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1979 (8) TMI 163
Procedure on failure to prove debts within fixed time ... ... ... ... ..... of limitation for preferring an appeal under rule 164 of the Rules is 21 days from the date of the service of the notice from the decision of the official liquidator. Mr. Kapoor conceded that the present claim petition has been filed beyond that period of limitation. There is no application for condonation of the delay and even if the present claims are treated as an appeal against the order of the official liquidator the same is barred by limitation. In view of what has been stated above, the preliminary issue is decided against the claimants and it is held that the objection petitions are not maintainable. In view of this finding, it is not necessary to record a finding on the issues regarding merits. For the reasons recorded above, the claim petitions are dismissed. Since there is no other appeal against the order of the official liquidator and no claim petition is pending under rule 177 of the Rules, the list of creditors as settled by the official liquidator is endorsed.
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1979 (8) TMI 162
Restriction on appointment of former managing agents to any office ... ... ... ... ..... s as set out in the special resolution dated May 2, 1975. 3.Shri J.H. Dalmia through his counsel, Shri S.R. Aggarwal, gives an undertaking to this court that in case the writ petition is dismissed, Shri J.H. Dalmia shall restore the entire benefits to the company. 4.Shri V.H. Dalmia, one of the directors of the company, is also present in the court and gives an undertaking that in case Shri J.H. Dalmia fails to restore the benefits received by him, Shri V.H. Dalmia will restore the same to the company and he will be personally liable for the same. This arrangement should be taken note of while considering afresh the application of the petitioners. The result of the above discussion is that the writ petition succeeds. The impugned letters are quashed. The Central Govt. will reconsider the application of the petitioners in accordance with the observations contained in this order and in accordance with law. On the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.
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1979 (8) TMI 159
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... on the company a demand under his hand requiring it to pay the sum due and the company has neglected to pay the same. The provision in clause (b) that if the creditor has a decree of a court in his favour and the execution is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts, does not mean that the effect of clause (a) is negatived in the case of a decree-holder creditor. The object of the two clauses is the same, that is, to show that the company concerned is unable to pay its debts. Action can be taken under either of them . Thus, it will be seen that the view taken by the learned judge of the Delhi High Court is on the same lines as we ourselves have taken in the present case. No other decision of any court taking a contrary view has been brought to our notice. Under these circumstances, we hold that the conclusion of the learned judge is correct. Hence the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (8) TMI 158
Winding up – Statement of affairs to be made to official liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... the case, they might be unable to do so, has not been considered in the impugned order. Probably, the inability of the appellants to file the requisite information was not urged before the learned company judge. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to consider the other two submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants as we are inclined to take the view that although the appellants can be called upon to submit the statement of affairs required, the learned company judge has not considered whether the appellants would be able to submit the necessary statement. We think that this aspect of the matter should be considered by the learned company judge. Mr. Ghose, appearing for the respondents, did not have anything to say against such consideration. In the result, this appeal is partly allowed and the case remanded to the learned company judge for consideration of the matter as pointed out above. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (8) TMI 150
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... he year leading to a cloth production loss of 11.70 lakhs metres. Similar losses were suffered in all other departments. To meet the market need and keep the machines working, which were out of balance due to breakdowns, the company had to buy capacities outside. A total payment of Rs. 223 lakhs involving a value added of Rs. 45 lakhs which could have been saved was made to outside parties for buying yarn and cloth, and for processing and finishing charges. Total payment on this account last year was Rs. 82 lakhs only. During the half year April-September 1978, sales had reached a level of Rs. 14.25 crores. With the rehabilitation programme already under way, the directors felt that on completion of the programme around March, 1980, the company would be able to earn normal profits. I, therefore, do not find any substance in the contention on behalf of the petitioners that the company should be wound up on the grounds urged. In the result, the petition is dismissed with costs.
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1979 (8) TMI 133
Amalgamation ... ... ... ... ..... I am inclined to take the view that a common petition is not maintainable but two separate petitions must be filed by the transferee and transferor-companies though for the same purpose. This view is further strengthened by the provision to clause (b)( vi) to sub-section (1) of section 394, which contemplates that no order for amalgamation and any scheme in connection therewith may be sanctioned by the court, unless the court receives a report from the Company Law Board or the Registrar that the affairs of the company have not been conducted in a manner prejudicial to the interests of its members or to public interest. In other words, the proviso contemplates that there must be a report in respect of each of the companies, in regard to the management of its affairs, until the date of amalgamation. In this view of the matter, the office objection is upheld and the applicants are directed to make two separate applications for amalgamation under section 391 of the Companies Act.
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1979 (8) TMI 124
... ... ... ... ..... duty of the deceased . It is evident from the plain reading of the aforesaid observations that the High Court was impliedly of the view that the exemption under s. 33(1) (n) in respect of the residential house was limited to the extent of the share of the deceased in that house. Even in R.C. No. 30 of 1974 dated 19th Oct., 1976 relied upon by the High Court, the deceased had one-third share in the residential house of the joint family and exemption to that extent alone was allowed under s. 33(1)(n) of the ED Act, 1953. 16. It appears that the point at issue was not thoroughly thrashed and argued before the ITAT in E.D.A. No. 9 (Pat) of 1975-76. We are, therefore, unable to follow the view taken by the Tribunal in that case. 17. In view of the above discussion, we reject the plea of the assessee for exemption of the value of the residential house of joint family to the extent of Rs.1 lakh under s. 33 (1)(n) of the ED Act, 1953. 18. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1979 (8) TMI 123
... ... ... ... ..... from the income of the assessee HUF after verification. Dis-satisfied with this order, the Department has filed the present appeal. 4. After going through the record and hearing the learned representatives of the parties, I do not find any infirmity in the order of the AAC. If Smt. Sushila Devi Tamakuwala has really deposited any amounts with the firms of M/s Dhanraj Sagarmal and Co. and M/s. Sagar Rice and Oil Mills in her individual capacity then the interest received by her on these amounts cannot be included in the income of her HUF, whatever may be the position regarding this interest in the case of the firm concerned. Again all that the Appellate Asstt. Commissioner has done is that he has directed the ITO to verify the correct position and then to exclude the interest from the income of the assessee HUF in case of its version being correct. There is nothing wrong with this direction and as such the impugned order is confirmed. 5. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1979 (8) TMI 118
... ... ... ... ..... essee had not acquired an asset by incurring an expenditure on the rented shop . The facts of the present case are similar to the facts in the said Allahabad High Court decision. The assessee is not the owner of the premises and simply because the assessee spent sum of Rs. 10,205 in the aforesaid contractions in the rented building, he does not get any enduring benefit of a capital nature as they only formed part of the premises of the landlords. It is further represented before us that the assessee firm is dissolved and in that case the assessee cannot be stated to have obtained any enduring benefit. It may be that the structure was used for the business of the assessee, but they formed part of the building belonging to the owners and so the assessee could not be stated to have acquired an enduring benefit. The expenditure was for running the business of the assessee and according to us is an allowable business expenditure. 5. In the result, the assessee s appeal is allowed.
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1979 (8) TMI 117
... ... ... ... ..... s construed as carrying the name connotation as the word used, the whole object with which s. 84 has been enacted by the legislature would be destroyed because it is almost impossible to utilise the whole capital which is employed in industry for the purpose of manufacturing. Further, as rightly pointed out by the assessee s counsel even under s. 19A(2), there is no exclusion of such advance. In fact, according to Mr. Santhana Krishanan, r. 19A(2)(iv) covers also the case of assets being debts due to the persons carrying on the business. The advance to director is nothing but a debt due to the company, and, therefore, it has been rightly claimed by the assessee as forming part of the assets. We agree with the assessee s counsel that this item would fall under s. 19A(2)(iv) and, therefore, we are of the opinion that the capital employed would represent the assets of the figure of Rs. 56,55,629 instead of Rs. 56,21,903 taken by the ITO. We reject the Misc. Petition accordingly.
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1979 (8) TMI 116
... ... ... ... ..... vented him from furnishing the return was the absence of accounts and the time taken for examination of accounts in the possession of the Department. If we appreciate the case in the background of the ordinary realities of life, under such circumstances the time taken for furnishing the return is not unduly long. Even by any standards the time taken to get the copies of accounts pertaining to this assessment year is not very much. 7. The assessee had raised a ground before the AAC that the assessee filed the return at the earliest possible time taking into account all the surrounding circumstances and considering the hardship to which the assessee was subjected by reason of the seizure and retention of the records. We are inclined to accept it as a true fact and reflective of the state of affairs as it existed. So there was a reasonable cause for the failure. We agree with the AAC and also with his reasoning and conclusions. 8. Therefore, the departmental appeal is dismissed.
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1979 (8) TMI 115
... ... ... ... ..... ribunal had referred to the principle laid-down by the Supreme Court in the case of the Mumbahi Kamgar Sabha, Bombay vs. M/s. Abdulbhai Faisullabhai and Ors., AIR (1976) SC 1455. The Tribunal had specifically pointed out that s. 17 of the Payment of Bonus Act was considered by the Supreme Court and it still held that the Payment Bonus Act referred to is only adjustment of customary bonus against. What s. 17 of the Payment of Bonus Act referred to is only adjustment of customary bonus payable under the Act. The Supreme Court recognised the existence of customary bonus and according to the Supreme Court in spite of s. 17 of the Bonus Act, customary bonus is outside the purview of the Payment of Bonus Act. The ld. AAC has consider all the aspects of the case and there is also the prior decision of the Tribunal in ITA No. 936/Mds/1977-78. Following the reasoning stated therein, with which we agree, we confirm the order of the AAC. 7. In the result, the Deptl. appeal is dismissed.
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1979 (8) TMI 114
... ... ... ... ..... be deducted referring to the Madras High Court decision in 1978 CTR (Mad) 45 (1977) 110 ITR 256 (Mad). We would hence reject the Revenue s ground. 25. That Revenue s next ground is that the AAC should not have allowed the sum of Rs. 4,907 being hotel bill, being expenditure under s. 37(ii)(b)(sic). The ITO had disallowed the above sum being sales promotion expenses as entertainment expenses. On the assessee s appeal the AAC referred to the analysis of the expenditure and was of the view that one item of hotel bill of Rs. 1,836 incurred on 28th March, 1976 included certain inadmissible item in the nature of entertainment. The AAC accordingly restricted the disallowance to Rs. 2,500 relying on the Gujarat High Court decision in Patel Bros, (1977) 106 ITR 424 (Guj). We have heard the parties. The allocation made by the AAC does not appear to us to be unreasonable in the circumstances of the case and hence we decline to interfere. In the result the Revenue s appeal is dismissed.
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1979 (8) TMI 113
... ... ... ... ..... aid down in the case of CED vs. Smt Leelavathi Devi reported in (1979) 10 CTR (Mad) 154 (1979) 117 ITR 97 (Mad) (FB) would be applicable. Originally the business was carried on by the deceased as the Kartha of a family. It is in that business there was a capital account which formed the basis of the partition. According to the narration she took possession of the same. It is only thereafter that the money was reinvested by the daughter of Perumal Chettiar in the firm in which the deceased became a partner. We hold that s. 10 clearly applies. As far as unequal partition is concerned we find that on the facts of this case the principles laid down in the case of Kantilal Trikamlal and P. Ranganayaki Ammal and others 1976 CTR (SC) 391 (1976) 105 ITR 92 (SC) clearly applies. Accordingly we uphold the addition of Rs. 15,000 as sustained by the Appl. Contrl. by invoking the provisions of Expln. 2 to s. 2(15) r/w ss. 27 and 10 of the ED Act. 8. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1979 (8) TMI 106
... ... ... ... ..... rns. The assessee went in litigation before the Hon ble High Court. Ultimately, of a result of the discussion with the Deptt., Settlement Petition was filed, practically on all the points, the matter was settled. The assessee also filed the returns. Thus it is proved that there were reasonable causes, which prevented the assessee from filing the returns in time. In any view of the matter, there is no material worth the name from which it could be established that the conduct of the assessee has been contumacious or dishonest. In the present case, at the most, it could be called that there was technical default. But, for such technical default, no penalty is leviable. Reference may be made to the decision in the case of Hindustan Steel Limited vs. State of Orissa (1). 11. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are satisfied that the ld. AAC was wrong in sustaining the impugned orders of penalty. Accordingly, they are cancelled. 12. In the result, both the appeals are allowed.
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1979 (8) TMI 105
... ... ... ... ..... sidering the facts of this case and authorities mentioned above we hold, following respectfully the view taken by the Karnataka, Madras and Andhra Pradesh High Courts that in the present case the provisions of s. 52(2) were not applicable. The authorities below were, therefore, not justified in law in determining the capital gains from the sale of plant and machinery by the two assessees on the basis of the fair market value of the asset instead of the sale consideration actually received. We would direct that the inclusion of Rs. 23,486 made by the ITO should be excluded. Having taken this view, it is not necessary for us to consider the Revenue s objection to the direction of the learned AAC to the ITO to refer once again to the Departmental Valuation Officer the question of Valuation Officer becomes unnecessary. 19. In the result, the Cross-Objections of the assessees (C.O. Nos. 18 and 19/JP/79) succeed and both the appeals of the Revenue (ITA Nos. 484 and 485/JP/79) fail.
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1979 (8) TMI 104
... ... ... ... ..... es estimated by the ITO in respect of the partners were on the higher side. 10. We are clear that this addition was wholly mis-conceived. Whether the partners had to spend more on account of their household needs than what they had withdrawn from their accounts in the firm, had nothing to do in the firm s case. The extent of withdrawals from the firm was a matter of discretion of the partners and if they failed to explain the expenditure incurred by them for their household purposes, the ITO could have made additions in their personal accounts as income from undisclosed sources. There was no warrant in law for making the addition in the case of the firm. Even if partners did not withdraw a single copper from their account in the firm, no addition could be made in the firm s case, because the firm was not liable to explain as to how its partners met the household expenses. We, therefore, do not see any basis for this addition and the same is deleted. 11. The appeal is allowed.
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1979 (8) TMI 103
... ... ... ... ..... me and the advance-tax payable by him and also to pay such amount of advance-tax as per his estimate on such of the dates applicable in his case as have not expired, by instalments which may be revised according to s. 212(2). In other words, there is a liability to file the estimate as well as to pay the advance-tax. Now, in the present case the advance-tax was actually paid by the assessee and it covered all shortages. Therefore, it is very likely that assessee did prepare an estimate on the basis of which he had to pay the advance-tax and he may have actually despatched the same. In any case the idea of s. 212(3A) is to ensure payment of advance-tax and that has been done in the present case. In the famous case of Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1), the Supreme Court has held that a penalty should not be imposed merely for a technical or venial breach of law and merely because it is lawful to do so, we, therefore, find no force in this appeal and dismiss the same.
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1979 (8) TMI 102
... ... ... ... ..... ve that he has not concealed particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income. The Explanation does not absolve levying penalty under the provisions of s. 271 (1)(c) . Here it was the stand of the assessee throughout that he was earning some brokerage and the impugned amount flowed out of his savings which accumulated over a period of years. It is true that this contention was rejected by the hierarchy of the Tribunal as constituted under the Act. From this, it cannot be held that the assessee was guilty of any fraud or gross or wilful neglect. This was a case of rejection of explanation offered by the assessee regarding the source of investment. Department has not been able to discharge its onus to bring the case within the coils of the Expln. engrafted to s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. We, therefore, quash the order of penalty and direct the ITO to refund the amount, if collected from the assessee. 6. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed.
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1979 (8) TMI 101
... ... ... ... ..... of Rs. 1,100 plus Rs. 630 per month and portion occupied by the assessee as self occupied portion, which according to the learned counsel for the assessee can fetch a monthly rent of Rs. 300, considering all the facts, the locality and the facilities available is assessed at a rental value at Rs. 400 per month with the result that the monthly rental yield stands at Rs. 2,130. Total annual rental yield Rs. 2130 X 12 Rs. 25,560 Less out-goings 25 per cent Rs. 6,300 Net annual value Rs. 19,170 The capital value is determined at a multiple of 12.5 times of the net annual value which comes to Rs. 2,39,625 rounded off to Rs. 2,40,000 and accordingly in our view this should be the appropriate valuation of the property and the subject-matter of appeal for all the assessment years. Concludingly the WTO is accordingly directed to take the valuation at Rs. 2,40,000 for all the assessment years under appeal, with the result that the appeals by the assessee partly succeed and are allowed.
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