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1979 (3) TMI 97
... ... ... ... ..... erials a proper conclusion can be arrived at regarding the ownership of this property. 11. As rightly pointed out for the Revenue, the claim of the appellant that no portion of the income form this property was chargeable in his hands as an individual is entirely a new claim as it was never before any of the authorities below. This also requires further examination. We, therefore, consider that it would be just and proper to set aside the order of the AAC and restore the matter to her file for fresh disposal after ascertaining all the facts and evidences mentioned above. We are sending the matter to the AAC since we were told that the appellant s appeals for the two subsequent assessment years are pending before the AAC. We further direct the AAC to allow full opportunity to the appellant to place all the materials and evidence in support of his claim and dispose of the appeal in accordance with law. 12. For statistical purposes, the appeal shall be treated as partly allowed.
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1979 (3) TMI 96
... ... ... ... ..... ppellant must be held to have discharged his onus of proof under the Expln. to s. 271(1)(c) of the Act and shown that there was no wilful or gross neglect on his part in returning the correct income. We are also satisfied that there was no intention on the part of the appellant to conceal the particulars of his income or to furnish inaccurate particulars thereof within the meaning of s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. On the contrary the materials on record clearly establish that the assessee had placed all the relevant particulars before the ITO for making a proper assessment. We are therefore satisfied that no penalty is exigible in the present case under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. In this view it is unnecessary for us to consider whether there could be any penalty in respect of deemed or fictional income. 11. In the result, we cancel the penalty of Rs. 35,000 levied by IAC and direct the ITO to refund the same if already collected form the appellant. Accordingly the appeal is allowed.
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1979 (3) TMI 95
... ... ... ... ..... . 2-1 of the WT Rules Following the above order of the Tribunal we set aside the order of the A.A.C and remit the case back to the file of the WTO to work out the value of the interest of the appellant in the manner provided under r.2-1 of the WT Rules. In our view, this decision completely answers all the arguments urged on behalf of the Revenue. 6. The decision in Addl. CIT vs. Chillies Export House Ltd(1). is clearly distinguishable on facts as contended by the assessee s learned Chartered Accountant. On the contrary, the decision in the case of Commercial laws of India P. Ltd. supports the case of the assessee. Since the matter has already been decided in favour of the assessee by the Tribunal in the earlier years, and since we are of the view that the decision in 107 ITR 822 is applicable to the facts of the present case, we would respectfully follow the said decisions, and confirm the order of the AAC for the year under appeal. 7. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1979 (3) TMI 94
... ... ... ... ..... artment is closed it would not amount to closure of the assessee s business. In the light of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in B.R. Ltd vs. V.P. Gupta, CIT, Bombay (4), and on the facts of the case before us, it is obvious that the foundry division was considered only as a Department of the assessee s business and not as a separate business and even the report of the Directors, relied on by the Departmental Representative and referred to earlier, describes the foundry as a departmental. From that point of view also we are of the view that the discontinuance of the manufacturing operations in the foundry division would not amount to a closure of the business. 10. We, therefore, hold that on the particular facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the payment of compensation and notice pay was made on the occasion of the closure of the business. It was made for the purpose of carrying on the business. 11. In the result, both the appeals are dismissed.
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1979 (3) TMI 93
... ... ... ... ..... ts on the dates mentioned there against Date of remittance Amount . Rs. 29.12.1975 37,500 29.3.1976 37,425 28.3.1977 42,615 30.9.1977 13,156 31.10.1977 13,000 This certificate proves that the assessee had complied with the provisions of Sec. 14(5) of the Voluntary Disclosure Act also and there is no material placed by the Revenue to show that the assessee was not entitled to the immunity provided in Sec. 14(1) of the Voluntary Disclosure Act. The appellant s learned counsel is right in his submission that Sec. 14(5) of the Voluntary Disclosure Act does not require a certificate to be issued by the CIT and that such certificate is required only in cases to which Sec. 8(2) of the Voluntary Disclosure Act is applicable. In the circumstances, the IAC was clearly in error in levying the penalties in these three years. We, therefore, accept the appeals and direct the amounts of penalties to be refunded, if already collected form the appellant. 5. In the result, appeals are allowed.
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1979 (3) TMI 83
... ... ... ... ..... me up for consideration before the Tribunal (Madras Bench B ) in the case of Shri Dhanalakshmi Finance Corporation vs. ITO (7). All India Tax Tribunals Judgments , Vol.-V, at page 329 wherein the Tribunal has taken the same view as we have taken above. 7. Before closing, we would like to mention that the assessee s learned counsel sought permission to file certain grounds stated to be additional grounds of appeal. Apart from its being belated, we find that the so called additional grounds in substance are only reiteration of the grounds already filed. In the circumstances, we have not admitted the additional grounds. 8. In the result, we restore the appeal to the file of the AAC to dispose of the same afresh after examining the claim of the assessee that the application in Form No. 12 was filed even on 2nd May, 1974 by M/s. V. Tirumalai and Co., Chartered Accountants, Madras, and on the merits of the case. 9. For statistical purposes, the appeal is treated as allowed in part.
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1979 (3) TMI 82
... ... ... ... ..... n is the subject-matter of appeal, the value finally fixed by the appellate authority has to prevail as there can be only one value and there cannot be scope for a lesser or higher value than that. It is in that context that we are of the view, the meaning of the word objecting with reference to s. 62(1)(a)(i) has to be considered. In the light of the above we are of the view that the Appellate Controller, having determined the value at Rs. 125.69 per share, which we have already held as the proper value, this value alone will have to be considered as the value of the shares and accordingly the assessee would be entitled to claim this as the value of the shares. In the light of the above, we direct the Asst. Controller to adopt the value of Rs. 125.69 per share as fixed by the Appellate Controller and modify the assessment. The Appellate Controller s order on this point is confirmed. 10. In the result, the assessee s appeal is allowed and the Department s appeal is dismissed.
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1979 (3) TMI 79
... ... ... ... ..... Rattanlal Krishna Kumar were also made in the books of the assessee. Similar entries were made in the books of M/s Rattanlal Krishna Kumar for having received a sum Rs. 15,000 as commission. If the entire evidence on record is considered in the light of preponderance of probabilities it would be clear that there was an agreement between the assessee and M/s Rattanlal Krishna Kumar. In pursuance of the agreement M/s Rattanlal Krishna Kumar was to get commission at the prescribed rates on the sale of articles in question. Actually the services were rendered by M/s Rattanlal Krishna Kumar. They also received a sum of Rs. 15,000 for the services rendered by them. The said payment was made by the assessee in the ordinary course of the business. It was laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. Thus, in our opinion, the learned AAC was wrong in sustaining the addition of Rs. 15,000. Accordingly, the addition is deleted. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1979 (3) TMI 78
... ... ... ... ..... debts but there was no success. The assessee also could not get anything from the said parties for the last many years. The assessee also claimed the debts in 1974. At that time it was held that there was no convincing evidence on record to show that the debts really became bad. The learned ITO on the basis of the finding of the Tribunal given in asst. yr. 1974 held that the debts in question did not become bad. The facts of the earlier year are different from the facts of this year. Looking to the aforesaid facts and the entirety of circumstances, in my opinion, the learned AAC was quite correct in holding that the debts in questions became bad in the year of account and they were correctly written off by the assessee. 9. In view of the aforesaid finding there does not arise the question of making the addition of Rs. 1,152. In view of the aforesaid discussion the appeal has no force and is liable to be dismissed. 10. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed.
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1979 (3) TMI 77
... ... ... ... ..... s able to show that preponderance of probabilities are in it is favour, the initial onus which lay upon the assessee shall stand discharged. This proposition of law has not been disputed by the learned Departmental Representative before us. Apart from it, there is no contrary decision on this point. Atleast, no contrary decision was brought to our notice. Looking to the aforesaid facts, we are fully satisfied that in the present case, there was no fraud or gross or wilful neglect on the part of the assessee in not returning the assessed income. There is also no convincing evidence on record to show that the purchases in question were bogus. On the other hand, the entire evidence record would go to show that the purchases were genuine. 10. Looking to the aforesaid facts and the evidence on record, we are satisfied that the learned AAC was wrong in sustaining the order of penalty. Accordingly, the impugned order of penalty is cancelled. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1979 (3) TMI 76
... ... ... ... ..... e made by the learned counsel for the Department in para-11 of the Tribunal s order does not help the Department. In fact, the High Court has accepted the contention of the assessee rsquo s counsel with regard to his alternative claim of registration for the second period. Even the decision in 87 ITR 615 does not help the Department in so far as it only deals with a case where an assessee has claimed that it continued throughout the previous year. In the present case the claim of the assessee is just the reverse. The mere fact therefore that the assessee has indicated in his return the income for the period 1st April, 1971 to 31st March, 1972 and not for the period 8th Oct., 1971 to 31st March, 1972 alone would not be fatal to its claim for registration. The procedural formalities regards registration have also therefore been as complied with. We hold that the assessee is entitled to registration for the period 8th Oct., 1971 to 31st March, 1972. The appeal is partly allowed.
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1979 (3) TMI 75
... ... ... ... ..... t a property inherited from the father in the hands of his sons and his family would be ancestral property and constitute a joint property. 7. Further through the employment of the funds arising out of the properties inherited from the father in the construction of the property, the income from the property cannot be detrimental to the interest of the family. Therefore, any income from such a property would have to be accounted for by the HUF and such income would partake the income of the family. Accordingly the AAC had rightly treated the income from property as the property of the HUF. Based on the materials referred to and relied on by the assessee s counsel, which were already there and also before the lower authorities, I am satisfied that the assessee s claim of HUF has been rightly accepted by the AAC and no strong case has been made out by the Department to depart from his findings. 8. In the result, I confirm the order of the AAC and dismiss the departmental appeal.
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1979 (3) TMI 74
... ... ... ... ..... of any director was not satisfactory in the opinion of the Board of Directors then his services were certainly liable to be terminated. The AAC did notice this control and supervision of the Board of Directors over the remuneration paid and the job entrusted tot he assessee but he did not attach due importance to that fact. He ignored the same merely saying that it was obvious. Though the aforesaid features taken individually may not be conclusive of the issue we are considering, yet all the factors taken together do, in our opinion, indicate that there was indeed employer and employee relationship between the assessee and the aforesaid Company. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that the remuneration received by the assessee was therefore assessable under s. 15 of the ITO under the held Salary and consequently the standard deduction under s. 16(1) was admissible as deduction. We direct that the assessment be modified accordingly. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1979 (3) TMI 73
Original Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... he assessments under section 153, indicates the Legislature intent to place a bar of limitation of two years for imposing penalty in all cases, including penalties emanating from set aside assessments, to our mind, does not exist. 20. We have analysed the provisions of section 275 and it is clear therefrom, that penalty in the case of the assessee in the original assessment proceedings had come to a naught. Thereafter, when the ITO made fresh assessment, which may be called assessment made de novo, the entire process of law applicable to assessments and penalties was reactivated. In this process, the authorities concerned had once again the same powers as vested in them when the assessment was originally finalised. We have seen supra that the IAC imposed the penalty within a period of six months from the receipt by the Commissioner of the order of the Tribunal in this case. The penalty is, therefore, within the period of limitation. 21. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1979 (3) TMI 72
... ... ... ... ..... ile we have no hesitation in holding that the assessee is entitled to file an appeal against charging of interest under s. 217(1A) in a case where he is challenging his liability to the assessment to advance tax in view of the Bombay High Court decision, we do not agree with the assessee s counsel that for this purpose he can rely on him and not on the facts as they are finally crystallised. In any even there is no dispute that as a result of the order of the AAC the assessee will be found to have no obligation to file a revised estimate under s. 212(3A). Having regard to the above discussion, we set aside the order of the AAC on this issue and restore the appeal to his file with a direction that if he finds in persuance of the Tribunal s order that the assessee had no obligation to file a revised estimate under s. 212(3A), he will hold that the assessee is not liable to interest under s. 217(1A). With this direction the appeal of the ITO is allowed for statistical purposes.
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1979 (3) TMI 71
... ... ... ... ..... greater and where any such income is once included in the total income of either spouse or parent, any such income arising in any succeeding year shall not be included in the total income of the other spouse or parent unless the ITO is satisfied, after giving that spouse or parent and opportunity of being heard, that it is necessary so to do . In the light of the Explanation, I have held in the third Member case that if either of the spouse does not have share income from the firm the clubbing cannot arise. In this case the husband has been assessed as individual with no share in his hands. The share income has been included in the hands of the HUF. Therefore, in the light of my decision as third Member in the case Supra and respectfully following the Andhra Pradesh High Court judgment Supra, I would hold that inclusion of the share income arising to the wife from the firm in the hands of the assessee, in his individual assessment, is not correct. 6. The appeals are allowed.
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1979 (3) TMI 70
... ... ... ... ..... me for the purposes of s. 212(3A) the assessee could no, on his own, file an estimate and this handicap constituted a reasonable cause. 4. On hearing the rival contentions, we are inclined to accept the submissions made on behalf of the assessee, which are in accordance with the view taken by us in several other similar cases. Shri Arrora has filed a copy of our order dt. 23rd Sept., 1977 on ITA No. 511/76-77. In that order, we had followed the views of Mysore High Court in 97 ITR, 168 Alahabad High Court in CIT U.P. Lucknow vs. Raj Rani, published in Taxation and Orissa High Court decision in 102 ITR 551. Following the view held by us until now, we hold that failure on the part of the firm to file the estimate under s. 212(3A) will constitute a reasonable cause in respect of a similar failure in the case of a partner. Consequently the levy of penalty by the ITO cannot be sustained and we confirm the view taken by the AAC. 5. The appeal of the Revenue fails and is dismissed.
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1979 (3) TMI 69
... ... ... ... ..... 80P(2)(a)(i) of the IT Act and I direct accordingly. Hence this appeal and the cross objection before us. 4. Heard the learned authorised representative of the Dept., Shri R.N. Shukla and the learned counsel for the assessee, Shri M.M. Sadh. In our view, no interference is called for in the order of the AAC, as in arriving at the above conclusion, he has followed the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Allahabad District Co-operative Bank Ltd. for the asst. yr. 1969-70 (ITA No. 1759 Alld.) of 1972-73. We have also noted that in the subsequent year in the case of the assessee itself, the ITO has allowed exemption under s. 80P(2)(a)(i) of the IT Act, 1961. Thus we confirm the order of the AAC and dismiss the appeal filed by the Revenue. Consequently, the cross-objection filed by the assessee which is in support of the order of the AAC will be allowed. 5. In the result, the appeal filed by the Department is dismissed and the cross-objection filed by the assessee is allowed.
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1979 (3) TMI 68
... ... ... ... ..... n above a clear finding that the Mahant was not the owner of the properties. The Math, a permanent entity was the owner of the properties and the Mahant was merely its manager. Even the will made by the deceased makes it clear that the was only a manager and in his term his nominee also would be only a manager. It would be clear that by means of this will the deceased Mahant was only appointing the manager. We have made it very clear in the very first para of this order that the Math has the tradition of getting the Mahant nominated by means of a will made out by the Mahant in office. The only property which was within the disposing capacity of the deceased Mahant was the nomination of his successor such his is property in could not by brought to duty in view of the specific provision of s.22. 18. In view of the above discussion we find that no property passes which could be included under any of the provisions of the Estate Duty Act. In the result the appeal succeeds fully.
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1979 (3) TMI 67
Prosecution - Evidence - Statement ... ... ... ... ..... s not given the confession immediately after his apprehension, but it was nearly two days after the apprehension that Ex. P-5 was recorded. Under those circumstances, can it be said that there was no inducement, threat or promise from P.W. 1 ? It should be noted that in cross-examination a suggestion was thrown to P.W. 1. that Ex. P-5 was recorded under duress and coercion. It should further be noted that the versions of the defence witness have not been carefully considered by the Court. I cannot persuade myself to believe that Ex. P-5 was a statement voluntarily given by the revision petitioner. Therefore Ex. P-5 has to be excluded from consideration. It should be further noted that A-2 has been acquitted. 7. For the foregoing reasons, the conviction of the revision petitioner is not sustainable and has to be set aside. In the result the revision is allowed, the conviction and sentence passed on the revision petitioner are set aside and the revision petitioner is acquitted.
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