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1982 (3) TMI 136
Rectification Of Mistakes, Apparent From Record ... ... ... ... ..... rlier order of the Tribunal. For the reasons stated therein, we agree, and we hold likewise. We may add that the proceedings, which led to the original assessments made by the ITO, for the said years were completed after initiating proceedings under section 147(1)(b) read with section 148. 16. Before we part, we would like to record that both the learned counsel for the assessee Shri O.P. Vaish and the departmental representative had advanced several other arguments regarding the conclusion arrived at by the ITO that the present case was a case of mistake apparent from the record, inasmuch as the assessee could not have had advantage of the provisions of the Voluntary Disclosure Ordinance, 1975 in the matter of immunity available to the assessee, in the matter of non-charging of the aforesaid interest and the initiation of penalty proceedings. We, in view of our above conclusion, are not dealing with those arguments. 17. In the result, the appeals by the assessee are allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 135
Assessment, Benami Transaction ... ... ... ... ..... Ram Rawatmull 1973 87 ITR 349, Karnani Properties Ltd. v. CIT 1971 82 ITR 547, CIT v. Durga Prasad More 1971 82 ITR 540, A. Govindarajulu Mudaliar v. CIT 1958 34 ITR 807, etc., apart from the various decisions of the High Courts. 6. Applying the ratio of the above decision to the facts of the present case, we find that apart from disbelieving the explanation furnished by the assessee, no evidence or material has been brought on record to establish that the house property at Jhinjhana Road, Shamli, was held benami by the assessee in the name of his wife, Smt. Lahar Kaur. We, are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no basis or material to include towards the net wealth of the assessee, the value of the house property atJhinjhana Road, standing in the name of Smt. Lahar Kaur. The value of the said property included towards the net wealth of the assessee for the assessment years 1970-71 to 1972-73 is, accordingly, deleted. 7. In the result, all the three appeals are allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 134
... ... ... ... ..... ect of the claim under section 80J, the learned counsel for the assessee had relied on the order of the Tribunal in the case of Marwell Sea Foods v. ITO 1981 11 TTJ 22 for the submission that deduction under section 80HH should be allowed to the assessee. In that case it was held that export of shrimps constituted production of a new commodity as the end product could not be restored to the original condition (fish). We are not dealing with an article of that nature and it is unnecessary for us to examine whether shrimps exported became a different commodity from fish. We have already held that without investment of capital in building, plant and machinery and without employing the required number of persons, the assessee is not entitled to deduction under section 80J. For the same reasons, we reject the assessee s claim for deduction under section 80HH. 8 to 31. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues. 32. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 133
Developement Rebate, Carry Forward And Set Off, Payment Not Deductible, Gratuity ... ... ... ... ..... er appeal is 1976-77. The provisions of section 40A(7)(b)(ii) would be relevant only for the assessment years 1973-74, 1974-75 and 1975-76. The claim of the assessee, if it had been for the assessment year 1975-76, would have been quite valid even though the trust had not been created before the end of the previous year for that assessment year. But the assessment year being 1976-77, the claim can only be considered under sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of section 40A(7). Under that provision, it is necessary that the gratuity trust was in existence during the previous year in order to enable the assessee to the claim of deduction of the provision made. Since this primary condition is not satisfied, the assessee is not entitled to the claim for the deduction of the sum of Rs. 2,54,452. The Commissioner was, therefore, justified in passing this order under section 263, withdrawing this allowance, originally granted by the ITO. 30. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 132
... ... ... ... ..... arent of his. The HUF is capable of using the property as its residence and, therefore, the alternative provision, namely, or a parent of his does not rob the assessee HUF of the benefit granted by this section. On this ground also there would not be any capital gains for the asst. yr. 1974-75. 20. In so far as the asst. yr. 1975-76 is concerned, the cost, on the above reckoning, of commercial portion of the property which was used for self business will be about Rs. 30,000. The sale proceeds were of Rs. 34,000. There will be thus capital gains of Rs. 4,000. But this capital gain will be of the nature of long-term capital gain as the property though acquired by the bigger HUF, the Karta of present assessee HUF, as one of the coparceners of that bigger HUF, had right, title and interest in that property from birth and cost as on 1st January 1954 to the previous owner has been considered due to a legal fiction. 4. In view of the above, the reference applications are dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 131
... ... ... ... ..... harge of concealing particulars of income could not be there and therefore, in the absence of satisfaction having been recorded by the ITO in the course of assessment proceedings, the very initiation of penalty proceedings were bad. 9. As far as the Expln. to s. 271(1)(c) of the Act, the ITO did not require the assessee to discharge his onus because as is clear from the order passed under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act, the penalty was levied simply because the addition was made in the assessment and which came to be accepted by the assessee. In any case, explanations offered by the assessee in the course of penalty proceedings were such which can be said to take the assessee out of the ambit of the Expln. also. 5. From the above finding, it is apparent that it was on the basis of facts that the Tribunal came to cancel the penalty. Therefore, the request of the Commr. for reference of the two questions, given above, is rejected. 6. In the result, reference application is dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 130
... ... ... ... ..... e parties, we find that reliance was placed on the respective arguments advanced in the case of Sham Lal in ITA Nos. 710 and 851 (ASR)/1979 decided on 30th Sept., 1981. The facts which are relevant for the determination of the issues before us are also in pari materia. For the reasons recorded by us in detail in the case of Sham Lal, we are of the opinion that memorandum of partial partition created an overriding title and the income was assessable in severalty in the hands of each recipient and Shri Jai Parkash was liable to assessment only in respect of the share that came to him. We may also point out that this position was clearly stated and pointed out by the Tribunal in its judgment for the asst. yr. 1971-72 which we have referred to supra and which have been accepted by the Revenue. In view of the above the re-assessments raised in the status of association of persons as well as unregistered firm are bad in law. These are cancelled. 4. Reference application dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 129
... ... ... ... ..... case of hypothecation and not of pledge. 4. When above are the uncontroverted facts, the finding of the AAC extracted and placed above, is found in order and does not call for any interference. Simply because the AAC did not give details of goods which were sold between 28 and 31st March, 1974 would not vitiate his action in deleting the said addition because he has found it as a fact that it was stock as on 28th March, 1974 which was furnished to the bank and the same since was not varied from day to day up to 31st March, 1974, it continued to be the same and he also observed that the assessee had sold some stock during the period. No addition on account of the discrepancy between stock of the assessee as on 31st March, 1974 as per books and with the bank as on 31st March, 1974 which was actually of 28th March, 1974 could be warranted after the state of affairs was explained and the AAC was justified in deleting the same. 5. In the result, the Revenue s appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 128
... ... ... ... ..... rd, the assessee has pointed out that lower rate of G.P. was accepted in the case of Naresh Kumar Banta, Prop. M/s. Naresh Bros. doing business in the same line and at the same place where the assessees business is located. We, therefore, delete the addition made to the trading results made by the ITO and sustained on different ground by the AAC in spare parts account. 5. With regard to the addition in tyres account, we find that in the asst. yr. 1976 77 the turnover was about Rs. 3,05,000 with the G.P. rate of 7.6 per cent. For the year under appeal, the gross profit has come down to about 5 per cent with turnover of Rs. 3,18,000. In so far as this ground is concerned, the ITO has pointed out that on a test check with reference to purchase bills, he found particular items unaccounted for. Considering all the facts of the case, in our opinion, an addition of Rs. 1,000 by way of corrective measure will meet the ends of justice. We order accordingly. 6. Appeal allowed in part.
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1982 (3) TMI 127
... ... ... ... ..... ssing the appeal of the revenue. 10. Now coming to the cross-objection of the assessee, we find that the addition of Rs. 4000/- was made by the ITO on account of low withdrawals apparently of the partners of the firm. Though the firm is not generally anything but a compendious name for its partners, yet for purposes of the statute that we are to apply i.e. the IT Act, 1961, the firm has a separate entity from its partners. Therefore, on the facts that have been brought before us, we are deciding only on the principle whether in the case of low withdrawals of the partners, addition can be justified in the hands of an entity which is entirely different from them in so far as the IT Act is concerned. In view of this principle, we do not find any justification for sustaining this addition of Rs. 4,000 and, therefore, delete this addition by reversing the order of the AAC on this issue. 11. The appeal of the revenue is dismissed and the cross objection of the assessee is allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 126
... ... ... ... ..... d by both the parties before us or relied upon by the two lower authorities would be futile war of words and would become academic because what would hold the field regarding the issue is the order of the court which stands unchallenged till today by anyone whatsoever. In the light of the above observation, we are not encumbering this order with the other contentions. The assessee s contention, therefore, in respect of all these three appeals is accepted and his share would be 1/3rd only in the said property. 14. Before we part, we may also mention that the contention of the revenue would not hold the field that even if the court order is to be the last word on the issue it must be effective from 14th June, 1973. We are unable to accept this contention because from the reading of the judgment, it would be evident that the plaintiffs were in possession of 1/3rd share each in property w.e.f. 20th Nov., 1970. 15. In the result, all the three appeals of the assessee are allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 125
Deductions, Income From Co-Operative Societies ... ... ... ... ..... which property is purchased in order to be held for the sake of the income which it will yield Stroud s Dictionary, 4th edition, p. 1419. 6. The savings bank account which the assessee had opened has to be understood in contrast to what the assessee could have done by placing the money in the current account. In the savings bank account, there are restrictions on withdrawals. For example, rule 6 of the Savings Bank Rule regarding deposits, stipulates that a depositor may withdraw money from his account not more than 12 times a month. The very name of the account is savings account and, therefore, by implication it is for the purpose of earning interest on savings. In our opinion, the narrow interpretation given by the authorities below to deny the assessee deduction under section 80P(2)(d) is not justified. We, therefore, reverse their orders and direct that the said amount of interest be treated as exempt under section 80P(2)(d) for the year under appeal. 7. Appeal allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 124
-ssessment, Validity Of ... ... ... ... ..... ment order made by him on 20-6-1979. Yet the assessment has been raised on Shri Bir Singh, deceased. This case, therefore, is clearly out of the ratio of the Gujarat High Court judgment in the case of Sumantbhai. In that case, the person on whom the assessments were raised died after filing the returns, but in the case before us the return had itself been filed by the legal representatives long after the death of the deceased. They had not known during the course of assessment proceedings that the GTO is going to adopt the status of an individual as they have been making a claim that they constitute a HUF. Therefore, the deliberate act of the GTO in making an assessment on a dead person cannot be brought within the ambit of the ratio of the Gujarat High Court judgment. On this count also the assessment is bad in law. 7. We annul the assessment on each of the above counts. In the result, the appeal of the revenue is dismissed and the cross-objection of the assessee is allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 123
Appeal To AAC, Appealable Orders ... ... ... ... ..... njab High Court, relied on by the learned counsel for the assessee, is of no avail to him. 16. Now the issue before us is whether the appeal that was entertained by the learned Commissioner (Appeals) and on which he has made an order and which has come before us, should be upheld as it is or it be annulled as being ab initio void. From what is stated above, it is clear that such an order, even if not appealed against, does not become legal and final in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Raja Jagdambika. But the order has come in appeal before us and we are of the opinion that we are competent to look into its legality on the set of facts before us and in our considered opinion, this order is ab initio void because no appeal lies against the order of the ITO made under section 220. Therefore, on the preliminary objection raised by the revenue, we cancel the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and restore in its place that of the ITO. 17. Appeal dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 122
Transfer Of Assets, For Benefit Of Spouse Or Minor Child ... ... ... ... ..... p and the gift that his grandmother made to him. The reliance by the learned counsel for the assessee on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Prem Bhai Parekh 1970 77 ITR 27 for the proposition that the connection between the transfer of assets and the income must be proximate is also well justified on the facts of the case. One has to remember that in this case itself the Supreme Court has further held that section 16(3) of the 1922 Act (corresponding to section 64 of the 1961 Act) creates an artificial income and it must receive a strict construction. But in this case, no such strict construction is necessary because, on facts, the action taken by the authorities below was without any basis. We, therefore, allow the appeal of the assessee by reversing the orders of the authorities below and directing the ITO to exclude from the total income of the assessee the share of profit that the minor got from the firm of Karam Chand Rakesh Kumar. 6. Appeal allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 121
... ... ... ... ..... t he checked the veracity of the said explanation and then came to reject it. The observation from the ITO s order, which is extracted and placed above, shows that he was of the view that under all circumstances the assessee was obliged to file the estimate under section 209A. On similar presumption, the ITO confirmed the said penalty as is apparent from para 4 of the order. We are of the view that under all circumstances, the assessee is not obliged to file the estimate, as is apparent from section 209A, which provides that obligation of the assessee is only if he thinks that his current income is likely to exceed the amount specified in sub-section (2) of section 208. When the ITO s order is perused, it is found that he nowhere gave a finding that the explanation given by the assessee was false and as such the assessee had failed without reasonable cause. The penalty levied by the ITO and confirmed by the AAC is, therefore, cancelled. 7. In the result the appeal is allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 120
Speculation Business ... ... ... ... ..... ral provision and a special provision operating in the same field, the special provision must be given effect to and the general enactment can only apply in respect of provisions not covered by the special or particular provisions. In this context, we find that there is a general provision with regard to the speculation business (sic). The interpretation and the definition of business under section 2(13), in our opinion, cannot be availed of. 9. In view of what is stated above, it is clear that there is a conflict of judicial opinions on the interpretation of the words speculative transactions used in Explanation 2 to section 28 and in these situations the interpretation in favour of the assessee must be accepted. We accept it and confirm the order of the AAC in this regard, thereby dismissing the appeal of the revenue. 10. This para is not printed here as it involves a minor issue. 11. The appeal of the revenue is dismissed and the cross-objection of the assessee is allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 119
Exemption, Provident Fund ... ... ... ... ..... e amounts prior to his retirement, insofar as question of taxation is concerned, continued. The amounts were, therefore, not includible in the net wealth of the assessee. 7. The amount included in the net wealth of the assessee is also factually incorrect because the amount of the provident fund sanctioned by the Deputy Accountant General vide his order dated 21-6-1976, represents the available balance of the deposits up to 1974-75 in the GPFA/C No. Med/Pb./1606 with interest calculated thereon up to the 5/76 . In other words, it includes the interest amount calculated after 31-3-1976. It is to be noted insofar as gratuity is concerned, it has to be calculated on particular formula provided and unless it is actually calculated and sanctioned it cannot be said to be an asset with the assessee for inclusion in the net wealth of the assessee as on 31-3-1976. Therefore, none of these amounts could be included. The order of the AAC is, therefore, justified. 8. Appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 118
Assets, Animals ... ... ... ... ..... word bird . But even according to the dictionary meaning that he relied upon and which does not appear to have been properly appreciated, the word bird itself connotes an animal because vertebrates are nothing but the backbone of animals as vertebrate is a joint of the backbone. Thus, even according to the definition which the WTO relied upon to reject the claim of the assessee, animals include birds like chickens. 8. Thus it appears that there was no justification for the authorities below to reject the claim of the assessee. Even if we do not go to the provisions of the Acts like the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, and the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, which treat the birds as animals, the dictionary meaning of the word animals clearly shows that its ordinary meaning will take in birds. The assessee s claim of exemption was, therefore, wrongly disallowed. We direct that the claim of the assessee be considered and necessary relief granted. 9. Appeal allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 117
In Part, Set Off, Total Income, Trading Liability, Unabsorbed Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... in the assessment order itself after certain prescribed conditions are fulfilled by the assessee. Thus, the two fields, one where trading liability is availed of by the assessee and the other where depreciation is allowed by the ITO, are quite different and the two cannot be compared as attempted by the learned counsel for the assessee. 21. We have already held that factually trading liability had been availed of by the assessee in the accounting period relevant to the assessment year 1976-77 and there is no argument, whatsoever, that can be applied to these facts to hold that trading liability was not availed of by the assessee and such a trading liability had not entered into the computation of what was finally determined to the loss of the assessment year 1976-77. Hence, these contentions stand rejected and on each of the above counts, this ground of the assessee is rejected. 22. In the result, the appeal of the revenue is dismissed and that of the assessee partly allowed.
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