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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 178 Records
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1984 (5) TMI 232
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... ... ..... en in the presence of such available remedy, an application under article 226 could be maintained, if there is violation of principles of natural justice and that apart, there was initial lack of jurisdiction of the concerned authority. But, the submissions of Mr. Ghosh that when the High Court has entertained an application under article 226, the same cannot be dismissed on the ground of available remedy or the non-availing of the same, cannot be accepted. It must also be recorded that there was another submission made by Mr. Dutta that since the facts relating to Review Cases Nos. 2 and 3 and Appeal No. 648 of 1976-77 were not duly pleaded, the petition would not be maintainable, were of some substance. In view of the above the rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs. In view of the findings and since the facts and point of law are the same, I also dispose of C.R. Nos. 2693 to 2695(W) of 1976 on the basis of the order as proposed in C.R. No. 2692(W) of 1976.
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1984 (5) TMI 231
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... ... ..... f the value of the goods in respect of which particulars are not furnished. Keeping in view the details of the provisions contained in section 38 of the Act it is difficult to hold that it is covered by the ratio of Mool Chand Chuni Lal s case 1977 40 STC 238 (FB) and intra vires the State Legislature being ancillary or incidental power to levy sales tax under entry 54, List II of the Seventh Schedule. In view of discussion above, section 38 of the Act is ultra vires the State Legislature as it is neither covered by entry 54, List II of the Seventh Schedule directly nor is it ancillary or incidental thereto. Rule 53 being consequential to section 38 of the Act can also be not sustained. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and section 38 of the Act and rule 53 of the Rules are struck down as unconstitutional and the respondents are restrained from compelling the petitioners to file returns as prescribed therein. No order as to costs. PREM CHAND JAIN, AG. C.J.-I agree.
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1984 (5) TMI 229
Government company ... ... ... ... ..... he said contract and having failed to perform its part of the obligations, the petitioner-company cannot now contend that the said agreement was not legal or valid in view of the provisions of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952, and the bye-laws of the East India Jute and Hessian Exchange Ltd. This is not a case in which the writ court should exercise its discretion and grant the injunction. I am prima facie satisfied that no ground has been made out for the interim order being continued till the disposal of the rule. I, therefore, vacate the interim order dated March 29, 1984, and direct the Allahabad Bank, respondent No. 3, to forthwith make payment of the amount covered by the bank guarantee to respondent No. 2. In the event the rule succeeds, respondent No. 2 shall refund the said amount covered by the bank guarantee to the petitioner. Advocate on record of respondent No. 2 is directed to communicate this order to the Allahabad Bank, respondent No. 3, forthwith.
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1984 (5) TMI 228
Regulation of export and transfer of securities ... ... ... ... ..... d the import and export of currency and bullion. It seeks to preserve rupee resources against foreign exchange in dollars. The Reserve Bank of India is the regulating authority. It has to grant or refuse the permission. The Reserve Bank of India having given the necessary permission there could not be any justification for granting the temporary injunction. Appellant No. 2 had been exercising his right as a voter since 1973 or 1974. His right was never challenged all these years. No irreparable injury is likely to be caused if appellant No. 2 was allowed to exercise his right as a shareholder till the disposal of the suit. Balance of convenience is definitely in his favour. In conclusion we accept the appeal, set aside the impugned order and discharge the temporary injunction granted by the learned single judge. The learned judge will deal with the case as expeditiously as possible, if possible within six months, as there is only one issue. There will be no order as to costs.
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1984 (5) TMI 227
Company – Membership of, Power of court to rectify register of members, Meetings and proceedings - Annual General Meeting, Extra Company Law Board’s power to call annual general meeting, Representation of corporation at meetings of companies & creditors, Appointment of directors and proportion of those who are to retire by rotation, Oppression and Mismanagement – Right to apply under section 397 and 398, Interim order by Tribunal
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1984 (5) TMI 226
Company – Service of documents on members by, Meetings and Proceedings – Extra Ordinary General Meeting, Meetings and proceedings - Restriction of exercise of voting rights of members who have not paid calls, etc.
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1984 (5) TMI 198
Director number of, Winding up – Statement of affairs to be made to official liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... the discussion of the facts of the case, that the two ex-directors are liable to make out a statement of affairs with the help of the records and books now available with the official liquidator within two months from today failing which the report of the official liquidator shall be treated as a complaint under sub-section (5A) of section 454 of the Act and penal proceedings shall have to commence. Further orders will be made only after there has been compliance or failure of compliance with the direction as above. At this stage there will be no order as to costs. If there is compliance with the direction given to the ex-directors, the official liquidator shall report the same with his comments to this court and, thereafter, appropriate final orders will be made on this report. However, the matter will be called in court after 60 days from today if there has been no compliance by them. This order is made ex parte Batcheler who resides outside the jurisdiction of this court.
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1984 (5) TMI 197
Oppression and Mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... itioners have also not been able to make out a case of substantial injustice which can be set right by the court invoking the principles laid down in Needle Industries (India) Ltd. v. Needle Industries Newey (India) Holding Ltd. 1981 51 Comp. Cas. 743 AIR 1981 SC 1298. For the reasons stated above, I am not inclined to and do not pass any order on this application except that I record that learned counsel for the respondents stated on instructions that the respondents and the company will not stand in the way of petitioner No. 2 to exercise his rights as a shareholder in the company in accordance with law. All interim orders are vacated and the special officers will stand discharged. The fees of the special officers paid by the petitioners in the first instance will be borne by the company. There will be no order as to costs. Learned counsel for the petitioners prayed for stay of operation of this judgment and order. As this order has no operative part, the prayer is refused.
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1984 (5) TMI 180
Power to cause investigation to be made into scheduled industries
... ... ... ... ..... he Central Government or its nominee certain assets pertaining to the aforesaid rayon unit and lying in the factory premises of the rayon unit for a token price of Re 1. The offer was time-bound. On 11th June, 1983, however, the petitioners withdrew the time-limit placed for acceptance of the offer by the Central Government. On 15th June, 1983, the Central Government appointed a Task Force, headed by the second respondent, to visit the factory premises without any prior notice to the first petitioner. The Task Force looked into the functioning and affairs of the rayon unit and submitted its report towards the end of June, 1983. Certain meetings thereafter were held between the officers of the petitioners and officers of the Central Government, the latter examining the possibility of re-starting the rayon unit. On 6th August, 1983, the impugned order was passed by the Central Government. These are the undisputed facts. The impugned order dated 6th August, 1983, reads as under
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1984 (5) TMI 171
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... ... ..... sides. There is not a word about its unavailability for any other reason. 9. The Appellate Collector says ldquo they have claimed exemption under the Notification 68/76 dated 16-3-1976 . He further said that rdquo here the issue is about giving the exemption . But he too came to the conclusion that as the paper being thin was finally coloured on both sides, the exemption was not available. 10. Seeing all this, we do not need to go behind the order to probe further. The issue was only whether the exemption should be given or not. The Assistant Collector and the Appellate Collector decided the paper was dyed on both sides and so should not be given the exemption. But we hold that the paper was dyed on only one side and, therefore, was entitled to the concession. 11. And we order that the paper should be assessed under Notification No. 68/76-C.E. as a converted paper subjected to printing of colour on one side. The appeal is allowed and the refund shall be granted expeditiously.
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1984 (5) TMI 170
Concessional rate of duty ... ... ... ... ..... t of the equipment is the extruder. Subsequent to the order-in-appeal, the Board also decided the dispute for import licensing purposes in favour of the appellants holding that lsquo extruder rsquo included the subject ldquo accessories rdquo . This has to be given due regard. There is also evidence of compulsory supply and of no separate charge being made for ldquo accessories rdquo . The goods may well have been entitled to the Accessories (Condition) Rules 1963. There is also force in Counsel rsquo s plea regarding classification of complementary machines with the main machine, though this may not necessarily apply to an exemption. However, even if the entire machinery is a cable insulating equipment, it is clear that the extruder is the main machine. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find sufficient reason to deny the exemption to the so-called accessories. In the result, we set aside the order-in-appeal and allow this appeal with consequential relief.
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1984 (5) TMI 168
Cocoa Powder ... ... ... ... ..... therefore, satisfied that in so far as no Excise Duty is leviable on unblended and unflavoured Cocoa Powder manufactured in India the said commodity, when imported, does not attract Countervailing Duty. 7. We may note at this stage that the Revision Petitions referred to the judgement of Bombay High Court as if it was Countervailing Duty that was involved in the said case also. No doubt, Shri Subramaniam stated the same in his arguments before us also. But on a perusal of the judgment of the Bombay High Court it is clear that what was in question in the said case was not a demand for Countervailing Duty but a demand for Central Excise Duty. But even so the conclusion that in the present appeals no Countervailing Duty is payable on the imports in question follows from the said decision for the reasons stated earlier. 8. Accordingly, both these appeals are allowed and the orders of the lower authorities are set aside ordering consequential relief to the appellant in both cases.
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1984 (5) TMI 164
Acrylic/plastic sheet scrap ... ... ... ... ..... with consequential relief to the appellants which shall be granted within 3 months from the date of communication of this order. 5. A copy of this order shall be placed in each of the appeal files. 6. emsp Order per H.R. Syiem, Member (T) . - The Appellate Collector says that the scrap itself is a plastic material, and for this reason he comes to the conclusion that the acrylic scrap is a substance falling under Item 15A(1). That it is a plastic material is true but that it is capable of moulding as such is not established. He also says that what the Advocate describes as his client rsquo s activity was no doubt correct. But he thinks that the process was not the only or necessary process. 7. emsp We think otherwise. And to say, as the Appellate Collector, that polymethyl methacrylate is itself thermoplastic and lends itself to moulding by compression, injection, extrusion, is not enough to prove what he claims. 8. emsp I, therefore, agree with brother Sankaran rsquo s order.
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1984 (5) TMI 163
Alkylated phenol ... ... ... ... ..... nts. 8. emsp Now, the appellants have filed another appeal before this Tribunal regarding the other consignment of 100 drums of Alkylated Phenol per vessel SS Ronnenburg involved in this case. As per the statement made by Shri R. Venkataraman, Dy. Manager, Indian Oil Corporation Limited, the facts of this appeal and the facts of the Appeal No. 721/83-C already decided by this Bench of the Tribunal on 19-5-1983 are the same and therefore, in view of the earlier decision passed in that appeal No. 721/78-C this appeal be also accepted and consequential relief be allowed to the appellants. 9. Shri Ohri SDR could not distinguish the earlier decision of the Bench in appeal No. 721/78-C from the facts of this case and therefore, following our earlier decision in Appeal No. 721/78-C, dated 19-5-1983, we also accept this appeal and direct that the consequential relief be also given to the appellants, regarding this consignments of 100 drums of Alkylated Phenol involved in this appeal.
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1984 (5) TMI 162
Yarn - Dutiability ... ... ... ... ..... n, since, according to him, the appellants were not, in any case, liable to pay the base duty. In view of this clarification, we consider that no useful purpose would be served by remanding the matter to the lower authorities as suggested by Shri Harbans Singh. 9. ensp On a careful consideration of the submissions on both sides, we therefore hold that the demand of differential duty from the appellant cannot be upheld. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned demand with consequential relief to the appellant. 10. ensp So far as the cross objection filed by the department, it is seen that no relief had been claimed thereunder, the same containing merely the arguments for the department and ending with the prayer that the order of the Collector (Appeals) may be upheld. In the circumstances there is really no cross objections in the real sense. In that view and also in view of the fact that the appeal itself is being allowed, the cross objection is dismissed.
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1984 (5) TMI 155
Electric machinery and equipment ... ... ... ... ..... ertificate, catalogues/assembly drawing etc. 3. emsp In their appeal, they have stated that the goods were imported for manufacture of Thristor Converters falling under Heading 85.01(1) of C.T.A., 1975. The appellants have also produced the D.G.T.D. Certificate as well as the relevant drawings and catalogues. Since the conditions laid down under the subject Notification i.e. No. 37-Cus., dated 15-2-1979 have been substantially complied with, the appellants have claimed reassessment of duty at the concessional rate of duty under the aforesaid notification. 4. emsp Sh. Rakesh Bhatia, S.D.R. has examined these documents submitted by the appellants and agrees that having regard to the decision of this Bench in similar other cases, the appellants are entitled to concessional rate of duty. 5. emsp The Bench has considered the submissions made by both the parties and allows the appeal. The orders of the Collector of Customs (Appeals), Bombay are set aside, with consequential relief.
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1984 (5) TMI 154
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... ... ..... msp Sh. R. Subramanian, Sr. Manager (Systems) of the appellants appearing on their behalf have admitted that duty exemption certificate in this case was issued by the General Manager of the appellants. This certificate is dated 13-3-1980. The goods, however, were imported in June, 1979. Relevant documents having not been produced expeditiously, it is too late now on the part of the appellants to agitate this matter at this stage. This is a small claim of Rs. 3,761/- only. Sh. Subramanian does not press claim, the appeal is, therefore, dismissed as not pressed.
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1984 (5) TMI 147
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... ... ..... uestion involved was income from such self-acquired property was assessable as assessee s individual income. He has pointed out certain observations from pp. 781 and 782. Those observations are distinguishable from the facts of the instant appeals. There is a clear intention of partition and/to effect actual partition because of the prohibition by virtue of law and, therefore, under such a circumstance it was impossible to register the partial partition, such was not a case before the Supreme Court. 12. In our opinion, the coparceners of the HUFs had clear intention to partition the lands in question but they did not do so because of the prohibition of law. Therefore, it was not possible for them to register the partial partition. The view taken by the authorities below not to accept the partial partition because of not registering the same is not proper. The ITO is directed to accept the partial partition. 13. In the result, the assessees succeed and the appeals are allowed.
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1984 (5) TMI 144
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... ... ..... with which the assessee rsquo s authorised representative had to travel to Delhi. As soon as the authorised representative returned, the appeal was filed. The assessee rsquo s case is that it was entirely due to this exigency that the delay had occurred and that no negligence could be attributable either to the assessee or to the authorised representative. We find force in these pleas. The AAC has sought reliance for dismissing the appeal in limine on a ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of J. B. Advani and Co. (P) Ltd. vs. R. D. Shah CIT, Bombay (1969) 72 ITR 395 (SC). That case, however, is in our view, clearly distinguishable on the facts, being a case where the delay had not been explained by the assessee. In the present case we find that the assessee had given justifiable reasons for the delay. In the circumstances, we set aside the order of the AAC and direct him to dispose of the appeal afresh after giving due opportunity to the assessee. 3. The appeal is allowed.
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1984 (5) TMI 141
Previous Year ... ... ... ... ..... ion 34(2)(ii) are, admittedly, not applicable in this case and the provisions of section 32(2)(iii), on the other hand, indirectly support the assessee s claim. The question that one should ask himself before deciding the issue is whether the assessee owned the particular asset in the previous year. The answer to this question cannot, certainly, be in the negative. This has to be seen particularly with reference to section 28(i) which provides for computation of income under the head profits and gains of business or profession , if the business or profession was carried on by the assessee at any time during the previous year. The expression at any time during the previous year which is used in section 28, under the scheme of the Act as I understand, would govern all the sections which provide for computation of income under section 28 after giving various allowances and/or deductions. 9. My order will now go to the Bench for deciding the appeal according to the majority view.
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