|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 213 Records
-
1982 (7) TMI 178
Late Filing, Reasonable Cause, Voluntary Disclosure Scheme, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... relevant circumstances and even if a minimum penalty is prescribed, the authority competent to impose the penalty will be justified in refusing to impose it when there is a technical or venial breach of the provisions of the Act or where the breach flows from a bona fide belief that the offender is not liable to act in the manner prescribed by the statute. In the present case, we are satisfied that the assessee was under the bona fide belief that as substantially his assets consist of agricultural properties, he was not amenable to the wealth-tax liability until he came to know of it on consulting his tax practitioner in view of the wide publicity given to the VDS. We are, therefore, satisfied that the assessee had reasonable cause in not filing the return within the time prescribed and, therefore, the penalty was not justified. In the result, the objections of the department are rejected and the orders of the AAC cancelling the penalty are upheld. The appeals are dismissed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 177
Accounting Year, Claiming Depreciation, Partnership Firm ... ... ... ... ..... nder section 32 shall be restricted to a fair proportionate part thereof having regard to the user of such asset for the purpose of the business. That section may apply to an asset being used not only for more purposes than one but also to an asset being used for the purposes of the business only for part of the year as in the present case. Since the asset has not been exclusively used throughout the previous year for the purpose of the business it seems to be reasonable in the light of section 38 to restrict the claim of depreciation to the period for which the asset was used in the business of the assessee. That is exactly what the assessee has claimed, for, the deduction for depreciation has been restricted to the period for which the buses were used in the business of the assessee-firm. We, therefore, see no reason why that claim should not have been allowed by the ITO. Hence, we confirm the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) granting that claim. The appeal is dismissed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 174
... ...
... ... ..... er, we hold that the delay in payment of taxes could be attributable to a reasonable cause for a period of 21 months in the case of Shri Uttam Chand Kankariya, 25 months in the case of Shri Gyan Chand Kankariya for the assessment year 1976-77 and 20 months for the assessment year 1977-78 and 20 months in the case of Smt. Urmila Kankariya. The ITO is, therefore, directed to re-calculate the penalties on the basis of the default as held by us to be one which is punished by way of penalty under section 140A(3). The default as determined by us is 2 months in the case of Shri Uttam Chand Kankariya, 3 months in the case of Shri Gyan Chand Kankariya for the assessment year 1976-77 and 2 months for the assessment year 1977-78 and 2 months in the case of Smt. Urmila Kankariya. All the four appeals are partly allowed. 6. As we have decided the appeals on facts we have purposely not adverted to the legal propositions placed before us. . In the result, all the appeals are partly allowed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 173
... ...
... ... ..... he changed his opinion in the reassessment order simply because the audit suggested to him to examine the entry of Rs. 16,861. I have gone through the reasons also having been recorded by the ITO. It is clear that nothing new came to the notice of the ITO and the entry of Rs. 16,861 was already brought to his knowledge at the stage of the original assessment. Therefore, it cannot be said that the audit party brought any new fact to the ITO s knowledge. On the facts of the case, I hold that no information within the meaning of section 147(b) was given to the ITO by the audit party and that there was no failure or omission on the part of the assessee within the meaning of section 147(a). The ITO having already agreed with the contention of the assessee that the receipt of Rs. 16,861 was not taxable, I hold that the reopening was bad in law. This being so, there is no need to go into the merits of the case. The reassessment order is, therefore, quashed. . The appeal is allowed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 172
... ...
... ... ..... s. 1,32,800. rdquo The WTO himself had admitted that the first return was filed on 31st December, 1971. Therefore, the finding of the WTO that there was a delay of 26 complete months for which he had to be penalised was obviously without any basis. If the WTO could not correctly inform himself about the period of default for proceeding to levy penalty under section 18 (1)(a), the penalty levied on the erroneous assumption is liable to be struck down. The assessee had shown us evidence that he had applied for extension of time upto 31st December, 1971. Considered together, these facts do not lead to a finding that the liability for even three months delay in furnishing the return can be penalised under section 18(1)(a). We vacate the finding of the AAC and cancel the penalty. 9. Since we have struck down the penalty on the first plea, we do not consider it necessary to deal with other pleas of the assessee. 10. The appeal of the assessee for assessment year 1971-72 is allowed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 169
... ...
... ... ..... not allow the claim because the assessee could not prove and so was the case with the CIT (A). 6. It is contended before us by the ld. counsel for the assessee that for a paltry sum of Rs. 1,674 it was considered admissible not to file any FIR because that would have complicated the issue further. The Deptl. Rep. on the other hand submitted that as the assessee had not been able to prove the lodge, the same had rightly been rejected. We would have agreed with the Deptl. Rep. If the amount was huge. But this being a paltry sum lost by way of theft out of the cash in hand, it should not have been disallowed because no FIR was filed or the assessee could not prove it to the hilt in the trade in which the assessee is engaged, huge sums of moneys are always kept in cash and this being the loss of paltry sum, should not have been added in the assessee rsquo s income. We, therefore, delete the addition as made by the ITO of Rs. 1,674. 7. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 168
... ...
... ... ..... ing both the parties in the matter. 8. The fourth ground of appeal is that the ld. CIT(A) has erred in not allowing the percentage expenses attributable to non-member s income. This ground of appeal was not pressed at the time of hearing and the same is, therefore, rejected. 9. The fifth ground of appeal is that the ld. CIT(A) has erred in not allowing the set off of loss of the last year. The ld. counsel has submitted that this ground of appeal was raised before the CIT(A) as an additional ground through assessee s letter dt. 29th Jan., 1981. A copy of this letter has been filed in the paper book. The CIT(A) has not considered this ground of appeal also in his order. In the circumstances, we direct that he should consider the admissibility of the additional ground of appeal raised before him and thereafter record his finding thereon after giving opportunity to both the parties, in case the additional ground is admitted by him. 10. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 167
... ...
... ... ..... y had advanced Rs. 10,000 each out of their agricultural income to the assessee. The ITO rejected the case of the assessee and made the addition of Rs. 20,000. The AAC deleted the addition. There is no material on record to doubt the statements of the creditors. It is not denied that they possessed agricultural land. The identity and the capacity of both the creditors have been clearly established by the assessee and we, therefore, uphold the order of the AAC. 2. The appeal is dismissed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 166
... ...
... ... ..... two comparable cases relied upon by the ITO are not comparable because of wide variation in turnover and one case mixed nature of sales being retail and wholesale. In such circumstances, the past history of the case, in our opinion, would be the only guide for determining the reasonableness of the profit for the assessment year under appeal. In the immediately preceding two assessment years, i.e., the asst. yr. 1975-76 and 1976-77, the GP rates accepted by the department are at 6.8 per cent and 7.5 per cent respectively. The GP rate declared for the assessment year under appeal is also at 7.5 per cent which compares favourably with the past history of the case. In such circumstances, no addition, in our opinion, was called for, even though technically speaking proviso to s. 145(1) was applicable. We are, therefore, unable to sustain the orders of the authorities below with regard to the above addition. The same is, therefore, deleted. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 165
... ...
... ... ..... This was confirmed by AAC. It is contended before me that when the full details of the expenditure of Rs. 7,405 incurred by the said Ahmedabad party were filed, the disallowance was not called for. The Deptl. Rep., on the other hand, contended that as the details were not filed before the Revenue Authorities, the disallowance made was justified. 8. After hearing both the parties, I am of the view that the disallowance was not justified. If any entry on the last day of the accounting period amounting to Rs. 7,405 influenced the mind of the Revenue Authorities for its disallowance, that influence was misplaced. The expenditure had been incurred by Asharam Sukhdev Rathi of Ahmedabad which was duly intimated to the assessee. Therefore, either the sum of Rs. 7,405 should have been totally disallowed or the machinery repairs, as claimed should be deducted. I, therefore, hold that the disallowance was not justified, which is deleted. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part.
-
1982 (7) TMI 164
... ...
... ... ..... not pointed out to us that the order of assessment for that year or the grant of registration u/s 185(b) had also been considered erroneous and prejudicial by the CIT by another order passed u/s 263. He had allowed these to remain and continue as valid orders. Therefore, we cannot be persuaded to consider the period of 14th March, 1978 to 31st March, 1978, as a part of the accounting year for 1978-79 and on that basis hold that the grant of renewal of registration by the ITO was erroneous and therefore, prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. We also have taken guidance from the cases cited by the assessee and also the case cited by the Deptl. Rep. In our view, the decision contained in 1975 CTR(All) 22 (1977) 106 ITR 342 (All) in effect, supports the case of the assessee. In that view of matter, it does not appears possible for us to sustain the order of the CIT as the correct order in law passed u/s 263. We vacate it and restore the order of the ITO. The appeal is allowed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 163
... ...
... ... ..... f Rs. 1,674 was stolen out of cash in hand. The ITO did not allow the claim because the assessee could not prove and so was the case with CIT (Appeals). 6. It is contended before us by the ld. counsel for the assessee that a paltry sum of Rs. 1,674 it was considered advisable not to file any F.I.R. because that would have complicated the issue further. The Deptl. Rep. on the other hand submitted that as the assessee had not been able to prove that lays the same had rightly been rejected. We would have agreed with the Deptl. Rep if the amount was huge. But this being a paltry sum lost by way of theft out of the cash in hand it should not have been disallowed because no F.I.R. was filed or the assessee could not prove it to the hilt. In the trade in which the assessee is engaged huge sums of money are always kept in cash and this being the lays of paltry sum should not have been delete the addition as made by the ITO of Rs. 1,674. 7. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 162
Transfer Of Assets, For Benefit Of Spouse Or Minor Child ... ... ... ... ..... ion 64(1)(vi) in Explanation 3 and, therefore, Explanation 3 cannot be stretched to intend to include section 64(1)(vi) as far as the share income is concerned. Apart from that, I find that the deposit of the gifted amount by the lady has no intimate connection with her becoming a partner in that firm. When the law empowers a person to enter into a contractual agreement like a partnership without investing any capital, I fail to see why this lady could not enter into such an agreement. As I find that the deposit in the firm and the lady s becoming a partner in the firm are not intimately connected and relying on the case law, relied upon by the learned counsel for the assessee, I hold the share income of the lady from the firm is not includible in the hands of the assessee in spite of section 64(1)(vi). Before parting with this appeal, I may mention that in the earlier order of the Tribunal referred to above, the same has become final. 4. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 161
... ...
... ... ..... he aid is also not to be given as a matter of course every year. A co-operative bank has to make out a case for State aid. The aid or subsidy under the circumstances could not be termed as a revenue receipt. It is clearly in the nature of a capital receipt, more so when it was given to the assessee for a specific purpose. The aid was also not related to the assessee s volume of business. We, therefore, agree with the finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) that the subsidy or donation, whatever it was, was not a receipt of revenue nature and was, therefore, rightly excluded by him from the total income of the assessee of different years. 5. The assessee has also taken cross objection. All of them are, however, late by 14 days. The counsel for the assessee did not make any appeal, either orally or in writing, for the condonation of the delay. He also did not argue them on merits. 6. In the result, both the appeals and the cross objections are respectively dismissed and rejected.
-
1982 (7) TMI 160
... ...
... ... ..... g into force of the Hindu Succession Act, because she was in possession thereof, the facts in that case and in the case before us are thus, entirely similar, except that in that case she sold the property and in this case she relinquished it. In fact, the assessee cannot claim that she had relinquished her interest in the property, though she was not full owner thereof. Such a position would be entirely contradictory. The two Gujarat High Court decisions, relied on behalf of the assessee, are clearly distinguishable. 8. We are clearly of the opinion that the ld. CIT(A) was correct in holding that the assessee had become full owner of half the property, even though it was undivided between her and her son, after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, by virtue of s. 14(1) thereof, and when she relinquished her interest in the said property, there was a taxable gift and the gift has rightly been brought to tax. 9. There is no merit in the appeal, which is dismissed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 159
... ...
... ... ..... ne machine is practically as good as another, and the product is so uniform that anyone can buy the goods in any shop. But by the definition which the Supreme Court gave in S.C. Combatt and Co. Private Ltd. vs. Commr. of Excess Profits Tax it may be said that this firm had a goodwill. We, therefore, reverse the finding of the CED (Appeals) that the firms of Vimal and Amar Talkies had no goodwill. Since he had excluded its value from the assessment on this ground alone and had not dealt with the other contentions of the assessee that even if the firm had goodwill, it did not pass on the death of the deceased, we set aside his order and restore to his file for dealing with this contention. We direct him to hear the assessee and the Asstt. Controller and then give a finding as to whether the value of the assessee rsquo s share in the goodwill passed on his death so as to be included in the assessment for the purpose of estate duty. 8. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 158
Private Company, Supreme Court, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... du Succession Act, because she was in possession thereof. The facts of that case and in the case before us are, thus, entirely similar, except that in that case she sold the property and in this case she relinquished it. But, in fact, the assessee cannot claim that she had relinquished her interest in the property, though she was not a full owner thereof. Such a position would be entirely contradictory. The two Gujarat High Court decisions, relied on behalf of the assessee, are clearly distinguishable. 8. We are clearly of the opinion that the learned Commissioner was correct in holding that the assessee had become full owner of half the property, even though it was undivided between her and her son, after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, by virtue of section 14(1) thereof, and when she relinquished her interest in the said property, there was a taxable gift and the gift has rightly been brought to tax. 9. There is no merit in the appeal, which is dismissed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 157
Partner In Firm ... ... ... ... ..... ctically as good as another and the product is so uniform that anyone can buy the goods in any shop. But by the definition which the Supreme Court gave in S.C. Cambatta and Co. (P.) Ltd. v. CEPT 1961 41 ITR 500 504 1961 2 SCR 805 it may be said that this firm had a goodwill. . . . We, therefore, reverse the finding of the Controller (Appeals) that the firm of Vimal and Amar Talkies had no goodwill. Since he had excluded its value from the assessment on this ground alone and had not dealt with the other contentions of the assessee that even if the firm had goodwill, it did not pass on the death of the deceased, we set aside his order and restore it to his file for dealing with this contention. We direct him to hear the assessee and the Assistant Controller and then give finding as to whether the value of the assessee s share in the goodwill passed on his death so as to be included in the assessment for the purpose of estate duty. 8. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 156
Appeal To Appellate Controller, Coparcenary Property ... ... ... ... ..... e property was only to the extent o one-ourth, the Controller was correct in making provision to the extent o Rs. 4,000 being one-ourth o Rs. 16,000 intended to be spent in the marriages o the two daughters o the deceased. We do not ind any provision in the Act or allowing any urther deduction or the marriages o the daughters rom the estate o the deceased. We do not agree with the contention o the learned counsel or the accountable person that the above expenditure was a charge on the estate o the deceased as per his will and, thereore, it can be allowed. There is again no provision in the Act or making any such deduction. In our opinion, thereore, the inding o the Controller is correct and does not require any intererence. This contention in the appeal by the accountable person, thereore, ails. 9. This para is not reproduced here as it involves a minor issue. 10. In the result, while the appeal by the department is dismissed, that by the accountable person is partly allowed.
-
1982 (7) TMI 155
... ...
... ... ..... ys with the firm and to receive interest thereon was dehors the deed and interest was paid in consequence of an arrangement between the interested parties and that merely because that arrangement was not reduced to writing it would not cease to be payment in pursuance of a vailed contract because oral agreements are also valid in law. The facts obtaining in this case being similar, following the reasoning found in the aforesaid order of the Judicial Member as a Third Member (the Accountant Member being a party to the order passed by the Bench on 17th July, 1982), we delete the inclusion of interest of Rs. 12,000, Rs. 17,075 and Rs. 19,986 respectively for the years under appeal. However, in regard to the inclusion of the share income we hold that the inclusion is in order since the share income, has been earned as a direct result of the admission of the minor to the benefits of the partnership. Therefore, s. 64(1)(iii) clearly applies thereto. The appeals are allowed in part.
........
|
