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Showing 81 to 100 of 263 Records
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1981 (9) TMI 186
Appeal To AAC, Appealable Orders ... ... ... ... ..... of the appeal after hearing the assessee s arguments. The revenue is now challenging before us the competence of the AAC to dispose of the appeal. From the above, it is evident that he was misled by the ITO to file the appeal before the AAC. The AAC has also erroneously disposed of the appeal and the ITO who should have raised the objection to the jurisdiction of the AAC before the AAC failed to do so. 6. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the order of the AAC, which is in appeal before us, is void and without jurisdiction. Since the appeal filed by the assessee before the AAC on the advice of the revenue should not have been disposed of by him, we vacate the order passed by him on the appeal filed by the assessee. In the interest of justice we direct the AAC to forward the appeal filed by the assessee before him to the concerned Commissioner (Appeals) for disposal in accordance with law. 7. In the result, the appeal is treated as allowed in part for statistical purposes.
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1981 (9) TMI 185
Agricultural Land, Assessment Proceedings, Capital Asset, Capital Gains, Compulsory Acquisition, Failure To Disclose, Full Bench, High Court, Reassessment Proceedings, Supreme Court
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1981 (9) TMI 184
Reassessment, Non-Disclosure Of Primary Facts ... ... ... ... ..... ould get time-barred if he were to give another opportunity. The assessee had thus no opportunity to produce this evidence at the assessment stage and, hence, I am of the view that she gave a satisfactory explanation for the non-production of this evidence at the original assessment stage. Before us the learned counsel for the assessee has submitted that in the grounds of appeal filed before the AAC, it was specifically mentioned that the certificate of the village Kancharapalem regarding the character of the land had been enclosed and, hence, it was submitted that nothing prevented the ITO from appearing before the first appellate authority on the date of hearing of the appeal and objected to the admission of the additional evidence. Not having chosen to do so, the ITO cannot now say that he was not given an opportunity to be heard. Hence this ground taken by the revenue also fails. 8. In view of what is discussed above, I uphold the order of the AAC and dismiss this appeal.
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1981 (9) TMI 183
... ... ... ... ..... ng off is also done in the books of the successor. It would certainly not be proper to construe this provision in a manner that the claim for bad debt is allowed in one type of situation and not in other type of situation although in both situations the business is taken over a as running concern. We respectfully follow the view taken by the Hon ble Andhra Pradesh High Court and hold that the assessee company merely stepped into the shoes of the firm in so far as the business is concerned, the various assets of the business continued to have the same character in the hands of the assessee company as they had in the hands of the firm and further that even if condition (a) was satisfied by the predecessor firm and condition (b) was satisfied by the assessee company, it has to be held that both the conditions were satisfied and therefore the claim of the assessee for bad debt had to be allowed. We uphold the order of the ld. CIT(A). 10. In the result, the Revenue s appeal fails.
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1981 (9) TMI 182
... ... ... ... ..... rgin of profit to the assessee ranged between 4.5 and 5.08 and this was accepted by the department. Had it not been for the increase of G.P. rate to 6.6 during the year under consideration there would not have been any default at all on the part of the assessee u/s 212(3A) of the IT Act. This apart, the accounting period of the assessee ended on 31st December 1975 when the last date for revision of advance tax u/s 212(3A) was 15th December 1975 and in the circumstances narrated by the ld. Counsel of the assessee, it cannot be held that the failure on the part of the assessee to file upward revised estimate of advance tax by 15th December 1975 was either wilful or motivated. In these circumstances, we hold that the failure on the part of the assessee to file an estimate of advance tax u/s 212(3A) is covered by a reasonable cause and accordingly we delete the penalty imposed by the ITO and upheld by the CIT (A) u/s 273 (c) of the IT Act. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1981 (9) TMI 181
... ... ... ... ..... . 1972-73 in case of Smt. Urmilla Devi and also another order dt.14th Sept., 1980of lsquo A rsquo Bench in ITA No. 4315/Del/79 for the asst. yr. 1975-76 in the case of assessee itself. The assessee rsquo s case is further supported by the case law reported in 1876 CTR (J and K) 279 (1977) 107 ITR 382 (J and K) and (1981) TLR 101. In the view of the proceding discussion we are of the considered view that no interest u/s 139(8) is chargeable from the assessee since there was no order made by the ITO in the original assessment. The demand notice subsequent issued to the assessee cannot be of any consequence. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order on the point and allow the assessee rsquo s appeal. 5. Ground No. 6 Interest u/s 214 of the IT Act. 1961 The arguments have been heard and record perused. The instant ground of the assessee rsquo s appeal is rejected as the same does not arise from the impugned order. 6. In the result, the assessee rsquo s appeal is partly allowed.
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1981 (9) TMI 180
... ... ... ... ..... owing the Gujarat High Court judgment in CIT vs. Patel Brothers and Co., Ltd. (1977) 106 ITR 424 (Guj). The Gujarat High Court judgment has been followed or referred to if the judgments in CIT vs. Shah Nanji Nagsi 1978 CTR (Bom) 305 (1979) 116 ITR 292 (Bom), CIT vs. Corporation Bank Ltd. (1979) 10 CTR (Kar) 39 (1979) 117 ITR 271 (Kar) and CIT vs. Karupuswamy Nadar and Sons (1979) 120 ITR 140 (Mad). We are thus not inclined to interfere with the order of the CIT (Appeals). 30. The only other ground is that the disallowance out of foreign tour expenses of partners should not have been reduced from Rs. 2,316 to Rs. 1,356. The relief of Rs. 960 given by the CIT (Appeals) represents two items of Rs. 460 and Rs. 500 (included in the expenditure of Rs. 856). Both the items of Rs. 460 and Rs. 500 have been held to be hotel room rent paid by the partners and in our opinion. this expenditure had been rightly allowed by the CIT (Appeals). 31. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1981 (9) TMI 179
... ... ... ... ..... 6 to 52 of the paper book. The ld. counsel submitted that the observations of the CIT regarding the unexplained investment in agriculture, if any, was nothing but mere suspicion. Having regard to the above materials placed before us, we are satisfied that the CIT was not justified in his conclusion that the ITO had accepted the Agrl. income of the assessee for the year under appeal without making proper inquiries, We are, therefore, unable to agree with the Revenue that the Commr. was justified in his conclusion that the assessment order passed by the ITO was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue on the three points mentioned above. On the contrary, the action of the Commr. seems to be based on mere suspicion and surmises, and, hence, was not justified in setting aside the assessment u/s 263 of the Act. We therefore, cancel the order of the CIT passed u/s 263 of the Act and restore the assessment passed by the ITO. 10. In the results, the appeal is allowed.
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1981 (9) TMI 178
... ... ... ... ..... artner. Therefore, the provisions of Indian Partnership Act would apply and the firm would automatically stand dissolved on the death of one of the partners. That being the position, the AAC was correct that there was a dissolution of the firm and not a charge in the constitution of the firm. As such two separate assessments had to be made. Since the ITO made a single assessment for whole of the year the AAC was correct in holding that this assessment should be treated for the second period and for the first period the ITO may initiate action to make fresh assessment. 5. In the other appeal by the department the only ground is that the AAC was not justified in directing the ITO to exclude the income of the first period. This appeal also must suffer the same fate. Once I have held that the firm stood dissolved on the death of the partner, there have to be necessarily two assessments and this one assessment shall be for the second period only. 6. Both the appeals are dismissed.
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1981 (9) TMI 177
... ... ... ... ..... d of valuing the goodwill of a business is to take it as being worth one to three years rsquo purchase of the annual profits. In that case, of course, deduction was not allowed for interest on capital and salary of the partners. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we would consider it reasonable to value the share of goodwill of the deceased by applying the multiple of 1 frac12 times purchase of the annual profits after allowing deductions on account of interest and salary of the partners. It is true that in the case of CED vs. Valluru Venkateswara Rao (1979) 12 CTR (AP) 247 the share of goodwill of the deceased was determined on the basis of one year rsquo s purchase of average profits but business in that case was of mica mining and sale of mica which is different from the business of the firm in the present case. Goodwill has to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. We order accordingly. 5. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1981 (9) TMI 176
Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Powers Of ... ... ... ... ..... hearing both sides as enjoined in section 254(1) of the Act. In this case the allegation made by the assessee is that notice of hearing for28-1-1980was not received by the assessee at all. When this fact was brought to the notice of the AAC by petition dated27-9-1980, the AAC has not stated that the aforesaid notice was not served but has refused to recall the order on the ground that there is no provision in the Act to reopen the case once decided by the AAC. The AAC has inherent power to recall an order if it had been passed without giving an opportunity of being heard to the assessee. This is clear from the authorities noted above. We would, therefore, set aside the order of the AAC and would direct him to decide the appeal afresh and according to law. 4. Since we are setting aside the order of the AAC, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the addition of Rs. 8,588. 5. In the result, for statistical purposes, the appeal shall be deemed to have been partly allowed.
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1981 (9) TMI 175
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... and it is for the year31-12-1975. We have also seen a copy of the assessment order for the assessment year 1978-79 wherein the accounting year is shown ending on31-12-1977. Thus, it is clear that the assessee follows calendar year as the accounting year. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the liability to pay the sum of Rs. 20,000 arose during the calendar year 1975. It is true that the show cause notice was issued by the DDA on31-12-1974but the assessee was required to pay the sum of Rs. 20,000 without finalising the objections and this payment was made on24-7-1975. When the assessee actually made the payment of Rs. 20,000, it can certainly say that the liability to make this payment had arisen in this year. The final liability was settled in the year 1979 but that would not disturb the existing liability of Rs. 20,000 which arose during this year and which was satisfied in this year. We thus do not find any merit in this appeal. 6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1981 (9) TMI 174
Reassessment, Non-Disclosure Of Primary Facts ... ... ... ... ..... of the machinery, accruing to the assessee in 1957, but is of the nature of damages agreed to be paid by the suppliers, to the assessee, as a compensation for breach of warranty, and this accrued to the assessee only on 17-5-1961, when the matter was settled between the parties. Accordingly, there was no question of the assessee reducing this amount from the original purchase price for purposes of claiming depreciation and development rebate for the assessment year 1958-59. It cannot be said that the assessee, either furnished inaccurate particulars of its income or withheld material particulars, so far as the claim of depreciation and development rebate for the assessment year 1958-59 is concerned. In the result, I would answer the question referred to me, in the negative, agreeing with the view expressed by the learned Judicial Member. 12. The case will now go back to the Bench, which heard the appeal, for final disposal in the light of the above discussion and conclusion.
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1981 (9) TMI 173
Rectification Of Mistakes, Apparent From Record ... ... ... ... ..... er section 16(v), it is for the assessee to show that the conditions laid down in that section are satisfied. When this had not been done before the ITO and the claim was based on section 10(14), it could not be said that the ITO committed a mistake apparent from the record when he did not consider the assessee s claim under section 16(v). Thus, on this short point, the assessee s case before the AAC should have failed. If it was not a case under section 154 but was a claim in the course of the assessment, the position might have been different, having regard to the view taken by the Tribunal in some other cases. However, that is not the case in the present reference. 7. Accordingly, I agree with the view expressed by the learned Judicial Member that the orders of the AAC accepting the assessee s appeals are wrong and have to be set aside. 8. The case will now go back to the Bench, which heard the appeal, for final disposal in the light of the above discussion and conclusion.
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1981 (9) TMI 172
Developement Rebate, Allowance of ... ... ... ... ..... mpany had imposed any such condition before booking the assessee s order. In fact, the statement contained in the company s letter dated25-11-1973is very categorical to the effect that in response to the assessee s request contained in his letter dated23-11-1973, the company has booked his order. The subsequent incidents of the company s representative visiting to the assessee for discussions and for receiving the amount of advance are only incidents subsequent to the conclusion of the contract between the assessee and the company for the supply of the machine. The company s letter dated26-11-1973, accordingly, denotes the acceptance of the assessee s offer to purchase the X-ray plant from the company and, consequently, the contract for all purposes was concluded on26-11-1973, which clearly falls prior to1-12-1973. Accordingly, the assessee is entitled to development rebate on the X-ray machine installed by him. The ITO is directed to allow the same. 8. The appeal is allowed.
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1981 (9) TMI 171
Investment Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... ts. We, therefore, accept the contentions of the revenue on this aspect of the case and reverse the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) in paragraph 2.9 of his order and hold that these three items of machinery should also be included for purposes of determining the ceiling specified in clause (2) of the Explanation to section 32A(2)(b). 16. For the reasons discussed above, we confirm the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) rejecting the assessee s claim for deduction of investment allowance under section 32A(1), as a small-scale industrial undertaking. We may also state that in view of the finding on this aspect or the case, none of the authorities below, nor ourselves have gone into the question whether the assessee satisfies the other conditions laid down in section 32A for allowance of the deduction of investment allowance, as the same is unnecessary. 17 and 18. These paras are not printed here as they pertain to minor issues. 19. Inthe result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1981 (9) TMI 170
... ... ... ... ..... , but a case of succession and that two separate assessments should be made separately on the two firms, as directed by the AAC. 9. The decision in (1979) 12 CTR (SC) 190 (1979) 119 ITR 996 (SC) (Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society vs. CIT New Delhi) no doubt overrules the decision of the Kerala High Court in CIT vs. Kelu Kutty 85 ITR 102 but it must be noticed that the Supreme Court overrulled the Kerala High Court decision on the point whether the opinion of the audit party on a point of law could be regarded as information enabling the ITO to initiate reassessment proceedings u/s. 147(b) of the IT Act, and not on the point of applicability of s. 187 or s. 188 of the Act. Hence, the AAC was not right in relying on this judgement of the Supreme Court to allow the assessee s appeal. 10. For the reasons discussed above, we confirm the order of the AAC directing the ITO to make two separate assessments on the assessee firm for the two periods and dismiss the Revenue s appeal.
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1981 (9) TMI 169
... ... ... ... ..... It is an interest which is vested in the assessee to be realised on the happening of a certain event, namely, the beginning of the assessment year in question on the first April of the financial year following. There can be no failure of this event happening and, therefore, there can be no failure of the assessee s right being realised by the assessee. 12. We cannot accept the contentions made on behalf of the assessee that the right to receive credit for the tax deducted at source is a personal right and, therefore, cannot be considered to have a saleability in an open market in order to determine and include in the assessment the value of the assets belonging to the assessee. It is necessary to postulate the existence of an open market and such postulation would cover cases of this type including the consideration of rights which are purely personal to a particular person. 13. We, therefore, uphold the orders of the lower authorities in this regard. The appeal is dismissed.
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1981 (9) TMI 168
... ... ... ... ..... ect estimate of cost of construction, accepted it and made an addition of Rs. 10,107 to the income declared by the assessee on account of understatement of cost of construction of the cinema building. It is pertinent to note that at that point of time the ITO had the power to reject the report of the registered valuer by calling for a report from the Valuation Officer. Though the report of the Valuation Officer had been called by the WTO, it had yet not been received. The ITO, therefore, used his discretion to finalise the assessment u/s 143(3). Thereafter, the receipt of the Valuation Officer s report could not constitute information. The ITO was in fact seized of the matter during the course of original proceedings and he could not, in law, opt to make piecemeal assessment leaving to his arbitrary discretion to reopen the assessment subsequently at will. We, therefore, while endorsing the Commr. s decision, dismiss the appeal of the Revenue as untenable. . Appeal dismissed.
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1981 (9) TMI 167
... ... ... ... ..... el for the assessee submitted that the assessee had in fact acquired the asst, paid for it and as such was entitled to the relief under s. 80J. The submissions were, however, opposed by the Revenue. 6. After careful consideration of the rival submissions we find that there is no case for an interference in the order of the ld. CIT (A) at the instance of the Revenue. The authorities cited by the ld. counsel for the assessee clearly lay down the proposition that if the asset was owned by the assessee on the first day of the previous year and it was paid for, the consideration paid for the asset has to be taken into consideration while computing the capital employed in the industrial undertaking. The ITO withdrew the claim in the reassessment proceedings on the mere ground that the asset had not been used. This is not a justification for withdrawing the relief. The assessee is entitled to relief and the ld. Commr. rightly allowed it. His order is confirmed. 7. Appeal dismissed.
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