|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 175 Records
-
1984 (10) TMI 211
Whether the charges of corrupt practice were established?
Held that:- The High Court clearly overlooked the fact that disturbing the election meeting by itself did not constitute undue influence. For establishing the link between the disturbance of the meeting and the returned candidate the evidence is wholly oral in character and has to be scrutinised with greater rigour. Merely on the statement of some of the witnesses who were essentially Akali Party workers or supporters a charge of corrupt practice could not have been taken as proved. The approach of the learned trial judge to the matter is contrary to law as settled by decisions of this Court relating to corrupt practice and proof thereof.
PW.12 was a supporter of the Akali Party as stated by him though he also indicated that he had accompanied the appellant in the course of canvassing for votes to Bagicha Singh’s house. A sum total view of the evidence, in our opinion, falls short of the legal requirement for finding corrupt practice. Here again, we are of the view that the High Court went wrong in accepting the case of the election petitioners that the appellant had committed corrupt practice for procuring the votes of Bagicha Singh, members of his family and his friends by getting the over-hanging electric wires removed. After all, if there be any scope for doubt, it must resolve in favour of the appellant who was facing a quasi-criminal charge.
The appeal has to succeed. We accordingly reverse the decision of the High Court and uphold the election of the appellant. The finding of the High Court that he was guilty of corrupt practice under ss. 123(1) and (2) stands vacated.
-
1984 (10) TMI 210
... ...
... ... ..... tomer and gets it reimbursed from the manufacturer. In this view of the matter, therefore, this also does not fall within the ambit of the definition of sale . 9.. A Division Bench in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Rita Sales Corporation 1986 61 STC 240 1984 17 VKN 299 although may not have considered this question but has taken more or less the same view. 10.. In the light of the discussion above, therefore, our answer to the question is in the negative and these transactions when the assessee gets reimbursement in respect of parts supplied during the warranty period or gets parts from the manufacturer supplied during the warranty period or gets parts from the manufacturer supplied during the period of warranty to the customers and the predelivery charges, these transactions do not fall within the ambit of sale under the provisions of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act and therefore not liable to tax. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
-
1984 (10) TMI 209
... ...
... ... ..... ales tax dues, Orissa sales tax dues, agricultural income-tax dues and Orissa taxation (on goods carried by road and inland waterways) dues and in issuing a sale proclamation for realisation of a consolidated amount of Rs. 4,09,718.52. In O.J.C. Nos. 289 and 290 of 1978 we have already held that the clubbing up of all the demands together is absolutely illegal and is not sanctioned by the provisions of law and the consolidation of all the demands has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. So we are of the view that the writ petition should be allowed, annexures 3, 4 and 5 and the sale proclamation issued in respect of the consolidated amount of Rs. 4,09,718.52 are liable to be quashed and are hereby quashed. 4.. In the result, therefore, the writ petition is allowed. However it may be made clear that it is open to the authorities to proceed further for realisation of the dues in respect of this case according to law. There is no order as to costs. MOHAPATRA, J.-I agree.
-
1984 (10) TMI 208
... ...
... ... ..... een given a reasonable opportunity of hearing inasmuch as the tax imposed by the assessing authority was enhanced by the revising authority. In my opinion the justice should not only be done but it should seemingly appear to have been done. It is also desirable that a person who is going to be fixed the liability of payment of tax to a higher amount than assessed by the assessing authority, should be given a fair and reasonable opportunity of being heard. In view of the aforesaid fact I am of the view that the petitioners were not afforded reasonable opportunity of being heard. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the order passed by the Assistant Sugar Commissioner dated 19th August, 1981, is quashed. The case is remanded back to the Assistant Sugar Commissioner with a direction to decide the matter afresh after affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.
-
1984 (10) TMI 207
... ...
... ... ..... ds of one taxable description and become those of a commercially different category and description. It appears to us that the position has been simplified by the amendment of the law, as indicated above, so that each of the categories falling under iron and steel constitutes a new species of commercial commodity more clearly now. It follows that when one commercial commodity is transformed into another, it becomes a separate commodity for purposes of sales tax. 6.. After considering the argument of both sides and the decisions cited by both the parties, especially 1977 40 STC 192 (Surana and Company v. State of A.P.) and 1984 55 STC 47 (Nemichand Parasmal and Company v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer), we hold that sugar-candy is liable to levy of sales tax under entry No. 86 (during the relevant period) of List C, i.e., List of goods subject to sales tax. 7.. In the result, therefore, the writ petition stands dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. MISRA, J.-I agree.
-
1984 (10) TMI 206
... ...
... ... ..... must construe a section as it stands and must not add any words to it in absence of a clear necessity. (See Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corporation AIR 1966 SC 1678 at page 1679). Unless, therefore, we read the section as we are inclined to by adding the words, if any, the result would be that not only the constitutional validity of the provision may possibly be in jeopardy but would defeat the avowed intention of the legislature. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Sales Tax Officer has exceeded the jurisdiction in passing the final order of assessment without passing the draft assessment order. The result is that this petition is allowed and impugned order of assessment dated 25th May, 1984 is quashed and set aside and the matter is remitted to the Sales Tax Officer for passing fresh draft assessment order and issuing notice to the petitioner as contemplated under section 46A if he is so advised. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.
-
1984 (10) TMI 205
... ...
... ... ..... h could be regarded as agricultural implements could be exhaustive so as not to allow the inclusion of any other items within that term. In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Bishram Tiwari 1971 28 STC 485, the Allahabad High Court has taken the view that the intention of the notification in question was to exempt all agricultural implements driven by human or animal power and to tax only those agricultural implements which are worked otherwise than by human or animal power, and therefore, agricultural sprayers are exempt from sales tax although they do not find a place in the list of articles mentioned therein. 2.. In T.R.C. No. 22 of 1983, an additional point has been raised and that is, whether zinc sulphate is a chemical fertiliser. Inasmuch as under the Fertilizer (Control) Order, it is one of the items (item 37) mentioned in the schedule of fertilisers, it could not be considered otherwise. Accordingly, we dismiss all these revision cases. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1984 (10) TMI 204
... ...
... ... ..... urged that the legislative intent in inserting explanation VI in the Second Schedule to the Act was to treat both cashew and its kernel as one and the same commodity. 14.. It seems to us that explanation VI is in the nature of an exemption clause which provides for exemption of kernel from the tax at the sale point if tax had been paid on the purchase of cashew. This is obviously a concession extended by the Legislature to keep down the price of edible kernel and not indicative of any other intention of the Legislature. 15.. Admittedly the petitioner had purchased cashew from the parties who have not paid tax under the Act. It is not in dispute that raw cashews are consumed in the manufacture of cashew kernels. All the conditions prescribed in section 6 of the Act having been thus satisfied, the levy of tax on the purchase turnover of cashew is, therefore, fully justified. 16.. In the result, the petition is dismissed. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
-
1984 (10) TMI 203
Business Expenditure, Business Loss ... ... ... ... ..... the test of public policy governs the facts of the case. The miller in the instant case defaulted in delivering the levy rice between November 1, 1972, and February 23, 1973. As a consequence thereof, rice worth Rs. 43,974 was seized and confiscated. The loss suffered by the miller, we hold, resulted due to infraction of law and, therefore, under s. 28 of the Act, such a loss cannot be treated as a business loss and also not as an expense under sub-s. (1) of s. 37 of the Act. For the aforesaid reasons, we remit the answer in favour of the Revenue, that is to say, against the assessee. No costs. After we have pronounced the judgment in this case, the learned counsel for the assessee sought oral leave to the Supreme Court of India. Oral leave is refused, for, on the facts of the case, no substantial question of law arises which is required to be decided by the Supreme Court of India. This cannot, therefore, be certified as a fit case for leave to appeal under s. 261 of the Act.
-
1984 (10) TMI 202
Whether there is rationality in the belief of the legislature that capacity to pay the tax increases, by and large, with an increase of receipts?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As the contentions put forward by the petitioners that the impugned enactment is devoid of legislative competence inasmuch as it imposes not a tax on sales but a tax on income, that the adoption of a slab system for determining tax liability is alien to the concept of sales tax and that the levy of additional tax under the impugned enactment violates articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution are all totally devoid of merit. We do not also see any substance in the plea raised in the writ petitions that the provisions of the impugned Act are violative of article 301 of the Constitution.
-
1984 (10) TMI 194
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Debts of all descriptions to be admitted to proof
-
1984 (10) TMI 193
Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases ... ... ... ... ..... Had any specific instance been brought out that would have been considered. In case they have reference to the above irregularities, then opinion about them has already been expressed. The complaint under section 211 of the Companies Act can, therefore, proceed subject to the observations made above. Another circumstance to which the parties have made reference is that a suit was instituted against the company and its managing committee which was partially decreed by J.D. Jain J. and a number of strictures were passed with regard to the affairs of the company. At present, an appeal against that judgment is pending before a Division Bench of this court and some stay has been allowed. In my view, the controversy raised in that litigation will receive adjudication in due course. The same could not affect the propriety of determining this petition under section 633(2) of the Companies Act. It has been as such that this order has been made. The petition is disposed of accordingly.
-
1984 (10) TMI 192
Winding up – Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... en at a loss, it can be clearly stated that the company is unable to function. In such a situation, a company which is not able to function cannot pay its debts. To suggest that it is a pressurising tactic only because Rs. 1,10,000 are not paid back in the court is rather not pressurising the company, but pressurising the petitioner to withdraw the petition. Cyclones are natural calamities, but the resultant effect is that the company is not able to function. When the company is not able to function at all, it is not able to pay the just claim of any of the creditors including the present petitioner. Under these circumstances, the petition is required to be admitted. Advertisement to issue in Gujarat Samachar and Times of India, the two newspapers which are published from Ahmedabad. Next date is fixed as December 10, 1984. The learned advocate, Mr. G.N.Shah, desires to challenge this order by filing O.J. Therefore, the operation of this order is stayed up to November 9, 1984.
-
1984 (10) TMI 171
Shares warrants and entries in register of members, Transfer of Shares – Power to refuse registration and appeal against refusal,Powers of Court to rectify register of members
-
1984 (10) TMI 170
Winding up – Overriding preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... ned to November 6, 1984. I must further mention that the learned counsel for the financial institutions vehemently contended that no interim order can be passed at this stage. It is not possible to accept this submission for the simple reason that their main objection regarding lack of power in company court to pass this order has been overruled on merits. So far as inter se contribution is concerned, all the banks as well as these financial institutions are inherently sound. It cannot be suggested that compliance with the ultimate order of adjustment of contribution as and when passed by this court will meet with any difficulty. Therefore, no prejudice will be caused to these financial institutions if each of them is made to contribute 12 frac12 on ad hoc basis. Request on behalf of the financial institutions by their learned counsel to stay the operation of my present order is rejected as the very purpose of passing the present order will be frustrated by granting any stay.
-
1984 (10) TMI 153
Plant and machinery ... ... ... ... ..... pplicability or otherwise of the Bombay High Court decision are available. Even the appellants have not placed all the necessary facts about what is claimed to be a machine shop to enable us to give a categorical finding about the entitlement of the appellants to their claim for exemption under notification. In view of all this, the matter requires a fuller and detailed examination at the lower levels. 8. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise shall again examine the matter in the light of two decisions referred to above and examine whether the appellants rsquo claim for exemption under the notification squarely fits in Notification in the light of the two decisions aforesaid and then pass orders in accordance with the law. The impugned orders are thus set aside and the matter remanded to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Coimbatore, for de novo decision as pointed out above after giving an opportunity to the appellants of hearing. The appeal is allowed by remand.
-
1984 (10) TMI 151
Stamping foils ... ... ... ... ..... R 258D . This fact has also been re-iterated in a written submission by Shri Balani in which he has also stated that an appeal on similar issue, relating to P.K. leather cloth being entitled to the benefit of assessment under Notification No. 29/79, dated 10-2-1979, by virtue of being embellishments for footwear, has been allowed to the same appellants, vide CEGAT Order No. D-220/83 dated 21-4-1983. 3. Shri Sunderrajan, JDR, who appeared on behalf of the respondents, agreed that the.... in this case was covered by these two earlier decisions of the Tribunal and he had nothing further to add in the matter. 4. In view of the foregoing, we allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
-
1984 (10) TMI 147
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... t a letter dated 8-10-1984 to say that since the issue was covered by an earlier decision, no hearing was necessary. 4. ensp Shri Sunder Rajan brought to our notice Order No. 353/84-C, dated 8-6-1984 in Appeal No. CD(SB)(T) A. 844/81 filed by the very same appellants and involving an identical issue. In that order the Tribunal had discussed the matter at length and came to the conclusion that the goods were appropriately classifiable under heading No. 73.27/28 of the Customs Tariff Schedule. Shri Sunder Rajan stated that this case would be covered by that decision although he would reiterate all the contentions put forth by the Departmental Representative in the earlier matter. 5. ensp Following our earlier decision, we direct that the goods herein shall be reclassified under heading No. 73.27/28 of the Customs Tariff Schedule. The appeal is allowed with consequential relief to the appellants which shall be granted within 3 months from the date of communication of this order.
-
1984 (10) TMI 146
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... shnan, JDR, has not controverted the above facts. 4. ensp We have carefully considered the matter. In view of the fact that, on examination, the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, and the Victoria Jubiless Technical Institute, Bombay, have given the opinion that the item imported by the appellants would be more appropriately classifiable as lsquo flats rsquo rather than lsquo Hoops and Strips rsquo and also that in 1980 the Collector of Customs (Appeals), Bombay has held in respect of imports of identical stainless steel lsquo flats rsquo in 4 separate appeals that such stainless steel lsquo flats rsquo are liable to be assessed under Item No. 73.15(1) and not under Item 73.15(2), and also that it appears that this decision of the Collector has since guided the assessment of similar imports, we hold that the goods imported by the appellants were liable to be assessed under Item 73.15(1). 5. ensp We allow the appeal accordingly with consequential relief to the appellants.
-
1984 (10) TMI 145
Demand notice - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... these strips, that would for this case make no difference because in substance, the article was the same and Department was fully aware of the process of manufacture. There was no suppression or mis-statement of facts or fraud or collusion on the part of appellants. In such a case, the time limit applicable for raising demand would be the shorter period of six months and not the longer period of five years. 7. ensp As to penalty also, we do not think that retrospective amendment made in Rule 9(2) of Central Excise Rules, 1944 can be evoked for imposing penalty for a past period. Even otherwise, on the facts and circumstances of the case, imposition of penalty is not justified. As a result of foregoing discussion, the demand of duty from the appellants is restricted to a period of six months preceding the receipt of the date of show cause notice. Rest of the demand of duty is, set aside. Penalty imposed on the appellants is also set aside. The appeal is thus partially allowed.
........
|
