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1984 (10) TMI 15
Reserves For Unexpired Risks, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... f money available to the assessee for payment or discharge of unexpected claims that might arise in respect of the policies which had been issued and which extended beyond the accounting year under consideration. Accordingly, in the view of the Tribunal, the amount so standing to the credit of these accounts could be regarded as a fund and was liable to be included in the capital computation. Mr. Jetly referred us to clause 2 of the said circular. It would appear to us that the said circular has direct relevance to the question under consideration before us. The Income-tax Officer and the other authorities under the Act, including the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, were bound to act in accordance with the said circular. This is well settled both by the Supreme Court and by several decisions of this court. Accordingly, without any further discussion, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs of the reference.
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1984 (10) TMI 14
Assessment, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... by section 33 of the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1984. A proviso was newly inserted to sub-section (2) of section 187 to the following effect Provided that nothing contained in clause (a) shall apply to a case where the firm is dissolved on the death of any of its partners. The above proviso which has come into force from the assessment year 1975-76 recognises the principle enunciated by this court earlier in Addl. CIT v. Vinayaka Cinema 1977 110 ITR 468 FB . Having regard to the above, we consider that the Tribunal was correct in coming to the conclusion that two separate assessments should be made on the assessee-firm for the two broken periods-one up to the date of death of the partner and the other for the period subsequent to the death till the end of the accounting year relevant to the assessment year under consideration. We accordingly answer the question in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 300.
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1984 (10) TMI 13
Advance Tax, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... ely preceding year. It is for that reason that the court held that there is no failure on the part of the assesse to file an estimate of such tax in terms of section 212(3A) and, therefore, the order of penalty levied under section 273 was not justified. In this case, after the Income-tax Officer had issued a demand based on the last completed assessment, the assessee, without accepting that demand, submitted his own estimate. Later, the assessee himself filed a return of income showing a considerably higher income than his estimated income. The fact that he made an estimate under section 212 does not dispense with his obligation to make a further estimate under section 212(3A). His failure to file an estimate under that section clearly attracts the provisions of section 273(c). In this view of the matter, the question referred to us has to be and is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The Revenue will have its costs from the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1984 (10) TMI 12
Depreciation, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... es. The Tribunal has already restricted the disallowance to Rs. 5,000 out of the motor car expenses at Rs. 22,359 which roughly comes to about 1/4th of the total expenses. Under such circumstances, disallowance of depreciation should be restricted to 1/4th of the depreciation claimed. We, therefore, hold that the disallowance of depreciation should be restricted to 1/4th of the total depreciation claimed for use of the six motor cars for non-business purposes. In View of my findings above, I hold that the Tribunal was not justified in law in holding that no disallowance can be made by the Income-tax Officer from the full depreciation allowance claimed by the assessee-firm, even though the motor cars owned by the assessee-firm were used by the partners of the firm for their personal purposes also. The question is, therefore, answered in the negative and in favour of the Department and against the assessee. However, the parties will bear their own costs. UDAY SINHA J.-I agree.
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1984 (10) TMI 11
Reassessment, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... e duty of the court, in exercise of its powers, to ascertain whether the Income-tax Officer had in his possession any information or material. The court may then determine whether that information is correct and the Income-tax Officer could have reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. As, in this case, I have formed the opinion that the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Incometax Officer did not exist as there is no indication that the name-lending was in connection with the loans involved in the assessment under consideration or there was nothing to show that it related to a loan of the assessee, the condition precedent was lacking. I, therefore, exercise my jurisdiction under article 226 of the -Constitution of India to quash the impugned notices. For the above reasons, the writ petitions succeed and are allowed. The impugned notices are quashed. On the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.
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1984 (10) TMI 10
Agricultural Land, Capital Gains, Exemption From Tax ... ... ... ... ..... d will lead to many anomalies. Therefore, it is necessary to avoid such an interpretation of the section which leads to anomalies and which will make it invalid. We have to adopt such construction which will make the section valid and certain. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Addl. CIT v. G. M. Omarkhan 1979 116 ITR 950 (AP), which is directly in point, supports the view we have taken. In that case, the expression which has got a population of more than ten thousand was held to qualify only the municipality or cantonment and not the expression in any area . We are inclined to agree with the reasoning in that case. In this view, we have to agree with the view taken by the Tribunal and hold that the capital gain arising out of the sale of the above land cannot be exempted under section 2(14)(iii) of the Act. The questions are, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The Revenue will get the costs from the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1984 (10) TMI 9
Assessee, HUF, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... s for the valuation of each asset, can be determined taking guidance from the Wealth-tax Rules. That being so, we do not see why the Wealth-tax Officer cannot seek guidance from rule 2(1) of the Wealth-tax Rules for the purpose of valuing the partnership interest held by a Hindu undivided family for the purpose of the Wealth-tax Act itself. It will be open to the Wealth-tax Officer to consider all the materials to determine the open market valuation and, while doing so, the Wealth-tax Officer can also take guidance from the principles of valuation in rule 2(1) of the Wealth-tax Rules. We, therefore, answer the second question of law referred to us to the effect that the inclusion of the value of the partnership interest in the computation of the net wealth of the assessee under section 2(m) read with section 3 of the Wealth-tax Act is perfectly valid. We accordingly answer both the questions in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 300.
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1984 (10) TMI 8
... ... ... ... ..... ssable under section 64(iv) and, in this connection, reliance was placed on Patwardhan s case 1970 76 ITR 279 (Bom). In view of these decisions, it cannot be doubted that the difference of Rs. 31,280 has to be included in the net wealth of the assessee, as out of the total value of 10 shares of Rs. 63,780, the consideration actually paid was only Rs. 32,500. In view of the aforesaid decisions, I hold that out of the total value of 10 shares transferred by the assessee to his wife, Rs. 31,280 will be included in the net wealth of the assessee. In view of my above findings, I hold that the Tribunal erred in law in excluding the value of 10 shares transferred by the assessee to his wife in computing the net wealth of the assessee which has to be computed as pointed out above. The question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. However, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, the Revenue will bear its own costs. UDAY SINHA J.-I agree.
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1984 (10) TMI 7
... ... ... ... ..... fusing to grant registration, even for part of the year up to the death of one of the partners. The question referred should not detain us any longer, since, the matter has been completely covered by the decisions of this court in CIT v. Shambulal Nathalal 1984 145 ITR 329 and in CIT v. Sree Durga Enterprises 1984 145 ITR 351. This court has consistently followed that in a case like this, there could only be a single assessment for the whole year. So far as question No. 3, relating to registration for the period July 1, 1971, to January 4, 1972, is concerned, it is needless to state that if there could be single assessment for the whole year, there cannot be registration for a broken period. The Tribunal also found factually that there was no dissolution and only a change in the constitution of the same firm. In that view also, there could not have been registration for the broken period. In the result, we answer all the questions in the affirmative and against the assessee.
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1984 (10) TMI 6
Assessment, HUF, Partition ... ... ... ... ..... validity of section 171 of the Act in the light of the principles enunciated on the scope and ambit of article 14 of the Constitution in taxation measures, reviewed and restated by the Supreme Court in The Twyford Tea Co. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1970 SC 1133, followed in all the later cases, it is abundantly clear that the challenge of the petitioner to the said section as infringing article 14 of the Constitution is ill-conceived and is devoid of merit. Even otherwise, section 171 of the Act that treats all undivided Hindu families that were previously assessed to tax, but are partitioned alike, cannot be condemned as offending the principles of permissible classification or as arbitrary also. In this view also, the challenge to section 171 of the Act has no merit. As the only contention urged for the petitioner fails, these writ petitions are liable to be rejected. I, therefore, reject these writ petitions at the preliminary hearing stage without notice to the respondents.
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1984 (10) TMI 5
Business Expenditure, Income ... ... ... ... ..... which is fastened on the assessee during the previous year relevant for the assessment year under consideration. It is not denied that the assessee has been maintaining its accounts in the mercantile system and that the excess collections relate to the transactions concerning the assessment year 1974-75. Irrespective of the fact whether the money was repaid to the constituents wholly or otherwise before the close of the accounting year, the assessee is entitled to claim the sum as a deduction following the mercantile system of maintaining accounts employed by it. In any view of the matter, we are satisfied that the decision of the Tribunal excluding the addition of Rs. 8,76,277 is correct. We accordingly answer the third question also in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In the result, all the three questions are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs.
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1984 (10) TMI 4
Advance Tax, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... al Magistrate, Pune, in Case No. 13265 of 1979 directing the Income-tax Officer concerned to produce the documents as sought by the complainant is quashed. A criminal revision application, being Criminal Revision Application No. 608 of 1983, has also been filed by the accused praying that the order dated December 5, 1980, issuing process against them should be quashed and that the petitioners be discharged because no prima facie case has been made out. The process was issued as long back as in 1980, and hence this application is inordinately delayed. Furthermore, the complaint before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate encompasses matters other than the production of documents relating to information of tax evasion and hence we see no merit in this application. The accused/petitioners in Criminal Revision Application No. 608 of 1983 may agitate this point before the trial court, if so advised. Rule, therefore, in Criminal Revision Application No. 608 of 1983 is discharged.
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1984 (10) TMI 3
... ... ... ... ..... o. 2 in the reference pursuant to the direction in O.P. No. 3125 of 1979E and question No. 2 pursuant to the direction in O.P. Nos. 3146 of 1979G, 3223 of 1979A and 4251 of 1979F, we hold that the trustees are liable to be assessed as representative assessees. The questions referred to this court pursuant to the direction in O.P. Nos. 397 of 1979L and 394 of 1979L relate to the assessment years 1972-73, 1973-74 and 1974-75 and concerning the deductions on account of the alleged bad debts. These questions are answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee, in view of the findings on facts by the Tribunal, agreeing with the Income-tax Officer, that the conditions under section 36(2) or 37 of the Income-tax Act have not been satisfied. The parties would bear their respective costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1984 (10) TMI 2
Procedure For Reference ... ... ... ... ..... e sent back to the Tribunal, as, in our opinion, such incomplete references ought not to be treated as references properly made at all. There is one observation which is required to be made. On occasions where the assessee is the applicant and some of the annexures are sent to the Department for verification and/or attestation and in such a case the annexures could not be sent, this must not be deemed to be default of the applicant but of the respondent-Department and the consequence we have indicated must not follow, for that would be visiting the applicant assessee with punishment for the default of the respondent. In all the three matters, there is gross default on the part of the Department right from the very beginning. In the circumstances, the references are returned to the Tribunal with the questions unanswered on the footing that the applicant Commissioners have failed to prosecute the same. Office to give effect to our order as far as possible by November 30, 1984.
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1984 (10) TMI 1
Priority Industry, Relief ... ... ... ... ..... tax which ought to be paid by Mr. Larner was paid by the assessee-company and such tax ought to have been deducted at source at the time of payment to Mr. Larner. The facts do not, however, support this claim of the Revenue inasmuch as the Central Government approved the contract of service to pay salary, without payment of any tax, to Mr. Larner, subject to the obligation that in excess of the sum of Rs. 4,000 per month paid to Mr. Larner, the assessee-company itself shall pay tax. This is, therefore not a case where the provisions of section 192 of the Act come into operation. In our opinion, the Tribunal was right in rejecting the Revenue s claim for payment of interest by the assessee for the three assessment years under consideration under section 201 (1A) of the Act. For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the question referred in the affirmative, i.e., against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. The Revenue shall pay costs of the assessee. Advocate s fee Rs. 300.
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