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Showing 61 to 80 of 218 Records
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1983 (10) TMI 238
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... ... ..... relating to waste and scrap was put in them but that no such amendment has been made in the case of Item 15A(3). The reason for this could be that various sub-items in the concerned metal items (26A, 26B, 27 etc.) applied to specified forms of those metals and some doubt or difficulty might have been felt in fitting waste or scrap into the particular forms described in the tariff. There is, however, no such doubt or difficulty in the case of Item 15A(3) as no form or shape of polyurethane foam is mentioned therein. So long as the material remains polyurethane foam in nature, characteristics, composition and use, it will continue to be covered by Item 15A(3). 9. To sum up, we hold that cuttings and trimmings of polyurethane foam, though described as waste and scrap, are smaller pieces of high quality and usable polyurethane foam and hence remain covered by Item 15A(3) “Polyurethane foam” and are liable to duty thereunder. In the result, we reject this appeal.
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1983 (10) TMI 237
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... ... ..... Bawa Potteries v. Union of India and Another, reported in 1981 E.L.T. 114. It is not possible, without any supporting evidence, to accept their contention that all the facts relating to their goods had been made fully known to the Central Excise authorities in such a manner as to invalidate the application of Rule 9(2). We accordingly reject this contention of the appellants. 15. As regards the third ground advanced by the appellants, namely that identical goods manufactured by other manufactures are being treated as non-excisable, we observe that no details have been given to show whether the goods manufactured by others are identical to the appellants’ goods and whether they are being assessed differently. In any event, it is the appellants’ case which is before us and we find that in the facts and circumstances of this case the classification was correctly made. 16. In the result, we confirm the order of the Appellate Collector and reject the appeal.
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1983 (10) TMI 236
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... ... ..... was considered doubtful whether the item as originally introduced in 1970 could have included flattened or folded containers. So much so, that when during March, 1970 the appellants themselves volunteered to pay duty on flattened or folded containers, the Central Excise authorities told them in writing not to do so as the goods were considered non-excisable and even asked the appellants to apply for refund of the duty already paid. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that Item 46, as in force during March and April, 1970, did not cover flattened or folded containers. We also find force in the appellants’ second argument that no proper show cause notice, as specifically required by Rule 10, was served on them within the time-limit laid down in that rule. In the result, we hold that the impugned demands totalling ₹ 14,514.07 are not sustainable and are set aside. 8. Accordingly, we allow this appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1983 (10) TMI 235
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... ... ..... . In reply, the appellants submitted that the common understanding of a coated fabric was of one which was covered with plastic material on one side while the other side remained untreated. In contrast, the spider cloth was covered with plastic material on both sides. In the absence of any specific authority we are unable to say how far this submission is correct. We, however, observe that the entire case before the lower authorities was whether the spider cloth was an “impregnated fabric” and the question of its being a “coated fabric” has not been raised at all. Such a contention, for which no factual foundation has been laid, therefore, cannot be gone into at this stage. 22. We accordingly hold that the finding of the Collector of Central Excise, Pune, that the spider cloth was an impregnated fabric falling under Item 19-III was not correct. We accordingly allow the appeal and direct that consequential relief as due be given to the appellants.
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1983 (10) TMI 234
Whether the rate of conversion mentioned in the said Article IX-3.1 applied only to 20 per cent of the amounts in French Francs payable by ONGC to Forasol in Indian rupees in respect of Forasol's operational fee, standby fee and equipment charges as contended by Forasol or whether it applied to all payments to be made under the said contract, whether in rupees or in French Francs, as contended by ONGC?
Whether the enhanced rate of exchange specified by the Umpire in the said award applied only to the amount payable by way of interest to Forasol as contended by ONGC?
What date to be selected by the Court for converting into Indian rupees the French Franc part of the said award in respect of which no rate of exchange has been fixed either by the said contract or the said award?
Held that:- It is pertinent to note that under Article IX-3.1 the amount of fees and charges payable to Forasol were to be computed in French Francs and thereafter 80 per cent thereof was to be paid in French Francs and the remaining in Indian rupees. Even with respect to such twenty per cent Forasol did not want to be dependent upon a possible fluctuation in the exchange rate of rupee and, therefore, the 20 per cent part of the amount computed in French Francs was covenanted to be converted at a fixed rate provided in the said Article IX-3.1. It is thus only the 20 per cent of the said fees and charges computed in French Francs in Forasol's invoices but payable in Indian rupees which was to be converted at the aforesaid rate of exchange specified in the said contract. The contention of ONGC that the fixed rate of conversion provided in Article IX-3.1 applied to all payments to be made under the said contract to Forasol must, therefore, be rejected.
The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court was, the in error in holding that the enhanced rate of exchange specified in the said award applied only to the amount of interest payable to Forasol. Thus this enhanced rate of exchange applied to the payments in Indian rupees under Article IX-3.1 of the said contract to be made by ONGC to Forasol from and after November 30,1966.
The learned Single Judge rightly took the date of the decree as the date of conversion.
The amounts on which interest is claimed by ONGC were payable by Forasol in rupees and not in French Francs. Therefore, by the express terms of the said award, there is no right in ONGC to claim any interest on these amounts and this claim for interest was rightly negatived.
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1983 (10) TMI 232
Whether Rule 50 of the State Bank of India (Officers and Assistants) Service Rules in force at the relevant time has been complied with or not?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. In the instant case though reasons have not been expressly stated, these reasons were implicit namely, the nature of the charges, the explanation offered and the reply of the appellant to the show cause notice. These appear from a fair reading of the order impugned in this case. It, further, appears that there was consideration of those facts and the decision was arrived at after consideration of those reasons. It is manifest, therefore, that absence of any denial by the appellant, indeed admissions of the factual basis and nature of the explanation offered by the appellant were considered by the authority to merit the imposition of the penalty of dismissal. Such a conclusion could not, in the facts and circumstances of the case, be considered to be unreasonable or one which no reasonable man could make.
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1983 (10) TMI 231
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... ... ..... efore, purchasing of building materials for constructing a factory could not be considered as a transaction in connection with, or incidental or ancillary to, the business of the assessee of manufacture of synthetic yarn. In the instant case, as the business had not yet commenced, the building materials were not purchased in the course of the business. Secondly, these purchases could not constitute transactions connected with or ancillary to the business of the assessee. 14.. In the light of the foregoing discussion, in our decision, the sum of Rs. 5,866 is exigible to tax as the transaction of selling of the articles in question fell within the scope of the term business as defined in section 2(bb)(ii) of the Act, extracted hereinabove. 15.. In the result, the question referred is answered in the affirmativethat is-in favour of the department and against the assessee. 16.. The reference is answered accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1983 (10) TMI 230
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... ... ..... not be given any benefit of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. s case 1978 42 STC 386 (SC) AIR 1978 SC 1591. The assessee did not maintain any account and the turnover and the tax liability had to be estimated. I do not find any such defect in determination of the turnover that would call for interference in revision. In the result, the revision is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. In Sales Tax Revisions Nos. 423 and 424 of 1982, the Tribunal found that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of the Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. s case 1978 42 STC 386 (SC) AIR 1978 SC 1591 in respect of a part of his turnover. Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. s case 1978 42 STC 386 (SC) AIR 1973 SC 1591 covers the case of the assessee. The Commissioner cannot get the benefit of section 6 of the Amendment Act. The revisions are accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1983 (10) TMI 229
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... ... ..... urisdiction of the latter. The jurisdiction attaches in virtue of her presence, just as with other objects within those limits. During her stay she is entitled to the protection of the laws of that place and correlatively, is bound to yield obedience to them. Of course, the local sovereign may, out of considerations of public policy, choose to forego the exertion of its jurisdiction, or to exert the same in only a limited way but this is a matter resting solely in its discretion. In Caltex (India) Ltd. v. State of Kerala 1961 12 STC 655 a Bench of the Kerala High Court took the same view. In the result, the tax revision cases are dismissed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200 in each. Mr. S.R. Ashok, the learned counsel for the petitioner, made an oral application for grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. It is represented that in similar matters in the case of the very same assessee special leave was granted by the Supreme Court. We therefore grant leave in this case.
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1983 (10) TMI 228
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... ... ..... rk as desired by a customer is done, but the contract is one of work and labour involved in the preparation of a printed article of the subject desired by the customer which involves considerable skill and labour. In these circumstances, we find that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee had executed the work of printing on job contract basis and therefore no tax is leviable under the Act on the price of the material used in producing the printed articles and that the total price of the finished articles will not be liable to sales tax. 7.. In view of the above discussion, we answer the question in favour of the assessee and against the department by holding that under the facts and circumstances of the case, when a printer produces for a customer an article which is of value only to the particular customer, the material used in producing such article is not liable to tax and also that the total price of the finished article will not be liable to sales tax.
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1983 (10) TMI 227
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... ... ..... to and, secondly, on the ground that no proper demand notice had been served on the assessee prior to the filing of the application in the Court. The learned Judges (G.K. Govinda Bhat, C.J., and M.K. Srinivasa Iyengar, J.) upheld the order of the Magistrate on the second ground and dismissed the revision. But, while not agreeing with the first ground referred to by the learned Magistrate in support of his order, the learned judges observe as under However, the learned Magistrate has also made certain observations in regard to the requirement of section 13 of the Act. He was of the opinion that until the complainant exhausts other remedies for the collection of tax he cannot file an application under section 13 to take coercive steps for recovery before the Court. This view is not correct. The aforesaid observations also indicate the wide choice open to the assessing authority in the matter of recovery of tax. 16.. For the reasons aforesaid both these petitions are dismissed.
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1983 (10) TMI 226
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... ... ..... e as the classic ancient form improvements have been made only in manufacturing method, not in design. So I find that the clay is a common material to both the bricks and the tiles. The process of manufacture are similar. What the assessee manufactured was made in the same way as bricks are made. However, it was described as brick tiles in the contract. The commodity manufactured by the assessee was different in size from the normal bricks that are manufactured. In building trades, it is known as a brick tile. It will certainly come within the meaning of tiles of all kinds mentioned in the notification. In the result the revisions are allowed and it is held that in respect of brick tiles being taxed as bricks, as directed by the Tribunal, they shall be taxed as tiles of all kinds within the meaning of the notification. The papers will now go back to the Tribunal to pass the necessary orders. The Commissioner, Sales Tax, is entitled to his costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1983 (10) TMI 225
Whether there was any evidence upon which the Disciplinary Committee could reasonably find that they have been guilty of 'professional misconduct, within the meaning of sub-s. of s. 35 of the Act?
Whether the finding of the Disciplinary Committee as to professional misconduct on the part of the appellant can be legally sustained.
Held that:- The appeal partly succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India holding the appellant and A.N. Agavane guilty of professional misconduct is set aside. The proceedings drawn against them under sub-s. (1) of s. 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 are dropped.
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1983 (10) TMI 224
Winding up – Statement of affairs to be made to official liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... ther admitted in cross-examination that any statement of affairs prepared on the basis of the record would not have been of any use and that no useful statement of affairs could have been prepared therefrom. As regards the statement of affairs filed by Iqbal Singh later on May 11, 1984, on the basis of compilation by the chartered accountants, he stated that the same was entirely defective and of no use. The eviction order as observed above was executed on February 11, 1975. The winding-up order came more than two years later. The record had thus already been spoiled. In the circumstances, the director had reasonable excuse for not filing the statement of affairs. No conviction, therefore, can be made under section 454(5) of the Companies Act. B. N. Bharadwaj, who was the managing director of the company and was said to be looking after its affairs, it is stated, died in September, 1974. The result, therefore, is that the two accused are acquitted and the complaint dismissed.
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1983 (10) TMI 223
Winding up - Circumstances in which a company may be wound up ... ... ... ... ..... ection 433 of the Companies Act, the Legislature codified the circumstances/grounds on which a company may be ordered to be wound up by the court. Section 434 provides as to under what circumstances a company may be deemed to be unable to pay its debts, whereas section 439 makes provision as to an application for winding up. It goes without saying that in case the petitioner is unable to satisfy the conditions precedent as laid down in sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, the petition for winding up is bound to be dismissed. The said petition cannot be taken to be the proceedings for the recovery of the disputed debts or proceedings regarding the settlement of the disputes arising out of the rights and liabilities or the conditions of the scheme. Therefore, the petition for staying the proceedings is misconceived. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in the application and dismiss the same. The case is adjourned to November 17, 1983, for written statement.
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1983 (10) TMI 222
Winding up – Exclusion of certain time in computing periods of limitation ... ... ... ... ..... e aforesaid facts. Consequently, I decide both the issues in favour of the petitioner. Issues Nos, 7 to 9, 9A and 9B The burden of proving issue No. 8 was on the petitioner and its counsel has not pressed the same. Consequently, I hold that respondents Nos. 4 to 8 are not proved to be the sureties. The burden of issues Nos. 7, 9, 9A and 9B was on the respondents and their counsel also has not pressed the same. Therefore, they are decided against them. Relief In view of the aforesaid findings, I partly accept the petition and grant a decree against respondents Nos. 1 to 3 for the recovery of Rs. 13,260 with interest at the rate of 12 per cent, per annum as provided in the pronote, exhibit P-128, from January 29, 1977, till date, with proportionate costs. The petitioner is also entitled to future interest till the date of realisation. The amount was raised by the respondents for the purposes of business. Consequently, I fix the rate of future interest at 12 per cent, per annum.
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1983 (10) TMI 221
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... ally and saddle the company with unprofitable transactions. The company at present is admittedly making profits and there is, therefore, no justifiable reason to allow it to disown these small claims of about Rs. 20,000 of these three bona fide creditors. As regards the happenings in 1963 and 1968 with regard to the dealings with the concern known as Blood Bank , and the parting of company between Jaswant Singh and his brothers and the proceedings under sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, they took place long back and cannot have any bearing on the decrees now obtained by the three creditors in October, 1976. The sole purpose of the scheme appears to be to defeat the claim of these creditors by 50 per cent., get released the attachment of goods that they have got effected, and pay the rest in driblets covering a period of five years. I have, therefore, the least hesitation in rejecting the scheme and dismissing the petition moved under section 391 of the Companies Act.
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1983 (10) TMI 196
Officer, Directors, etc. not to hold place of profit, Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases
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1983 (10) TMI 187
Clandestine removal - Short levy - Demand - Show cause notice ... ... ... ... ..... d not curtail the period of limitation in this case as held by the Tribunal in the case of M/s. Anna Aluminium Co. v. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin 1983 ECR 1137-D (CEGAT) holding that in the absence of any indication that the amendment brought about with effect from 6-8-1977 was to operate retrospectively, the provisions of the rules, as they existed before the said amendment, as to the period available to the Department, would operate for this particular case. 30. emsp As a result of the foregoing discussions, we do not find it possible to uphold the contention that the demand could not be raised with reference to Rule 9(2) or was otherwise barred by time. The appeal is accordingly liable to be dismissed. The party has already been given relief by the Appellate Collector as to the quantum of duty to be worked out in relation to the tariff rates applicable as well as quantity of goods. We, therefore, uphold the Appellate Collector rsquo s order, and dismiss the appeal.
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1983 (10) TMI 182
Refund claim - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... for refund should be made within six months from the date payment of duty. We agree with the submission of the learned Representative for the department that it is the debiting of the PLA that constitutes the act of payment of duty and that assessment of RT 12 amounts only to levy and assessment and nothing more. We keep in mind that the Kerala High Court judgment cited by the learned Representative is quite clear. In that matter, their Lordships held that even when the exemption related to the value of production in a financial year, that the crucial date for computation of limination was the date of payment of duty. In the instant matter, the exemption related to the value of clearance in the past year and was known to the appellants from the first day of the financial year following the same. Therefore, we respectfully agree with the views expressed in the Kerala High Court judgment cited above. 10.In the circumstances, we find no merit in the appeal and dismiss the same.
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