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1982 (11) TMI 72
... ... ... ... ..... the question of distributing and allocating loss if any of the firm among the partnership adjusting the share of loss if any in the assessee s total income u/s 182 does not arise. 3. For those and other reasons that may be urged at the time of hearing it is prayed that the order of the CIT(A) may be set aside and that of the ITO restored. and in respect of which further arguments adduced by the ld. departmental representative have been adverted to would fall to be dismissed. The cross objection (No. 11 (Coch)/81)in substance only seeks for the order of the CIT (A) being upheld. This is dismissed as superfluous. 11. The aforesaid decision would govern ITA No. 153 (Coch)/81 and C.O. No. 12 (Coch)/81 and also ITA No. 154 (Coch)/81 and C.O. No. 13 (Coch)/81. 12. The result is that ITO Nos. 153 and 154 (Coch)/81 will be treated as dismissed subject to our observations referred to in regard to ITA No. 152 (Coch)/81 and C.O.Nos. 12 and 13 (Coch)/81 will be dismissed as superfluous.
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1982 (11) TMI 71
... ... ... ... ..... pay by way of penalty a sum not exceeding one and a half time the amount of tax which has been avoided, or would have been avoided if the income returned by such partner had been accepted as his correct income and no refund or other adjustment shall be climbable by any other partner by reason of such direction. We are not stating that this a case to which the provisions of s. 271 (4) apply but we have only referred to the statutory provision to show that merely because the allocation is not in conformity with the deed it is not axiomatic for registration will full to be refused. 7. In view of our aforesaid findings, we hold that there has been an instrument of partnership which was in existence during the accounting period and further the clauses in the instrument of partnership have been adhered to. We therefore uphold the order of the CIT (A) though on different reasons, directing the grant of registration to the assessee firm. 8. The appeal of the department is dismissed.
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1982 (11) TMI 70
Flat Rate, Foreign Company, Indian Company, Real Income, Tax At Source ... ... ... ... ..... , in the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1980-81.The balance sum of Rs. 75,000 is the adjusted expenditure. As the aggregate expenditure of Rs. 1,00,000 exceeds half per cent of the turnover of Rs. 40,00,000, 15 per cent of Rs. 75,000, i. e., Rs. 11,250, shall further be disallowed under section 37(3A) . . . . 11. Thus, the plain language of sub-section (3A) imports the meaning that the percentage of disallowance is in respect of the aggregate expenditure incurred by the assessee and in the manner provided thereunder. We, therefore, hold that under sub-section (3A) of section 37, in restricting the allowance on the aggregate expenditure on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion incurred in India, the assessee is not entitled to any basic allowance of Rs. 40,000 and for the purpose of disallowance the total expenditure incurred by the assessee has to be taken into account. In this view, we sustain the order of the AAC. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1982 (11) TMI 69
... ... ... ... ..... taking into consideration the rival submissions, we are unable to confirm the action of the AAC. We direct the WTO to apply to multiple of 12 in respect of house property situated at Bhadaur House, Ludhiana for the very same reasons given by the AAC in respect of valuation of this very property in subsequent assessment year. We have held more than once that there is no hard and fast rule that multiple has to be a particular figure. As a matter of fact, while adjudicating the issue pertaining to the application of multiple, many a thing is taken into consideration such as situation of the property, the town where it is situated, type of construction, the bank rate of interest and availability of property, etc. We have consistently adopted the multiple of 12 in respect of town properties such as those of Ambala, Ludhiana, etc. The contention of the assessee, therefore, in this regard is accepted and action of the AAC is reversed. 4. In the result, assessee s appeal is allowed.
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1982 (11) TMI 68
... ... ... ... ..... placed before us by the Revenue. as observed above, nor the some were made available to the assessee by the ITO in spite of the assessee s application dt. 10th Feb.,1980, yet when we peruse the orders of the two lower authorities projecting the discrepancies between the two statements of Sri Ram and Sat Parshad, according to us, there is no discrepancy of the type which could be fatal to the assessee s claim. We are also fortified in our finding on the issue by the decision in the case of Gumani Ram Siri Ram. 6. Before we part with the issue, we may also mention that though the assessee is neither in appeal nor in cross objection before us on the issue regarding the observation made by the AAC pertaining to the gift but it is trite law by now that even as a respondent the assessee could support the order of the AAC. In the light of the above discussion, and for the reasons given by us above, the order of the AAC is confirmed. 7. In the result, revenue s appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (11) TMI 67
... ... ... ... ..... but until that event happened, the assessee would have to be assessed only as an individual. In the light of the above discussion, the assessee s income from dividend, interest from banks and annuity refunds could not be subjected to tax in his hands as individual. 34. Coming to the ground Nos. 6 and 7, which pertain to charging of interest under sections 139(8) and 215, the only submission of the learned counsel for the assessee was that this ground may be treated as consequential to the ground we have discussed above. Therefore, in this respect, we confirm the action of the Commissioner (Appeals) to the extent that no appeal lies in respect of the ITO s action against the levy of interest under sections 215 and 139(8), but in case the assessee gets relief in consequence to our finding given above regarding exclusion of income from property acquired by him on partition, the same will be granted to the assessee. 35. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is partly allowed.
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1982 (11) TMI 66
Amalgamating Company, Business Loss, Carry Forward And Set Off, Unabsorbed Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... as contained in sub-section (2) of section 32 and section 72, respectively. In the absence of this, carry forward of loss and unabsorbed depreciation will be governed by the plain meaning of the language used in sections 72 and 32(2). 18. The learned authors, Kanga and Palkhivala, have also expressed the view which corresponds with the above discussion. The said view may not constitute the authority of a judgment of the Hon ble High Court or the Supreme Court but it is an opinion of an expert and may be looked at for assistance. The Hon ble Punjab and Haryana High Court referred to the views of Kanga and Palkhivala in Addl. CIT v. Karnail Singh V. Kaleran 1974 94 ITR 505 and accepted them. There is, therefore, no substance in Dr. Pal s contention that Kanga and Palkhivala s views cannot be looked at. 19. In view of what we have stated above, we have no option in the matter but to uphold the order of the Commissioner and to reject the assessee s appeal. Accordingly, we do so.
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1982 (11) TMI 65
Assessment Year, Minor Child, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... unless substantial reasons such as tax evasion, deliberate concealment, etc., warrant it. Since we are not sure whether the greater income and tax obtain by having the clubbing process in the hands of the assessee, i. e., the husband, rather than that of the wife, we cannot lay down that in the future also the clubbing should be in the husband s hands. If, however, the department after working the income and tax effect find that the clubbing of the incomes in the husband s hands would satisfy the condition of clubbing in the hands of the spouse having the greater income for this assessment year for which the clubbing is done for the first time, in our view, it would be bound to follow consistency with regard to this in the subsequent years also. This should be the case even though the amendment to Explanation 1 came with effect from 1-4-1980 for the reasons stated above. 8. Subject to the above remarks, the Commissioner (Appeals) s order is upheld and the appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (11) TMI 64
Flat Rate, Foreign Company, Indian Company, Real Income, Tax At Source ... ... ... ... ..... ident and ordinarily resident assessee and it was held that the foreign income in the hands of such an assessee would have to be assessed only on the basis of accruing or arising outside India during the accounting year even if it is not received in or brought into India. This case has also no direct bearing on the issue involved in these appeals. 16. The second and the last ground is that the deduction of Rs. 5,000 under section 80VV of the Act, should be allowed entirely against the interest income and not apportioned between the dividend income and the interest income. It is contended that there being no specific provision in the Act warranting such an allocation, it is for the assessee to claim the deduction under section 80VV against the income under one or the other head. We are inclined to accept the assessee s submission and direct that the deduction of Rs. 5,000 may be allowed against this interest income as claimed. 17. In the result, the appeals are partly allowed.
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1982 (11) TMI 63
HUF Property, Individual Property, Wealth Tax Return ... ... ... ... ..... stified in making the assessment only in respect of half wealth of the HUF and excluding the other half which has devolved on the heirs of the deceased. The Commissioner was wrong in setting aside the assessment order and directing him to re-do by bringing into tax the entire wealth of the family. 8. The decision in Kalloomal Tapeswari Prasad (HUF) v. CIT 1982 133 ITR 690 (SC) relied on by the revenue has no application to the facts of the instant case. That is a case dealing with the claim of partition under section 171. It has no application to the instant case, as here, the HUF continues, but only the share of the property of the deceased which devolved on his heirs gets diminished from the property of the HUF. In fact, this objection of the revenue has been answered by the Mysore High Court in the case of Nagarathnamma. 9. We cancel the order dated 17-3-1981 of the Commissioner, Karnataka-I and restore the assessment order of the WTO. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1982 (11) TMI 62
Refund Of Tax, Regular Assessment, Tax At Source, Tax Deducted At Source ... ... ... ... ..... ng the amount of tax (or refund) payable (refundable) to (by) the assessee. Hence, this is a matter which is appealable as part of the assessment unlike, for example, interest under section 217 of the Act where a separate order is necessary as held by the Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT v. Nanda Theatres 1978 115 ITR 301. The Madras High Court in the case of Triplicane Urban Co-operative Society Ltd. v. CIT 1980 126 ITR 125 has clarified that even where the order is under section 214 and there is no specific right of appeal under section 246, there could be an appeal against the order of assessment as such. It is (sic) we have to decide in favour of the assessee even in respect of jurisdiction. 7. Since we are directing interest on refund only from the date of assessment as against the date of deduction of tax at source, the appeal will be treated as partly allowed. The assessee will be entitled to interest from the date of original assessment till the date of refund.
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1982 (11) TMI 61
Computing Value, Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... he assessee would be entitled to claim exemption as contemplated under section 5(1)(xxxii). In this view of the matter, we are not prepared to accede to the submissions made on behalf of the revenue that the concluding words in the parenthesis are applicable to any asset mentioned therein and not applicable to the other portion of the words used in the parenthesis. In any event, since two views are possible in interpreting the words mentioned in the parenthesis, the view in favour of the assessee has to be preferred. For all these reasons, we do not find any infirmity in the orders of the AAC under appeal. However, in order to protect the interest of the revenue we direct the assessee to furnish the necessary particulars before the WTO who will then have an opportunity to examine and verify the correct amount of exemption allowable under section 5(1)(xxxii). The WTO is, therefore, directed to modify the assessments accordingly. 8. In the result, all the appeals are dismissed.
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1982 (11) TMI 60
... ... ... ... ..... . The penalty order of the WTO shows that she had explained that at the time of filing of wealth-tax return for the asst. yr. 1975-76 it was found by her ITP that the total wealth exceeded Rs. 1 lac and immediately she filed the return. The assessee after all is a lady and she may not know for which year she should be liable to wealth-tax. The AAC s order shows that the wealth return for the asst. yr. 1975-76 was filed on 13th November 1975. Since as stated by her before the WTO that her liability to wealth-tax for the asst. yr. 1974-75 was found by the ITP at the time of filing the return for asst. yr. 1975-76, it can be said that this liability was found only in November, 1975. She has filed the return on 17th January, 1976, i.e., within a reasonable time after she found out about her liability. Therefore, on the facts of this case, we are of the view that her explanation is quite reasonable and no penalty is leviable. 7. The penalty is cancelled and the appeal is allowed.
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1982 (11) TMI 59
Chargeable Profits, Computation Of ... ... ... ... ..... under the scheme framed by the Government will reduce the assessee s Surcharge liability to the extent of the amount of the deposit. The speech of the Finance Minister, Notes on Clauses and Memorandum explaining the provisions of the Bill support our reading of the provisions rather than that of the assessee s counsel. It has nowhere been suggested that the amount of the deposit has or can be treated as a payment towards surcharge liability. It is not a case where the option was that either you pay a surcharge or pay the equivalent amount as something else. The option has been that if you deposit under the scheme, the deposit will reduce the surcharge liability to the extent of the deposit. Such a reduction has been contemplated and taken care of under rule 2(i) of the First Schedule to the Act. Therefore, we do not think that the assessee is entitled to the deduction of the gross amount of its surcharge liability as claimed by it. 11. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (11) TMI 58
Import licence - Renewal of ... ... ... ... ..... etermines the period of validity of the first and subsequent renewals and no more. The view taken by the respondents appears to be correct inasmuch as the regulations do not provide for the contingency of the application being made beyond the period of the licence which has already been renewed once. That lacuna cannot be cured by construing the provision in sub-clause (3) of Regulation 13 of the Regulations in the manner in which the learned counsel wants to construe the same. That would be rewriting the regulation and also would amount to conferring jurisdiction on the first respondent which the regulation have not conferred expressly. 4. In this view of the matter, the only alternative left for the petitioner is to seek a fresh licence in accordance with the aforementioned Regulations and therefore this writ petition is misconceived and the impugned orders do not call for interference. 5. I reject the writ petition without rule being issued for the reasons aforementioned.
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1982 (11) TMI 57
Civil suit Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... can only be done if such a suit is open to him according to law. We do not think that the said observation would enable the plaintiff to get over the period of limitation or to challenge the findings of fact arrived at by the Central Excise authorities on a proper appreciation of the relevant evidence adduced before them. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to invoke the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and exclude the period during which the writ petition was pending for purposes of computation of the period of limitation for filing the present suit. If that period cannot be excluded, the suit would be clearly barred under Section 69 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a period of three years for recovery of specific movable property, from the date when the property was wrongfully taken. We, therefore, hold that the suit is also barred by limitation. 21. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1982 (11) TMI 56
Seized goods Retention beyond the time limit is illegal and without jurisdiction Natural justice Invalid extension of period for retention Burden of proof wrongly cast on the petitioner Order of confiscation illegal Prohibitory order Effect Burden of proof Smuggled goods
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1982 (11) TMI 55
Valuation Drugs and medicines Statutory provisions ... ... ... ... ..... per cent of the cost for the manufacturing expenses cannot be accepted. It is no doubt true that the claim made by the petitioner for deduction of as much as 88 per cent as manufacturing expenses cannot straightway be allowed and the second respondent can go into the question as to what is the actual manufacturing expenses in respect of particular items of drugs or medicines manufactured by the petitioner. For that purpose, the respondents can either take the retail price under the Drugs Price Control Order, 1979 and give deduction for the actual post-manufacturing expenses incurred or work out the cost of manufacture and the manufacturer s profits from the books of account maintained by the petitioner. 10. In this view of the matter, the order of the second respondent dated 27-12-1981 is quashed with a direction to the second respondent to determine the assessable value according to law and after excluding the post-manufacturing expenses. There will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (11) TMI 54
Appeal - Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... enue, but I must ultimately be able to base myself upon some language in the section to uphold the contention of Mr. K. Subrahmanya Reddy that the power of enhancement can be exercised even in a case like this where the Department has not filed an appeal. I do not find any such language. On the other hand, the wide words used in Section 128, clause. (1) conferring a right of appeal on any aggrieved person which I take, include even the department or at any rate the Government would belie by implication the argument of the learned counsel. 5. I accordingly hold that the appellate authority could not enhance the penalty in an appeal preferred by the party. Such a thing could have been done only when the Department or the Government of India had preferred an appeal. For the reasons alone, I allow this writ petition with costs, and set aside the order passed by the appellate authority as confirmed by the revisional authority, to the extent of enhancement. Advocate fee Rs. 150/-.
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1982 (11) TMI 53
Patent or Proprietary medicines ... ... ... ... ..... headache, and pains. In the light of these facts, the learned Judge followed the decision in Writ App. No. 23 of 1964 and held that the product was liable to excise duty. We are of the opinion that the facts before the learned Judge were entirely different from the facts in this case. 8. To conclude, we agree with the learned single Judge that the symbol used by the respondent cannot be said to be distinctive enough to attract item 14-E read with Explanation 1 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act. It is also admitted that the said symbol or mark is not the registered trade mark of the respondent. It is equally admitted that this mark is being used by the respondent in respect of all their preparations. There is absolutely nothing in the mark to indicate a connection in the course of trade between the medicine and the respondent. We therefore confirm the order of the learned single Judge and dismiss the appeal. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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