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Showing 201 to 220 of 234 Records
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1982 (3) TMI 34 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Exemptions, House Property ... ... ... ... ..... of s. 23(3) of the Act will go to show that the assessee has to prove, for getting the benefit of that provision, that the residential house could not be occupied by him by reason of the fact that owing to his employment, business or profession carried on at any other place, he has to reside at that other place in building not belonging to him. Some nexus between the fact of residing in a building not belonging to the assessee and his employment, business or profession must be shown before the benefit under s. 23(3) can be claimed in respect of the residential house which is not occupied by the assessee. On the findings reached by the Tribunal, this nexus or connection has not been established. The assessee, therefore, is not entitled to the exemption. For the reasons given above, we answer the question referred as follows There was justification in law to hold that the assessee was not entitled to exemption under section 23(3) of the Act. There will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 33 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Appeals, Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... n our opinion, appears to be reasonable and should be accepted. A statutory provision conferring a right of appeal should, in case of doubt, be liberally construed. Moreover, in the matter of construction of a statute like the I.T. Act, which is of all India application, it is necessary that there should be uniformity as far as possible amongst the different High Courts. For these reasons, we fall in line with the majority High Courts and we hold that the orders dismissing the assessee s applications for registration were appealable. We respectfully agree with the aforesaid observations. In our opinion, therefore, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the appeal filed by the assessee before the AAC was competent. Our answer to the question referred to this court for its opinion is, therefore, in the affirmative and against the Revenue. Under the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1982 (3) TMI 32 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Necessity Of Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... v. R. K. Deo 1982 137 ITR 324), we have taken a similar view and have relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in 1972 83 ITR 26, 29 (Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa), where it was stated An order imposing penalty for failure to carry out a statutory obligation is the result of a quasi-criminal proceeding, and penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party obliged, either acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or dishonest, or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. In that very case we have also held that the Tribunal as a second appellate authority has the same jurisdiction as the WTO for appreciating facts to determine whether a fit case for imposition of penalty was made out. For the reasons given in these two decisions, we must hold that no question of law arises out of the appellate order of the Tribunal. We decline to answer the reference. No costs. BEHERA J.-I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice.
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1982 (3) TMI 31 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mmissioner has no revisional power over the AAC. The question whether the ITO s order has merged with that of the AAC has to be answered on this basis. Accordingly, in the present case, in respect of both the assessees, the Commissioner s revisional jurisdiction under s. 263 was available only over matters not considered and decided by the AAC and it did not extend to those items which Were covered by the AAC s appellate decision. As a result of the above discussion, our answer to the question referred is as follows Answer The Appellate Tribunal was not correct in law in holding that the entire assessment orders of the ITO had merged in the order of the AAC irrespective of the points urged by the parties or decided by the AAC and, therefore, the Commissioner was not competent to revise those orders under s. 263 of the I.T. Act, 1961, even in respect of the points not considered and decided by the AAC. The reference is answered accordingly. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 30 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ere is a long period of limitation and the technical requirements connected with the filing of a second appeal which required the filing of a certified copy of the appellate court s judgment and the certified copy of the trial court s judgment, do not exist. So, there was no impediment at all to the filing of the application on any day during the period of six months. Furthermore, the petitioner was actually served before 24th August, 1980. In addition to all this, we find that the power-of-attorney (vakalatnama) in favour of the counsel who filed the application in this court is dated 11th March, 1981. We accordingly cannot accept the explanation that this is a fit case in which the delay should be condoned. We accordingly reject the application for condonation of delay and accordingly dismiss I.T.C. No. 44 of 1981, as being barred by time. However, we would refrain from passing orders regarding costs in view of the circumstances in which the application has been dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 29 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Assets, Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... it is an item of asset in his hands. We are respectfully inclined to agree with this view and even without expressing ourselves on the question as to whether sub-s. (2)(b) of s. 7 of the Act can be extended to heads other than business, in the case of bad debt irrespective of the system of accounting, in income-tax assessment it is taken into account in the computation of the net income. In wealth-tax assessment where the question is of determining the net wealth of the assessee, there is no question of not including the debts which do amount to an asset. Our answer to question No. 1, therefore, is in the affirmative, in favour of the Department and against the assessee. We answer question No. 2 by saying that the arrears of rent could be included in the net wealth of the assessee since it is an asset and the system of accounting maintained by the assessee is not at all relevant for this purpose. The Commissioner of Wealth-tax is entitled to costs, which we assess at Rs. 250.
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1982 (3) TMI 28 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
HUF, Partial Partition In HUF ... ... ... ... ..... and went out from the joint family. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in coming to the conclusion that the assessee s HUF had established its case of partial partition in the family. During the assessment proceedings of the assessee s HUF for the year 1972-73, the ITO added a sum of Rs. 15,636 in the income of the assessees, being the income earned by Mani Lal as partner from M/s. Vikas Agencies on the reasoning that he continued to be a member of the HUF and the claim for partial partition was not established. The Tribunal rightly deleted this amount on the finding that there was a genuine partition made under s. 171 of the Act and consequently the amount earned by Mani Lal Kedia as partner from M/s. Vikas Agencies could not be added to the income of the assessee s HUF. In the result our answers to the questions referred are in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The assessee is entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 250, one set.
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1982 (3) TMI 27 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Factory Building, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... TVS Ltd. (No. 2) 1977 110 ITR 346 (Mad) and Hukamchand Mills Ltd. v. CIT 1978 114 ITR 870 (Bom), it was held that a road inside a factory complex, laid out for the purpose of aiding and assisting the manufacturing processes, must be regarded as a building for the purpose of depreciation. In Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1980 122 ITR 660 (Cal), the Calcutta High Court had no hesitation in holding that constructions relating to fencing, culverts and drainage inside an aluminium manufacturing factory formed part of factory buildings. In the light of the above decisions, to find out whether a particular structure or construction falls within the category of factory buildings or not, we have to approach the question from the functional point of view. Viewed in that light, we have no doubt that the above items cannot be considered to be otherwise than part of factory building. We, therefore, answer question Nos. 1, 3 and 5 in the affirmative. There will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 26 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... application of the principle to be applied. The expenses were jointly incurred and were proportionately divided on certain rational basis and such expenses, if as a result of incurring such expenses, the carrying on of the business or earning of the profits of the assessee was facilitated, would be allowed as revenue expenses. The knowledge that was gathered by incurring these expenses was necessary for the use of sophisticated equipment having regard to the nature and type of business the assessee was carring on. Certain decisions were referred to us but these do not in fact apply to this case though the principles of these decisions do not militate against the conclusion that we are arriving at. Therefore, it is not necessary to deal with those decisions in detail. In the premises, we will answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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1982 (3) TMI 25 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Interest On Loans And Advances ... ... ... ... ..... rse a different consideration would apply. If before the end of the previous year, negotiations had been entered into for giving up any amount, then there was stoppage of accrual of debt due in the previous year. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal has arrived at a correct conclusion. In the premises, question No.1 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. So far as question No. 2 is concerned, it is slightly misleading, because the Tribunal held that the, interest of Rs. 16,080 did not become due until the assessment year 1970-71. Therefore, we must answer the question by saying that the Tribunal was correct in holding that the interest of Rs. 16,080 became due during the assessment year 1970-71 and, as such, was allowable as a deduction. This question is, therefore, answered also in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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1982 (3) TMI 24 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Application For Reduction Or Waiver, Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... sioner under s. 18(2) is a statutory remedy available to him. It cannot possibly be accepted that the petitioner was not entitled to be heard in support of the claim put forth by him. By now it is well settled that before an order can be passed even by an executive authority much less a quasi-judicial authority affecting the civil rights of an individual, an opportunity of being heard is a must. In view of the above, the impugned orders (annex. P-4 in both the petitions) are unsustainable and deserve to be, quashed. I order accordingly. As a necessary consequence of this, the case is sent back to the Commissioner, for re-hearing in accordance with law and the observations made above. It is further made clear that till the final disposal of the case as directed above, the amount of penalties imposed on the petitioner would not be recovered. The petitioner through his counsel is directed to put in appearance before the Commissioner on May 10, 1982. I pass no order as to costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... ties that the transfer of the property by the assessee was a perfectly honest and bona fide transaction where the full value of the consideration received by the assessee was correctly disclosed at the figure of Rs. 16,500. Therefore, on the construction placed by us, sub-s (2) had no application to the present case and the ITO could have no reason to believe that any part of the income of the assessee had escaped assessment so as to justify the issue of a notice under s. 148. The order of reassessment made by the ITO pursuant to the notice issued under s. 148 was accordingly without jurisdiction and the majority judges of the Full Bench were in error in refusing to quash it. Applying the ratio of the said principle of the Supreme Court in the facts found in the instant case we must, therefore, answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of this case, parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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1982 (3) TMI 22 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Donations To Political Party, Loss Incurred In Export, Show-cause Notice, Tax Concession, Widely Held Company
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1982 (3) TMI 21 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Industrial Company ... ... ... ... ..... e excess receipts on account of conversion of one currency into another would be revenue receipts. But if the profit by exchange operations comes in, not by way of business of the assessee, the profit would be capital. These observations will also show that on the view which we have taken that the recovery of compensation for the stock-in-trade lost on account of being seized by the Govt. of Pakistan was in connection with the business transaction of the assessee, viz., as dealer in stock-in-trade, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Canara Bank s case 1967 63 ITR 328, also the excess receipt would be of a revenue nature. Having regard to the view which we have taken, it is clear to us that the excess amount of Rs. 1,14,710 constituted business profit and was assessable to tax as such. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered by holding that the sum of Rs. 1,14,710 is assessable to tax as business profit. The assessee to pay the costs of the reference.
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1982 (3) TMI 20 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Exemptions, House Property ... ... ... ... ..... not able to meet the liability, then they can be sent to civil prison in execution of that certificate. In such a case, the citizen is likely to be put into jail pursuant to a tax recovery certificate wherein his name is not mentioned. We, therefore, accept the second contention and hold that an individual partner cannot be proceeded against on the basis of a tax recovery certificate issued in the name of the firm. It shall, however, be open to the Department to issue such a certificate against the petitioner or his co-partners for making the impugned recovery. On the above-quoted precedent, the impugned orders, annexs. E,F,G and 1, passed by the TRO cannot be sustained as also the proceedings taken thereunder for recovery from the petitioners. Accordingly, this petition is allowed, leaving it open to the respondents to take steps for effecting recovery of the tax arrears in, accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 19 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Donations To Political Party, Loss Incurred In Export, Show-cause Notice, Tax Concession, Widely Held Company
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1982 (3) TMI 18 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Tax On Indeterminate Shares Of Beneficiaries, Trusts ... ... ... ... ..... sion of this court in the case of CIT v. Trustees to the Trust Estate of Tarun Kumar Roy 1974 94 ITR 361. We do not find anything in the decision of this court in the case of Official Trustee v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1954 26 ITR 410, to the contrary. It appears to us that s. 139(4A) of the I.T. Act, 1961, to which our attention was drawn, will not be applicable to this case as that applies to receipt of income derived from property held under trust or other legal obligation wholly for charitable or religious purposes. It may incidentally be mentioned that, in view of the language of the trust deed here, it cannot be said that it is wholly for religious or charitable purpose. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal arrived at the correct conclusion and the question must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances of the case, each party to pay and bear its own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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1982 (3) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Litigation Expenditure, Litigation Expenses, Whether Allowable Deduction
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1982 (3) TMI 16 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Rectification ... ... ... ... ..... an rectify that mistake under s. 154 although the said relief was not claimed by the assessee in the return. We respectfully agree with the view taken by the Gujarat High Court. The learned counsel for the Department submitted before us that even otherwise the conclusion that the assessee was entitled to the relief under s. 35B was not apparent from the record. We cannot examine this submission because the question referred has to be answered on the assumption that it was apparent from the record that the assessee was entitled to the relief under s. 35B. For the reasons given above, we answer the question as follows If it is apparent from the record that the assessee was entitled to relief admissible under section 35B, that relief can be granted to him by an order under section 154 by rectifying the assessment even though relief under that section had not been claimed by the assessee in the original assessment proceedings. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1982 (3) TMI 15 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Deduction From Total Income, Priority Industry, Such Profits ... ... ... ... ..... h to press the question and, therefore, we decline to answer this question. So far as the third question is concerned, the scope and effect of s. 80-I has been gone into by a Division Bench of this High Court in the case of CIT v. Orient Paper Mills Ltd. The judgment was delivered on 18th/19th March, 1981, in I.T. Ref. No. 424 of 1977-since reported in 1983 139 ITR 763. Following the principles laid down in that judgment, this question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. So far as the fourth question is concerned, the principles relating to depreciation on roads, drains and culverts will be governed by the decision given by this High Court in the case of CIT v. Kalyani Spinning Mills Ltd. 1981 128 ITR 279. In view of the principles laid down in the said decision, this question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of this case, each party will pay and bear its own costs. SABYASACHI MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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