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Showing 21 to 40 of 306 Records
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1984 (7) TMI 391 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... ted to a Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court in Criminal Revision Case No. 206 of 1976, Criminal Revision Petition No. 204 of 1976 in Assistant Collector of Customs, Preventive Department, Custom House, Madras v. Misrimal and Shah Monmal Misrimal and has taken the view that an order of acquittal would not render negatory or inoperative a valid order of confiscation by a competent adjudicating authority. It would look incongruous if an order of confiscation would remain intact notwithstanding an order of acquittal by a Criminal Court but personal penalty alone would get automatically set aside. Such a proposition of law, in our opinion, is clearly mis-conceived. At any rate, no questions touching the same at all arise under the order of the Tribunal meriting a reference to the High Court. 9. We, therefore, find that no question of law arises out of the order of the Tribunal for reference under Section 130(1) of the Act. Accordingly, we dismiss the application.
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1984 (7) TMI 390 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE (APPEALS), CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... sives, there can be no denying of the fact that they are ultimately used in the manufacture of explosives because the chemical components to which Platinum/Rhodium are converted are actually used in the manufacture of explosives. The argument of Mr. Samarjit Ghosh, Solicitor that even if there is no direct use, the same is covered by the provisions of Rule 56A so long as the Platinum/Rhodium after some chemical conversion are used in the manu- facture of explosives is accepted. The decision of the Appellate Collector of Central Excise, Bombay and the decision of the CEGAT Bombay Branch cited by Mr. Samarjit Ghosh are relevant. Therefore, in this case also the Platinum/Rhodium are to be treated as used in the manufacture of explosives. The appellants are entitled to the credit of duty on this material under Rule 56A of the Central Excise Rules. The appeal is allowed and the order of the Assist- ant Collector is set aside. Consequential relief may be granted to the appellants.
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1984 (7) TMI 389 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... der of the Tribunal for a reference. 11. The cross-objections filed for the Respondent do not propose any question of law to be referred to the High Court. On the contrary it would appear that Respondent desires reference of an alleged question of law to the Supreme Court. Such a cross-objection cannot maintain. 12. In the premises the Application for Reference is allowed in respect of the following questions - (i) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the letters dated 2-2-1973 and 14-3-1973 can be construed to be a protest in terms of Section 11B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944? (ii) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the protest, if any, related to the question of valuation only or could cover rate of duty as well? 13. The aforesaid questions of law arising out of order of the Tribunal dated 9-8-1983 are referred to the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Madras as questions of law for its considered opinion.
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1984 (7) TMI 388 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... -going vessels”. We note that sailing vessels, Liners, trawlers, fishing vessels, etc. have been categorised as ocean-going vessels. The subsequent notifications re-inforce our conclusion that the vessels in question are “ocean-going vessels” entitled to the exemption sought for. The learned SDR has also cited the views of the Principal Officer of the Mercantile Marine Department according to whom there is no difference between an “ocean-going vessels” and a “Sea-going vessel”. If a sea-going vessel is to proceed to sea beyond the inland waters it should be registered under the Merchant Shipping Act. Besides, the character of a vessel can be determined on the basis of its capability and use. According to the criteria, the vessel in question has to be considered as “ocean-going” for the purposes of Notification 55/75, dated 1-3-75 as amended. The impugned orders are accordingly set aside “and the appeals are allowed.
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1984 (7) TMI 387 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... s necessary for the Collector to investigate whether the concerns which fabricated these goods (valued at ₹ 10,39,407) were ‘factory’ under the Factories Act, 1948. The appellants will also have to lead evidence in support of their plea that these items were manufactured in premises which were not ‘factory’. Regarding the other batch of items consisting of storage tanks, steam trap tanks, pipe and pipe fittings etc., totally valued at ₹ 19, 88,940/-, no excise duty is leviable on these since they could not be considered as complete machinery and, therefore, were eligible to exemption under Notfn. No. 118/75, dated 30-4-1975. The balance of the items valued at ₹ 12,28,054 are admittedly liable to payment of excise duty and the appellants should pay duty at appropriate rate under Item 68 CET. We order accordingly and set aside the order passed by the Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Ahmedabad. The appeal is thus partly allowed.
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1984 (7) TMI 386 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... d no clarify. Section 5(1) of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act clearly refers to a situation in which a provision of a Bill providing for the imposition or increase of a duty of Customs or Excise in respect of which a declaration (that it is expedient in the public interest that the provision of the Bill relating to such imposition or increase shall have immediate effect) is made by the Central Government comes into operation as an enactment in an amended form before the expiry of the 75th day after the day on which the Bill containing it was introduced. Section 5(1) applies only to amendments effected to “declared” provisions of such Bills. Quite clearly, an exemption notification issued under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules cannot and does not amount to an amendment of a “declared” provision of a Finance Bill. We reject the learned Counsel’s contentions in this behalf. 9. In the result, the appeal lacks merit and is rejected.
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1984 (7) TMI 385 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... vernment has powers to grant refund ex-gratia, the Tribunal has no such powers. It has however not been urged that if the Tribunal orders refund, the same would be disobeyed. We do not think that on this hair splitting argument, we should sit in judgment over decision of the Supreme Court driving the appellants from pillar to post and reject their claim on the technical plea of limitation when the Government itself as evidenced by the order of the Supreme Court agreed to waive limitation and examine the appellants claim on merits and when now before us it is not disputed that appellants goods were not chargeable to countervailing duty. It is manifest that on merits the appellants’ claim deserves to be granted. 9. In view of the orders of the Supreme Court, the appellants are held entitled to and arc ordered to be refunded the sums collected from them as countervailing duty in the five cases within 3 months from the date of this order. The appeals are thus allowed.
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1984 (7) TMI 384 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... want of bond fide is imputable to a party. Similar is the position in the case of a corporate body which is not entitled to a greater indulgence under Section 5 of the Limitation Act than a private individual. It was held in the case of District Board, Sargoda v. Shamasdin reported in 123 Indian Cases 1983 (extract taken from page 54 of the Limitation Act by B.B. Mitra, XVIII Edition) (not cited by the parties). 5. After the aforesaid discussions and in view of the legal position, I do not feel it to be a fit case where this court should exercise its discretion in condoning the delay in filing of revision applications under sub-section (5) of Section 129-A of the Customs Act, 1962. I hold that the appellant was not prevented by sufficient cause in the late filing of the revision applications. Accordingly, all the four appeals are dismissed being hit by limitation. Since the appeals are dismissed on the point of limitation, I am not going into the merits of the appeals.
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1984 (7) TMI 383 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... d in quadruplicate and shall be accompanied by four copies (at least one copy of which shall be a certified copy) of the order appealed against and where such order is an order passed in appeal or revision, four copies (at least one copy of which shall be a certified copy) also of the order of the adjudicating authority. 6. In view of my aforesaid discussions, I hold that filing of papers in conformity with the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1982 is obligatory on the part of the appellant and accordingly, the appellant is directed to file the same. 7. During the course of the argument, the learned Advocate had pleaded that this court should summon the records from the lower authorities and I had advised the appellant to approach the lower authorities for getting the copies of the same and if the lower authorities do not accede to his request, he may approach this court for necessary directions as to the production of records.
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1984 (7) TMI 382 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... e relevant documents we cannot accept the contention of the appellants that the Customs had allowed clearance of similar goods against similar licences. In any case, if by inadvertence or mistake an illegal import had been permitted, that cannot be made a ground to clear the subsequent illegal import. There is no question of estoppel operating against the Customs. 15. Coming to the complaint of fine being excessive, Shri Jain had submitted that the Collector had taken into consideration the margin of profit. In the matter of imposition of fine in lieu of confiscation, the Act gives discretion to the concerned authority. The appellants have filed to satisfy us that the discretion has been improperly or arbitrarily or capriciously exercised by the learned Collector. In the circumstances we see no reason to interfere with that part of the order also. 16. After careful consideration of all the aspects, we see no merit in this appeal, and accordingly we reject the same.
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1984 (7) TMI 381 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... e the assessee does not sell in the course of wholesale trade at the price fixed under any law or the maximum price fixed under any such law; and (f) apparently, the Appellant had transgressed the provisions of the Fertilizer Control Order and the Essential Commodities Act in recovering the freight on raw material in addition to the controlled price. The controlled price was not the price at which the goods were, in fact, sold. On top of this, the contention is that the assessable value has to be determined with reference to the controlled price only. 4. We see little merit in such a contention. The Appellant would have been better advised to accept the remand by the Appellate Collector on the issue of manufacture rather than question the inclusion, in the assessable value, of the freight incurred on raw material unauthorisedly recovered in the sale of the finished products. 5. Accordingly, the Appeal is dismissed and the order of the Appellate Collector confirmed.
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1984 (7) TMI 380 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... iling and there was some force in the plea that it could be treated as process scrap but if there was any defective end-product, it could not be called scrap and treated as process waste, free of duty. 6. In reply, Shri Gopal Prasad pointed out that even according to the invoices goods wre sold as wire scrap and filament scrap. 7. There is no dispute that the so-called scrap in this appeal is processing scrap which arises during the course of manufacture. We agree with Shri Lakshmi Kumaran that T.I. 68 being non-descriptive, there is some difficulty in equating the scrap with the end product. The scrap in this case cannot, therefore, be treated as a ‘manufactured’ product falling under T.I. 68. We accordingly allow the appeal. However, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 11, we agree with the department and limit the consequential relief to six months from the date of payment. We accordingly, modify the impugned order and partly allow this appeal.
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1984 (7) TMI 379 - CEGAT BOMBAY
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... ... ..... emsp;As has been stated earlier, dispatching the order to the Advocate would be sufficient communication to the applicant. The order had been despatched to Shri Karmali. According to the applicant, Shri Karmali told him that he had received the order in September. The applicant however would have it that Shri Karmali told him that he did not communicate the order, because of the endorsement found on the order itself. The applicant had not chosen even to file a letter of Shri Karmali in support of his statement. 10. On careful consideration of all the aspects, we are satisfied that the applicant had not shown any cause much less sufficient cause to condone the delay of nearly 6 months in preferring the appeal. We, therefore, reject this application for condonation of delay. 11. As we have rejected the applicant’s application for condonation of delay the appeal shall have to be rejected as barred by time, and accordingly, we reject the appeal as barred by time.
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1984 (7) TMI 378 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... tion fr6m the duty of excise leviable, or, as the case may be, fixing a rate of duty, only under such Central law or Central laws, unless such notification or order also. by express words, provides for an exemption from the duty of excise leviable, or, as the case may be, fixes the rate of duty, under the Central Excises Act." “Central law” for this purpose has been defined as a “Central Act other than the Central Excises Act and includes a declared provision within the meaning of Section 2 of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931",- Section 2(b) of the aforesaid 1982 Act . 16. From a combined reading of the two aforesaid clauses, it is clear that the exemption contained in Notification No. 70/77 is limited to the duty leviable under the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 and does not extend to the duty leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. In this view of the matter, the appeals fail.
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1984 (7) TMI 377 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... to by the appellants; namely, No. 139/77, dated 18-6-1977 as amended by Notification No. 6/79, dated 13-1-1979; the goods which fulfil the conditions as laid in S. No. 10 in the Table annexed to the Notification will be fully exempt from countervailing duty so far as goods classifiable under T.I. 19, are concerned. 16. To avoid confusion, we order as follows That goods covered by Bill of Entry No. D 172 dated 2-2-1978 will be fully exempt the width being less than 15 Cms. (43 Mms. per invoice at page 8 of the Appeal File), whereas goods covered by Bill of Entry No. D 174 dated 2-2-1978 will not be so exempt, the width exceeding 15 Cms per invoice at page 11. In respect to goods covered by Bill of Entry D 801 dated 10-1-1978, one roll with width less than 15 Cms. per invoice at page 14, shall be so exempt whereas the second roll having width, in excess of 15 Cms. will not be so exempt. 17. We allow the appeal to the extent indicated above with consequential relief.
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1984 (7) TMI 376 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... t unloaded at their place of destination in India, or so much of the quantity of such goods as has not been unloaded at any such destination if goods unloaded at such destination are short of the quantity required to be unloaded at that destination ; (c) payment of drawback as provided in Chapter X, and the rules made thereunder; are not correct in law. If the intention of the legislature had been to take away the jurisdiction of the appeals (then revision petitions) filed before 11-10-1982, the legislature would have made a specific provision to this effect. Accordingly, I hold that only those cases are to be transferred to the Central Government where the orders have been passed by the Collector (Appeals) under Section 128A of the Customs Act, 1962. Accordingly, I hold that this Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the present appeal. The appellant as well as the respondent are directed to appear in this Court on the 24th August, 1984 for hearing and disposal of the appeal.
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1984 (7) TMI 375 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... ct and in case of M/s. Madras Rubber Factory v. Union of India and others (not cited by the party) reported in AIR 1976 S.C. 638 1983 E.L.T. 1579. The Customs Act is self-contained law to govern and regulate the functions of Customs from the collection and assessment of customs duty. The learned authorised representative’s argument that the appellant’s refund claim is governed by Section 23 does not help him. The provisions of Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962 for refund are mandatory and the appellant had filed a refund application under Section 27 of the Customs Act and now the appellant says that the refund claim is not governed by Section 27 but is governed by Section 23. The appellant cannot go both ways. Section 23 of the Customs Act deals as to the remission of duty on lost, destroyed or abandoned goods. In the result I hold that the appellant’s refund claim is barred by limitation under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962. The appeal is dismissed.
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1984 (7) TMI 374 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ependent and complete and recommends assessment under Heading 84.66 of the optical profile grinding machine. According to the Board’s order on which Shri Chatterjee strongly relies, the imported machine is not covered by this description but is a machine tool. Moreover, the Industrial licence was issued on 18-12-1980 whereas the Bill of Entry had been filed on 3-11-1980 and application for registration of the contract was made only on 26-3-1981, while the order for the goods appears to have been placed prior to 9th July, 1980, as seen from the ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ORDER from M/s. Autoflow. The regulations contemplate determining the entitlement to the benefit of project import in advance of the import and it appears to us that the claim for project import in this case is an after thought. 9. We accordingly hold that the prescribed regulations not having been complied with, the goods are not entitled to assessment under Heading 84.66. We, therefore, reject the appeal.
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1984 (7) TMI 373 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... red, with such plant, machinery, materials or thing." The learned Advocate’s argument that the appellant had committed a default under rules 53 and 226 is not tenable as per Cl. (a) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 173Q above. The judgment cited by the Id. Advocate in the case of Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa does not help him as the facts and circumstances of the same are different. 7. I uphold the orders passed by the lower authorities. However, I feel that the quantum of penalty is excessive. To meet the ends of justice the penalty is reduced from ₹ 10,000/- to ₹ 7,000/- (Rupees seven thousand) only. Thus, the appellant is entitled to a relief of ₹ 3,000/-(Rupees three thousand) only. The Revenue is directed to refund the amount of relief to the appellant within two months from the date of this order, after necessary verification as to the payment of the same. Except for this modification, for statistical purposes the appeal is rejected.
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1984 (7) TMI 372 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... e of the issue of the notification. Appeal allowed and case remanded. 9. No doubt the appellant is bound with the expert opinion given by the testing officer, Jamshedpur in view of the bond dated the 13th August, 1971 executed by the appellant which appears as annexure on page 26, attached to the revision petition. In the bond the appellant had bound himself. The relevant extract from the bond is reproduced as under - “and shall abide by any test result conducted on the representative sample and the decision taken thereof”. 10. In view of the above discussions I am satisfied that there is denial of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, I remand the case to the learned Collector of Customs, Calcutta and further direct that he should afford an opportunity to the appellant to cross-examine the testing officer and decide the same in accordance with the law within six months from the date of this order. For statistical purposes the appeal is allowed.
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