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1982 (7) TMI 93
Phone-com is not exempt from duty ... ... ... ... ..... s Phone-com is manufactured by a private company for inter-communication system and therefore this cannot be called as telephone as manufactured by the Govt. of India. In that view of the matter there is no merit in the submission made by the petitioner. 2. The Rule is therefore discharged. There will be no order as to costs. 3. I am told that Mr. Justice M.N. Roy took the similar view in C.R. 15407(w) of 1976 (M/s. Radio Supply Storage (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and ors.), decided on 18-5-1982.
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1982 (7) TMI 92
Price list and seizure - Alternative remedy - Quantitative discount - Admissibility of ... ... ... ... ..... its factory premises within the territorial jurisdiction of the respondents, the appropriate order to be made with regard to the payment of duty is to direct the petitioner to pay the entire excise duty payable on the said goods on the basis of the value arrived at with reference to the revised price lists. The learned Standing Counsel for the Central Government states that the twelve trucks which were loaded with the goods and which were also seized are liable for confiscation. To ensure their production if and when an order adverse to the petitioner is made finally, the petitioner shall execute a bond to produce them as and when called upon to do so and also undertake not to alienate or in any way tamper with the said trucks. On filing of such a bond and payment of duty, the respondents shall release the goods and the trucks for the use of the petitioner-factory. A direction to the above effect shall issue. 5. Subject to the above direction the writ petition is dismissed.
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1982 (7) TMI 91
Refund of duty paid under mistake of law ... ... ... ... ..... f the duty was collected without the authority of law, provisions of Rule 11 of the Rules cannot be invoked by the Union Government. 9. In these circumstances, when the facts of the case are not in dispute, the impugned order of the 1st respondent-Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Mangalore, is patently illegal and suffers from patent errors of law. Such being the case, notwithstanding the fact that the Act and the Rules framed therein provide machinery for refund, appeal and revision against such orders, this Court exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution should not needlessly drive the petitioner-company and the like of it, to protracted proceedings to enforce its legitimate rights. 10. In the result, the impugned order is quashed which is at Annexure M to the petition and further a direction will issue to refund that amount which the order impugned has disallowed in the sum of Rs. 72,584-59. Rule will accordingly issue and be made absolute. No costs.
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1982 (7) TMI 90
Fibre/tops exempted if produced out of duty paid waste - Manufacture out of - Meaning - Classification lists - Review - Interpretation
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1982 (7) TMI 89
Tools - Dies fitted into machine tools - Alternative remedy if illusory ... ... ... ... ..... d into machine tools or designed to be fitted into machine tools. That was not warranted in the circumstances of the case. 11. In the result, a direction will issue to the respondents to refund the difference in duty which they collected in excess in the light of this order. The refund shall be made after proper calculations within three months from the date of receipt of this order. 12. However, before parting with this ease, I must point out that the petitioner has not availed of a statutory remedy by way of revision to the Central Government. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that that was an innocuous remedy in as much as it was unlikely that the department would have given the relief and therefore such remedy was illusory. That is accepted as an exception to the general rule of this Court. 13. In the result, rule will accordingly issue and be made absolute in the above terms. Annexures G and J are quashed as being illegal and without the authority of law.
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1982 (7) TMI 88
Rayon and artificial silk fabrics dyed or printed with aid of steam - Liability to duty - Notification - Retrospective effect - Admissibility of
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1982 (7) TMI 87
Estate Duty, Gift ... ... ... ... ..... that the rents were credited to the joint account of the donees and after meeting the necessary expenditure were divided between the donees separately, it would be clear that bona fide possession and enjoyment of the property was immediately assumed by the donees and was retained to the entire exclusion of the donor. The rents received by the donees were in their own right to the exclusion of the donor. The property was rented out and the only manner in which possession and enjoyment could be assumed was by receiving their respective share of rents in their own right. In our view, therefore, there is no error in the findings recorded by the Tribunal that s. 10 was not attracted at all both in the case of the cash gifts as well as in the case of the gifts of immovable property. Accordingly, question No. 1 is answered in the negative and against the Revenue. Question No. 2 is also answered in the negative and against the Revenue. The Revenue to pay the costs of this reference.
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1982 (7) TMI 86
... ... ... ... ..... denly changed its stand when the long-term agreement was entered into. The mere duration of the lease deed is of no significance (We have already expressed our opinion on this aspect). (g) The broad and liberal test evolved by the Supreme Court in CEPT v. Shri Lakshmi Silk Mills Ltd. 1951 20 ITR 451. We are unable to say that on a cumulative consideration of the above facts and circumstances, the Tribunal was not justified in coming to the conclusion it did. The broad and liberal test evolved in CEPT v. Shri Lakshmi Silk Mills Ltd. certainly supports the Tribunal s conclusion. In the present case, the assessee has not either by word or conduct, expressed its intention of discontinuing the business altogether, as was done by the assessee in New Savan Sugar and Guy Refining Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1969 74 ITR 7 (SC). In the totality of this state of affairs, legal and factual, we are inclined to answer the question referred to us in affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No costs.
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1982 (7) TMI 85
... ... ... ... ..... uthorities estimated the income at a higher figure than what was estimated by the assessee, no penalty was leviable and that where the estimate made by the assessee was proved to be a deliberate under-estimate, an inference of concealment of income could certainly be drawn. In our view, it is wholly unnecessary to refer to these cases because, as we have already pointed out, in this case it is not possible to say that there was any deliberate under-estimation of his income by the assessee. Even the additions made by the ITO in the estimates of income made by the assessee are so modest, that merely from those additions it cannot be said that the assessee has made any deliberate under-estimation of his income. In the result, question No. (2) is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. It is not necessary to answer question No. (1), because our answer to question No. (2) disposes of the entire reference. Commissioner to pay costs of the reference to the assessee.
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1982 (7) TMI 84
Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... ken to be the income accruing to the wife from the house constructed by her, and so much of that income accruing to the wife, as is referable to the amount gifted to her by the assessee, could alone be included in the assessee s income. If according to the provisions contained in s. 23(2) the amount gifted by the assessee did not lead to the accruing of any income to the assessee s wife, it will not be possible to add anything to the assessee s income on that account. The view of the Tribunal that in case the assessee s wife has no other income the annual value under s. 23(2) of the Act would be treated as nil also appears to be correct. However, as is apparent from the order of the Tribunal, whether the assessee s wife has got some other income has yet to be found out. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to his costs, which we assess at Rs. 250.
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1982 (7) TMI 83
... ... ... ... ..... m, it cannot be treated as the income of the family. Reference may also be made to Prem Nath v. CIT 1970 78 ITR 319 (SC), in this connection. The above mentioned principle laid down in the case of Raj Kumar Singh Hukam Chandji 1977 78 ITR 33 (SC) and V. D. Dhanwatey 1968 68 ITR 365 (SC), has been followed by the court in Y. L. Agarwalla v. CIT 1978 114 ITR 471 (SC) and by our court in CIT v. Pratap Veer Kakkar 1980 125 ITR 598. In our opinion, therefore, on the facts found in the present case, the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal was erroneous in law. The disputed payments having been made to Sri Laxman Das for services rendered by him to the firm and not by any detriment to the funds invested by the assessee-HUF in the firm, cannot be treated as the assessable income of the assessee-HUF. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to costs, which are assessed at Rs. 250.
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1982 (7) TMI 82
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... r in the firm after attaining majority is to the extent of 25 . It, therefore, follows that there was no change in the constitution of the firm within the meaning of s. 184(7) and s. 184(2) of the I.T. Act, 1961, when the minor, Mahendra Kumar, who had been admitted to the benefits of the partnership, attained majority and did not opt out. In this view of the matter the first question referred to us for opinion has to be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Learned counsel appearing for both the parties are agreed that in case the first question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee, the answer to the second question would also be deemed to be answered in the negative and it would not be necessary for this court to answer the same. In the result we return the second question unanswered. As the assessee has substantially succeeded, we direct the Commissioner to pay the costs of this reference to the assessee which are assessed at Rs. 250.
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1982 (7) TMI 81
Estate Duty, Property Passing ... ... ... ... ..... Mr. Vakil was that as the gift or donation was made bona fide by the deceased, the provisions of sub-s. (1) of s. 9 are not applicable to such a donation at all. According to Mr. Vakil, in order to be included in the property which passes on the death, a gift or donation must not have been made bona fide and must not have been made more than one year prior to the death of the deceased. In our view, this submission involves a clear misreading of the provisions of sub-s. (1) of s. 9. A plain reading of the said sub-section shows that in order not to be included in the property which passes on the death of the deceased, the gift inter vivos must have been made bona fide and made at least one year before the death of the deceased. In the case of gift to charity, the period prescribed was 6 months instead of one year. Hence the second submission of Mr. Vakil must also be rejected. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee.
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1982 (7) TMI 80
Maintaining Dwelling Place In India ... ... ... ... ..... he said premises at Arvind House cannot be considered to be a dwelling house maintained by Or caused to be maintained for the assessee during the relevant year. As far as question No. 2 referred to us is concerned, it is common ground that the answer to that would follow the answer to question No. 1. As far as question No. 3 is concerned, it is agreed between the counsel for the assessee and the Commissioner, that the said question is covered by the decision of a Division Bench of this court in CIT v. Shri Ramnath A. Podar 1978 112 ITR 436, and in accordance with the said decision, the said question is liable to be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In the result, the questions referred to us are answered as follows Question No. 1 In the negative. Question No. 2 In the affirmative. Question No. 3 In the negative. It is clarified that all the questions are answered in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner to pay costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1982 (7) TMI 79
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... d as contemplated by Expln. 2 of cl. (15) of s. 2 of the said Act. In this connection, reliance was placed by Mr. Naik on the decision of the Supreme Court in CED v. Kantilal Trikamlal 1976 105 ITR 92. In that case it was held that where on the partition of an HUF property, a coparcener takes less than his share, there is a disposition within the meaning of Expln. 2 to s. 2(15) of the E.D. Act, 1953, by him of that part of his share which he relinquishes and on his death within two years of the partition that part of his share would be property deemed to pass under s. 9(1) read with s. 27(1) and Expln. 2 to s. 2(15). In our view, the ratio of this decision has no application to the case before us, because the case of a partition is altogether different from the case of the sale such as the one we have before us. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner to pay costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1982 (7) TMI 78
... ... ... ... ..... mained due from him as per Ex. P-1. The question is whether the petitioner is liable to pay interest between 30th November 1977, when the amounts were refunded to him by the department and 26th February, 1980, when the fresh notice of demand was served on him, viz., Ex. P-5 subsequent to Ex. P-4 order of the Tribunal on 3rd January, 1980. In so far as the petitioner had paid the amount at the right time and received the refund as per the order of the AAC, he had no liability to pay any amount to the department until Ex. P-5 notice of demand was served on him consequent upon the reversal of the order of the AAC by the Tribunal. The petitioner s liability to pay interest, therefore, arises only on 26th February, 1980, which is the date of demand. This is so declared. Exhibit P-5, in so far as it has levied interest under s. 220(2) from 30th November, 1977, to 26th February, 1980, is unsustainable. It is quashed to that extent. This O.P. is allowed in the above terms. No costs.
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1982 (7) TMI 77
Depreciation, Person Entitled To Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... session even after the expiry of the lease, he could not be deemed to have sold or discarded or demolished or destroyed the building within the meaning of s. 10(2)(vii) of the Indian I.T. Act. Though the claim under s. 10(2)(vii) was rejected, what is relevant for the purposes of the present case is that during the period of the lease the assessee was held to be the owner of the building. The Tribunal, in our view, was justified in holding that the assessee was the owner of the building, fixtures and fittings of Alpana talkies within the meaning of s. 32 of the I.T. Act, Consequently, the assessee would be entitled to depreciation under s. 32 of the I.T. Act, 1961, on the above items. Thus, both the questions will have to be answered in favour of the assessee. Accordingly, question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 2 is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee to get the costs of the reference.
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1982 (7) TMI 76
Search And Seizure ... ... ... ... ..... der s. 147 and this is called reassessment. This being the position, the assessment which must have been made after the remand of the case will be either a regular assessment under s. 143(3) or an ex parte assessment under s. 144 and for the amount of liability determined on completion of the same, the seized assets retained would be liable to be utilised. As regards the second submission, the regular assessment made by the ITO was only set aside by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the case was remanded for making the assessment afresh. It cannot be said that the assessment for the year under consideration has been completed or that the proceedings have been quashed. The assets retained under s. 132(5), therefore, have to be retained to deal with in the manner provided under s. 132B. It is, hence, not correct to say that there is no liability under the Act outstanding against the petitioner. The petition is, hence, wholly misconceived and is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.
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1982 (7) TMI 75
Electric Supply Undertaking, Income ... ... ... ... ..... to the consumers contributions and, from the figure arrived at, reduced the amount to the extent of the written down value of the items, the charges for which had been contributed by the consumers. The Tribunal s observation in its order, that the figure of actual cost as under the old Act or the new Act were not available, was factually incorrect and as noticed above both the figures had been entered in the order of the ITO, the former being Rs. 8,91,006 and the latter Rs. 6,17,595. The Tribunal, therefore, rightly rejected the assessee s contention that the possibility of the ITO having taken into consideration the new definition of the term actual cost in the written down value could not be ruled out, with the observation that there was no material on the record to support this contention. We have, therefore, no hesitation in endorsing the view of the Tribunal on question No. 2 and the same is, accordingly, answered in the affirmative. No costs. PREM CHAND JAIN.-I agree.
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1982 (7) TMI 74
Capital Gains, Deduction Of Cost Of Acquisition ... ... ... ... ..... ase of CIT v. Dewan Chand Dholan Dass 1981 132 ITR 790 (Delhi). Learned advocate for the Revenue also drew our attention to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Kalooram Govindram v. CIT 1965 57 ITR 335, at p. 340. There, in a different context, the Supreme Court made certain observations about the HUF and members thereof. In the facts of the present case in view of the language used, and in view of the fact that we are construing the application of capital gain, which must, in our opinion, be an artificial income, the said decision would have no relevance in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the view we have taken and in view of the construction of the section we are of the opinion that the Tribunal had arrived at the correct conclusion. Therefore, the question must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties will pay and bear their own costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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