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Showing 181 to 200 of 205 Records
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1980 (7) TMI 25 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Cash Credits, Penalty, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ere all bogus, it was open to the Tribunal below to act on such a statement and to infer that the assessee-firm failed to prove the genuineness of the cash credits of the impugned amounts. We, therefore, answer the two questions of law referred to us in I.T.R. No. 111 of 1975 in the affirmative, i.e., against the assessee-firm and in favour of the revenue. Once a finding is arrived at that the assessee-firm made false entries in its books of account and there was the additional evidence of the money-lending dealer to the effect that he had been indulging in namelending only, it was open to the Tribunal below to come to the conclusion that the assessee-firm had indulged in a deliberate concealment of income and to impose penalty on it. See in this connection (Hazi Mohd. Mir Ahmed v.CIT 1977 110 ITR 630 (P and H)). The question of law referred to us in I.T.R. No. 115 of 1975 is also answered in the affirmative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. No costs.
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1980 (7) TMI 24 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Expenditure Tax ... ... ... ... ..... erred to us relates to the legality of the action taken under s. 16 of the Expenditure-tax Act, 1957. The answer to the question depends on the facts and circumstances of the case . If the expenditure was incurred from out of income which was part of the income of the HUF, then the order of the Tribunal would be correct, but if the source of the income was the individual assets of the members of the family, then the Tribunal s action would be not justified. As in the income-tax reference it has been held by this court that the income was of the individual members of the family and not the family itself, it must follow that the expenditure from that income was also of the individuals and not of the assessee-family, and, hence, the Tribunal s action would not be justified, in these altered circumstances. Hence, the question referred to us has to be answered in the negative. As our decision is based on the decision in the other case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1980 (7) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... onstitute the income of the assessee for the assessment year 1962-63. But we also observe that the assessee has stated that subsequently the average adjusters had recommended a refund of Rs. 7,257.76, which was in excess of the final amount of contribution. The assessee has also stated that from the deposit balance of Rs. 18.223, if the amount refundable of Rs. 7,257 was deducted the income which accrued in 1964-65, when the final report of the adjusters was finalised, was Rs. 10,966. If anything out of the amount that was allowed in the computation of the income of the assessee for the year 1964-65 was refunded then the revenue will be entitled in law to adjust such computation. On cessation of the liability of Rs. 10,996 if it had been allowed, anything becomes refundable in the previous years, it should be adjusted in accordance with law in those years. In the facts and circumstances of the case, each party will pay and bear its own costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1980 (7) TMI 22 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Jewellery, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... Mr. B. L. Pal and hold that in its ordinary meaning the term jewellery always included all ornaments made out of precious metals with or without stones, then the introduction of the above Explanation to section 5(1)(viii) with prospective effect would be redundant and also absurd. We cannot impute a redundancy to any clause which has been embodied in a statute. If the Explanation was added to the section for reasons of greater caution as held by the Gujarat High Court in the case of Jayantilal Amratlal 1976 102 ITR 105 (Guj), then it was all the more necessary to make the Explanation retrospective as the main amendment and not prospective. We are in respectful agreement with this view and hold that the gold ornaments of the assessee could not he included in her net wealth for the relevant assessment year. For the reasons aforementioned, we answer the question of law in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue, No costs. B. S. DHILLON J.-I agree.
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1980 (7) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Foreign Income, Income From Other Sources ... ... ... ... ..... ppears to have been overlooked. Whilst a certain degree of simplification has occurred, the overall picture is one of increased complexity. But even if s. 47(2) is taken into consideration it would be the income of the assessee. There the taxed income would be accruing or arising abroad in the United Kingdom. Under s. 5(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, of India read with s. 196 of the I.T. Act, 1961, of India, an income which is deemed to accrue or arise abroad (to an assessee) who is resident in India, cannot be brought to tax. For the reasons in the judgment by us on July 24, 1980, in I.T. Reference No. 613 of 1972 (CIT v. Shaw Wallace and Co. Ltd. since reported in 1981 132 ITR 466 (Cal)), question No. 1 must also be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the premises, both the questions are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1980 (7) TMI 20 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... the amount of penalty to a sum of Rs. 50,000 only. At the instance of the assessee and the Department, the Tribunal has referred the aforesaid questions of law to this court for its opinion. At the time of hearing of this reference, learned counsel for the Department and the assessee agreed that the date on which the case regarding imposition of penalty was referred by the WTO to the IAC was material as the answer to the first question referred to this court would depend on that date. As there is no reference to that date in the statement of the case, this is a fit case, in our opinion, where the Tribunal should be directed to furnish a supplementary statement of the case. The Tribunal is accordingly directed to send a supplementary statement of the case and to state therein the date on which the matter regarding imposition of penalty was referred by the WTO to the IAC in the instant case. After the receipt of such statement, the reference shall be fixed for further hearing.
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1980 (7) TMI 19 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... om the firm, M/s. Shiv Narain Karmendra Narain and divided it between himself and his wife, the act of Shiv Narain Agarwal, in continuing to act as a partner in the firm of M/s. Shiv Narain Karmendra Narain, with the purpose of collecting the profits of that firm and distributing it between himself and his wife, would constitute the business of the alleged sub-partnership. We are, as such, not inclined to accept the contention that s. 64(1)(i) does not apply to a case of sub-partnership. We would have refrained from answering the second question as we have held that no sub-partnership came into existence between the assessee and his wife, but as the matter is appealable on certificate, we thought it fit to answer the second question also. We, accordingly, answer the first question in the negative, and the second question in the affirmative. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs. This judgment shall govern I.T.R. Nos. 764 of 1975 and 511 of 1977.
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1980 (7) TMI 18 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ome or not as the incidence of taxation would work out more or less in a way similar (though not mathematically) to that in the cases of firms and other associations of persons. But, in a case, where there is a member of the HUF deriving income over Rs. 5,000, that member, because of the treatment meted out by the I.T. Act to HUFS, certainly derives an advantage not available to members of other associations of persons. Thus looking from the point of view of taxation, there exists good reason for placing the two categories of HUF, as have been placed, in different categories, and, their being subjected to tax at different rates, specially with a view to neutralize the advantage, which, till then was being derived by members of such HUF cannot, on the basis of the decisions cited above, be said to contravene art. 14 of the Constitution. In the result, we find no merit in any of the submissions made by the petitioner. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1980 (7) TMI 17 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... obtain the requisite permission from the Government. The two clauses read together can be regarded only as going to the very nature of the property or to the very nature of its transferability. The clauses cannot be read as part and parcel of the very terms of the sale, much less as imposing a condition which had to be fulfilled first before the property in the goods could be regarded by the parties as passing from the, one to the other. Having regard to all the circumstances aforesaid, we are satisfied that the sale of the trees numbering 200 in all took place in the year ended March 31, 1971, corresponding to the assessment year 1971-72. It follows that the entirety of the consideration named in the agreement of sale, must be regarded as forming the full value of the consideration for the said sale. In this view, we answer both the questions referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee shall pay the costs to the Revenue. Advocate s fees Rs. 500.
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1980 (7) TMI 16 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... hat provision. The Tribunal, in our opinion, was also not justified in holding that there was a vested right in an assessee to have his case considered by the IAC prior to the passing of an order imposing penalty by the WTO. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held in CWT v. K. Butchaiah 1977 108 ITR 324 that the provisions of old s. 18(4) of the Act did not confer any vested right on the assessee. We are in respectful agreement with that view. On the date, when the order imposing the penalty was passed by the WTO, there was no provision of law requiring him to obtain the prior approval of the IAC. The Tribunal, in our opinion, was not justified in holding that that the order of imposition of penalty passed by the WTO was vitiated as the previous approval of the IAC was not obtained. For all these reasons, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1980 (7) TMI 15 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Capital, Income ... ... ... ... ..... cases the findings arrived at are vitiated . The facts of that case were entirely different. The Revenue wanted to raise a question as to perversity. The Tribunal reframed the question by stating whether the finding as to benami transaction was legally valid or not. The Supreme Court held that the questions as framed were thought by the Supreme Court to be wide enough to include the questions raised before the Tribunal. Further, the Supreme Court observed that the High Court had jurisdiction to intervene if it appeared that the Tribunal had misunderstood the statutory language. In the instant case before us, there is no such term before us. In that view of the matter and in view of the findings that have been arrived at by the Tribunal and which are not disputed or challenged, the question must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1980 (7) TMI 14 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Agent, Income, Loss, Speculation ... ... ... ... ..... f contracts for actual delivery of merchandise sold. Entering into contracts in course of business is said to be not sufficient for the purpose. It was for the assessee to prove that that was done with a view to guard against future loss in respect of contracts for actual delivery of merchandise. According to the Tribunal, the assessee failed to discharge the onus which lay on it. The only evidence placed by the assessee was the oral evidence of assessee representative Mr. Duncan Smith. The, oral testimony of course remained uncorroborated. In this view of the matter, the finding of the Tribunal that the sum of Rs. 39,824 was not allowed does not appear to be unreasonable and perverse. Thus in view of the finding of the Tribunal and in view of the materials placed before, us, we answer questions Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 in the negative and question No. 2 in the affirmative and all in favour of the Revenue. Each party to pay and bear its own costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJEE, J.-I agree.
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1980 (7) TMI 13 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Education ... ... ... ... ..... ard to the nature of these clauses other than cl. 3A(i) cannot be said to be reasonable or justified on the material on record. The memorandum of association does not give any indication that the company was engaged in any business or trade as such. There was no other material on record suggesting any such inference. The information given in regard to the activities that are being carried on and the prospectus of the institution which was being run by the company clearly indicate that no fees was being charged and scholarships were being given to cover up expenses regarding food, accommodation, etc. In the light of the above discussion, it must be stated that the conclusions reached by the Commissioner are vitiated and, accordingly, the order made by him cannot be supported. It is, accordingly, quashed with a direction that the application of the petitioner shall be disposed of by the Commissioner afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above.
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1980 (7) TMI 12 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l erred in confining the concealed income to Rs. 3,000 only, for, this amount related only to the purchases which were not accounted for, while the assessee had entered into a number of other transactions which did not find place in his accounts. On the frame of the question it is not possible for us to consider this aspect of the matter, for the question as referred does not solicit an inquiry into the validity of the finding regarding the estimated concealed income on this score. All that the question requires us to consider is as to whether the Tribunal was justified in fixing the concealed income at Rs. 3,000 when the total income had been computed at Rs. 25,000 in the quantum matter. It is as such not possible to go into this aspect of the matter. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee, and against the Department. The assessee is entitled to its costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure.
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1980 (7) TMI 11 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Assessment, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... nst the deceased assessee against the provisions of the law. For aught we know, it was an error or oversight on the part of the ITO. If the procedure is laid down for continuing assessment proceedings against a deceased person, then it is doubtful to accept the proposition that the assessment proceedings become non est because the order of assessment happens to be passed against the deceased assessee. In any event, at this stage, we are not called upon to give any final opinion about this matter. All that we need to emphasise is that in these circumstances a question of law does arise. We, therefore, allow this petition and direct the Tribunal to refer the following question of law to this court for its opinion Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in annulling the assessment on the ground that the assessment order in this case was non est in the eye of law ? We make no order as to costs. BHOPINDER SINGH DHILLON J.-I agree.
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1980 (7) TMI 10 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... surely be a relevant material on the basis of which the ITO can form a reasonable belief that the income of the assessee has escaped assessment for his omission or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. But in the instant case the facts were not like that and, accordingly, Nanji s case 1979 120 ITR 593 (Cal), has no application. No other point has been urged on behalf of either party. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the judgment of the learned judge and make the rule nisi absolute. Let a writ in the nature of certiorari issue quashing the impugned notice under s. 148 of the I.T. Act, 1961. Further, let a writ in the nature of mandamus issue commanding the respondents not to give any effect or further effect to the impugned notice and not to proceed with the assessment proceedings reopened on the basis of the impugned notice. The appeal is allowed, but in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs. A. N. SEN C.J.-I agree.
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1980 (7) TMI 9 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Revision By Commissioner ... ... ... ... ..... been referred to this court for its opinion though in a modified form in I.T.R. Nos. 66 and 67 of 1975. We do not find any reason not to ask the Tribunal to refer this question of law for the opinion of this court in I.T. Ref. No. 14 of 1976, especially when the same question in a little modified form has been referred for the opinion of this court in the connected reference. For the reasons recorded above, we direct that this question of law be also referred for the opinion of this court in both the cases and the modified question of law (No. 1) on this aspect of the matter, which has been referred for the opinion of this court in Income-tax References Nos. 66 and 67 of 1975, be deleted. We order accordingly. The supplementary statement of the case may be submitted by the Tribunal to this court within two months and all the cases may then be put up for hearing. Civil Writ Petition No. 1036 of 1977, be also listed along with these cases. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1980 (7) TMI 8 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Partnership Whether Legal ... ... ... ... ..... rant of a subsequent permission. The whole thing depends upon the construction of r. VI. As, in our opinion, r. VI, on a reasonable construction, empowers the grant of a retrospective permission, we find no difficulty in holding the partnership valid from the very beginning. For these reasons, we are of the View that the Tribunal was right in holding that the partnership was not illegal and that registration and continuation of registration under the. I.T. Act ought to be granted in favour of the partnership. For the reasons mentioned above, we answer the question as follows, M.C.C. No. 326 of 1976 (1) The partnership was legal and was entitled to the benefit of registration for the assessment year 1968-69 and continuation thereof for subsequent years. (2) In view of our answer to question No. 1, it is not necessary to answer this question. M.C.C. No. 111 of 1978. The assessee is entitled to continuation of registration. There will be no order as to costs of these references.
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1980 (7) TMI 7 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Change Of Law, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... ion would apply if in a particular penalty proceeding pending before the IAC the period of limitation was still running on 1st April, 1971. In view of the aforesaid decisions, our answer to the first question referred to us is that the amendment of s. 274(2) of the Act, which came into force on 1st April, 1971, did not have the effect of taking away the jurisdiction of the IAC to proceed with the penalty proceedings in question. Our answer to the second question is that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the amendment made in s. 274(2) of the Act with effect from 1st April, 1971, extended the period of limitation for finalisation of penalty proceedings. For these reasons, our answer to the first question referred to this court is in the negative and against the assessee. Our answer to the second question referred to this court is in the affirmative and in favour of the Department. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1980 (7) TMI 6 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
HUF, Partition ... ... ... ... ..... is to be apportioned according to the portion of the joint family property allotted to each member and thereafter the various members are to be assessed separately under s. 23. In our opinion, it stands to reason that it is necessary to notice the individual members who are to be separately assessed under s. 25A(2). As no notice was issued to petitioners Nos. 2 to 7, the assessment order, passed on 8th July, 1974, for the assessment year 1957-58, cannot be enforced against them. For the same reason no demand notice upon this assessment order could be issued against them. The petition is partly allowed. The demand notices dated 8th July, 1974, issued by the ITO, A-Ward, Sagar, against all the petitioners for the years 1956-57 and 1958-59 are quashed. Further, the demand notices issued against petitioners Nos. 2 to 7, on the same date for the assessment year 1957-58 are also quashed. There will be no order as to costs. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioners.
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