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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 132 Records
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1982 (11) TMI 164
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... ... ..... is the common experience of those who deal in or go in for jalopies of this kind that second-hand cars are a class apart and the market for old and second-hand cars is quite a distinct sector from that for new cars, from many points of view, including the type of clientele, the nature of the bargain, the quality and the degree of warranty of performance, and so on. In every sense of the word, therefore, second-hand cars are a different commercial commodity from new automobiles. We, therefore, hold that the question of applying a single point levy and exempting sales of old cars, tracing to them historically a first sale when they were new ones cannot be a proper way of applying the provisions of single point taxation to this particular kind of commodity. For all the above reasons, we set aside the order of the Tribunal and restore that of the assessing authority and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The State will have its costs from the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1982 (11) TMI 163
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... ... ..... elevant provisions of the General Sales Tax Act. Now that the law has been properly explained by the Full Bench, we have to follow the Full Bench in the decision of this question raised by the assessee. However, sitting in revision we do not think it proper to entertain the C form declarations or go into the question of sufficient cause. Since the assessee had sought to file these declaration forms before the first appellate authority, namely, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, we think it proper that he should be asked to consider the matter once again in the light of the decision of the Full Bench. We, accordingly, set aside the order of the Tribunal, as well as that of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and direct the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to go into the question of entertaining the C form declarations in exercise of his discretion. The revision is technically allowed, but with the direction which we have set out above. There will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (11) TMI 162
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... ... ..... followed for two assessment years 1971-72 and 1972-73 and both these assessments were confirmed in appeal, as stated above. These revisions are against the combined orders of the Tribunal. We think that we should not interfere in revision in a matter of estimate of this kind, sitting in revision, because matters of estimate are matters of degree. In this very assessee s case, for different assessment years, this Court had declined to interfere with similar orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal in appeal (vide judgment dated 13th June, 1978, in T.C. Nos. 569 and 571 of 1975). In view of the above considerations, these revisions are dismissed. There will however be no order as to costs.
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1982 (11) TMI 161
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... ... ..... the entries in the accounts, invoices and other relevant documents showing that the transactions were put through by the assessee through the media of agents, but went so far as to say that the commission payments to the agents must be disregarded in order that the transactions may be treated as direct sales by the assessee to the so-called agents, treating the latter as principals. The orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner cannot be supported at all. The argument of learned Government Pleader was sought to be put forward only on the basis of the reasonings contained in the orders passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. On the clear findings rendered by the Tribunal that the transactions were really effected by the assessee through the accredited agents and the transactions themselves were only transactions of sale in the course of export, we must reject these revision petitions as without substance. We do so accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (11) TMI 160
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... ... ..... ed the goods to foreign purchasers. The Tribunal examined all the records in this case and came to the contrary conclusion. The Tribunal stated in their order as follows We could see from the documents filed that the goods were sold only on behalf of the appellants and that the exporters were only their agents and have charged only a commission of 0.55 paise per piece. We could also see that the terms of agency with the exporters commenced from the year 1974 onwards. From the tripartite agreement produced before us we could also see that the appellants, the exporters and also the foreign buyers have signed the agreement and the fact of privity of contract with the foreign buyer is also established. In view of the above, we find that the transactions are clearly exemptable as exports through agents. The findings of the Tribunal quoted above speak, for themselves. They are findings of fact. In this view, this tax case has got to be dismissed and we accordingly do so. No costs.
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1982 (11) TMI 159
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... ... ..... on, Bombay. It was nobody s case that the factual position regarding skimmed milk powder in the present case was in any manner different from that set out in the case of M/s. Vyas Corporation. The Tribunal also proceeded on that basis in arriving at its conclusion and has exhaustively discussed the factual position as set out in the case of M/s. Vyas Corporation and has relied upon the finding in that connection given in that case. In these circumstances, it is not possible to hold that there was no material or evidence before the Tribunal for coming to the conclusion that skimmed milk powder is now understood as milk in common parlance. 11.. In the premises, we answer the questions as follows Question No. (1) In the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the department. Question No. (2) In the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the department. 12.. The applicant to pay to the respondents the costs of the reference.
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1982 (11) TMI 158
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... ... ..... r, after making the assessment. In such a situation, it was held that the appellate authority too cannot receive the forms, because by doing so, it would be exercising a power which is not available to the original authority. We, therefore, do not think it necessary to refer to those decisions. Similarly it is unnecessary to refer to the decisions cited by Sri Dasaratharama Reddi, in support of the principle that the appellate authority can exercise all the powers of the original authority. For the above reasons, we hold that the appellate authorities were not right in holding that there is no power in them to receive the five C forms tendered before them. The matter is accordingly remitted to the first appellate authority. The first appellate authority shall dispose of the matter in the light of the observations contained herein and in accordance with law. The T.R.C. is accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1982 (11) TMI 157
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... ... ..... ales Tax Act, 1959, while the amounts collected by the applicants from their purchasers and shown in the bills issued by them as surcharge on account of sales tax paid by them was not in contravention of the said section 46(2) except with respect to the amount in excess of the amount recovered from the applicants by the applicants vendors. The Tribunal while disposing of this reference will calculate the aggregate of the amount which according to our judgment was collected by the applicants in contravention of the said section 46(2) of the Act and would only direct forfeiture of such amount. Question No. (2) in Reference No. 10 of 1978 which we have allowed to be raised on the applicants notice of motion and question No. (2) in Sales Tax Reference No. 42 of 1979 do not require to be answered in view of our answer to question No. (1) in both these references. The applicants will pay to the respondents the costs of these two references consolidated at Rs. 300 in the aggregate.
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1982 (11) TMI 156
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... ... ..... preme Court in Hardeodas Jagannath v. State of Assam 1970 26 STC 10 (SC) AIR 1970 SC 724. This was again a matter relating to sales tax. The relevant provision for appeal before its amendment required payment of admitted tax before the appeal could be entertained. By the amendment, the pre-condition for the entertainment of the appeal was changed to payment of the assessed tax and penalty, if any, levied thereon. It was held that the provisions of the amending Act applied even to assessments relating to earlier years which had not yet been completed. Similar would be the case here. In view of the matters which have been discussed above, no infirmity can be imputed to the order of the Sales Tax Tribunal holding that the appeal filed by the petitioner could not be entertained on account of the non-compliance with the provisions of section 39(5) of the Haryana Act. There is, thus, no merit in this petition which is accordingly hereby dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 300.
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1982 (11) TMI 155
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... ... ..... cannot be inferred by analogy. We are unable to see how the principle of the said decision can be said to nullify the principle of the Bench decision of this Court. The above Bench decision is based upon the principle that the penalty proceedings being ancillary to the assessment proceedings, cannot stand on a higher footing and that, the period of limitation prescribed for making the assessment equally applies to the levying of penalty. We are, therefore, unable to agree with Mr. J.V. Suryanarayana that the authority of the Bench decision of this Court has in any manner been shaken by the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to go into the question whether the period between 3rd October, 1966, and 19th July, 1972, could have been validly excluded by the Tribunal, and whether there is any provision warranting such exclusion. The tax revision case, accordingly, fails and is dismissed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1982 (11) TMI 154
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... ... ..... to say that the view taken by the Tribunal is wrong and just as the Supreme Court has the power to say that the view taken by any High Court is wrong. A superior tribunal is not bound by the decisions of inferior tribunals and to say that the Tribunal should have while deciding the appeals adopted the view taken by the department prior to the said circular dated 20th April, 1976, is unsustainable in law and on principle. In the result, we answer questions Nos. (1) and (2) in each of these references in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessees and against the department. We answer question No. (3) in each of these references in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessees, inasmuch as the Tribunal purported to follow the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra 1976 37 STC 319 (SC). The respondents will pay to the applicants in each of these two references the cost of the reference fixed at Rs. 300.
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1982 (11) TMI 153
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... ... ..... became immaterial. As has been mentioned earlier, ghee and butter are different commercial commodities. The purchase of butter by the assessee would attract purchase tax and he would pay first purchase tax and sales of ghee made by him would attract sales tax under section 3-D(2) as what he would sell was ghee. As has been noticed earlier, ghee, butter, cheese and cream had been taxed separately earlier and there is no reason to hold why they ceased to be separately taxable under the impugned notification dated 30th May, 1975. In this view of the matter, the order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained. The revision is accordingly allowed with costs which are assessed to Rs. 200. It is held that the sales of ghee by the assessee are liable to sales tax under section 3-D(2) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. A copy of the decision shall be sent to the Tribunal in accordance with section 11(8) of the Act for orders as are necessary to dispose of the case in conformity with the decision.
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1982 (11) TMI 152
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... ... ..... ers and the State cannot seek to levy tax on railway freight if it is not made a part of the price........ Moreover, in this case, the benefit of such unauthorised collection ultimately goes to the members of the society only, who are very large in number. Having regard to the observations of the Supreme Court, referred to above, we hold that the Tribunal was in error in holding that the value of the gunny bags must be included in the turnover of the assessee only on the ground that the assessee charged and collected sales tax thereon. With the result, these tax revision cases are partly allowed, and it is held that the value of chemical fertilisers supplied by the assessee to its members as also the value of the gunnies in which sugar was sold and or transported by the assessee is not liable to be included in the assessable turnover of the assessee. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200 in each.
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1982 (11) TMI 151
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... ... ..... rice before the Assessing Authority and took adjournments after noting down dates but on the final date of hearing neither filed any explanation showing any reasonable cause nor appeared either personally or through his duly authorised representative and so it is not open to him to take the plea of the above kind. For the reasons aforementioned, I dismiss this petition. Since the petitioner has utilised for his own use a sum of Rs. 9,567 payable by him to the Government, in pursuance of the impugned order for all those seven years as a result of stay order obtained from this Court and thus deprived the State Government from realising the said amount, it would be in the fiftness of things that the petitioner should part with the part of the gains that he received as a result of utilisation of the said amount for his own purpose. I therefore impose costs of Rs. 2,000 which the State Government would be entitled to realise along with the amount in question under the Act itself.
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1982 (11) TMI 150
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... ... ..... ent at any stage, nor is it the ground upon which the Commercial Tax Officer s order was revised by the Deputy Commissioner. For the above reasons, we hold that the spark plugs cannot be brought under entry 38 as it read at the relevant time and, if so, they must necessarily be taxed as general goods. We may also state here that in 1976 entry 38 has been substituted altogether making it very elaborate. Spark plugs are now placed expressly under a new entry, viz., entry 138, introduced simultaneously. If spark plugs are essentially electrical goods, one would expect the legislature to have included them in entry 38 while recasting the same in 1976. Of course, this is only one way of looking at the matter and it is clear that we are not basing our decision on this subsequent circumstance. For the above reasons, the two revision cases are allowed and it is held that spark plugs do not fall within entry 38 of the First Schedule as it then stood. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1982 (11) TMI 149
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... ... ..... were all orders of assessments which were appealable under section 20 of the Act. Not having exhausted the statutory remedies under the Act, the petitioner cannot invoke the jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution merely in the guise of challenging the constitutional validity of section 6-B of the Act. The constitutional validity of section 6-B of the Act is indeed not challenged. 11.. I have already given the reasons why the argument of the society cannot be accepted that the levy is confiscatory in character. 12.. For these reasons, there is no merit in the contentions of the petitioner and therefore this writ petition is rejected. The petitioner was directed to furnish the bank guarantee for the sum demanded by the 4th respondent, the 4th respondent is now free to enforce the bank guarantee and also collect such additional tax which may be found to be due and which is not covered by the bank guarantee already furnished. 13.. There will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (11) TMI 148
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... ... ..... as envisaged under sub-section (4-A) of section 14 of the Act. As already stated and as observed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal the assessee did furnish correct particulars of the turnover before the assessing authority during the pendency of the proceedings of assessment. If so, the Deputy Commissioner could revise the assessment only within a period of four years from 31st March, 1972, as prescribed under sub-section 4-A(b) of section 14 of the Act. The order of the Deputy Commissioner revising the assessment having been passed on 20th October, 1976, four years after 31st March, 1972, the said order, we must hold, is barred by time. We accordingly set aside the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal as also the order of the Deputy Commissioner revising the assessment made by the Commercial Tax Officer and restore the order passed by the Commercial Tax Officer. The tax revision case is accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1982 (11) TMI 147
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... ... ..... t from vanaspati. If a person goes to a shop and asks for groundnut oil, no trader would give him vanaspati. Similarly a person asking for vanaspati would not be given groundnut oil. Applying the same analogy, merely because, commercially speaking, kerosene and deodourised kerosene are different, it would not make any difference for the purpose of the enquiry relevant herein. The Tribunal, inter alia, relied upon the fact that the value of these two goods is different, to come to the conclusion that both are different goods. In our opinion, however, that cannot be a relevant fact because even in the case of groundnut oil and vanaspati, the values or prices do differ. For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that deodourised kerosene is kerosene for the purpose of entry in item 31(d) in the First Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. The revisions are partly allowed. The assessments already made shall be accordingly revised. Advocate s fee Rs. 200 in each.
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1982 (11) TMI 146
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... ... ..... parties are left to bear their own costs. C.W. No. 1219 of 1973. Now I take up the fifth petition of Gulati Fruits Co. (C.W. No. 1219 of 1973). The facts in this case are entirely different. The impugned order in this case of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax assessing khajoors at 5 per cent is dated 24th March, 1969. On 24th March, 1969, the petitioners were present. They were heard. The impugned order was made in their presence. They did not prefer any revision to the Chief Commissioner as is provided in law. The only step that they took is that they filed the present writ petition in this Court on 13th September, 1973. There is great delay in this case. On the ground of delay and on the ground that the petitioners have not pursued the remedy provided to them under the Act, they are not entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. For this reason this writ petition (C.W. No. 1219 of 1973) is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1982 (11) TMI 145
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... ... ..... ate appearing for the department contended that the Board has the power to remand the matter for reassessment under the provisions of section 38(5) of the Act. Thus a question of law does arise from the order of the Board of Revenue to the effect whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Board of Revenue was justified in law in remanding the matter for reassessment. The other questions suggested by the applicant do not arise out of the order of the Board of Revenue. 4.. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, the application is partly allowed. The Board of Revenue, M.P., Gwalior, is directed to state a case and refer the following question of law arising out of the order of the Board in Sales Tax Appeal No. 322-PBR/77 for the opinion of this Court Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order of remand passed by the Board of Revenue is illegal? In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs of this application.
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