Industrial Undertaking, Office Appliance
-
1979 (3) TMI 20 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Passing Of Property ... ... ... ... ..... ential purpose must, therefore, be construed in a practical and pragmatic way rather than in a pedantic sense. The trend of law also is in favour of such a construction. The very fact is that this requirement of exclusive use of the building or property for residential purposes has been omitted by the Finance Act No. 2 of 1971 with effect from April 1, 1972. But, at present, the exemption is permissible for the house or part of a house belonging to an assessee is established. We may notice the decision of the Delhi High Court in CWT v. M/s. Avtar, Mohan Singh 1972 83 ITR 52, wherein it was held that the physical residence of the family of the assessee without any legal right to share the use of the house by the assessee does not come in the way of exclusiveness of the use of the house by the assessee. For all the reasons stated, we answer the reference against the department and in favour of the assessee. As none appeared for the assessee, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (3) TMI 19 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Domicile Of Choice, Domicile Of Origin, Estate Duty, Question Of Fact ... ... ... ... ..... therwise, on the facts here, we find that a Tribunal properly informed about the relevant principles applicable to the determination of the question of domicile, could not have come to the conclusion at which it has arrived. We do not, therefore, find any ground to sustain the objection that this being a pure question of fact cannot be the subject of consideration by us. Of the two questions, the first question raises the point as to whether the deceased had retained the domicile of origin, and the second question raises the point of onus. The question of onus is really not material where all the facts are before the body which has to determine the problem. Even assuming that the question of onus is relevant on the facts herein, we are satisfied that the department has discharged the onus by relying on the facts of the life of the deceased. The two questions are, therefore, to be answered in the negative and against the accountable person. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (3) TMI 18 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ent, in the circumstances of the case, to the wife had the effect of giving quittance to the family obligation to maintain the kartas wife and, therefore, such consideration is money s worth and hence the payment was not a gift. That apart, the transaction can be justified even as a family settlement in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1976 SC 807. The Supreme Court held that the family arrangement may be even oral and if there is a memorandum which is only a record of the settlement entered into orally earlier, it does not require registration even if it involves immovable property. In the present case, the finding of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal that the property was given to the wife of the karta in lieu of maintenance is correct. For all the reasons stated, our answer to the question is in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The reference is answered accordingly with costs. Advocate s fee, Rs. 250.
-
1979 (3) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Transfer Of Property ... ... ... ... ..... t follows upon the submission of account or copy of application by the accountable persons and what the Controller is required to do is in a regular manner, upon receipt of such account or copy of the application. Therefore, in such cases there cannot be any commencement or initiation of proceedings for the levy of duty. The observations made by us herein are strictly on the basis of and limited to the facts of the instant case, i.e., where an application for the grant of representation is made by the accountable person and a copy of the affidavit with the account is delivered to the Controller in compliance with the provisions of s. 56 of the Act. In the above view of the matter we are unable to agree with the view of the learned judge of the court of the first instance. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The orders under appeal are set aside. Rule nisi is discharged. Interim order, if any, will stand vacated. There will, however, be no order as to costs. GHOSE J.--I agree.
-
1979 (3) TMI 16 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
High Court, Law And Fact, Mixed Question, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... hereof, and from the mere fact that such a claim had been allowed in subsequent years it could not be assumed that the prescribed conditions justifying a claim for exemption under s. 84 were also fulfilled, the Tribunal was not competent to hold that the AAC should have entertained the question of relief under s. 84 or to direct the ITO to allow the relief. In that view of the matter, I reject the contention of Mr. Ghosh. This application is dismissed and the rule is discharged. Interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs. I make it clear, however, that I have not gone into the question as to whether the assessment order was made without jurisdiction, i.e., whether it is barred by the law of limitation. If the petitioner is entitled to agitate this point before the AAC, then he will be entitled to do so irrespective of the question as to whether such point was taken before or not and whether the order of remand was passed on some other ground or not.
-
1979 (3) TMI 15 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Bench Of Tribunal, Petition Against Order, Powers Of Tribunal, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... of the Tribunal, dated 30th September, 1974, is entirely in conflict with the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the above mentioned decision. While answering question No. 1 referred to in Income-tax Reference No. 174 of 1971 (Gargi Din Jwala Prasad v. CIT 1974 96 ITR 97 (All)) this court thus cannot be held to have expressed the opinion that the notice issued to opposite party No. 1 itself was in any fashion vitiated. As long as the notice remained, legal proceedings consequent thereon could be recommenced and such proceedings could not be affected as a consequence of the answer given by this court on question No. 1 referred to in the income-tax reference mentioned above. For the reasons given, we allow this petition and quash the order of the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal, dated 30th September, 1974, as well as the application made by opposite party No. 1 under s. 35 of the Act leading up to the order. The petitioners are entitled to their costs from opposite party No. 1.
-
1979 (3) TMI 14 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Passing Of Property ... ... ... ... ..... e Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Chawla s case 1973 90 ITR 68 as also the decision of the High Court of Madras in CED v. Smt. S. M. Muthukaruppi Achi 1977 109 ITR 345. In the latter case, the learned judges referred to the observations of the Privy Council in Petheperumal Chetty v. Muniandy Servai 1908 ILR 35 Cal 551 at 559 to the following effect Where a transaction is once made out to be a mere benami, it is evident that the benamidar absolutely disappears from the title. His name is simply an alias for that of the person beneficially interested. This sums up the position so far as benamidar is concerned and, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it is clear that the deceased was the owner of the property and the beneficial interest in the property belonged to him and, therefore, the property passed on his death. In view of this, the second question referred to us is answered in the affirmative. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.
-
1979 (3) TMI 13 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... r and it is from there that the documents referred to in annex. P-5 belonging to the said transport society were recovered and not from the premises of the said transport society. Even if for the sake of argument it is taken that the premises of the said transport society had been searched without there being any search warrants from the Commissioner, respondent No. 1, then it is that transport society which is entitled to make a grievance and not the petitioner and, therefore, it is unnecessary to go into the question as to whether the documents in question had been seized from the premises of the petitioner or from the premises of the said transport society at Hoshiarpur, when no notice under r. 112 A of the Rules regarding those documents and the undisclosed income has been issued to the petitioners. For the reasons aforesaid, I find no merit in these writ petitions (Civil Writs Nos. 4392 to 4397, 4465, 4467, 4469, 4562 and 4564 of 1975) and they are dismissed with costs.
-
1979 (3) TMI 12 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Deemed Dividend, Dividends, Legal Fiction ... ... ... ... ..... as long as there is no excess over the actual cost, the shareholders cannot be taken to have realised any income by the sale of the capital assets of the company. The mere fact that the balancing charge is brought to tax as deemed income under s. 41(2) of the Act in the hands of the company, does not mean that it loses its character as capital receipt. In the hands of the shareholder the balancing charge is not a deemed income and it represents only capital receipt and, therefore, it cannot be treated as accumulated profits. If the balancing charge cannot be treated as accumulated profits then the sum of Rs. 7,28,760 in this case cannot be treated as accumulated profits. If there are no accumulated profits then there is no question of any deemed dividend attracting the provisions of s. 2(22)(c). In this view, both the questions are answered in the affirmative and against the revenue. The revenue will pay the costs of the assessees in each case. Counsel s fee Rs. 100 in each.
-
1979 (3) TMI 11 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Valuation Officer ... ... ... ... ..... y the Valuation Officer for these years are also valid and within jurisdiction. There will be a. writ of certiorari quashing the order of reference under 3. 16A(1) so far as the years 1968-69, 1969-70, 1970-71, 1971-72, 1972-73, 1973-74 and 1974-75 are concerned. There will be a writ of prohibition directing the respondents not to proceed or any further proceed with the reference under s. 16A(1) and the notices under S. 16A(2) and s. 16A(4) of the Act so far as the assessment years 1968-69, 1969-70, 1970-71, 1971-72,,1973-74 and 1974-75 are concerned. So far as the assessment years 1975-76 and 1976-77 are concerned, the Valuation Officer is directed to proceed in accordance with law. I make it clear that he shall act in accordance with law including any law laid down by this court or any other court or Tribunal or authority whose decision or direction is binding on him. The rule is disposed of accordingly. Interim order, it any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (3) TMI 10 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... of the wide definition of executor made by the Explanation, she would be covered by the definition and, as earlier pointed out, since there was no discretion left with the tax authorities, the income from the estate of Dinesh could be charged to tax only in the hands of his mother, Pushpavati. The necessary consequence must be that the income which was sought to be included as income of the assessee could not be brought to tax in her hands. In our view, the AAC and the Tribunal had taken a correct view of the scope of the provisions of S. 168 of the Act. Having regard to the circumstances, therefore, it is obvious that the income arising from the undistributed personal estate of Dinesh or income from the undistributed share of the interest of the deceased could not be taxed in the hands of the assessee. The question referred to us must, therefore, be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1979 (3) TMI 9 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Writ, Income Tax, Mistake Apparent From Record, Natural Justice, Writ Petition
-
1979 (3) TMI 8 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... nstruction is 19th, November, 1975. In the assessments under reference the WTO completed the as assessments for all the three years under consideration on 28th February, 1974. Thereafter, the appeals were disposed of by the AAC by his common order dated 11th February, 1975. It is true that the Tribunal s decision is dated 23rd January, 1976, that is, after the date of the said instruction. But, in the circumstances, it would be a debatable point whether the decision of this case should rest only on the said instructions. In our opinion, the legal position is fairly clear, and we have thought it advisable to base our decision and answer the question on the provisions as they appear to us rather than on the basis of the said instructions. The instructions then are mentioned in passing only. In the result, the question referred to us in this reference is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The department will pay to the assessee the costs of the reference.
-
1979 (3) TMI 7 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Penalty, Self-Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... ions of the Act. After reiterating the observations made by the Supreme Court in Navnit Lai C. Javeri v. K. K. Sen, AAC 1965 56 ITR 198, it was observed that the directions given in that circular clearly deviated from the provisions of the Act, yet the court held that the circular was binding on the ITO. We, therefore, hold on this ground also that the assessing authority must be held to be having the jurisdiction and discretion to consider in each case whether it is a fit case for levy of penalty or not. In the present case, the Tribunal on a consideration of the facts and circumstances, has held that there was reasonable cause for the short delay in payment of the balance of the tax and, therefore, this is not a case for levy of penalty under sub-s. (3) to s. 140A. For all the reasons stated, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the department. The department shall pay costs to the respondent-assessee. Advocate s fee, Rs. 300.
....
|
