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1980 (9) TMI 48
Reserve, Super Profits Tax ... ... ... ... ..... gree that the substance of the matter had to be looked into. But the substance of the matter indicated that though it was not distribution, yet it was not intended to be used for making a future expenditure that might be necessary. That is the fundamental distinction one has to bear in mind about an expenditure to be incurred and the principle relating to allowance which is liable for deduction, that is to say, it is not to be expended out but to be kept back for future use. As there is no finding that this major provision for distribution has not been brought about for any revaluation or other methods of the book assets as contemplated by Expln. 1 of the Second Schedule to the Act, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was justified in law in its finding. In the premises, the question will be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1980 (9) TMI 47
Annual Value, House Property ... ... ... ... ..... he rooms have been let out on rent to different lodgers on a monthly basis is not sufficient to constitute these rooms into separate residential units for the purposes of the grant of the benefit under cl. (b) of the second proviso to s. 23(1) of the Act. As already indicated, we are clearly of opinion that the operation of the said proviso is to be restricted to buildings comprising a plurality of dwelling units which by themselves constitute independent residential houses or homes. Accordingly, we hold that the view taken by the Tribunal and by the AAC that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to s. 23(1) of the Act is illegal and erroneous. We answer the question referred in this case in the negative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the department. The parties will bear their respective costs. A copy of this judgment, under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar, will be forwarded to the Tribunal, as required by law.
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1980 (9) TMI 46
... ... ... ... ..... husband as, under s. 27(i), the assessee will be deemed to be the owner of such property for the purpose of income-tax and so its income will be deemed to be his income for the assessment year 1969-70. Under s. 64(iii) the income will be included in the income of the assessee. In computing this income no retrospective effect is being given to s. 27(i) or to s. 64(iii). The question whether in fact he owned the income or not, or whether the transfer was valid or not, would be irrelevant. Section 27(i) and s. 64(iii) only provide for principles of computation and taxing in the hands of the transferor. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative. On a true interpretation of s. 64(iii) read with s. 27(i) of the 1961 Act, the income from the house property in holding No. 401, which was gifted by the assessee to his wife in 1954, should be added to the income of the assessee, for the assessment year 1969-70. We pass no order as to costs. D. PATHAK, Actg. C.J.-I agree.
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1980 (9) TMI 45
Business Expenditure, Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... ade of ship builders, ship repairers and marine engineers. For the purpose of construction of the dock specially shaped new basin was excavated and the same was lined with concrete, installing valves, pumps, electricity generators and other machinery. The House of Lords held that the dock was plant and the expenditure on the excavation and the concrete lining attracted the allowance of depreciation. Clearly the expenditure incurred for the installation of a plant was treated as expenditure for plant and machinery for purposes of depreciation allowance. The case has no application to the facts of this case because construction of metal roads for hauling compost cannot be considered as an expenditure on plant or machinery. Our answer to question No. 2, therefore, is that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the assessee was not entitled to depreciation on the amount of the cost of construction of metal roads on the trenching grounds. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1980 (9) TMI 44
Agricultural Income Tax, Change In Constitution Of Firm ... ... ... ... ..... iciently comprehensive and precise about the constitution of the firm and the shares of the partners including the minors on their becoming majors in the profits and losses and we cannot agree with the Commissioner that consequent on the minors attaining majority there was a change in the constitution of the firm requiring the execution of a fresh deed of partnership. With respect we differ from Ganesh Lal Laxmi Narain v. CIT 1968 68 ITR 696 (All) and prefer to follow Badri Narain Kashi Prasad v. Addl. CIT 1978 115 ITR 858 (All) FB , and the cases which take the same view, as they accord with our reading of the partnership deed. In the result, we answer the questions in the negative, i. e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs in this reference. A true copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, Trivandrum.
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1980 (9) TMI 43
Advance Tax, Assets, Company, Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... essee during the relevant assessment year. On the aforesaid reasoning it appears clear to us that the AAC as well as the Tribunal were right in their view that the disputed amount of Rs. 76,857 cannot be treated as a taxable asset of the assessee on the valuation date within the meaning of s. 2(e) of the W.T. Act. In that view of the matter, our answer to the first question as refrained is in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. So far as the second referred question is concerned, the learned advocates of the respective sides agree that the answer to the second question is covered by our decision in Wealth-tax Reference No. 3 of 1975, decided by us today (See CWT v. Ashok K. Parikh 1981 129 ITR 46). For the reasons given by us in the said decision, we answer question No 2 in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Commissioner will pay costs of this reference to the assessee. Orders accordingly.
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1980 (9) TMI 42
Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... refore, no hesitation in holding that the period of limitation prescribed under s. 132(5) applies only to orders passed at the initial stage. The period of limitation will not apply when a fresh order is passed by the ITO pursuant to any direction given by the appropriate authority under s. 132(12) or by the High Court in proceedings under art. 226 of the Constitution of India. In the result, the order passed by the ITO under s. 132(5) is quashed and the ITO, the third respondent herein, is directed to pass fresh orders under s. 132(5) after giving the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of being heard. In view of the fact that a long time has elapsed since the seizure took place the third respondent is directed to dispose of the matter Within six months from this date. In the view that I have taken the petitioner is not entitled to the relief of mandamus for the release of the sum of Rs. 50,000. With the direction as given above, the writ petition is dismissed without costs.
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1980 (9) TMI 41
Accrual, Income ... ... ... ... ..... Trading Corporation dated September 10, 1970, and that as that contract did not authorise the assessee to charge the aforementioned amount the said charge could not be said to have accrued as income to the Agro Corporation during the relevant year. The right to receive the price accrued to the Agro Corporation not because of the contract which it had entered into with the Trading Corporation on September 10, 1970. It accrued because of a subsequent and independent contracts which the Agro Corporation entered into with its customers at the time of the selling the tractors. In law, notwithstanding the contract between the Agro Corporation and the Trading Corporation, the former was entitled to receive from its customers the entire price for which it had agreed to sell the tractors to them. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the Commissioner who shall be entitled to his costs which are assessed at Rs. 250.
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1980 (9) TMI 40
Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... under s. 14(2) of the Act. The view taken by us also finds support from CIT v. Indra and Co. 1971 79 ITR 702 (Raj), Mullapudi Venkatarayudu v. Union of India 1975 99 ITR 448 (AP), CIT v. D. V. Save 1979 117 ITR 266 (Bom), G. S. Atwal and Co. (Asansol) v. CIT 1979 119 ITR 171 (Cal) and R. Lakshminarayana Reddiar v. CIT 1980 121 ITR 767 (Mad). Mr. Jain, the learned counsel for the respondent, brought to our notice the case of Addl. CIT v. Rampratap Shankarlal 1979 117 ITR 662 (MP) decided by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court for the contrary proposition, but in a subsequent decision in Chunnilal and Bros. v. CIT 1979 119 ITR 199 (MP), the same High Court has taken a different view. For the reasons aforementioned, we answer question (i) in favour of the assessee and against the revenue and answer questions (ii) and (iii) in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. DHILLON J.-I agree.
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1980 (9) TMI 39
Actual Cost, Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... ct of this sub-section is that for the purpose of computing development rebate, the provisions of s. 43A(1) are to be wholly ignored and only the definition of actual cost in section 43(1) is to apply. The result is that if an assessee has not borrowed money to pay for a capital asset but has an outstanding liability to pay the price in foreign exchange, which liability increased as a result of devaluation of the Indian rupee, and the increase is not later than the year in which the development rebate is allowable under s. 33, the assessee would be entitled to claim development rebate on the basis of such increased cost. After considering the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act in this connection and the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the assessee is entitled to development rebate on, the actual cost of the new machinery which was Rs. 9,89,01.7. The Income-tax Officer is directed to allow development rebate on the above sum as per rules.
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1980 (9) TMI 38
Business Expenditure, Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... ut any merit. The learned counsel for the revenue has placed reliance on a Supreme Court decision in Swadeshi .Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1967 63 ITR 65. In the above case, the machinery which was agreed to be purchased was in fact never purchased and the interest was paid even though the assessee had not utilised the machinery for his business. In this view of the matter, the said authority, is of no help to the learned counsel for the revenue. The Tribunal, after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, came to the conclusion that the assessee was entitled to a deduction of interest for a total amount of Rs. 28,511 and accordingly enhanced the amount allowed by the ITO by Rs. 14,831 on account of payment of interest. This is essentially a finding of fact. We have no reason to take a view different from the one taken by the Tribunal. The second question is, therefore, answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue, in the affirmative.
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1980 (9) TMI 37
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... re of the opinion that the income in question should be considered as business income and not income from other sources. The Appellate Tribunal, after examining the facts of the case, held that the assessee had commenced manufacture of oil and diesel engines and the plant and machinery were in full running condition. Further, the assessee had entered into an agreement with a Calcutta company for the sale of the engines and pumps, etc., and it was to comply with this obligation that the plant and machinery had been leased out for a better management, so that the contractual commitment may be fulfilled. According to the Tribunal, it was a case of commercial exploitation and the income from the lease was business income. Clearly, this finding is one of fact based on the material placed before the Appellate Tribunal and, therefore, no question of law as such arose from the order of the Tribunal. We, therefore, decline to answer this question. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1980 (9) TMI 36
... ... ... ... ..... ecognized, but a legal right in its strict sense is one which is an assertable claim, enforceable according to law. While considering the question as to whether or not income had accrued to an assessee, it has to be ascertained, whether the assessee is vested with the right to claim that amount, and if the claim is not legally enforceable, then the assessee, in our opinion, cannot be said to be vested with a right to claim the amount. The question of enforceability of the right to receive income is, therefore, embedded in the concept of accrual of income while considering the question of taxability of such income under the provisions of the Act. In our opinion, therefore, the interest income cannot be held to have accrued to the assessee on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. Our answer to the question referred to us is, therefore, in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1980 (9) TMI 35
Advance Tax, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... been reiterated in the following cases CIT v. S. P. Jain 1973 87 ITR 370 (SC) and CIT v. Manna Ramji and Co. 1972 86 ITR 29 (SC). Learned counsel for the assessee could not convince us by pointing out circumstances to hold the view that on the various factors pointed out above, no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law would have come to the determination in question as held by the Tribunal. It is not permissible for us to disturb the findings of fact made by the Tribunal, and it is not open to the High Court in a reference to embark upon the reappraisal of the evidence and arrive at the findings of fact contrary to those of the Tribunal. See Karam Chand Thapar and Bros. (P.) Ltd. v. CIT 1971 80 ITR 167 (SC) . The levy of penalties in the case was lawfully imposed and was justified. In the result, we answer the question against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. We, however, do not pass any order regarding costs. K. LAHIRI J.-I agree.
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1980 (9) TMI 34
... ... ... ... ..... the directions of this court vide order dated 20th November, 1973, was asked to ascertain the material facts indicating whether the Board while permitting the purchase or sale of gold, placed any restrictions on its price and nothing else. That is clear from the Rules itself that if the assessee had declared the bullion in is declaration submitted under r. 126-I, he could sell the gold to a licensed dealer at the market rate. No other argument has been raised before us. For the reasons recorded above, question No. 3 in W.T. Refs. Nos. and 3 of 1971 and question No. 1 in W.T. Refs. Nos. 2 and 7 of 1971, are answered in the negative, i. e., against the assessee and in favour of the revenue, and it is held that the value of the gold could be the market value of the bullion as there had been no value fixed under the Gold Control Order. Question No. 1 in W.T. Ref. No. 28 of 1975 is also answered in the negative, i. e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. No costs.
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1980 (9) TMI 33
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... placed by the Tribunal on this statement . In our view, therefore, there is no such evidence on record as, would establish that the deceased had an intention of making India her permanent home after the death of the said George, and in view of this it cannot be said that after the death of the said George the said deceased acquired her domicile of choice in India. It, may be noted here that it was submitted by Mr. Kolah that the domicile of origin of the said deceased was in Austria and that on the, death of the said George that domicile automatically revived. . Speaking for ourselves, we have some doubt regarding the correctness of this contention. However, it is not necessary for us to go into the same as we have held that even at the time when the said George died the domicile of the said deceased was outside India. In the result, the question referred to us for our opinion is answered in the negative. The applicant must pay to the respondent the costs of this reference.
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1980 (9) TMI 32
Co-operative Society, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... the real issue between the parties. We, therefore, reframe question No. 1 referred to us as follows Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the income of the assessee derived from credit sales was (not) liable to be deducted under the provisions of section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Act, in computing the total income of the assessee ? In our opinion, the provisions of cl. (a)(i) of s. 80P(2) of the Act, are not attracted in the instant case in view of the finding of the Tribunal that no part of the income of the assessee was attributable to the activity of the assessee of selling goods on credit. Therefore, our answer to the question framed as above is in the affirmative and against the assessee. Learned counsel for the parties conceded that question No. 2, referred by the Tribunal, did not really arise in this case and we, therefore, decline to answer that question. Parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1980 (9) TMI 31
Double Taxation Relief ... ... ... ... ..... ot have come to this court at all because the firm was not subject to any tax and did not have to pay any tax under the then applicable provisions of the income-tax law. It was pointed out to the learned counsel for the appellant that in fact that firm had no grievance, but he submitted that the individual partners could act collectively by instituting the present writ petition and appeal. This does not appear to be correct. Under the income-tax law, a registered firm is a separate assessee and the individual partners are separate assessees distinguishable from the firm. There was no grievance as far as the firm was concerned, because neither did the firm have to pay any tax in India nor in Pakistan. The grievance, if any, was of the partners in their individual cases. Therefore, it would appear that the petitioner before the court and, therefore, the present appellant, is not party with any grievance. In any case, for the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1980 (9) TMI 30
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... ge did not involve any extra expenditure, rejected the assessee s claim that some expenditure was involved in the transport of luggage also and the same should have been considered for determining the net profit from luggage receipts. Clearly the finding is one of fact and no question of law could arise therefrom. Learned counsel for the assessee very strenuously argued that while carrying luggage there was always some extra expenditure in terms of wear and tear and also extra consumption of diesel, etc., and, therefore, this ought to have been taken into consideration by the authorities below. It is not necessary for us to comment on this argument because the fact whether the transport of luggage involved any extra expenditure was question of fact which only the Tribunal was competent to decide. The Tribunal answered this against the assessee and this being a finding of fact ends the matter. We, therefore, decline to answer this question. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1980 (9) TMI 29
Question Of Law, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... return. The contention on behalf of the department on this question before the High Court was that penalty can be levied under s. 271(1)(a) on the assessee, a partner of the firm, even though a penalty under this very provision had also been levied on the firm. This question was answered by the High Court on the basis of its decision in Amritlal Somabhai v. CIT 1979 116 ITR 833 (M.P.). In that case, the court had repelled the contention of the assessee that the imposition of penalty under s. 271(1)(a) of the Act on the firm and also on the partner for the same default amounted to double punishment. Since, in our opinion, the Appellate Tribunal had held that there was reasonable cause for the assessee for the late filing of his return inasmuch as the assessee was unable to ascertain his income till such time as the accounts of the firm of which he was a partner were finalised, no question of law arises and we decline to answer the question. There shall be no order as to costs.
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