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Showing 141 to 160 of 199 Records
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1981 (4) TMI 59 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Information, Reassessment, Salary ... ... ... ... ..... to the position of law based on the opinion expressed by the IAC in the first instance, and then by the CBDT. We have already stated that the opinion expressed either by the department or by the CBDT cannot constitute information on a point of law. Information on a point of law is only that which flows from the changes in law made either by the Legislature or by judicial decisions. Hence, the present case is not covered by any of the propositions stated above and is, therefore, clearly out of the purview of s. 147(b). We are, therefore, more than satisfied that in the present case the ITO had no jurisdiction to reopen the assessment proceedings, and hence, the reassessment is invalid in law. In the result, our answer to the first question is in the affirmative, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee, and our answer to the second question is in the negative, against the revenue and in favour of the assessee. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (4) TMI 58 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not invalidate the assessment orders. The computation of the tax has been made on the same page as the assessment orders. So, it was reasonable to presume that the ITO would have signed the assessment orders, after the computation of tax had been noted on that sheet. This is the view taken by the Tribunal and we cannot say that it is unreasonable. In our opinion, it cannot be said that any question of law arises from out of the order of the Tribunal justifying a reference. We may, however, observe that, under s. 143(3), the tax payable is to be determined by the ITO and that would not be merely a ministerial act. In these circumstances and in order to avoid any controversy, the assessment order itself should indicate that the computation of tax was also made by the ITO. Therefore, it would be appropriate if the ITO affixes his signature after the computation of tax is made and below such computation also, if it is made separately. Accordingly, these petitions are dismissed.
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1981 (4) TMI 57 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Corrosive Chemicals, Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... used as noun, means a substance, as an acid, alkali, salt, synthetic, organic compound, obtained by a chemical process prepared for use in a chemical manufacture or used for producing a chemical effect. It is obvious from the dictionary meaning of the word chemical that the sugarcane juice cannot be covered by this term simply because some acid has been mixed with it for its filtration. Moreover, the acid and the lime is mixed in the sugarcane juice for the purpose of its filtration and once the chemical reaction has been caused, most of its effect would be lost and whatever remains, settles down along with the sediments at the bottom. Thereafter, the filtered sugarcane juice which comes into contact with the machines before it is converted into crystallised sugar cannot be said to be a corrosive chemical by any stretch of reasoning. Consequently, the third question noted above is answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. No costs.
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1981 (4) TMI 56 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... for the assessee. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the ITO and AAC were right in holding that the disputed land was not agricultural land and the Tribunal was in error in holding that the disputed land was agricultural land. The identical question referred to us in each of the four allied references which have been heard together as a group is, therefore, answered as under Question Answer Whether, on the facts and in the In the negative and against the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal assessee was right in holding that the land in question admeasuring 30,885 sq. yds. which was admittedly non-agricultural land, was an agricultural land within the meaning of section 2(14) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and, therefore, on sale thereof, tax on capital gains resulting therefrom was not leviable ? The references are answered accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. A copy of this judgment shall be placed on the record of each of the four references.
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1981 (4) TMI 55 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Gift By Deceased ... ... ... ... ..... subsequent loan given by her to him, the provisions of S. 46 of the Act were not attracted. In the result, we answer the questions referred to us as follows At the instance of the accountable Poison 1. Whether the estate duty liability In the negative and against ought to have been allowed as a deduction the accountable person in the computation of the principal value view of the decision of this of the estate ? court in Smt. Shantaben Narottamdas case 1978 111 ITR 365. At the instance of the revenue 2. Whether, on the facts and in the In the negative and against circumstances of the case, the finding of the accountable person. the Tribunal that no link or nexus between the original gift made by the deceased to his daughter and the subsequent loan given by her to him was established and, therefore, the provisions of section 4 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, for abatement could not be attracted, is justified in law ? Reference is answered accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1981 (4) TMI 54 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Priority Industry ... ... ... ... ..... the reason why we are unable to answer the two questions which have been referred to us. The answers must depend on whether or not the items manufactured by the assessee-company fall within the expression basic components specified in item No. (17) as interpreted by us. This question will have to be decided on the basis of the material placed on record by the assessee. This has not been one by the Tribunal, and therefore, the matter will have to be remitted to the Tribunal for a fresh decision in accordance with law in the light of the interpretation placed by us in regard to item No. (17) having regard to the material placed by the assessee on the record, as was done in the case of Indian Molasses Co. P. Ltd. 1970 78 ITR 474 (SC). We, therefore, decline to answer the questions referred to us and remit the matter to the Tribunal for a fresh decision in accordance with law in the light of the observations made hereinabove. There will be no order as to costs. Order accordingly.
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1981 (4) TMI 53 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Income, Lease ... ... ... ... ..... s no question of any real income arising in the present case. It is also, contended before us by Mr. Joshi that the Tribunal has misconceived the observations of the Supreme Court in Shoorji Vallabhdas Co. s case 1962 46 ITR 144. It was pointed out that the Supreme Court in that case had merely observed that when there is neither accrual nor receipt of income, income cannot be said, to result at all merely on the making of entries in the books of account. We have already pointed out that having regard to the decision of the civil court and the Gujarat High Court, the amounts received could not be treated as income at all, and we do not think it necessary for the purposes of the present case to go into the question as to whether the Tribunal was justified in invoking the concept of real income on the facts of the present case. In the view we have taken, the question referred must be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Revenue to pay costs of this reference
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1981 (4) TMI 52 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, HUF ... ... ... ... ..... stions as follows ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- QUESTIONS ANSWERS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Whether, on the facts and in Not necessary to answer. the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that on the death of the deceased who was a coparcenary in a Mitakshara Hindu joint family, his interest ceased under section 7 of the Estate Duty Act ? 2. Whether, on the facts and in In the affirmative and against the circumstances of the case, the the accountable person. Tribunal was justified in holding that interest of the lineal descendants of deceased in the joint family property should be taken for rate purposes under section 34(1)(c) of the Estate Duty Act ? Reference answered accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1981 (4) TMI 51 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Deduction, Firm, Partners ... ... ... ... ..... actually resulted from the firm. In the present case the difficulty arises because of a difference between the previous year according to which interest is paid and the previous year of the firm which yields the share income. But there could also be other cases where an assessee may borrow monies for investing as capital in a partnership. But for several reasons it may take some time before the partnership is actually able to earn income from its business and before a share income materialises to the assessee. In the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court referred to earlier it is difficult to say that in such a case the assessee will not be entitled to any deduction at all until and unless there is a positive share income from the firm. For the above reasons, we are of opinion that the view taken by the Tribunal in the present case wits correct. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. We make no order as to costs.
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1981 (4) TMI 50 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the highest court of the compensation would entitle the Income-tax Officer, notwithstanding the period of limitation fixed under the Income-tax Act, to reopen the assessment in which The had included the initial compensation awarded by the Collector and recompute the entire income on the basis of the final compensation? We do not think there can be any justification for such a proposition. On a proper construction of the terms accrue or arise we are of the view that such an interpretation cannot be placed. The interpretation given by us does not affect the interests of the revenue. At the same time, it safeguards the assessee and prevents harassment. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the provisions of law. We, accordingly, answer question No. 2 referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The assessee, who has substantially succeeded in this reference, will get her costs from the revenue. Advocate s fee is assessed at Rs. 200.
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1981 (4) TMI 49 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Reserves, Super Profits Tax ... ... ... ... ..... iated for the said reserve account by a deliberate action, and, secondly, it is so done by the power of the board of directors which is the requisite authority under the articles of association of the company. Both the conditions laid down by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 1953 24 ITR 499, for an appropriation of funds to the reserve accounts are, therefore, fully satisfied in the present case. The said amount will, therefore, be entitled to be called reserves notwithstanding that it is not in so many figures reflected in the profit and loss account or the published balance-sheet. Hence, it will have to be counted in the capital base of the company for the purpose of r. 1 of Sch. II of the S.P.T. Act. In the result, our answer to the first question is in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In view of the fact that questions Nos. 2 and 3 do not survive, the same are not answered. The revenue to pay the costs of the assessee.
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1981 (4) TMI 48 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Export Profits Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... the specified industries, the claim of the assessee to the concession must fail. The Gujarat High Court thus seems to have taken the view that but for the provisions in cl. (c), the assessee would have been entitled to the benefit of sub-cl. (ii). However, in the view which we have taken and which is in our view, sufficient to dispose of the reference, we need not consider the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee that the Gujarat High Court was not justified in taking the view that cl. (c) operates in respect of the entire industry of vegetable oil and vanaspathi. As already pointed out, the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee is that cl. (c) must be construed as taking away the benefit of additional export rebate only in respect of the two articles, namely, vegetable oil and vanaspathi. In the view which we have taken, the question referred must be answered in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee to pay the costs of the reference.
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1981 (4) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Tribunal and rejected, clearly indicated that the amount of Rs. 29,000 did not belong to the assessee s wife at all but belonged to the assessee. The circumstances referred to above by us were clearly material to justify the assessment of Rs. 29,000 as the income of the assessee. It was for the Tribunal to appreciate the material evidence and to reach a conclusion as to the circumstances on which an inference could be drawn against the assessee. The circumstances reproduced above were clearly material in respect of the finding of the Tribunal. Therefore, question No. 1 has to be answered against the assessee. It is not in dispute that once question No. 1 is answered against the assessee, question No. 2 would automatically stand answered against the assessee. The questions are accordingly answered as follows Question No. 1--In the affirmative and against the assessee. Question No. 2--In the affirmative and against the assessee. The assessee to pay costs of this reference.
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1981 (4) TMI 46 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons ... ... ... ... ..... we have already pointed out, there has been a finding that all the seven persons of the erstwhile joint family became owners of the capital that lay to the credit of the HUF which alone was the partner previously, but there is no clear finding with reference to the agreement entered into among them that they had any joint enterprise to undertake. In on view, on the facts found, the AAC was justified in holding that the status of the assessee was not an AOP and unless a clear finding came to satisfy both the tests, the Tribunal had no justification to reverse the finding of the AAC and restore the status of the assessee to that as determined by the ITO. Our answer to the question referred, therefore, is On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal is not justified in holding that the members of the family constitute an association of persons and are liable to be assessed in such status. There would be no order for costs. J. K. MOHANTY J.-I agree.
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1981 (4) TMI 45 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Assets, Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ed in the definition of assets in the Wealth-tax Act. It is, in our opinion, not necessary to express any view with regard to the correctness of that decision. Suffice it to say that the decision in that case proceeded upon the assumption that the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, were materially different from those of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. It was, in fact, on that ground that the learned judges of the Calcutta High Court distinguished the case of Maharajkumar Kamal Singh v. CWT 1967 65 ITR 460 (Pat), as well as the decision of the Patna High Court which is now the subject-matter of the present appeal. The net result is that the decision of this court in the case reported in 1970 78 ITR 214 (CWT v. U. C. Mahatab) stands as good law and we are bound by the said decision. In this view of the matter, we answer question No. 2 in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Each party will pay and bear its own costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1981 (4) TMI 44 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons, Business, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... e at rupees nil, for, it was intimately wedded with the objection that the notice issued to them was void and they were not an AOP in whose hands the income was perhaps to be taxed. The AOP as an assessee having not been served, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the notice under s. 148 of the Act served upon the ladies was not valid in the eye of law. Thus, question No. 2 has to be answered in the affirmative, that is against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. But even if, by any stretch of imagination, we were to hold otherwise, that the service on the ladies was service on the AOP, it would still be dependent upon the finding whether the ladies in fact were an AOP. That being a finding of fact, it has been held against the Revenue. All the same we chose to answer the question and it has hereby been so done. For the foregoing reasons, this reference is declined in view of the questions dealt with and answered by us in the manner afore indicated. No costs.
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1981 (4) TMI 43 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Appellate Assistant Commissioner ... ... ... ... ..... siness of the assessee-company. There is, therefore, no justification for disallowing interest payment to the extent of Rs. 50,000 on the ground that it is not revenue expenditure. The AAC and the Tribunal have disagreed with the ITO and allowed interest payment of Rs. 50,000 as revenue expenditure. We see no good reason to take a contrary view. The decision of the Supreme Court in Challapalli Sugars Ltd. v. CIT 1975 98 ITR 167, on which reliance was placed by the Revenue before the Tribunal, has no application to the facts of the present case. Had it been the Revenue s case that the amount expended for acquiring capital asset was expended by the assessee-company prior to the commencement of the business, the matter would have stood on a different footing. The assesseecompany had commenced business prior to the assessment years under consideration. In the result, we answer both the questions referred to us in the affirmative and against the Revenue with no order as to costs.
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1981 (4) TMI 42 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Limitation, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ant case in view of the findings of the Tribunal that Indrabai, a partner of the firm, was a benamidar of her husband, who was not a partner of the firm, and that the other partners, namely, the brother and the mother of Indrabai s husband, knew or had reason to believe that Indrabai was benamidar of her husband and that they had not communicated that fact to the ITO. In view of these findings, the Tribunal rightly held that by virtue of the provisions of the Explanation to s. 185(1) of the Act, the firm could not be held to be a genuine firm. The contention that the findings given by the Tribunal are contradictory is not well founded and the contention that there was no evidence before the Tribunal for arriving at its findings falls outside the scope of this reference. For all these reasons, our answer to the question referred to this court is in the affirmative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1981 (4) TMI 41 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... . 18, that the power of the Commissioner becomes exercisable. If on that basis the Commissioner exercises his power and an order has been passed, then person cannot be aggrieved by the exercise of that power. In that view of the matter, in view of the language used in s. 18(2B) read with s. 18 (sic), in our opinion, these two powers cannot co-exist, in the facts and circumstances of the case. Our attention was drawn to ss. 241, 242, 252, 254 and 375 of the Cr. PC. In view of the specific language used in those provisions, it is not appropriate to draw any analogy with the provisions with which we are concerned. In the scheme, by a necessary implication, after the introduction of sub-s. (2B) in s. 18, in our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, no appeal lay and the Tribunal was correct in its conclusion, and the question must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. Parties will Pay and bear their own costs. SUDHINDRA MOHAN GUHA J.-I agree.
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1981 (4) TMI 40 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
"Finding" Or "Direction" In Appellate Order, Direction, Finding, Limitation, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ings. The income which was originally disclosed as belonging to the estate of the deceased was, after a positive application of mind by the ITO, held to be not the income of the estate. Merely because in some other assessment of a legatee a finding is recorded that the income does not belong to her, that cannot create an infirmity in the original order of assessment in the nature of an error apparent on the face of the record. The Tribunal was therefore, justified, in our view, in not sustaining the argument that the proceedings could be supported as being one under s. 35 of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922. Having regard to the discussion earlier made, the questions referred are answered as follows Question No. (i) In the affirmative and against the revenue. Question No. (ii) In the affirmative and against the revenue. Question No. (iii) In the affirmative and against the revenue. Question No. (iv) in the affirmative and against the revenue. Revenue to pay costs of this reference.
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