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Showing 41 to 60 of 92 Records
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1980 (6) TMI 54
... ... ... ... ..... assessee does not make his own estimate or makes default in paying advance tax in accordance with ITO s order under s. 10. According to the learned authors s. 18A(8) of the old Act of 1922 was wide enough to authorise the levy of interest in such a case. Therefore, according to the assessee, it had denied its liability to the charging of interest altogether and it was not merely a question of denial of liability for a part of the interest levied. 4. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the appeal by the assessee over this matter was competent. We do not know the circumstances under which interest was levied by the ITO under s. 217(1A) nor does the order of the CIT discuss this matter on merits. We have, therefore, no alternative but to accept the appeal and restore the case back to the CIT (A) for a decision on the merits of this ground of appeal raised before him. 5. In the result, for statistical purposes this appeal shall be deemed to be allowed as such.
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1980 (6) TMI 53
... ... ... ... ..... nce of depreciation on Jeep. The ITO had denied the claim of depreciation on the ground that the assessee was not the owner of the Jeep as it has not been registered in the name of the assessee. It is contended before us that Jeep was a movable asset and it could be transferred by delivery. The assessee was the owner of the Jeep and the insurance was also paid in the name of the assessee. The consideration for the purchase had also been paid by the assessee. It was, therefore, contended that the claim should not be denied merely because the registration under the Motor Vehicles Act had taken some time. 6. We have considered the facts of the case and we are of the view that the assessee was the owner of the Jeep as he had purchased it and the insurance was also in his name. Registration has also been transferred in the assessee s name later on. Under these circumstances, it would not be correct to deny the claim for depreciation. The same is allowed. 7. The appeal is allowed.
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1980 (6) TMI 52
... ... ... ... ..... sessee is also very nominal. The Department did not refer to any comparable case. In the absence of any material on record, the net profit rate disclosed by the assessee should be accepted. 6. The ld. Deptl. Rep. supported the order of the ld. AAC. 7. In our opinion, from the books maintained by the assessee, true income is not ascertainable. The reason given by the ld. ITO for rejecting the books results is quite reasonable. So, technically, proviso to s. 145 of the Act is applicable. 8. The declared receipts have been accepted by the Department. It is the first year of the business of the assessee. The firm invested capital of Rs. 26,000 only. Even then, the declared income was Rs. 62,180. The Department did not refer to any comparable case while applying the net profit at 12 per cent. In the absence of any other evidence on record, the net profit rate declared by the assessee should be accepted. The addition in question is deleted. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1980 (6) TMI 51
... ... ... ... ..... ng to show that the actual consideration shown by the assessee was not the consideration which was received by him. The bona fides of the transaction have not been assailed and the fact that the property Has actually been sold by the purchasers for a higher consideration later on could only be the starting point for making enquiry whether the transactions in question were bonafide or not. Without establishing that the transactions were mollified in so far as the consideration was concerned. The ITO could not apply the provisions of s. 52(2). The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the assessee fully support the above view. We, therefore, hold that the Dept. has not been able to establish that there has been an under-statement of actual consideration in the present case. In view of this, the provisions of s. 52(2) could not be applied. We, therefore, direct the ITO to recompute capital gains without applying the provisions of s. 52(2). 7. The appeals are allowed.
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1980 (6) TMI 50
... ... ... ... ..... 2 which were termed by the ITO as entertainment expenses and disallowed as such. The AAC following Bombay High Court decision in the case of Nanji Nagsi(2) in which Patel Brothers(1) of Gujarat High Court was followed had accepted the claim of the assessee. This action of the AAC now deserves to be confirmed in the light of Supreme Court decision in the case of Allied Publishers (P). Limited(3), in which the issue pertaining to entertainment expenses is laid at rest. The revenue, therefore, fails in its contention. 2. In the result, the Revenue s appeal is dismissed.
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1980 (6) TMI 49
... ... ... ... ..... has challenged it and there is not evidence in support of the departmental stand, we have to proceed on the basis that no assessment order was passed. In the circumstances, the stand taken by the assessee that the proceedings and under s. 147 (a) were invalid has to be upheld in the light of the Supreme Court decisions and the Bombay decision discussed above. We would, therefore, quash the assessment order passed under s. 147(a). It is not therefore, necessary to join to the merits of the case. 15. As for the penalty order it would naturally fall to the ground in the light of our decision in the quantum proceedings as discussed above in Even on merits, we find that it was only on the basis of unsatisfactory evidence that the penalty was levied. No contumacious or dishonest conduct can be laid successfully at the doors of the assessee. in any view of the matter therefore the penalty order cannot survive it is therefore cancelled. 16. In the result both the appeals are allowed
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1980 (6) TMI 48
... ... ... ... ..... rted the order of the AAC. 4. We have heard the parties and perused the evidence on record. The authorities below gave good reasons for rejecting the book results. So, from the books maintained by the assessee, true income cannot be ascertained. The authorities below estimated sales at Rs. 9,60,000 and the same is quite reasonable. 5. In the asst. yr. 1973-74 the ld. AAC applied the gross profit rate of 9.5 per cent. In that year, the sales were about Rs. 8 lakhs. In the year of account the disclosed sale were at Rs. 9,39,868. It means that in the year of account the sale have increased considerably. In the immediately preceding year, the ld. AAC applied the rate of 9.5 per cent. That finding was accepted by the Department. Looking to the aforesaid facts and the evidence on record, in our opinion, the gross profit rate of 9 per cent shall be applied on estimated sales of Rs. 9,60,000. The assessee shall get relief accordingly. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part.
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1980 (6) TMI 47
... ... ... ... ..... see did not plead any change in the method of accounting. As for the Allahabad decision (1979) 16 ITR 728 (All), the assessee did not carve out a class of customers or transactions for adopting a change in the method of accounting. Therefore, both these decisions are not applicable to the facts of the case before us. 10. As for the other two mills taken over by the Industrial Reconstruction Corporation of India Ltd., the assessee was not in a position to seriously dispute the finding of the Commissioner. In regard to these two mills, the assessee could recover Rs. 9.2 lakhs out of the total outstanding of Rs. 14.9 lakhs and even at lower stages the assessee had adopted an attitude of ambivalence as to its treatment that it could be added to the total income of the assessee. In view of the reasoning adopted by the Commr. In para 18 of the appellate order we see no reason to differ from him. 11. In the result, both the departmental Appeal and the Cross Objection are dismissed.
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1980 (6) TMI 46
... ... ... ... ..... o jurisdiction to invoke s. 263 to revise the order of assessment of the ITO because according to the special Bench order of the Tribunal in Dwarkadas and Co. the Commr s jurisdiction in regard to revision of an order of the ITO will be barred not only in regard to matters which form the subject matter of appeal and on order by the appellate authority but also in regard to matters or points which could have been agitated by the assessee in an appeal and considered by the AAC. In this case, according to the assessee s contention, the assessee denies any liability to be charged under s. 217 because its stand is that its income is totally exempt or it had no chargeable income, in which case the assessee can agitate the matter in appeal even if there was a charge, on the ratio of the decision of the Bombay High Court in Daimler Benz (A.G.) 1977 CTR (Bom) 568 (1977) 108 ITR 961 (Bom) (FB). For all these reasons we set aside the order of the Commissioner. 7. The appeal is allowed.
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1980 (6) TMI 44
... ... ... ... ..... the ld. Deptl. Rep. Shri Chatterjee was not able to show to us that when the share of Smt. Chameli Kr. was a profit for the asst. yr. 1974-75, the ultimate destination of the income was Shri Rameshwar Singh. The claim of the assessee s ld. counsel that in the assessments of Shri Rameshwar Singh made on the same day, the share of Smt. Chameli Kr. From this business was not included in his total income, has not been controverted by the ld. Deptl. Rep. Taking all these facts into consideration, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that finding of the Revenue authorities that Smt. Chameli Kr. was a Benamidar of Shri Rameshwar Singh was not justified. This was the only reason for refusing the assessee s claim of registration. We, therefore, hold that the assessee s claim of registration ought to have been allowed by the Revenue authorities. The ITO is, therefore, directed to register the firm for all the three years under appeal before us. 7. The appeals are allowed.
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1980 (6) TMI 43
... ... ... ... ..... n for registration together with the instrument of partnership and a certified copy thereof were filed before the ITO on 7th May, 1974 i.e., before the end of the previous year, which ended on 14th Dec., 1974, which was within time. Nothing therefore, turned on whether the instrument of partnership deed was executed on 6th Dec., 1973 i.e., the date of the commencement of the firm or on a subsequent date upto 7th May, 1974, since in either case the assessee s claim for registration would not have been refused on that ground alone. Taking all these facts into consideration and looking to the totality of the facts and circumstances, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the assessee s claim that in the instrument of partnership the date 6th Dec., 1973 was a typographical error for 7th Dec., 1973 ought to have been accepted. This means that the claim for registration was wrongly refused. ITO is, therefore, directed to register the firm. 7. The appeal is allowed.
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1980 (6) TMI 42
... ... ... ... ..... down in this circular in our view, however, is applicable even in the present case because even after the IT Act, 1961 came into force it is the individual partner who suffers tax and as advised the Board and equity relief should be given if the same income has been taxed in two places at one place in the hands of the firm and at the other in the hands of the partners. 7. Shri J. P. Shah, the ld. Advocate for the assessee relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in CIT vs. A. Dharma Reddy (1969) 73 ITR 751 (SC) in support of his submission that when the profits of the registered firms are exempted the assessee for the purpose of paying the tax is not the registered firm but each partner of that firm. 8. In our view, there is considerable force in the submission made on behalf of the assessee, the benefit envisaged by the circular was rightly given to the other partners with whom the assessee was also a partner. 9. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1980 (6) TMI 41
... ... ... ... ..... he letter referred to above in the assessment file. It is seen that the assessee had written on the same date viz. 18th April, 1977, two other letters, both making in respect of additional education cess, one in respect of the asst. yr. 1975-76 and the other in respect of the asst. yr. 1976-77. These two letters have admittedly been received by the IT Authorities concerned. 16. We have carefully considered the submission of the ld. counsel for the assessee and ld. Deptl. Representatives. We are inclined to believe that the assessee wrote the letter bearing reference No.527/77 dt. 18th April, 1977 and made a claim of Rs. 45,580 for the additional education cess, claiming the same to be deducted in the asst. yr. 1974-75. That a demand had been raised by the Municipal Authorities for the above sum has not been disputed. We restore this matter to the file of the ITO for disposal in accordance with law and the findings contained herein. In the result, we allow the appeal in part.
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1980 (6) TMI 40
Manufacturer - Use of own premises - Effect - Biris ... ... ... ... ..... s no reasonable basis. This contention has no substance. There is an essential difference between the two types. The petitioners get the biris rolled in their own premises. They directly come under the definition of Takedars whereas in the other type of Takedars, the process of manufacture does not take place in their premises. They merely pass on the leaves which they obtain from the Principal Manufacturer to the home-workers who roll them into biris at their houses. Thus there is an essential difference between the two. These Takedars merely keep the biris received from the house-workers for few hours before they are despatched to the Principal Manufacturer. All the Takedars, who get the biris rolled in their premises are treated alike. Hence the petitioners cannot complain of any discrimination between persons placed in similar circumstances. 11. I see no merits in any of the contentions raised in the writ petitions. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1980 (6) TMI 39
Valuation - Tippers of various types ... ... ... ... ..... hin purview of Item 34 from the point of view of value is clearly motor vehicle without the specialised material handling equipment wherever these are fitted to them. Since the petitioners are marketing their ordinary chassis as such without the specialised material handling equipment which imparts the character of chassis, Government consider that in their case undoubtedly, it is the value of the ordinary vehicle which alone should form the basis of assessment even when it is cleared in the form of Tipper. Government therefore see no justification why for the same reason the value of steel body which forms the container for moving and handling material should be included for purposes of assessment of the Tippers under Item 34 of the Central Excise Tariff as done by one appellate authority in disposing of their appeals. Government accordingly set aside the impugned orders-in appeal covered by the aforesaid 18 Revision Applications with consequential relief to the petitioners.
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1980 (6) TMI 38
Refund - Advance deposit under Compounded Levy Scheme ... ... ... ... ..... mitation had to be counted from the date the petitioners ceased to operate under Compounded Levy Scheme or the date from which he was finally absolved of his liabilities under the Compounded Levy Scheme whichever was later. As such, Government hold that the petitioners claim is not barred by limitation. 3. Revision Application is accordingly allowed with consequential relief to the petitioners.
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1980 (6) TMI 37
Goods classified under one Tariff Item for long time cannot be classified under different item
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1980 (6) TMI 36
... ... ... ... ..... is not borne out by the records inasmuch as the Appellate Collector had duly considered this aspect of the matter before he passed a well reasoned and speaking order which is in question. 5. Government are unable to agree with the petitioner s contention that merely because the capillary glass tubes in question are meant for use in clinical thermometers these should merit classification under Item 23A(2) of the Central Excise Tariff. As such Government see no warrant for interfering with the order-in-appeal which is correct in law. 6. The Revision Application is accordingly rejected.
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1980 (6) TMI 35
... ... ... ... ..... Government further observe that duty-paid goods are transferred from the petitioners Steel Plant to the stockyards of the branch sales offices and it is a case of transfer of duty-paid goods from one wing of the petitioners organisation to the other, mainly for the convenience of marketing. However, the fact remains that the debit entries were not made in the PLA and the petitioners being a public sector undertaking should have been all the more careful in their despatches of excisable products after making due debit entries in the PLA. As no mala fide is involved the penalty of Rs. 40,000/- retained by the Board is set aside. However, in respect of the offending goods, the action in rem is correct in law, but considering the circumstances of the case the fine of Rs. 25,000/- retained by the Board is reduced to Rs. 500/- (Rupees Five hundred only). 3. Subject to the above modification, the order-in-appeal is confirmed and the revision application is disposed of accordingly.
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1980 (6) TMI 34
Valuation - Refund of excise duty illegally collected ... ... ... ... ..... nses during the period from 15-4-1970 to 30-11-1974 and amounts recovered in excess during the period 11-12-1974 to 4-1-1975 by including marketing and distribution expenses as a part of the price chargeable to Excise Duty. The petitioners have no doubt made a claim for a total amount of Rs. 8,90,320.31. It will however be for them to satisfy the appropriate authorities about the exact quantum of the amount under the heads referred to above. 18. This petition is therefore allowed, Rule is made absolute but no order as to costs. This petition has been pending for the last four years and therefore the department will dispose of the claim within a period of four months. 19. Mr. Lokur applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that similar matters are already pending in the Supreme Court. We have merely applied decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court and we do not think therefore that it would be proper to grant leave in this case. Application rejected.
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