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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 218 Records
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1983 (10) TMI 278 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mp Mahesh Kumar (supra) has held that where a dealer is entitled, under a statute, to realise sales tax from a purchaser, then the said amount of tax cannot be treated as part of his turnover for the purposes of levy of sales tax. 17. In view of the declaration of law by the Supreme Court with which I am bound, I cannot hold otherwise though I do see force in the argument of the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel that it is only the deductions permissible under Rule 44 which can be made from the turnover of an assessee. 18. In the rusult, the revision is allowed, and the order of the Tribunal is modified to the extent that the assessees will be entitled to depreciation on the sales of motor vehicles at 30 instead of 25 allowed by the Tribunal. It is further held that the amount of sales tax recovered by the assessee from his customers will not be included in the assessee's taxable turnover. The assessee is entitled to his costs which are assessed at ₹ 200/-.
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1983 (10) TMI 277 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ivation in profit’. The Court further observed that ’the superiority in many respects of State Transport Undertakings, in the legislative judgment, has led to r. 155-A’. The Court ultimately held that the assignment of marks under r. 155-A is geared to public interest, which is the desideratum of s. 47 (1) of the Act. Once the assignment of 5 marks to State Transport Authority Undertaking is held to be valid, the Transport Authority was perfectly justified in refusing renewal of permits to the petitioners in comparison to the State Transport Undertaking. As for failure to explain absence of night halt cleaners, in the absence of concerte evidence, no inference can be drawn. This was the only additional contention in this group of petitions and we find no substance in it. These are all the contentions in this group of petitions and as we find no substance in any of them, all the petitions are dismissed with no order as to costs. N. V. K. Petitions dismissed.
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1983 (10) TMI 276 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ave subsequently been made. The fact that nothing has been done leaves an impression in our mind that this Court had not misread the situation. At any rate it is not for the Court to fill up any lacuna in the legislation and as the law stands, the appellant has no right to contend that the view taken by this Court is not tenable in law. We may recall the observation of Lord Denning in Seaford Estates v. Asher; 708 "A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases." All the three contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant fail. We have already taken the view that at the instance of the appellant the application for restoration was not maintainable. Therefore, the appeal cannot be allowed and we cannot direct restoration of the election petition. Accordingly the appeal fails and is dismissed and the order of the High Court is confirmed. We leave the parties to bear their respective costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1983 (10) TMI 275 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Incentive Scheme for higher production of sugar ... ... ... ... ..... s notifications issued subsequently would not be applicable, for these rates of Excise duty and additional Excise duty on Levy sugar pertained to all other sugar factories except those which were covered under Notification No. 35/76 has no merits at all. We find no substance in any of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. No other point was urged. 29. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. 30. While we were delivering judgment in this case Shri Awasthi, learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for a certificate under Article 134-A of the Constitution so as to enable him to go up in appeal to the Supreme Court. Having heard Shri Awasthi we are not satisfied that the proposed appeal to the Supreme Court involves any substantial question of law of general importance or that the question raised in the case needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. The prayer for the certificate made by Shri Awasti is accordingly rejected.
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1983 (10) TMI 274 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rticulars but are such as would have been taken into consideration. The only liberty given to the Court was to frame issues on the basis of allegations in an appropriate manner and thereafter the High Court was to take evidence and decide the issue. We would, therefore, direct the High Court to frame issues in respect of paragraphs 29 and 36 as they stand and then take evidence of both the parties and then give a final verdict on the issues and record its finding and submit the same to this Court after which we will hear the entire case and decide also issue No. 35 on which we have not adjudicated so far because we have called a finding from the High Court. 5. We therefore set aside the order of the High Court to the extent indicated above. All the records should be sent to the High Court immediately. All the parties are directed to appear before the Registrar on 21st November, 1983, for appearing before the court to which the matter is assigned by the learned Chief Justice.
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1983 (10) TMI 273 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Bijli Cotton Mills v. CIT, U.P. . The Officer carried the matter to the Tribunal but the Tribunal upheld the AAC's decision. 4. On behalf of the Commissioner Mr. Joshi has drawn our attention to the decision of this High Court in CIT v. M/s. E. H. Kathawala & Co. (1982) 135 ITR 384 (Bom). We had noted in the said decision that the Allahabad decision had been subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court in CIT (Central), New Delhi v. Bijli Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. . 5. The question referred to us may be answered in accordance with our earlier decision without further elaboration. In the present matter also the ITO has made a bald order without making necessary enquiries of the nature indicated in our decision in Kathawala's case (supra). Such addition was obviously not permissible. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favor of the assessee. Parties to bear their own costs of the reference.
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1983 (10) TMI 272 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on conferred on the High Courts udder Art. 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority", and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. In this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Art.227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1983 (10) TMI 271 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ction or which were occupied, as the case may be, prior to January 31, 1973. Those buildings are governed by the provisions of the Act and any decrees passed in respect of them are governed by section 13 of the Act. The notification applies only to those buildings which are given sewerage connection or electric connection or which are occupied, as the case may be, on or after January 31, 1973. In the result we declare that section 3 of the Act and the notification dated January 31, 1973 and the other notifications impugned in these cases are valid and effective. We further declare that the exemption granted by the notification dated January 31, 1973 applies only to those buildings which are given sewerage connection or electric connection or which are occupied, as the case may be, on or after January 31, 1973 and not to those buildings which satisfied any of the said conditions before January 31, 1973. The petitions are accordingly disposed of. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1983 (10) TMI 270 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... de that the election is held in violation of Sec. 73B. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court was in error in upholding the election, which is ex facie illegal, invalid and contrary to law. Accordingly both these appeals succeed Civil Appeal arising from S.L.P. No. 7732/83 is allowed and the decision of the High Court is quashed and set aside and the one rendered by the Additional Commissioner is restored. Civil Appeal No. 1810/81 is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court are set aside. A writ be issued quashing and setting aside the election of respondents 3 to 12 to the Board of Directors of the Parbhani District Cooperative Bank Ltd. The concerned statutory authority in both the cases should proceed to hold the election afresh as early as possible and should complete the process within a period of 3 months from today. In the meantime, the status quo as on today should continue. There will be no orders as to costs of hearing in this Court. Appeals allowed.
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1983 (10) TMI 269 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e, held to be constitutionally valid in all respects. We allow the appeals, dismiss the writ petitions, set aside the judgment of the High Court and hold that the Act is constitutionally valid. However, as some portions of the Act, in view of the time-lag, may have become out of date, a few consequential amendments may have to be made. Mr. Ray, appearing for the appellant, had also conceded that so far as the question of compensation was concerned, it was open to the arbitrator or the compensation authority not to confine itself strictly to the yardstick contained in the second schedule to the Act but they can make marginal changes as the circumstances require. As a appellants have succeeded in the appeals, we revoke the interim order passed by this Court on June 26, 1973 directing the appellants to pay ₹ 100 (Rupees one hundred) per day to the respondents. In the peculiar circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs. Appeals allowed and Petitions dismissed.
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1983 (10) TMI 268 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ved. 8. On the question of time bar, nothing has been said to refute the contention that the department became wise to inclusion of the value of stators and rotors to that of electric motors, only after the Board clarified that no motor as such comes into being in the manufacture of such pumps. There is also substance in the contention in view of the exemption Notification 73/68 pointed out by the appellant. It cannot, therefore, be said that there has been any wilful mis-statement or suppression to invoke the limit beyond 6 months and to this extent, the demand exceeds jurisdiction. Even on merits, keeping in view the finding of the Assistant Collector allowing refund of duty on motors for a subsequent period, it would be difficult to sustain inclusion of their value for purposes of granting the exemption in respect of earlier years. In any event, the demand is clearly time barred and we, therefore, set aside the order of the Appellate Collector and allow this appeal.
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1983 (10) TMI 267 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... the appellants would not have got the benefit of Notification No. 71/78-C.E., which they had availed of. We agree with the learned Departmental representative that the appellants were guilty of suppression. Once it is found that the appellants were guilty of suppression, the demand of duty made from the appellants must be held within time. It was contended by the appellants that at best duty in respect of original equipment worth ₹ 41,358.00 could be realised from them. We do not agree that Notification Nos. 101/71-C.E. and 153/71-C.E., are not conditional upon Notification No. 71/78 whereas converse is the case. On behalf of the respondent, Sh. V. Laxmi Kumaran stated that appellants would no doubt got the benefit of Notification No. 101/71-C.E. in respect of Motor Vehicle parts intended to be used as original equipment. We therefore hold that the appellants would not be denied this benefit. In view of the foregoing, seeing no force in the appeal, we dismiss the same.
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1983 (10) TMI 266 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ment and Regulation) Act to the effect that the limit of 13 paise per cent of the value should be taken to refer to the cumulative incidence of the goods produced by a particular industry, even though the goods may be quite different and distinct from one another. Accordingly, we are unable to accept the contention of Shri Khaitan that the levy of cess on jute yarn would be illegal in view of the maximum limit imposed in Section 9(1) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. 45. In the result, we are unable to accept either of the two basic grounds which have been argued by Shri Khaitan on behalf of the appellants. We note that substantial relief has already been given by the Collector (Appeals) on the ground of limitation under Rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules. For the reasons we have set out above in detail, we do not find any valid ground for further relief. We accordingly confirm the Order-in-Appeal of the Collector (Appeals) and reject these 5 appeals.
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1983 (10) TMI 265 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... d Bill of Entry. We think it would be only fair if this minimum quantum is allowed in respect of each of the cartons covered by the respective Bill of Entry. Accordingly we order remission of duty be allowed at the rate of 0.6 kg. for each carton covered by the Bill of Entry No. C. 367, dated 17-8-1980 and 1 kg. per carton covered by Bill of Entry No. C561, dated 28-8-1980. Appeal No. 458/83 9. The issues involved in this case are identical to the ones dealt with in Appeal No. CD (MAS) 457/83, except that the number of cartons involved is 290; the date of examination was 13-10-1980 and the actual examination of the cartons was limited to six packages showing shortage as follows - (1) - 2 kg. (2) - 1.5 kg. (3) - 1.0 kg. (4) - 1.5 kg. (5) - 1.0 kg. (6) - 1.5 kg. Following the decision in respect of Appeal No. 457/83, we order the remission of duty be granted at the rate of 1 kg. per carton in respect of the 290 cartons covered by Bill of Entry No. C. 403, dated 21-10-1983
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1983 (10) TMI 264 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ces, that an animal needs in a balanced feed. 11. We agree with the Appellate Collector and with the learned Counsel for the department that the judgment of the Gujarat High Court is a judgment involving the sales-tax law and, therefore, does not apply to an interpretation of the central excise laws with which we are concerned here. The opinions and certificates which the Appellate Collector rejected because they were obtained after the issue was raised by the department have been seen. These certificates do not say anything that would induce us to change our minds. Whether the minerals are fed directly or mixed with other feed will make no difference to the proposition we have set out above, namely, that these are not by themselves animal feed, and cannot be given the assessment claimed by the Aries Agro-Vet Industries. 12. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed as the order of the lower authorities are correct. We order accordingly.
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1983 (10) TMI 263 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... rship; impliedly the experience of any of the partners will not be relevant; but that of the partners put together namely the partnership firm is the deciding factor. In the present case, the request to induct the appellant Ravindramohan as a partner was rejected on the only issue that he does not have enough experience in gold control work - a fact which is disputed by the counsel for the appellant. In the light of the policy being adopted by the Government, the question as to whether Ravindramohan has experience in gold trade or not would not arise for decision so long as the proposed partnership as a whole will have sufficient expertise in dealership in gold. The other partner to the proposed partnership firm is already a licensed gold dealer and hence he is presumed to have the necessary background. In this view of the matter we allow the appeal and direct that the appellant, Ravindramohan, be allowed to be taken as a partner in the gold dealer’s licence No. 15/78.
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1983 (10) TMI 262 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... from the date of communication of this order. 11. Order per H.R. Syiem, Member (T) . - I agree with Sankaran’s reasonings that the appeal should succeed. I would like to add a few thoughts that occur to me. 12. What the customs and excise did in Hyderabad flies in the face of what it did in Bombay. There is an unwritten law that when a tax collecting authority makes an assessment which is incorrect, it is prohibited from saying to the tax-payer later that he (tax-payer) cannot do anything that may be a consequence of the incorrect assessment made by itself (tax collecting agency). When the polyester and polyether imported by M/s. Jay Industries were assessed under 15A-CET as countervailing duty (when the correct assessment should have been under 68), the customs and excise is forbidden from saying later that the assessee should not take proforma credit for the duty paid under 15A. Such proforma credit was permissible in the case of goods assessed under 15A.
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1983 (10) TMI 261 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ctory because of the words “cleared for home consumption......from one or more factories” as appearing in the opening para of Notification No. 80/80. The Tribunal has not taken cognizance of the specific language used in the said notification. The provisions of Rules 9 and 49 of the Central Excise Rules are inapplicable in the context of present notification because of its different phraseology which specifically link the clearances with the factory in order to determine the size of unit for the purpose of eligibility to exemption. Further, the Tribunal has also not dealt with the aspect that if home consumption’ is taken to include captive consumption’, it will amount to double accounting of the same goods and will frustrate the purpose for which value of clearances are to be computed i.e. to ascertain the size of the Unit. Accordingly, the Board’s decision in Bharat Metal Industries - 1981 (8) E.L.T. 503 - seems to be correct and more logical.
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1983 (10) TMI 260 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... the learned counsel for the appellants who are a sister concern of IMP, that the latter had paid duty on the transformers in their finished form. This is also borne out to a large extent by the observations of the Assistant Collector. In these circumstances we consider that it was not open to the Department to seek to recover duty again on the articles under the description of transformers at the stage when they left the premises of the appellants. The two orders of the Assistant Collector dated 22-2-1980 and 16-6-1980, demanding duty on this ground, and the Appellate Collector’s order in so far as it relates to these two orders, cannot therefore be sustained. We, therefore, allow the appeals before us relating to the above mentioned two orders of the Appellate Collector and dealt with in File Nos. 2118/83 and 2119/83. The third appeal, arising out of the Assistant Collector’s order dated 16-9-1978, as upheld by the Appellate Collector, is dismissed as withdrawn.
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1983 (10) TMI 259 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... edly the C.I.F. value is only ₹ 14,151/-. The Customs authorities have assumed that the appellants would have made 300% profit. Further, the facts disclose that the husband was detained under COFEPOSA for 4 1/2 months and the goods are absolutely confiscated. The part played by the wife was only to sell certain goods during the absence of her husband. In the circumstances we are of the view that the learned Additional Collector was not justified in imposing a penalty of ₹ 20,000/- on husband and another sum of ₹ 20,000/- on the wife. We consider it just and reasonable to reduce the penalty from ₹ 20,000/- to ₹ 15,000/- in the case of the appellant in Appeal No. 281 of 1983 and from ₹ 20,000/- to ₹ 5,000/- in the case of the appellant in Appeal No. 282 of 1983. 7. In the result these two appeals are allowed in part. The appellant shall be given consequential relief within 3 months from the date of communication of this order.
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