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Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 206 Records
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1984 (6) TMI 106
Assessment Order, Assessment Proceedings, Income Tax Authorities ... ... ... ... ..... the IAC, Indore, had no jurisdiction over the assessee and, accordingly, he could not have given directions under section 144B and these directions could not have been made the basis for assessment in law inasmuch as there can be no confirmation of power through misconstruction of statute and jurisdiction cannot be conferred by parties or else by the consent of the assessee. There being no doctrine of implied powers or global jurisdiction, there was on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, a want of jurisdiction vis-a-vis the IAC, Indore, and since a want of jurisdiction results in an order and proceedings which are void ab initio, the assessment order along with section 144B proceedings are held to be so, and amounts to a nullity. We hold and direct accordingly, with the result, that the orders of the lower authorities stand cancelled. The grounds by the assessee succeed and stand allowed. 17 to 23. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues.
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1984 (6) TMI 105
Interest On Securities ... ... ... ... ..... t of the same. 6. The assessment of the interest amount in the hands of the assessee is bad for another reason. The assessee-company has taken over the assets and liabilities of a business carried on by the Government. When the assessee took over the business, the interest amount had already accrued due to the Government and it formed part of the assets taken over by the assessee. This is confirmed by the deed of sale executed in favour of the company by the Governor of Kerala and the connected papers regarding the valuation of the assets. The assessee merely collected an amount which had accrued due to the predecessor in interest. It was not, therefore, a case of the assessee receiving an income. It was only a case of a recovery of an asset. In this view of the matter also, the interest amount cannot be brought to tax in the hands of the assessee. We, therefore, confirm the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) deleting the additions. 7. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1984 (6) TMI 104
Applied To, Revised Return, Time Limit For Completion ... ... ... ... ..... 12. The learned departmental representative advanced an alternative contention to the effect that the present case can also be brought under clause (b) of section 153(1) and a period of eight years will be available from the end of the assessment year as the present case is one failing within clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 271 of the Act. It was pointed out in this connection that the ITO had found that the assessee had concealed income to the extent of Rs. 85,000. We do not consider it necessary to go into the question in view of our finding in favour of the department on the main contention advanced. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel for the assessee that the Tribunal should not express any opinion on the question of concealment as the entire assessment has now gone back to the ITO as per the orders of the Commissioner (Appeals). This will be another reason for not dealing with the contention at this stage. 13. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1984 (6) TMI 103
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... ... ..... nd the relevant authorities. The addition has been made because of low withdrawals of the partners and not because of any credits appearing in their names. A careful perusal of the judgements cited on behalf of the Revenue shows that where the Court justified an addition in the hands of the partner, it was a case where there were credits in the accounts of the partners in the proportion of their profit sharing ratio. But the case before me is not the type which the authorities cited by the Revenue had decided. Therefore, these authorities cannot come to its aid. As regards the judgment of Banta Singh Kartar Singh, it was regarding the quantum of penalty which was fixed within the statutory limits but on agreement with the assessee. Therefore, that the case too was distinct on facts. Since in this case the addition is in the hands of the entity different from the entity regarding which the withdrawals were considered low, it is not justified. It is deleted. 7. Appeal allowed.
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1984 (6) TMI 102
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... ... ..... umar survived the deceased. All this, as a matter of fact, is academic because we have annulled the reassessments but we have given the finding as per submissions and request of the learned counsel for the assessee in this regard which also goes in favour of the assessee. 14. In respect of valuation of the two plots, he had submitted that the values were enhanced from what they were taken at in estate duty matters and for that he had relied on a Jaipur Bench decision where it was held that whatever value was taken in wealth tax should be taken in estate duty. Even on this issue, we have to be with the learned counsel for the assessee for these two years because whatever was taken to be values of the plots in estate duty, should have been taken here as dates are in proximity so far first year is concerned and the same is to be repeated for subsequent years but this again is academic as the reassessments as such as annulled. 15. In the result, all the four appeals are allowed.
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1984 (6) TMI 101
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... ... ..... has later been amended so as to make this object more expressive by providing two independent sections, namely 59 and 61 in the ED Act, 1953, as amended in 1958. As it is necessary to interpret sec. 62, without causing violence to the main intendment, scope and object of the Act, we are of the view that any mistake falling under the group designed by us as above is bound to be rectified under s. 62. But this was on the basis of s. 62 then available on the statute regarding rectification which is not so in the instant case, as subsequently s. 62 was splitted and two ss. 59 and 61 were brought on the statues. Under s. 61 therefore according to us, rectification could not be effected because it is nothing but change of opinion and this sort of fiction, if confirmed, would not only open the gates of litigation but litigation would never come to an end. In the result, rectification orders passed by both the lower authorities are annulled. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1984 (6) TMI 100
Agricultural Income ... ... ... ... ..... departmental representative which was that of Rani Ratnesh Kumari s case, that was a case also of malikana which was an allowance payable under the various engagements entered into at the time of settlement of revenue and was not in the nature of a share in the land revenue or rent arising from the villages and, therefore, malikana income was not held to be agricultural income by their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court. Reliance of the learned departmental representative on this case as well, is misplaced. To summarise ratio of all the judgments, if carefully gone through, supports the contention of the assessee because there is no controversy about the fact that receipt of Rs. 2,400 per annum was rent of land which was utilised for agricultural purposes, the trees having been planted and attended to, could not be termed as spontaneous growth. The contention of the assessee is, therefore, accepted and the AAC s action is reversed. 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1984 (6) TMI 99
Levy Of Penalty, Reasonable Cause ... ... ... ... ..... lakhs. The tax in question was to be deposited by 31-3-1977, otherwise, the disclosure would have become invalid. As such, there is substantial truth in his contention that he was prevented due to financial stringencies from depositing the demand. Keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of the case, it is held that the appellant was prevented due to reasonable cause in not paying the demand in question. However, since the demand has not been paid, it would be reasonable to sustain the impugned penalty to Rs. 5,000 as against Rs. 15,000 levied by the ACED. The appellant is thus entitled to a relief of Rs. 10,000. From the above finding, it is clear that it has been held by the Appellate Controller that the accountable person was prevented due to reasonable cause in not paying the demand in question. If it is so, she was not justified to sustain even a portion of the penalties. Both the penalties are, therefore, cancelled. 9. In the result, both the appeals are allowed.
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1984 (6) TMI 98
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... ... ..... before the assessment was made. If the claim was made by the assessee through a letter before the assessment was made, the ITO could not have ignored the claim of the assessee. The claim might not have been accepted but the claim must have been considered by the ITO and thereby the assessee would have got a right to go in further appeal. If the claim of the assessee can be considered on the strength of a letter, there is no reason that the claim of the assessee cannot be considered when the same has been filed through a return and before the assessment is made. Under the above circumstances, the return filed by the assessee on 25th Feb., 1982 was a revised return as well as it was also a claim before the ITO and, therefore, the ITO should have acted upon the return of the assessee dt. 25th Feb., 1982. Consequently, the plea of the assessee is accepted and the ITO is directed to Act upon the return of the assessee dt. 25th Feb., 1982. 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1984 (6) TMI 97
Revised Return ... ... ... ... ..... before the ITO before the assessment was made. If the claim was made by the assessee through a letter before the assessment was made, the ITO could not have ignored the claim of the assessee. The claim might not have been accepted but the claim must have been considered by the ITO and thereby the assessee would have got a right to go in further appeal. If the claim of the assessee can be considered on the strength of a letter, there is no reason that the claim of the assessee cannot be considered when the same has been filed through a return and before the assessment is made. Under the above circumstances, the return filed by the assessee on 25-2-1982 was a revised return as well as it was also a claim before the ITO and, therefore, the ITO should have acted upon the return of the assessee dated 25-2-1982. Consequently, the plea of the assessee is accepted and the ITO is directed to act upon the return of the assessee dated 25-2-1982. 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1984 (6) TMI 96
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... ... ..... on under s. 146 within the prescribed time. Unfortunately, it was filed before the ITO, District III(I) instead of the ITO, District III (2), apparently due to inadvertence. When the mistake was pointed out, the assessee took prompt steps to rectify the same. The present position is that the petition filed by the assessee under s. 146 of the Act is still pending. The disposal of the appeal against the quantum of assessment by the AAC while the Petition under s. 146 is still pending is contrary to the scheme of the Act., as well as the Board s circular on the point. Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, we vacate the orders of the AAC and restore the appeal to his file with a direction to dispose of the same afresh in accordance with law, after the petition under s. 146 is disposed of by the ITO, and after giving reasonable opportunities or being heard to the parties concerned. 6. In the result the appeal may be treated as followed for statistical purposes.
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1984 (6) TMI 95
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... ... ..... on, rejected the said submission. Under r. 27 of the ITAT Rules, the assessee can support the order of the ld. CIT (A) on a point decided against him. The appellant cannot, of course, be made worse than what it was, when it came to the Tribunal, but if relief granted by the ld. CIT (A) is capable of being defended on a ground other than that decided by the ld. CIT (A) in his order, such a plea can always be raised by the assessee. The effect of accepting such a plea would be to confirm the order of the ld. CIT (A). Even though if the assessee had been in appeal, he would have been eligible for a total relief on that account. In the present case, as noted above, the assessee is not in appeal and, therefore, the assessee cannot get more relief than has already been granted to it by the ld. CIT (A). This being so, we confirm the order of the ld. CIT (A) though on a different ground and dismiss the departmental appeal. 11. In the result, the departmental appeal stands dismissed.
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1984 (6) TMI 94
Valuation Of Assets, Unquoted Equity Shares ... ... ... ... ..... ial Bench of the Tribunal at Delhi has already held in Biju Patnaik v. WTO 1982 1 SOT 623 that rule 1BB of the Rules is procedural in nature and retrospective in operation. It, therefore, applies to pending assessments. The decision in the case of Smt. Kusumben D. Mahadevia by the Hon ble Supreme Court was in relation to a gift-tax matter and the applicability of rule 1D was not specifically in dispute in that case. Now that we have got a specific rule and a number of High Court authorities wherein they have held that the Tribunal has no discretion in the matter of valuing unquoted equity shares otherwise than in accordance with the rule, we are not in a position to ignore the rule notwithstanding the fact that a Bench of the Tribunal has not properly considered the effect thereof. Accordingly, we accept these appeals, set aside the order of the AAC, and direct that the value of these shares shall be computed in accordance with rule 1D. 6. The appeals are accordingly allowed.
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1984 (6) TMI 93
A Firm, Certain Assets, Computing Value, Net Wealth, Set Off ... ... ... ... ..... hile computing the net wealth of the firm the exemption available to all the partners in terms of section 5(1)(xxiii) ought to be allowed while computing the net wealth of the firm. The shares may not belong to an individual partner, but they do belong to all the partners and, therefore, while computing the net wealth of the firm, due recognition of this joint ownership has to be taken and due relief as provided under the law has to be allowed. The WTO was, therefore, wrong in not granting exemption in respect of the shares while computing the net wealth of the firm. He should now recompute the net wealth of the firm after deducting the exemption under section 5(1)(xxiii) read with section 5(1A) from the net wealth of the firm. The proportionate share of the partner will be computed with reference to such net wealth and not with reference to the net worth of the firm as was done by the WTO. 13. Subject to the above observations, the appeals of the assessee are partly allowed.
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1984 (6) TMI 92
Original Assessment, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... m and the share incomes of the partners, it will be a case which will fall squarely within the language of section 155(1), which stipulates that-- Where in respect of any completed assessment of a partner in a firm it is found-- (a) on the assessment or reassessment of the firm, or ... the share of the partner in the income of the firm... is not correct, the Income-tax Officer may amend the order... four years... from the date of the final order passed in the case of the firm. 9. In the present case, the reassessment of the firm, consequent to the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) has been done, as pointed out by my learned brother, some time in 1978, changing the total income of the partners including that of the assessee. The rectification in the assessee s case under section 155(1)(a) in 1980 is, thus, within time. 10. The assessee s appeal, therefore, has no merit and deserves to be rejected, as has already been done by my learned brother. I respectfully agree with him.
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1984 (6) TMI 91
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... ... ..... , there is interregnum between the deduction of tax and the payment thereof, the correct course in law would be to treat the tax not so paid as outstanding from the assessee, (though its recovery cannot be pressed against the assessee) and as soon as the tax is paid, the payment is adjusted against the tax so outstanding. To relate the tax paid to the assessment in respect of the previous year in which tax was paid is against the scheme of the Act as discussed above. 19. In the present case the tax has been paid in July, 1980. Such payment will be adjusted against the tax due from the assessee for the year under consideration and which was outstanding till the payment in question was made. The tax will, of course, be treated as paid on behalf of the assessee in July, 1980, but the payment will be in respect of the tax due from the assessee for the assessment year under consideration. 20. With these observations, we dispose of the present appeal treating it as partly allowed.
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1984 (6) TMI 90
Advertisement Expenditure, Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... ach movie in the case of a producer is a separate and an independent industrial undertaking and, therefore, the provisions of section 37(3D) are applicable and not those of section 37(3A). 8. It may not be out of place to mention that our above interpretation is also justified on equitable grounds. The reason behind the provisions of section 37(3D) appears to be that the advertisement expenditure on a new product including the movie/picture in the initial stages should be allowed in full as that is a bare necessity for the carrying on of the business while after a few years the necessity may or may not be so much. In the case of a film producer, the movie/picture is a new product which requires a separate establishment and new advertising machinery. No doubt, the banner under which it is produced has also some advertising value but the main thing is the picture or the cast and not the banner. 9. In the result, the departmental appeal is dismissed though for different reasons.
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1984 (6) TMI 89
Appellate Assistant Commissioner, High Court, Raw Material ... ... ... ... ..... mstances of the case. As explained by the learned judges of the Bombay High Court in the case of Daimler Benz A.G. the assessee was fully entitled to take up the ground before the Commissioner (Appeals). Further, we find that the Commissioner (Appeals) has not set aside the entire assessment. Since the order of the ITO on the issue was too cryptic, he restored the matter to the file of the ITO for re-examination of the assessee s liability to this levy. From the terms of the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), it is clear that the Commissioner (Appeals) was fully aware of the Bombay High Court decision in the case of Daimler Benz A.G. and in terms he has followed it. We, therefore, see no substance in the appeal on behalf of the revenue on any of the grounds on this issue. The appeal of the revenue on this issue is rejected. 18. In the result, the appeals for the assessment years 1972-73 and 1973-74 are dismissed whereas for the assessment year 1978-79, it is partly allowed.
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1984 (6) TMI 88
Assessment Year ... ... ... ... ..... of the society, although the latter aim had not been achieved in the relevant assessment years. We would follow the said decision of the Tribunal which clinches the issue in favour of the assessee. 19. In any case, it is an established principle that where two reasonable views can be fairly taken while interpreting the provisions of a taxing statute, one in favour of the assessee should be preferred. In the present case, the department took the stand in favour of the assessee for almost ten years after interpreting section 10(22) in revision under section 264. Thereafter, no decision had been reported which rendered the earlier view untenable. The Supreme Court s decision in Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust s case, as already stated, dealt with a different aspect and nothing stated therein required a change of view on the interpretation of section 10(22). 20 and 21. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues. 22. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1984 (6) TMI 87
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... ... ..... upying it alongwith his brothers whenever on leave or was otherwise in Baroda. The ld. counsel for the accountable persons has been able to support his arguments by two ld. commentators to the effect that what was necessary was that the property should be used exclusively for residence. It was not necessary that the property should been used for the exclusive residence of the deceased. If such a restrictive meaning was placed on the clauses even, if the deceased resided in the property with his wife and children, the accountable person would be denied the relief under s. 33(1)(n) of the ED Act. This certainly should not have been the intention of the legislature. In our opinion, the orders of the lower authorities require to be reversed. They are accordingly reversed. The relief will be granted to the accountable persons in respect of the value of the 1/4th share in the property at Baroda used by the deceased for his residence. 4. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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