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Showing 181 to 200 of 237 Records
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1983 (3) TMI 58 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
Customs - Valuation - Landing charges are includible in assessable value - Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... 57 of the Customs Act. Counsel for the Petitioners could however, not show in what manner this form was illegal or the petitioners were prejudicially effected thereby. In other words, no meaningful challenge could be launched against it. As at present advised all that was required to be incorporated by the petitioners in the bill of entry was merely information regarding the goods imported. Counsel for the petitioners failed to show what illegality attached to such information being required to be given. 8. For the foregoing reasons the petitioners are relegated to the statutory remedy of appeal under the Customs Act. Keeping in view the circumstances of the case, Counsel for the respondents very fairly stated that no objection on the ground of limitation in the filing of appeals in these matters by the petitioners shall be raised, if such appeals are filed within one month from today. The Writ Petitions are hereby disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (3) TMI 57 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Export of goods, under Central Excise bond - Interpretation of Taxing statutes ... ... ... ... ..... favour of the taxing authority and the other in favour of the subject, the latter interpretation must hold the field. The court is not bound to fill up the deficiencies and rectify any legal inartistry in the use of the language in the statute. If these principles are applied, I am not able to sustain the demand and the levy of the duty as made by the respondents, admittedly invoking the aid of clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 20 of the Customs Act, as submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the respondents is not in a position to demonstrate and sustain any convincing reason to construe the expression in bond occurring in clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 20 of the Customs Act, so as to denote, connote and include the Central excise bond. This obliges me to interfere in writ proceedings. 6. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. But there will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (3) TMI 56 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Re-import — Interpretation — Fiscal statutes ... ... ... ... ..... p the deficiencies and rectify the legal inartistry in the use of the language in the statute. If these principles are applied, I am not able to sustain the demand and the levy of the duty as made by the respondents, admittedly invoking the aid of clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Customs Act and if so, naturally the matter could be brought only within the purview of clause (d) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Customs Act, as submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents is not in a position to demonstrate and sustain any convincing reason to construe the expression in bond occurring in clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Customs Act, so as to denote, connote and include the Central Excise bond. This obliges me to interfere in writ proceedings. 6. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. But there will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (3) TMI 55 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Show cause notice — Confiscation — Scope ... ... ... ... ..... id circumstances, I am not prepared to attach any credence to this version, which is given in the course of the arguments on behalf of the respondents. These factors oblige me to accept the case of petitioner that no show cause notice was issued within the time as required by the provisions of the Act. Section 110(2) of the Act itself is explicit when it states that when no show cause notice is given within the stipulated period, the goods shall be returned to the persons from whose possession they were seized, subject to the proviso which gives a further time of six months. It is not the case of the respondents that the proviso had come into play in the instant case, because their specific case is that the show cause notice was, in fact, issued on 9-3-1979, to the petitioner, which case, I find, cannot at all be accepted on the facts disclosed. This obliges me to interfere in writ proceedings and accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (3) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Brand name and manufacture of goods for or on behalf of - Manufacture - Aerated water ... ... ... ... ..... buy the concentrates and manufactured aerated water out of the concentrates on their own account. They are also independent assessees under the Sales Tax and Income Tax Acts. The affixing of the trade mark Fanta and Campa on the products would also not mean that the product was manufactured for and on behalf of either Coco-Cola Export Corporation or Pure Drinks Private Ltd. In this review order, the Government of India drew to their support the judgment reported in Messrs Cibatul v. Union of India, 1978 E.L.T. 68. 29. Thus, on the facts of the present case and also on the principles laid down in the above quoted decisions, it is clear that Messrs Spencer and Co. Ltd. are the manufacturers of the beverage known as 77 and therefore the exemption granted under the Notification No. 211/77 is available to them. 30. In the circumstances, the impugned order dated 25-8-1978 passed by the first respondent is quashed and the rule nisi made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (3) TMI 53 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Search without warrant — Penalty may be lenient if accused had suffered a lengthy trial — Search illegal
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1983 (3) TMI 52 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
Viscose Staple Fibre ... ... ... ... ..... The question now arises whether in view of the exemption being granted to basic customs duty under Section 25 of the Customs Act in view of the provisions under Section 3(6) of the Customs Tariff Act, additional duty under Section 3 is also exempted. The wording of the notification and the scheme of the provisions under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, holds against such a contention. In the circumstances I am of the view that the respondents are right in imposing additional duty as per Section 3 in spite of the notifications concerned. 8. It was requested on behalf of the petitioners that time may be granted to them for payment of arrears of additional duty which has to be paid by them in view of the decision taken by the court. I think interest of justice will be served if the petitioners shall pay 50 of the amount within a month from today and the balance amount one month thereafter. The original petitions are disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (3) TMI 51 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYD.
Lozenges and Candy - Distinction between - Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... sible, and when the Customs authorities adopted a reasonable view, the said finding could not be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But that is not the position here. Here the authorities have ignored the Indian usage and the ISI publications, and erroneously followed the American usage which was inadmissible vide Davies L.J. in Hardwicke Game Farm v. Suffolk etc. Association Limited (5). It is therefore a case where relevant considerations have been ignored and irrelevant considerations have been applied and there is therefore a clear error of law apparent on the face of the record. vide Union of India v. Tarachand Gupta and Brothers (9) A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1558 . 24. For all the above reasons, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the respondents as also the learned Single Judge. The appeal is accordingly allowed and a Writ of Certiorari will issue as prayed for. There shall however be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.
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1983 (3) TMI 50 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... lled in this case, the property passing on the death of the deceased continued to be not liable to be charged to estate duty the state of non-liability was not transformed into a state of liability by the aggregation under section 34. Hence, we have no hesitation to hold that in order to grant the rebate as visualised u/s. 35(3) of the Act the authority has to take into consideration only the principal value of the property which passes on the death of the deceased and if that does not exceed rupees two lakhs, the rebate will have to be allowed. It is thereafter for the purpose of determining the rate of estate duty, the lineal descendants property and the value thereof will have to be added to the property which passed on the death of the deceased. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative stating that the rebate u/s. 35(3) of the Act is allowable notwithstanding the provisions of s. 34 of the Act. The reference is accordingly answered in favour of the assessee.
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1983 (3) TMI 49 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... ered inoperative and repealed. I am, however, in this regard in agreement with my learned brother that repeal by implication has not to be readily inferred, and there should be something leading to the imperative and inescapable conclusion that the particular provision has to be treated as impliedly abrogated. This has not been the position in the present case as the relevant provisions of law discussed above show. Thus, so far as the Union Territory of Delhi is concerned, the extension of the relevant provisions of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act are unaffected by s. 97 of the Amendment Act of 1976. The position being as such and the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act being still operative in Delhi, 1, agreeing with my learned brother, do not see any escape from the conclusion that the main residential house of a judgment-debtor or an assessee which is occupied by him, is exempt from being proceeded against in execution of a simple money decree or an income-tax demand.
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1983 (3) TMI 48 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Failure To Furnish Information, Properties Held Benami ... ... ... ... ..... and claiming himself to be the real owner thereof. On the other hand, according to us, he is laying his claim on inheritance from his father setting up a claim that his father was the real owner notwithstanding the sham decree in an arbitration proceeding in favour of the plaintiff s mother. The learned subordinate judge, therefore, materially misread the provision as aforesaid in holding that a part of the plaintiff s claim is barred thereunder. As the learned subordinate judge has totally non-suited the plaintiff in respect of a part of his claim acting upon a clear misreading of statutory provisions, the order impugned needs to be set aside in exercise of our powers in revision as otherwise the plaintiff would suffer irreparable prejudice in the suit and we direct accordingly. The revisional application, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. The two issues are answered in favour of the plaintiff. There will be no order for costs. S.N. SANYAL J.-I agree.
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1983 (3) TMI 47 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Debt Owed, Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... pear to be by itself a complete code, it is only a scheme which provides a method for the liquidation of an already existing income-tax liability which was present on the relevant valuation date. The Department had relied upon a decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CWT v. Ahmed Ibrahim Sahigara 1974 93 ITR 288. That decision of the Gujarat High Court was reversed by the Supreme Court in 1981 129 ITR 314. We accordingly find that the Tribunal was perfectly justified in law in holding that the income-tax liability of Rs. 5,88,000 under s. 68 of the Finance Act was a debt owed on the relevant valuation date, that is, November 15, 1963, and on that basis the allowance of the same as deduction in the computation of the assessee s net wealth was fully justified. We accordingly answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The assessee shall be entitled to his costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 250 only.
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1983 (3) TMI 46 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Acquisition Of Property To Prevent Evasion Of Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ified in sub-s. (1) has to be served on the transferor of the immovable property, the transferee, the person in occupation of the property. The object is to provide an opportunity to him of being heard. Relying upon s. 292B of the I.T. Act inserted by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act of 1975 learned counsel submitted that the defect of non-service of notice was fairly a technical objection and as such the same should not come in the way of the validity of the acquisition. We are unable to agree. Section 292B may apply to a case where service has already been effected, but there is a technical mistake in the notice. But where, , as here, no notice has been served, this section will not come to the rescue of the Department. Moreover, this section came into force with effect from 1st October, 1975, whereas the proceedings in the instant case has been initiated earlier. For this reason also this section will not apply. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1983 (3) TMI 45 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Educational Trust, Private Trust, Remainderman, Trusts ... ... ... ... ..... ril 10, 1950, and as to whether the minors had any interest in the property transferred on 30th March, 1974, did not and could not arise for consideration before the learned First Additional District Judge, because the only question for consideration before him was whether, assuming that the minors bad any interest in the trust property as claimed by the guardians of the minors, the guardians should be permitted to transfer that interest of the minors on the ground that such transfer would be for an evident advantage to the minors. Therefore, the question as framed does not set out any point of law and cannot, therefore, be held to be a question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal. Therefore, we decline to answer question No. 6. Reference answered accordingly. We are grateful to the learned counsel for the assessee and the Department for the valuable assistance rendered to us. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1983 (3) TMI 44 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Clubbing Of Income Of Minor Child, Inclusions In Total Income, Minor Child, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... correct to hold that the assessment of the share income of the two minor children of the assessee in his individual hands was justified, and s. 64(1)(ii) of the Act provides for the clubbing of the share income of all the minor children. The question is answered accordingly. R. A. No. 97 A.Y. 1974-75 Re. Question No. 1 For reasons stated above while answering question No. 3 of the above group our answer to this question is in the affirmative and against the assessee. R.A. No. 97 -4.Y. 1974-75 Re. Question No. 2 For reasons stated while answering question No. 4 of the above group, our answer to this question is that the Tribunal was legally correct to hold that the assessment of the share income of the two minors of the assessee in his individual hands was justified and s. 64(1)(ii) provides that for the clubbing of the share income of all the minor children. The reference is answered accordingly. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1983 (3) TMI 43 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Public Interest, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... company who had been subsequently given employment. But it is not very much disputed that a large majority of them were not re-employed. The specified authority also found that having regard to the factors mentioned in the minutes, it would not be justified to give relief to the tune of approximately rupees two crores under s. 72A and the same would be in the nature of windfall to the amalgamated company. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the impugned decision of the specified authority was not liable to be struck down by this court. The specified authority had declined to recommend the petitioner s application upon consideration of relevant facts. Therefore, exercising writ jurisdiction, I am not in a position to decide the sufficiency of the reasons which weighed with the specified authority. This rule accordingly fails. I, accordingly, discharge this rule without any order as to costs. Let the operation of this order remain stayed for a period of four weeks from date.
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1983 (3) TMI 42 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Appeals, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... e firm for the assessment year in question. The learned counsel for the assessee was unable to point out that the view taken by the Tribunal is contrary to law. It was for the assessee to have satisfied the ITO that it was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the declaration, in Form No. 12, within limitation. The assessee having failed to do so, the ITO did not commit any error in refusing to continue the registration by condoning the delay in filing the declaration in Form No. 12. The learned counsel for the assessee was unable to point out that in the absence of any application by the assessee for condonation of the delay, the ITO was duty bound to afford an opportunity to the assessee to explain the delay in filing the application for registration. Our answer to question No. 2 referred to us, therefore, is in the affirmative and against the assessee. The reference is answered accordingly. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1983 (3) TMI 41 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Delegated Legislation, Promissory Estoppel, Public Interest ... ... ... ... ..... the petitioners did not incur any expense for manufacturing the goods which were meant to be exported. In other words, the petitioners were not actually out of pocket. In these circumstances, the benefit of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not available to the petitioners to claim any relief. In Civil Writ No. 310 of 1980, we find that there was in fact no firm commitment or contract between the petitioners and the foreign buyer. The petitioners seek to invoke the provisions of paragraph 316 of the Hand Book. The pre-condition for invoking the said provision is that there should be a firm commitment by an exporter., The facts as enumerated by our learned brother clearly show that the contract dated March 25, 1977, was altered and amended from time to time at the sweet will and pleasure of the parties. The said contract could not be regarded as any firm commitment. On this ground alone the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The petitions are dismissed with costs.
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1983 (3) TMI 40 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Application U/S 256(2), HUF, Practice, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... the said fund was acquired lay upon the assessee-Hindu undivided family? and call upon the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad, to draw up a statement of the case and refer the aforesaid question of law for the opinion of this court. Let the opinion given by me above be placed before the Bench concerned for passing necessary orders. BY THE COURT (21-7-1983).-In view of the opinion received by the third hon ble judge, we direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad Bench A, Allahabad, to submit a statement of the case on the following question of law Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was legally justified in holding that the property purchased in the name of Sri Ayodhya Prasad had actually been purchased from out of the funds belonging to the Hindu undivided family and that the burden to explain the source from which the said fund was acquired lay upon the assessee-Hindu undivided family? The assessee shall be entitled to its costs.
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1983 (3) TMI 38 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Cash Credits, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... s case only to this extent that by legal fiction the presumption against the assessee arises by virtue of the provision of the Explanation in certain contingencies. The instant case is not one of those cases in which the Tribunal was oblivious of the Explanation. As a matter of fact, it was very much alive to the legal position and the effect of the Explanation appended to s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. In para. 8 of its judgment it has clearly noticed the change in the law and has observed that the initial onus lay on the assessee by virtue of the Explanation. It is only thereafter that the Tribunal has proceeded to go into the facts and materials on the records to find out that the assessee has been able to discharge the initial onus. Having held that such initial onus had already been discharged by the assessee, the principle in Anwar Ali s case 1970 76 ITR 696 (SC), came into full play. There is thus, no force in the submission of the learned standing counsel for the Revenue.
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