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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 254 Records
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1983 (9) TMI 311 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... offence under Section 8(1) of the Act and the confiscation of primary gold in the hands of the appellant, Hansraj Jeevandas, for violation of Section 8(1) of the Act, is maintainable in Law. 11. In so far as the gold coins are concerned, the charge is that Goki Bhen was required to declare it in terms of the Act; she did not do so; therefore, the coins became liable to confiscation. A notice to show cause has been issued to Hansraj Jeevandas; the articles were seized from his possession; he having come in such possession by succession in terms of the proviso to Section 71 of the Act, the coins would not be liable to confiscation in the hands of Hansraj Jeevandas for the omission by Goki Bhen to declare these. So the confiscation of the gold coins is set aside. 12. In the unusual circumstances under which the appellant came to be in possession of the primary gold without declaration, we reduce the penalty imposed on him to ₹ 5,000 (Rupees five thousand only).
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1983 (9) TMI 310 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... s 4/14-4-1981 - lends strength to the claim of the appellant contained in his letter dated 11-8-1980 that they were given to understand that they will be entitled to refund of excess duty as soon as the price list is finalised. In the light of the above, we are satisfied that despite there being no endorsement on the gate passes or the R.T. 12s that assessment has been done provisionally; what has actually happened is provisional assessment and that too because of the inability or delay on the part of the department itself to finalise the price-list within a reasonable time and further giving an impression to the appellant that until that is finalised, he need not bother about filing a claim. In the light of this finding we do not traverse the other alternative argument of the advocate that the assessment in any case was provisional. 6. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the claim of the appellant for the period 16-7-1980 to 12-9-1980 will be treated as within time.
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1983 (9) TMI 309 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... authorities based on the Trade Notice issued by the Collector. A contention was taken before the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat that the writ petitioners cannot maintain the petition without exhausting an alternative remedy of appeal provided under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. While refuting that contention the Gujarat High Court held that Section 35 of the said Act does not provide any appeal against such a Trade Notice. The Trade Notice was held to be an administrative direction. 7. Having regard to our view that the warning endorsed on the shipping bill and communicated to the Appellants by the Asstt. Collector by means of a letter dated 15-2-1983, and subsequently clarified by the Addl. Collector is only an executive direction and not a decision or order within the meaning of those expressions and therefore, no appeal lies to the Tribunal under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 129-A of the Act. We therefore, reject this appeal as incompetent.
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1983 (9) TMI 308 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... icate as to whether the Company in that case did avail of proforma credit of the duty paid on stampings and laminations used in the manufacture of electric motors. In any case, Shri Kohli cannot lawfully contend that just because one of the Assistant Collectors has permitted another factory to avail a concession, the Appellant’s factory will also be entitled to such concession even though the law does not provide for such a concession. We are afraid that we cannot have any jurisdiction to go into the question of alleged discrimination meted out by different Collectors to different manufacturers. Our duty is only to interpret the law correctly. As has been stated earlier, Shri Kohli has conceded that in terms of concession notification the appellants are not entitled to claim proforma credit and therefore the demand is not illegal. 9. Having considered all aspects of the case, we are satisfied that there is no merit in this appeal and therefore we dismiss the same.
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1983 (9) TMI 307 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... . On the other hand, Shri Lakshmi Kumaran relied on Interpretative Rules 3(a) which provides that the heading most appropriate to the goods should apply. Note 2(f) to Section XVII mentioned in the order under appeal, clearly excludes electrical machinery and equipment covered by Chapter 85 from this section, which also includes aircraft falling under Chapter 88. Heading 85.18/27(4) expressly covers electrical filament lamps. In the present case, the lamps have also been invoiced separately and mentioned separately in the Bill of Entry and have been separately assessed. In reply, Shri Mathur argued that there was no use of Note 3 to Chapter XVII if it was to be superseded by Note 2. 5. We have carefully considered the matter and Interpretative Rule 3(a) read with Section Note 2(a) to Chapter XVII makes it abundantly clear that the stand taken by the department is correct. Agreeing with them, therefore, we uphold the order of the Appellate Collector and reject this order.
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1983 (9) TMI 306 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... int out the source from which he purchased and vindicate his innocence. When the goods in question are clearly proved to be smuggled goods, even without applying the statutory presumption under Section 123 of the Act, the claim of the appellant that he is a bona fide purchaser for value without knowledge of the fact that the goods are smuggled and is therefore, legally unsustainable. In other words, even a bona fide purchaser will not be entitled under law to claim smuggled properties on the ground that he purchased the same without knowledge that those goods were smuggled. 14. The facts and circumstances of the case clearly point to the conclusion that the appellant had purchased YKK zips of foreign origin and had transported the same to his place under cover of a false and fictitious invoice. The order of confiscation in the circumstances is maintainable in law and we affirm the order of the Collector of Central Excise, Guntur, appealed against and dismiss the appeal.
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1983 (9) TMI 305 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ed with gramophones, record players etc. The decision would, therefore, not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 9. Considering the foregoing, we are of the view that the speaker Units imported by the appellants were not parts and accessories of gramophones, record players, record changers etc. listed under sub-item (ii) of Item 37A. The exception (viii) and (ix) in the original Notification No. 112/66-C.E., introduced by Notification No. 14/75-C.E., dated 1-3-1975 would not therefore, be applicable to the appellants’ goods. The appellants’ goods therefore, could not be held assessable under sub-item (ii) of Item 37A of the CET nor could Notification No. 112/66-C.E., dated 9-7-1966 as amended by Notification No. 14/75-C.E. dated 1-3-1975 be applied to it. The goods would therefore be properly assessable under T.I. 68 at the material time. The appeal is thus allowed in the light of observation made above with consequential refund to the appellants.
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1983 (9) TMI 304 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... g providing a general description. In accordance with Rule 2(a) of Notes under Section XVI, goods of a kind described in any of the heading of Chapter 84 and 85 (other than Heading Nos. 84.65 and 85.28) are in all cases to be classified in their respective headings. In accordance with these rules of interpretation, the classifications of these goods have been correctly made under the Heading 85.08 of the CTA. 3. The Bench has carefully considered the points made by both the parties and agrees with the arguments put forward by the Departmental Representative. The goods have been correctly classified under Item 85.08 which covers the goods more specifically than the alternative item under Chapter 84. Unless therefore, a special exemption is given to these goods, they would be assessable at the appropriate rate under the sub-heading of the Tariff. The appeal is accordingly rejected. The Appeal Nos. 535/80-B, 536/80-B, 541/80-B and 579/80-B are also disposed of accordingly.
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1983 (9) TMI 303 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ic motors and not under Item 30.B., which is for motor starters. 3. In the present appeal the claim for refund of ₹ 2500.74 has been repeated and the photostat copy of the Manual has been sent, offering to provide the catalogue if required. Shri Subramanian repeated the contentions. On the other hand, Shri Kunhikrishnan pointed to the difference between a motor and a motor starter. This article was a D.C. motor operating on a battery. Item 30.B.(1) covers “Motors which operate on direct current with rated output not exceeding 7.5V and the rate of duty is 20% adv. Motor starters are different articles which are assessable under Item 30.B. at 15% adv. The higher duty was definitely attracted in this case. The representative of the appellants was unable to refute the contention of the department. 4. We agree that the starter is a motor in itself and has been correctly assessed under Item B.(i) of Item 30 CET and this appeal is, therefore, rejected.
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1983 (9) TMI 302 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... a). Accordingly, Item 68 of the CET is more appropriate for these goods. On going through the classification list, there can be no doubt that the appellants had not given necessary particulars by which the Excise authorities could have come to conclusion that the appellants were also manufacturing product which was classifiable under Item 68. The appellants did not mention Item 68 or even the fact that they were manufacturing brass rods upto 10 mm diameter. This clearly shows that there was suppression of facts on the part of the appellants. Besides, no penalty has been imposed against the appellants and only duty has been demanded from them. Once it is held that there was suppression of facts on the part of the appellants, there is no dispute that the demand made from the appellants of duty is within time. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, no interference with the orders passed by the lower authorities is called for. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal.
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1983 (9) TMI 301 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the petitioner. 23. Even otherwise, an officer appointed to perform statutory duties from a date named in a notification cannot exercise the statutory powers prior to his appointment and there cannot be a retro-operative or retrospective appointment to perform statutory duties are firmly concluded by the rulings of the Supreme Court in Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab and Another (A.I.R. 1967 Supreme Court 856) and The Income Tax Officer, Alleppey v. M.C. Ponnoose and Others (A.I.R. 1970 Supreme Court 385). From this it follows that the officers appointed in the year 1969 under the 1966 Act were not competent to recover any of the outstanding amounts from the petitioner or its predecessor in interest. 24. On any view of the matter, the impugned demands are liable to be quashed. I, therefore, quash the impugned demand notices issued by the Superintendent. 25. Rule issued is made absolute in both the cases with costs. Advocate’s fee ₹ 200/- in one sets.
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1983 (9) TMI 300 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... . There is another judgment reported in 82 I.T.R. 314 - Malchand Surana v. C.I.T. where it was held that having decided an appeal on a preliminary issue, the tribunal has implied jurisdiction to vacate the order in appropriate cases and hear the appeal on merits. From the statements on bar of the advocate of the appellant as well as the S.D.R., we feel that this court had come to the conclusion that the appellant had no claim at all on the basis of the fact that S/Shri Biswaranjan Maity and Mrinal Kanti Maity had not filed appeals and as such the orders had become final against them. This goes to the root of the case. In view of the above arguments and the legal position discussed above, we feel that justice demands that this matter should be re-heard on merits. We, accordingly, recall the order of the Tribunal dated 7-4-1983 disposing of the appeal. In the result, the miscellaneous application dated 6th June, 1983 is allowed and the appeal shall be posted for fresh hearing.
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1983 (9) TMI 299 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ppeal, had not been filed by the appellants, namely, M/s. Nellimarala Jute Mills Co. Ltd. but by their clearing agents, the Express Clearing Agency. The Bench was not inclined to entertain this objection at the belated stage. It may be stated that the appeal was fixed for hearing on 1-8-1983, then adjourned to 21-9-1983 but on the earlier dates this objection had not been taken (Objection having been taken at belated stage i.e. on 26-9-1983, it was rejected). After this was communicated to Shri Kunhikrishnan, he submitted that question of classification of compound ball and roller bearings has been examined by the Department and that after consulting the Deptt. he conceded that they are correctly classifiable under Heading 84.62(1) of CTA. 5. In view of the concession, the appeal is allowed and it is ordered that the compound ball and roller bearings imported by the appellants would be classified under Heading 84.62(1) of CTA with consequential refund to the appellants.
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1983 (9) TMI 298 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... case. The question whether Item 52 or Item 34A was more specific and appropriate in relation to these goods would also require careful consideration in the light of all the facts and evidence. We consider that in the interests of justice the question of possible classification under Item 34A should also be examined. Since, however, this plea was not specifically raised at the earlier stages. It was not dealt with by the authorities below, and it would not be proper for us at the stage of second appeal to embark on an examination of this basic and factual question. We, therefore, consider that it would be appropriate to remand the case to the Assistant Collector for a de novo determination, taking into account the alternative classification under Item 34A. We accordingly set aside the orders of the authorities below and remand the case to the Assistant Collector for readjudication. The readjudication should be completed within six months from the date of receipt of our order.
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1983 (9) TMI 297 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ed a cross-objection, they had not sought a reversal of this finding. According to him, the readjudication by the Assistant Collector should be consistent with this finding. In other words, even if on the question of excisability or classification the decision was adverse to the appellants, the demand could not in any case extend beyond a period of six months. Shri Tayal had no submissions to make on this point. 6. We accordingly set aside the findings of the Appellate Collector and the Assistant Collector as regards the classification of the goods and remand the case to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, for readjudication on the question of classification of the goods, taking into account the additional ground taken by the appellants to the effect that the goods were not excisable. His decision should, however, be without prejudice to the finding of the Appellate Collector that a demand in this case beyond the period of six months would be time-barred.
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1983 (9) TMI 296 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... n 122/71. Our attention has not been drawn to any definition on these lines in the technical literature referred to before us. We are, therefore, of the view that the definition introduced on 1-6-1971 cannot be applied to the prior period to the disadvantage of the appellants, particularly in the context of the overwhelming evidence in technical literature to conclude that, in technical parlance, polyester resins were covered by the broad description “alkyd resins”. For the same reason we cannot accept Shri Jain’s contention that the explanation introduced on 1-6-1971 was only clarificatory in nature and, therefore, would apply in respect of the prior period as well. Having regard to the view which we have taken on the classification of the 2 products in question, vis-a-vis Notification No. 156/65, it is not necessary for us to go into the other contentions and submissions. 17. In the result we set aside the order appealed against and allow the appeal.
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1983 (9) TMI 295 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... uded. In the present case, even if the value of the returned goods were to be excluded, the situation does not improve in favour of the appellants. If, as the SDR has pointed out, the value of goods returned within the period 1-4-1977 to 28-2-1978 were excluded the aggregate value of Sodium Silicate cleared for home consumption during the said period would still be in excess of ₹ 13.75 lakhs. This position was admitted in the course of the hearing by Shri Menon. However, his contention was that not only the value of this lot but the balance of the goods which were returned after 28-2-1978 should also be excluded because they were not taken into consumption. As we have said, there is no force in this contention. 6. Shri Menon’s submission regarding the value of the goods in terms of Explanation-1 of the notification also loses force in view of our finding that the value of the returned goods could not be excluded. 7. In the result the appeal is rejected.
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1983 (9) TMI 294 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ttached to the Notification refers only to cinematograph films. 8. We have perused the Tribunal’s decision reported in 1983 ECR 277-D (CEGAT) 1983 E.L.T. 845 (CEGAT). The goods in that case were crushed scrap of acrylic sheets and the dispute was whether the imported goods could be said and held to be plastic materials as mentioned in Item No. 15A(1) of the Central Excise Tariff Schedule. The Tribunal held that the imported crushed scrap could not be termed as flakes. The basis of the decision was that the crushed scrap, being not pure plastic sheets and not being capable of direct moulding, cannot be considered as plastic material within the ambit of Item 15A(1) of the CET. We do not think that this decision has any relevance to the issue before us. 9. Having regard to the foregoing discussions, we allow the appeal and direct that the concerned Customs authorities shall grant consequential relief to the appellants within 3 months from the date of this order.
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1983 (9) TMI 293 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... party and referred to above, have no relevance, when the wording of the Tariff Entry is unambiguous. 14. We also find justification in the distinction drawn out by the learned SDR. Tariff Entry 18E vis-a-vis Item 68 inasmuch as the former refers to all type of “yarns” not elsewhere specified whereas Tariff Entry 68 refers to all “goods” not otherwise specified. To that extent, the former is more specific so far as yarn is concerned, as compared to the latter. We, therefore, do not think that the controversy now raised, namely, that the multiple yarn ought to be classified, under Tariff Entry 68 and that the proportionate refund be allowed to be adjusted accordingly, is entertainable. The finding of the lower authorities as to constituent yarns also being liable to excise duty as contemplated by Tariff Entries 18A and 18 respectively, is not even being disputed. We find the appeal accordingly liable to rejection. The same is rejected accordingly.
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1983 (9) TMI 292 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ht out specifically to highlight the proceedings of a particular conference, it cannot obviously be classified under Heading 49.02. We also find stated in the heading of the subject News Bulletin that it was “published as a Professional Service for May and Baker Ltd.” The articles contained in this Bulletin related to the views of various participating doctors on usefulness of the drug Metronidazole. The appellants imported as many as 24,500 copies of the Bulletin, ostensibly for distribution among the medical practitioners in India. From these facts, it is quite apparent that the whole exercise was to propagate and promote the use of the drug Metronidazole. The lower authorities were, therefore, not in the wrong when they classified the subject Bulletin as advertising material falling under Heading 49.08/11. Incidentally, we find that their action finds support also from what is stated in the BTN. Accordingly, we uphold the impugned order and reject this appeal.
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