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Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 203 Records
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1981 (8) TMI 84 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-A
Valuation Of Assets ... ... ... ... ..... Parikh and Co. (P.) Ltd. for arriving at the market value of the shares on the basis of the break-up value of the shares of the company. On the other hand, the WTO was right in coming to the conclusion that in determining the break-up value of the shares, the amount of advance tax paid by the company in the relevant year and shown on the asset side of the balance sheet is not to be deducted from the tax payable in determining whether the provision for taxation is in excess over the tax payable with reference to the book profits in accordance with the law applicable thereto. 18. Thus, we are of the view that the orders passed by the WTO were not erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. In support of our conclusion we are also fortified by the ratio of decision in the case of Ashok K. Parikh. 19. Thus, the orders passed by the Commissioner are incorrect and deserve to be cancelled. Accordingly they are cancelled. 20. In the result, all the appeals are allowed.
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1981 (8) TMI 83 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
... ...
... ... ..... sessee has to incur it on account of business expediency. 5. We have carefully considered the submissions made by both the sides. As pointed out by the ld. CIT (Appeals) in para 6 of his order that even after forfeiture of Rs. 30,000 the assessee has stood to gain in the commercial sense. It is quite natural that any prudent businessman would prefer to purchase machinery for Rs.1,90,000 than to purchase the same machinery from the other party for Rs. 3,00,000 when the machinery is equally durable as that of the machinery which he contracted to purchase for Rs. 3,00,000. Though the assessee has forfeited the amount of Rs.30,000 for purchase of capital assets, he was competent to do so due to business expediency. We, therefore, fully agree with the order passed by the CIT(Appeals). We do not find any reason to interfere with the order of the CIT(Appeals) and the order passed by the CIT(Appeals) is, therefore, confirmed. 6. In the result, the appeal of the revenue is dismissed.
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1981 (8) TMI 82 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Customs - Confiscation of conveyance - Confiscation of vessel and personal penalty ... ... ... ... ..... ear-cut finding recorded by the Additional Collector that the Master had no knowledge of the existence of the goods on the ship. In my judgment, order of confiscation of vessel deserves to be quashed. 7. Shri Sethna also made a faint attempt to urge that the question whether the Master had knowledge or otherwise should be determined by reference to the facts on record. It is not for this Court to decide whether the Master had knowledge and more so when the authority had recorded the finding in favour of the petitioners. The petitioners are entitled to the reliefs sought in the petition. 8. Accordingly, the rule is made absolute and the order passed by the Additional Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay on August 22,1977 is set aside only as far as confiscation of the vessel under Section 115(2) of the Act. The question of exercise of option naturally does not arise. The rest of the order is confirmed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (8) TMI 81 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Paper and Board ... ... ... ... ..... that clause (i) of the proviso in question will apply to the definition of the mill-board as well as of straw-board. In this context it is necessary to decide whether the other material used by the petitioner in the manufacture of the board is in excess of one-third by weight of the total weight of the ingredients. If it exceeds one-third then clause (i) of the proviso will not apply, otherwise it will. 9. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned order passed by the Central Government dated 5th of October, 1977 is quashed and the matter is sent back to the Government of India for deciding the revision afresh in accordance with law, and in the light of the observations made above. The parties may however, bear their own costs. 10. We are informed that the petitioner had made some deposits of money with the Assistant Collector under an interim order passed by this Court. The Central Government will pass suitable orders with regard to those deposits.
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1981 (8) TMI 80 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Woollen waste and rags - Trade advice - Validity - Samples - Demurrage charges - Goods exempted from duty
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1981 (8) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT
Order of acquittal by High Court challenged
Held that:- The three outstanding circumstances established against the respondent and not disputed before us by the respondent were (1) the presence of the respondent in the flat at the time of the raid by the Central Excise Officers and the recovery of the gold slabs of foreign origin from the steel almirah and (2) the recovery of the bunch of eight keys from his person which keys fitted the almirah from which the gold slabs were recovered and (3) the recovery of a bunch of three keys from his person one of which fitted the lock which was hanging from the inside handle of the door of the flat.
To any mind, unassailed by "some light, airy, unsubstantial doubt that may flit through the minds of any of us about almost anything at sometimes or other" these circumstances should be sufficient to draw an inference of guilt. The High Court however thought that the steel almirah in the flat was not shown to have been specially made and that the keys of a similar almirah could well fit it and that was perhaps how the keys recovered from the accused did fit the almirah in the flat. That of course was not the plea of the accused nor was it a suggestion made to the prosecution witnesses.
We are unhesitatingly of the view that the explanations fancied by the High Court was a wholly unreasonable explanation in the circumstances of the case. Shri Jethmalani reminded us first that we were considering circumstantial evidence, second we were dealing with an appeal against acquittal and third we were exercising our extraordinary but exceptional jurisdiction under Article 136. We think that, interference in this case is imperative and hesitation to interfere will lead to a miscarriage of justice - set side the judgment of the High Court - respondent will surrender forthwith. The gold slabs will stand confiscated - appeal allowed.
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1981 (8) TMI 78 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Demurrage charges - Refusal to issue detention certificate by Customs ... ... ... ... ..... 139 is very appropriate. The Division Bench was considering the ambit of Entry 8-A of the Fifth Schedule of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1957, and observed that worn out and torn old clothing pieces purchased through hawkers from the public and then sold for the manufacture of paper are not textiles exempted from the Sales Tax Act. The Division Bench observed that if old and worn out wearing apparel are purchased, they do not revert to the category of textiles, but they retain the character of wearing apparel liable to sales tax. In my judgment, on the plain reading of Item No. 85, it is clear that it would not cover the manufactured garments, but would restrict itself to the textile in its pure form. The Port Trust authorities were justified in levying demurrage charges at the rate mentioned in Item 92 of the Scale of Rates. The submission of the petitioner that the levy should be under Item No. 85 deserves to be turned down. 13. Accordingly, the rule is discharged with costs.
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1981 (8) TMI 77 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Valuation - Delivery charges are not includible in the assessable value - Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in App. No. 506 of 1979. The fact that the decisions of the High Court of Bombay were rendered with reference to periods prior of the High Court of Bombay were rendered with reference to periods prior to the amendments of Section 4 of the Act, does not alter the situation and the relevant principles already recognised in judicial precedents do not stand altered. I am inclined to follow the ratio of the decisions of the High Court of Bombay. 5. In this view, I find that the adjudication by the authorities under the Act cannot be sustained. This obliges me to interfere in writ proceedings and accordingly the writ petition is allowed and the order of the third respondent in App. No. 1474 of 1978 dated 20-9-1978 is quashed and the authorities under the Act are directed to approve the price list filed by the petitioner on and from 5-10-1978 without including the delivery charges. There will be no order as to costs in this writ petition.
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1981 (8) TMI 76 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Show Cause Notice - Extension of period for issue - Confiscation of seized goods after their release
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1981 (8) TMI 75 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Additional duty - Viscose staple fibre and non-cellulosic fibre - Writ jurisdiction - Natural justice - Countervailing duty - Interpretation
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1981 (8) TMI 74 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Polyamide chips - Liability to countervailing duty ... ... ... ... ..... mption notification are more than satisfied. The impugned show cause notice was entirely misconceived and requires to be struck down. 9. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and the impugned notice dated March 15, 1979 annexed as Ex. I to the Petition and based on letter Ex. G from the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Pune is quashed and the respondents are restrained from proceeding to levy countervailing duty in respect of import of polyamide chips for the period commencing from May 23, 1978 to September 4, 1978. The petitioners have furnished Bank Guarantee and executed a bond in respect of the amount of countervailing duty mentioned in Ex. I. That Bank Guarantee and bond stand discharged. The Petitioners are at liberty to adopt proper proceedings to recover the alleged excess Customs duty paid on the said import. That question in not considered in this Petition. The rule is made absolute accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1981 (8) TMI 73 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Power driven pumps ... ... ... ... ..... and so the same treatment should be given to the present case also by dropping the review proceeding. 4. The Government of India have carefully considered the written as well as oral submissions made by the importers in reply to show cause notice for review. The Government observe that in the case of impugned pumps the power source is from the machine only and it is not external. The Government further observe from a reading of the tariff item 30A of CET that the power driven pumps mentioned in the said item refer to the pumps driven by external source of power and the pumps which are not driven by external source of power fall outside the scope of item 30A of CET. The Government therefore, hold that the impugned pumps, for which the power source is from the machine only and not external, fall outside the purview of item 30A of CET as held by the Appellate Collector. In view of the foregoing, the Government of India uphold the appellate order and drop the review proceeding.
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1981 (8) TMI 72 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Manufacture - Stage of completion and levy - Power - Interpretation - Judicial or dictionary meanings - `Process' or `Processing' - Licensing - Seizure
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1981 (8) TMI 70 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Trading Loss ... ... ... ... ..... bonds before they became ripe for payment. The bonds carried interest only at 4 1/2 while the assessee-company had raised loan to subscribe to those bonds at 10 . No such compelling reason has been disclosed by the assessee-company in the present case. The Govt. bonds certainly carried interest at 4 1/2 and the amount was subscribed by the assessee from its cash credit account. There is nothing on the record to show as to at what rate the assessee was paying interest on the loans taken against the cash credit account. Thus, there was no compelling necessity whatsoever for selling the Govt. securities, before they became ripe for payment. There was no nexus established by the assessee-company between the loss suffered and the business carried on by it. Its claim, therefore, has been rightly disallowed. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the department. The department is entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1981 (8) TMI 69 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Res Judicata ... ... ... ... ..... s under Exs. P-2 to P-4 orders for the assessment years 1966-67, 1967-68 and 1968-69. 1, therefore, hold that the decision taken by respondents Nos. to 3 in Exs. P-5, P-6, P-7, P-8 and P-10 orders, assigning a status different from what was assigned to the assessee in Exs. P-2 to P-4 orders, is not warranted and, therefore, those orders are liable to be quashed. In the light of the principles discussed hereinbefore, the reason stated as aforesaid for quashing Exs. P-5 to P-8 and P-10 cannot be upheld. We are, therefore, constrained to set aside the judgment under appeal and dismiss the original petition by allowing this appeal. We do so. Parties shall suffer their costs throughout. The learned counsel for the respondent made an application under art. 134A of the Constitution of India for certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We see no substantial question of law of general importance needing a decision by the Supreme Court arising in this case. Leave declined.
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1981 (8) TMI 68 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Company ... ... ... ... ..... tatutory rule or otherwise from which it can be said that the rights of the assessee-company in the properties got extinguished on the dates of the agreements. Possibly it can be said that when the land was eventually acquired by the Government such acquisition resulted in the extinguishment of the rights of the assessee in the properties. But, the acquisition did not take place during the previous year. The acquisition, if any, was subsequent and, therefore, no capital gains, alleged to result from such acquisition, would be taxable in the assessment year with which we are concerned. For the above reasons, we answer the question by saying that the Tribunal was not in error in holding that there was relinquishment or extinguishment of the rights of the assessee in the properties in question and that the Tribunal was right in deleting the capital gains assessed by the ITO. The reference is answered accordingly. The assessee will be entitled to its costs counsel s fee Rs. 350.
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1981 (8) TMI 67 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Income ... ... ... ... ..... ollowing that with respect we are of the view that the question of law was wrongly decided by the Tribunal. We would, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was wrong in law in coming to the conclusion that there was a completed sale of shares on February 5, 1948. In our view, no equitable title in the ownership in the said shares passed on either to Mrs. Jain or Dalmia. In our view, the sum of Rs. 3,59,559 (which has been wrongly printed as Rs. 3,50,559 at p. 5 of the paper book, because both the counsel for the parties have agreed that the correct figure should be Rs. 3,59,559) was liable to be included in the income of the assessee and taxed as such as held by the ITO and the AAC and the Income-tax Tribunal committed an illegality in holding that it was not so liable to be taxed and ordering deletion. We would, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the revenue. The reference is answered accordingly. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1981 (8) TMI 66 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... has led to the conclusion that there has been escapement of income from being assessed. Therefore, I cannot attach much importance to the assertion made that the respondent learnt about the so-called diversion of fund only when he was doing the assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1977-78. In the light of the two decisions relied on above, I think it is unnecessary to notice some of the other decisions, cited by Shri Prasad for the assessee except to notice that in the reply filed to the statement of objections, it has been asserted that the withdrawals for 1976-77 assessment year were also available to the ITO in his file as the same had been filed even before the assessment had been concluded. This is not disputed by the learned counsel for the revenue. In the result, the impugned notice under s. 148 of the Act at annex. E is without jurisdiction and illegal and the same is hereby quashed. Rule will accordingly issue and be made absolute. No order as to costs.
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1981 (8) TMI 65 - DELHI HIGH COURT
New Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... course of the year. Moreover, the position regarding debts, unlike in regard to other assets, can be widely fluctuating from time to time and the process of averaging in the manner referred to in sub-r. (6) will be difficult. These are some reasons which indicate that it could not have been the purpose of the rule to introduce too many refinements into the computation of capital and that the process of averaging was intended only to be restricted to tangible items of specific assets acquired during the computation period. Having regard to all these considerations we are reluctant to extend, merely on the basis of a general implication, the concept of averaging into the structure of cl. (c) of sub-r. (1). We, therefore, agree with the view taken by the Tribunal and we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. We, however, do not think that this is a case in which any costs should be awarded. We, therefore, make no order as to costs.
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1981 (8) TMI 64 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Deduction, Estate Duty, HUF ... ... ... ... ..... ayment of estate duty under s. 33(1)(n) but the value of the interest of the lineal descendants of the deceased in the HUF property. Under s. 33(1)(n) what is exempt is not the value of the entire residential house of the HUF but only the value of the interest which the deceased had in the house. Therefore, that which is exempt under s. 33(1)(n) is not included in the dutiable estate under s. 34(1)(c). The line of argument adopted by the accountable person is fallacious and proceeds on a misconception and a misreading, of the aforesaid two provisions of the Act. There is absolutely no warrant for the claim made by the accountable person that the entire value of the residential house is exempt for all purposes under s. 33(1)(n). In our opinion, the view taken by the Tribunal is correct and unexceptionable. We, therefore, answer the first question as reframed by us in the affirmative and against the accountable person. Reference answered, accordingly, with no order as to costs.
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