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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 237 Records
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1983 (3) TMI 236
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... ... ..... t petition is not maintainable. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner contended that as the question involved in respect of these orders is the same, a single writ petition is maintainable. However in the circumstances, he requested that this writ petition may be confined to the order made by the joint Commissioner on the application relating to the provisional assessment of tax and the recovery thereof for the month of April, 1982. Without going into the merits of the rival contentions, we direct that this writ be confined to the order relating to the provisional assessment in respect of the turnover of April, 1982. In respect of the assessments for the months of May, June and July, 1982, the writ petitioner has undertaken to file separate writ petitions. Hence, the order similar to the one made in this writ petition shall issue in the other writ petitions as and when filed. With the above directions, the writ petition is disposed of. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 156.
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1983 (3) TMI 235
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... ... ..... r section 32 is subject to the other provisions of the Act such as section 16 and therefore the Deputy Commissioner cannot make an assessment on an escaped turnover without reference to the assessing authority and also without reference to the period of time prescribed by the Act for bringing to assessment any escaped turnover. In D. Padmavathi v. State of Tamil Nadu 1979 44 STC 446 a Division Bench of this Court has held that section 32 provides for the examination of the order passed by a subordinate authority under certain conditions set out therein and so long as the jurisdiction is exercised with respect to an order contemplated by the section, there would be no error in the exercise of the jurisdiction. We therefore feel that the Tribunal has come to the right conclusion when it said that the Deputy Commissioner can modify the order and refix the taxable turnover taking note of the wrong exemption granted by the assessing authority. The tax case is therefore dismissed.
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1983 (3) TMI 234
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... ... ..... the present product. Thus, we reiterate that all the contentions carry no merit. The only other decision which requires reference is Silver Chem Industries v. State of Tamil Nadu 1980 45 STC 315. This is brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the assessees. That again does not really help the assessees. For, there a Division Bench of this Court was concerned with the question whether damping hose cloth fell within item 4 of the Third Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, and the Division Bench found that the hose in the present case was tubular in shape and was in no way different from the cloth used for banians. It is not in dispute that banian is a textile. Quite rightly, therefore, the Division Bench held the product which is in no way different from the cloth used for banian is a textile. In the instant case, the finished product as earlier pointed out ceases to be a textile and is a new commercial product. The revision is therefore dismissed.
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1983 (3) TMI 233
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... ... ..... learned counsel for the revenue, even if it is not a preparation of vegetable, it is still an article of food. Normally, the dictionary meaning of food is something taken into the system to maintain life and growth and to supply nourishment. We do not think that in that sense arrow-root powder sold by the assessee can be taken to be an article of food. As has been pointed out by the Tribunal, even if arrow-root is a vegetable, every product of vegetable cannot be taken to be an item of food. If every product of vegetable is taken as food, then even turmeric powder has to be taken as food, which is obviously untenable. In this view of the matter, we are in entire agreement with the view of the Tribunal and we accordingly hold that arrow-root powder sold by the assessee in this case cannot be taken to be either an article of food or a preparation of vegetable, which alone will bring it under item 103(viii) of the First Schedule to the Act. The tax case is therefore dismissed.
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1983 (3) TMI 232
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... ... ..... just a conduit pipe, that the goods having been despatched from one State to another pursuant to a contract of sale which came into existence directly between the assessee and the buyer the sales effected by the assessee should be held to be inter-State sales. In this case there is no direct link established between the assessee in Madras and the buyer in Andhra Pradesh as was the case before the Supreme Court. The contract of sale had been entered into between the assessee s Andhra Pradesh branch and the local buyers. In view of the fact that there is no direct link between the assessee who is in Madras and the dealers of Andhra Pradesh, the despatch of the goods cannot be taken to have been occasioned by the contract of sale entered into by the assessee s branch with the local buyers. We are therefore of the view that in this case the Tribunal has come to the right conclusion and no interference with its order is called for. The tax revision case is accordingly dismissed.
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1983 (3) TMI 231
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Winding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its debts
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1983 (3) TMI 230
Penalty where no specific penalty is provided elsewhere in the act, Temporary protection of employee – Protection of employees during investigation by inspector or pendency of proceedings before appellate tribunal in certain cases
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1983 (3) TMI 229
Oppression and mismanagement, Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... ucture and on piercing the veil it is found that in reality it is a partnership . From the above enunciation, it is clear that the petitioner who holds only 1/4th of the shares in the private limited company cannot now claim that the affairs of the company have reached a kind of deadlock by which the affairs of the company cannot be managed which will warrant dissolution of a partnership in similar circumstances or a company itself when it is closely held by member-relatives. If this is the law declared by the Supreme Court, the decision rendered by the Chancery Division in 1935 has no application whatsoever to the facts of the present case. For these reasons, I do not think that this petition is well-conceived. It is, therefore, liable to be rejected in limine. I must also state that no evidence was asked to be recorded nor was it recorded in this proceeding except to go by the papers produced by the parties. The petition is dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (3) TMI 208
Penalty for wrongful withholding of property, Section 630 also applies to ex-employees and its application is not confined to present employees
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1983 (3) TMI 207
Winding up – Debts of all descriptions to be admitted to proof ... ... ... ... ..... gment, remaining unsatisfied, ought not, in India, to be held a bar to a subsequent action against the other promisor or promisors. I am in respectful agreement with the above view. The filing of a claim before the official liquidator in the case of a company in liquidation stands on the same footing as instituting a suit. I am, therefore, of the opinion that if a suit is filed for recovery of a debt against some of the joint debtors and the amount is not recovered from them, a claim can be filed before an official liquidator against another joint debtor mdash a company in liquidation. In the circumstances, the order of the official liquidator in rejecting the claim of the appellant on the ground that the suit filed by it against the directors bars its claim against the company is erroneous and liable to be set aside. For the aforesaid reasons, I accept the appeal, set aside the order of the official liquidator and remand the case to him to decide the matter afresh on merits.
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1983 (3) TMI 191
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... y the Courts or Tribunals. We also find force in the contention of the learned Senior Departmental Representative that the test reports cover goods produced during the subsequent period and cannot be considered to be pertaining to the goods produced during the preceding year. Even the List relied upon by the appellant, copy whereof is at Page 38 of the file, reveals that glass fibre is the basic material for all these products, the majority of the goods have even their name after ldquo fibre glass rdquo as the certificates on Page 56 of the paper book as well as on Page 57, indicate. On these descriptions, the goods are to be treated as nothing but ldquo manufactures of glass fibre rdquo and because of unexceptional wording of the explanation (iv), as it prevented at the relevant time, there is no escape from the classification under Entry 22F of the CET. We do not, therefore, find any infirmity in the view taken by the Appellate Collector, and dismiss the appeal accordingly.
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1983 (3) TMI 190
Rubber products ... ... ... ... ..... this time lag. The appellants were earlier paying Excise duty on the product but subsequently discontinued the same. They also have not explained why they did so, in proper sequence. Be whatever it may, there can be no doubt that the authorities were not only aware of the fact but were in full knowledge of the fact of manufacture and consumption of cushion compound in the appellants factory, long before the issue of show cause notice and the matter was subject to litigation between the parties in the Kerala High Court. In these circumstances, I am clearly of the view that the appellants cannot be said to have concealed the fact of manufacture of cushion compound and its captive consumption by mere non-mention of the same in the Classification List. To my mind sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of the Central Excise Rules would not be attracted on the facts and circumstances of this case. I would, therefore, hold that the show cause notice and the demand of duty were barred by limitation.
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1983 (3) TMI 187
Adjudication - Burden of proof penalty and confiscation ... ... ... ... ..... Excises and Salt Act. For this proposition he realised upon the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Rajasthan Tobacco v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise (1979 E.L.T. 637 J). But the Allahabad High Court in Geep Flash Light Industries v. Union of India (1979 E.L.T. 674 3) had considered the matter fully and had taken into consideration another judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Universal Cable Ltd. v. Union of India 1977 TLR 1925 1977 E.L.T. (J 92) (HP) and had held that the provisions of Section 40(2) do not apply to proceedings initiated by the Central Excise authorities for quantification and realisation of duty and that the bar of limitation under that section can only be set up in proceeding before a Court of Law. We are, accordingly, of the opinion that the appellant cannot rely upon Section 40(2) to contend that the proceedings are barred by time. 8. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the order of the Board, dated, 22-9-1980 is set aside.
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1983 (3) TMI 184
Omission of declaration condonable ... ... ... ... ..... can be permitted to be satisfied subsequently as has happened in the present case. We, therefore, feel that there is no justification in the lower authorities rejecting the appellants rsquo claim for not giving the declaration at the time of shipment. The D.R. rsquo s plea that the declaration was statutory and therefore mandatory is not acceptable. The requirement for declaration is incorporated in the Public Notice issued by the Government in terms of Rule 4. Under this rule the Central Government have powers to revise the rate of drawback fixed under Rule 3. The Public Notice is not a statutory rule or order and thus the lack of compliance cannot be considered as mandatory. Besides, in their appeal to the Appellate Collector of Customs, the appellants have pointed out instances in the past when such omissions were condoned. Accordingly, we condone this requirement and direct that the consequential relief may be given to the appellants after the examination of their claims.
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1983 (3) TMI 181
Project Import Regulations ... ... ... ... ..... ents and under four separate Bills of Entry (of course under one contract) for the purpose of convenience. As regards the availing of benefit under Project Import Regulations as well as exemption notification No.40/78-Cus we find no such ground taken in the Show Cause Notice issued by the Government of India. However, since the point was raised during the hearing, we would like to add that there is no bar to availing of more than one benefit unless it is barred categorically. Hence we uphold the orders of the Appellate Collector and set aside the Show Cause Notice issued by the Government of India. 6. ensp We further direct that the appellants may be given the benefit of Notification No. 40-Cus./78 (as amended by Notification No. 109/78) after the customs authorities satisfy themselves that all the parts imported would form complete Hydraulic and Impact Extrusion Presses as described in the aforesaid notification based on the relevant Bills of Entry, contract and drawing etc.
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1983 (3) TMI 180
Refund arising out of Appellate Collector’s Order ... ... ... ... ..... to be dismissed. As regards the cross-objection filed by M/s. Hico Products Pvt. Ltd., we find that it merely seeks to uphold the Appellate Collector rsquo s order and the cross-objection seems to have been filed through misunderstanding of law. No variation of Appellate Collector rsquo s order is sought by the cross-objection. As regards the request that there is a delay in, paying the refund consequent to the Appellate Collector rsquo s order dated 22-5-1982, we see no reason to accept the same and therefore there is no justification in the grant of plea of M/s. Hico Products Pvt. Ltd. that we should direct the Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-II and his officers to repay the amount within a stipulated period. This is a matter which is left to the discretion of the jurisdictional officers. In view of these findings, we reject the appeal of the Addl. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-II and dismiss the cross-objection of M/s. Hico Products Pvt. Ltd. as not sustainable.
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1983 (3) TMI 173
Bill of Entry cannot be amended after the goods have gone out of Customs charge ... ... ... ... ..... purchase department that the order placed by the said department did not ask for any motor. 3. emsp On reference to the subject Bill of Entry, we find the description of Items 1 and 2 declared therein by the appellants themselves as under ldquo (1) Gear Box complete for Hot Blast Valve with an A.C. Elec. Motor of 415 V. 5 H.P. 4 K.W. (72b) (2) Gear Box complete for Main Hoist Valve with an A.C. Elec. Motor of 415 V. 30 H.P. 22 K.W. (72b) 4. emsp It is clear from the above declaration that both the items contained an A.C. electric motor, each. If the appellants felt that their declaration in the Bill of Entry was wrong, they should have taken steps to have it corrected at the proper time when the goods were still available for verification by Customs. Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962, bars amendment of the Bill of Entry after the goods have gone out of Customs charge. The Bill of Entry as on record belies the claim of the appellants. 5. Accordingly, we reject this appeal.
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1983 (3) TMI 172
Hearing - Request for adjournment ... ... ... ... ..... ion from the appellant. Shri K.V. Unnikrishnan for the Revenue is present. We have repeatedly observed and have held that it is for the parties to inform themselves as to the outcome of their requests made, particularly when these are postal or telegraphic ones and it cannot or should not be expected of the Tribunal to inform as to whether requests are accepted or rejected. 3. emsp In the present case when adjournment was requested for 15 to 20 days and which was accepted, we find no justification for fixing a fresh hearing date. Therefore, exercising our discretion under Rule 20 of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1982, we dismiss the appeal for default of appearance.
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1983 (3) TMI 171
Drawback of duty on garment ... ... ... ... ..... 979 they cannot have effect in respect of a shipment made in June, 1978. The appellant also states that drawback has been allowed in respect of shipments made in 3une, 1979 under Shipping Bill Nos. 2884, 2885, 2869, 2870, 2871 and 2875 for similar articles and by the same Custom House. Serial No. 2730, inter alia, reads - ldquo All types of readymade garments made from textile fabrics but excluding garments made partially or wholly from...... cotton...... powerloom fabrics ....... . The words lsquo cotton powerloom fabrics rsquo have not been qualified to indicate any percentage of cotton, or to exclude mixed cotton fabrics from its scope. We, therefore, consider that drawback is not admissible in respect of the garments in question. We should presume that if circumstances attendant on the six cases referred to by the appellant are the same, the payment was in error and this by itself cannot justify payment of drawback in the present case. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1983 (3) TMI 170
Promissory estoppel evolved by equity to do justice ... ... ... ... ..... ners did not incur any expense for manufacturing the goods which were meant to be exported. In other words, the petitioners were not actually out of pocket. In these circumstances the benefit of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not available to the petitioners to claim any relief. 85. emsp In Civil Writ No. 310 of 1980, we find that there was in fact no firm commitment or contract between the petitioner and the foreign buyer. The petitioners seek to invoke the provisions of paragraph 316 of the Hand Book. The pre-condition for invoking the said provision is that there should be a firm commitment by an exporter. The facts as enumerated by our learned brother clearly show that the contract, dated 25th March, 1977, was altered and amended from time to time at the sweet will and pleasure of the parties. The said contract could not be regarded as any firm commitment. On this ground alone the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. 86.The petitions are dismissed with costs.
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