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Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 203 Records
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1981 (2) TMI 63 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... tural lands on the date when the sales were effected to the different co-operative societies in respect of these five survey numbers which we have mentioned above. It is obvious in view of the provisions of the I.T. Act, 1961, as it stood at the relevant time, that if the land was agricultural land at the time of the sale, the profit made on the transaction could not be charged as capital gains in the hands of the seller. That legal position is not disputed before us. Under these circumstances, it must be held that the Tribunal was in error when it reversed the finding of the AAC and held that on the date of the sale the land was not agricultural land and hence capital gains tax was liable to be paid by the assessee in respect of the profit which he made on the sale of these lands. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Commissioner will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1981 (2) TMI 62 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ne notice above and we cannot find anything in that notice to come to the conclusion that the Income-tax Officer was really attempting to assess an association of persons. The impugned notices are not directed against any association of persons alleged to have been formed by the petitioners. They are addressed to the individuals. Assuming for the sake of argument that an association of persons existed, even then the ITO exercised his option to assess the individuals. Again, it is not permissible as the same would amount to change of opinion or setting an opinion. I have chosen to record reasons, as each assessment year has to be taken as a separate and distinct proceeding. My view is the same as that held by B. C. Misra J. for the assessment year 1954-55. For the above reasons, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned notices are quashed as also subsequent proceedings in pursuance thereof on the facts and circumstances of the case. I make no order as to costs.
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1981 (2) TMI 61 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he instant case, there is no expenditure which is incurred for the purpose of earning the amount of dividends. The expenditure incurred by way of payment of interest was incurred for the purpose of carrying on the business of the assessee and that has been deducted under s. 36(1)(iii) while computing the income of the assessee for the purpose of profits and gains from business. Under these circumstances, the conclusion of the Tribunal is correct as the interest was paid by the assessee on moneys borrowed on overdraft and employed in the business of dealing in shares. Question No. 1 is, therefore, answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Question No. 2. Relief under s. 80M is to be granted on the gross amount of dividends since there is no interest attributable in respect thereof. We thus answer question No. 2 in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Commissioner will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1981 (2) TMI 60 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Income From House Property ... ... ... ... ..... 102 ITR 499, where the owner was held liable to be assessed in respect of the income from the property even though the property had been transferred in such circumstances as attracted the application of s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and although the assessee had written to the tenants requesting them to attorn to the transferees with effect from a date anterior to the date of execution of the sale deed. He points out that the rights of the present assessee in the property are on a much better footing than those of the transferor in the case before the Bombay High Court. We do not, however, think it necessary to dilate on this case or the other decisions referred to by Mr. Wadhera because the matter is clearly governed by the decision of this court in the case of Kartar Singh 1969 73 ITR 438. For these reasons, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the department. The department will be entitled to its costs Counsel s fee Rs. 300.
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1981 (2) TMI 59 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Deduction, Ground Rent, Income From House Property ... ... ... ... ..... the parties as damages and penalty, but it is clear that the payment was nothing more than by way of an enhanced rent for using the property in a manner different from that for which the rent of Rs. 600 was fixed. The payments merely represent additional payments which the lessee was called upon to pay in respect of the user of the property. A payment received by the landlord from his tenant for the use of the property is clearly nothing but rent. There is, therefore, no doubt in our minds that the amounts which the present assessee was called upon to pay to the Land and Development Officer constituted nothing but ground rent within the meaning of s. 24(1)(v). In this view, it is unnecessary to consider the tenability of the claim under s. 24(1)(iv). We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to his costs of this reference. Counsel s fee Rs. 200 in one set. Question answered in the negative.
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1981 (2) TMI 58 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Income, Trading Receipt ... ... ... ... ..... t had been collected. On these facts, it was held that the sum of Rs. 32,986 realised as sales tax by the appellant in its character as an auctioneer formed part of its trading or business receipts and that the fact that the appellant credited the amount received as sales tax under the head Sales tax collection account did not make any material difference. It was further observed that it is the true nature and quality of the receipt and not the head under which it is entered in the account books as would prove decisive and, if a receipt is a trading receipt, the fact that it is not so shown in the account books of the assessee would not prevent the assessing authority from treating it as a trading receipt. Except that, here, the amount in dispute was collected as a royalty, there is no point of distinction between the case before the Supreme Court and the present case. The question referred, therefore, has to be answered in the affirmative and we order accordingly. No costs.
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1981 (2) TMI 57 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f change. The Tribunal, in our opinion, had rightly indicated that the rubber stamp referred to in the assessment order is not a material feature for resolving the dispute, in issue. We are inclined to agree that the Tribunal came to the right conclusion on the facts. The criticism of the learned standing counsel that upon a bare Proposition of law, the reversing finding which had been reached by the Tribunal is not warranted. The Tribunal indicated the law, tested the facts and upon an application of the law came to the conclusion. Upon such a state of facts our answer to the question referred, therefore, is On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the status of the assessee was that of an HUF. The conclusion of fact was not reached on a bare proposition of law but by applying a proposition of law to the set of facts before the Tribunal. Parties will bear their respective costs of these references. B. N. MISRA J.-I agree.
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1981 (2) TMI 56 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Fully And Truly, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... s return. The Tribunal has observed that the law did not cast any further obligation on the assessee to show the source of investment in the return, in the prescribed form for filing the return. No provision of law has been brought to our notice by learned counsel for the department to show that it was the duty of the assessee to disclose the source of the fund which was invested in the construction of the new portion. The assessee thus had disclosed fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for the year in question. As one of the conditions for exercising jurisdiction under s. 147(a) of the Act was not satisfied, the Tribunal, in our opinion, was right in holding that the ITO had wrongly exercised his jurisdiction in reopening the assessment under s. 147(a) of the Act. For all these reasons, the reference is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1981 (2) TMI 55 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Deduction, Know-How ... ... ... ... ..... . Tax incentive contemplated thereunder is basically for encouraging Indian companies to export their know-how and skill abroad. Mere supply of particulars or bio-data of various Indians willing to work abroad and their selection or recruitment accordingly in India is a situation falling far too short of the requisites necessary for attracting the benefits of this section. Widely worded though it is, the section does not cover a case as the present one. The contentions raised on behalf of the assessee are de hors the actual facts reflected in the agreements and constitute a strained effort to gravitate or bring the matter within the four corners of the said section. Acceptance thereof would militate against the object and purpose behind the law in question. A judicial interpretation should be so geared as to fairly serve the legislative intent. The impugned order of the Board is correct and legal. It suffers from no infirmity. This petition, therefore, fails and is rejected.
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1981 (2) TMI 54 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ommitted prior to the assessment and the notice of demand. It is not in dispute that the assessee has been guilty of the specific default. The failure to file a return in time was the offence for which the assessee is being penalised and it is difficult to see what connection the subsequent payment of tax has to do with it. The default, which had already occurred, cannot be condoned by the mere payment of the tax payable or the tax assessed before the penalty order is passed. There does not appear to be any ambiguity in the language of the provision. For the reasons outlined above, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the penalty levied on the assessee was strictly in accordance with the provisions of s. 271(1) of the 1961 Act and no interference was called for. The question is, therefore, answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 300. Question answered in the negative.
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1981 (2) TMI 53 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... ficial residences of such Rulers. From a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that what has been exempted is the bona fide annual value of the palace of a Ruler of an Indian State which is declared by the Central Govt. as the official residence of such Ruler. The exemption could by no stretch of imagination be held to embrace income in the nature of capital gains realised on the sale of land forming part of the official residence of a Ruler. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal was justified in holding that capital gains realised by the assessee on the sale of a portion of land within the compound of Jhabua Kothi which was declared as the official residence of the Ruler of Jhabua was not entitled to exemption from tax by virtue of Para. 15(1)(iii) of the Taxation Concessions Order. For all these reasons, this reference is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1981 (2) TMI 52 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... outlined above, it would appear to us that the expenses incurred by the assessee on account of the Commission of Inquiry were an allowable business expenditure. With regard to the second question, it is the admitted case that the sum of Rs. 19,170 was spent by the law department of the assessee in connection with the Commission of Inquiry. The ITO had disallowed this amount on the same basis as the expenditure of Rs. 45,088 and the AAC and the Tribunal had affirmed the disallowance. Since we have held that, the assessee honestly incurred the expenditure of Rs. 45,088 to safeguard its interest before the Commission and to preserve and protect its reputation and business, this amount which was expended by its law department must also be allowed. In the result, question No. 1 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 2 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee is Rs. 300.
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1981 (2) TMI 51 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the above-mentioned two grounds, namely, firstly, the category of the assessee was different, and, secondly, by virtue of the change of definition in s. 2(30) in the 1961 Act, that being an inclusive definition, the entire concept of the exemption under the option has changed and, therefore, the option of 1953 would no longer apply in the case of the present assessee because he was in the year under reference a person resident but not ordinarily resident . Under these circumstances, the final conclusion reached by the Tribunal was, in our opinion, correct. The questions referred to us are, therefore, answered as follows Question No. (1)-In the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Question No. (2)-In the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Question No. (3)-In the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Commissioner will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1981 (2) TMI 50 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Carry Forward And Set Off, Loss ... ... ... ... ..... ntracts. The rejoinder affidavit shows that there is a contract with Tata s Mithapur, Gujarat, for 250 million , one with Coromandel Fertilisers for 200 million , one at Nangal Expansion, Haryana, for 30 million , one for Hindustan Lever for 300 million , one which is described as a modifications in MRL for 15 million and for setting up a refinery in Turkey jointly with some other Indian concern is for 200 million . These huge contracts would show that very large funds will have to be available with the petitioner from time to time. It would, therefore, necessitate the petitioner having large liquid funds at times and a businessman placed in such a situation would normally try to get some interest on such deposits and the same would be considered as business income. We would, therefore, hold that set-off as claimed has to be allowed even against interest on securities. However, in view of the nature of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1981 (2) TMI 49 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Mutual Concern ... ... ... ... ..... exists as it did in the case before the Supreme Court, and as it does in the case before us, it is very difficult to say that the element of a charitable organisation exists. We are, therefore, of opinion that the present case is directly governed by the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Indian Sugar Mills Association 1974 97 ITR 486. We may also mention that though the Indian Sugar Mills Association was one of the interveners before it in Surat Art Silk s case 1980 121 ITR 1, the decision in the Indian Sugar Mills Association s case 1974 97 ITR 486 (SC) was not one of the numerous decisions considered and referred to by the Supreme Court in Surat Art Silk s case 1980 121 ITR 1. It has not been disapproved, nor its authority in any way shaken, as suggested by Shri Ahuja. In the result the second question referred to us is also answered in the negative and in favour of the department. As the assessee has failed, it will pay costs to the respondent. Counsel s fee Rs. 200.
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1981 (2) TMI 48 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, HUF, Property Passing ... ... ... ... ..... rned had recognised the partition by an order under s. 25A of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922. In that view of the matter, therefore, we must uphold on behalf of the accountable person that the deceased Saremal and his wife, after the deed of partition, held the remaining properties of the family as tenants-in-common having I share therein. The necessary consequence of this finding is that the Tribunal was in error in confirming the order of both the authorities below that the entire properties passed on the death of Saremal and were liable to estate duty as properties passing on the death. It is only the interest and the share of Saremal, which is, in our opinion, half, that would pass on the death of Saremal and can be subjected to estate duty. The result is that we answer the question referred to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the accountable person and against the revenue. The Controller of Estate Duty shall pay the costs of this reference to the accountable person.
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1981 (2) TMI 47 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Delay In Filing Return, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... part of the assessee in the delay in filing the return. Since the initial burden which has been placed on the revenue was not discharged by the revenue, the question of considering whether after the burden shifted to the assessee it has discharged that burden by leading evidence about the explanation does not arise for consideration. Under these circumstances, in the light of the principles laid down by the Full Bench in I.M. Patel and Co. s case 1977 107 ITR 214 (Guj), it must be held that the revenue has failed to establish its case regarding the imposition of penalty. We, therefore, answer the questions referred to us as follows Question No. (1)-In the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue Question No (2)-In the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue Question No. (3)-In the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Commissioner will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1981 (2) TMI 46 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... n error of law in holding that the assessee had not set up the business till 24th February, 1968. In our opinion the assessee had set up the business when the building was placed at the disposal of the firm, that is, on 1st July, 1967. Before we answer the questions, it should be noted that question No. 1 postulates that the expenses which were incurred were in the nature of revenue expenses since the question as formed concedes the position that the expenses were not of capital nature but were otherwise. The result is that we answer question No. 1 in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Question No. 2 is consequently answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Question No. 3 is answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue and question No. 4 is not required to be answered since it was not pressed. The Commissioner shall pay costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1981 (2) TMI 45 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... out of place to refer to the corresponding section, viz., s. 24(3) of the Act of 1922, which also provides that in the course of assessment if a loss is computed the ITO was to notify to the assessee by an order in writing the amount of the loss as computed by him. Thus, there was no escape from the finding that it was incumbent on the ITO on the computation of loss to notify to the assessee as to such computation or determination. In the absence of such a communication it was rightly found by the Tribunal that the assessment could not be treated as a valid assessment order. It naturally follows that the subsequent notice for reopening the assessment and the assessment made, were not according to the provisions of law and as such invalid. In the premises, question No. 1 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 2 is answered in the affirmative and also in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1981 (2) TMI 44 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed by the Tribunal, as would be evidenced from the facts stated hereinbefore, have not been challenged by any question raised or challenging the said findings either as perverse or being based on no evidence. In that view of the matter, we would answer the question by saying that the Tribunal was justified in holding that no penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) could be imposed in the facts and circumstances of the case. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the interpretation of law relating to s. 271(1)(c) of the I.T. Act, 1961, on which the Tribunal has based its findings. In this connection, we refer to the observations we have made in respect of question No. 1 in I.T. Ref. No. 320 of 1972 in the case of CIT v. Rupabani Theatres P. Ltd. 1981 130 ITR 747 (Cal). The question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee, in the manner indicated above. Each party will bear its own costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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