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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 255 Records
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1984 (8) TMI 304 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the seller who collects such gallonage fee from the purchaser has an accredited instrumentality for the recovery of the said gallonage fee and therefore the same cannot be taken to form part of the sales turnover. It was also held in that case that since the collection of gallonage fee from the purchasers and remitting the same into the treasury by the distilleries is a statutory obligation, the said fee collected cannot form part of the sales turnover and as such it cannot be brought to charge under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. The analogy of gallonage fee not forming part of the sales turnover, as has been held in the above case, applies to the textile committee cess collected by the assessee, in pursuance of the statutory obligation laid under the provisions of the Textiles Committee Act. Thus, the view taken by the Tribunal appears to be correct and no interference is called for by this Court. The tax revision cases are therefore dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1984 (8) TMI 303 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tensils does not make his sales any the less the second sales. We are of the view that the claim for exemption on the ground of second sales will not depend upon as to who has purchased the goods and the claim for exemption on the ground of second sales cannot be denied merely on the ground that the second sale is not to a dealer in electrical goods. Once the goods purchased and sold by the assessee are of electrical goods, the assessee is entitled to claim exemption on his second sales irrespective of the fact as to who is the purchaser. The Board of Revenue had, of course, referred to certain decisions as supporting its stand but we are of the view that the decisions referred to have no relevancy at all on the question as to whether the assessee s sales are second sales and as such, they are to be exempted. We cannot therefore accept the view taken by the Board of Revenue in this case. The tax appeal is allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1984 (8) TMI 302 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s tax realised from the customers was not admissible deduction in terms of section 7(2)(a)(ii) of the Act. The court has proceeded on the basis that whether the amount shown in the sale memo included partly the value of the goods and partly sales tax realised on the sale, would depend upon the bargain between the buyer and the seller and so long as the buyer and the seller have understood that what was paid in respect of the sale not only includes the price proper but also sales tax, then the seller can claim deduction in respect of the sales tax payable on the sale notwithstanding the fact that sales tax collected has not been separately shown in the sale bills. In view of this preponderance of judicial opinion on the question, we are not in a position to agree with the Tribunal in this case. In our view, the assessee is entitled to seek deduction of the sales tax paid by him from the gross turnover. The tax revision cases are therefore allowed. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1984 (8) TMI 301 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... not kept only in the houses, but in offices and business places as well and everywhere the items, which are of convenience and which have an element of decoration or ornament, can be said to be the items of furniture. The iron pallets, which are used for stacking sugar and wheat bags and which are hardly visible, are merely the items of utility and therefore, they cannot be characterised as items of furniture. The shelves or racks either in the business places or in the offices, are the items not only of utility or convenience, but they add to the beauty of an office or a business place, wherever they are used for keeping or storing the things in well arranged manner. So an item, which is used for convenience and which has an element of decoration, art or ornament, can be said to be the item of furniture. For these reasons, I hold that the Tribunal rightly accepted the appeal of the assessee. In the result, the revisions are dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.
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1984 (8) TMI 300 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ommercial Taxes Officer, Special Circle, Jaipur in the present case, this very question arose before the Board of Revenue in A.C.T.O., Ward III, Circle D, Jaipur v. Raj. jewellers, Cutters Co-op. Society 1978 RRD 498 and A.C.T.O., Ward II, Circle B, Jaipur v. Phoolchand Gangaram 1979 RRD 130 and in both the cases the Board of Revenue has taken the view that for the purpose of filing a revision under section 14(1) of the Act, the assessing authority would be the officer having jurisdiction at the time the revision is to be filed. In the result the question referred to is answered in the negative and it is held that under the facts and circumstances of the case, the Board of Revenue was not right in holding that the revision petition presented by the Commercial Taxes Officer, Special Circle II who was the assessing authority at the time of presentation of revision petition was not proper. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1984 (8) TMI 299 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... denied the power to tax the inter-State sale or purchase of newspapers. Even without the exclusion of newspapers from the definition of goods under section 2(d), the charging section under the Act obviously could not have been invoked to tax the sale of newspapers effected in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. The Parliament being aware of this aspect, has kept the provisions of section 8(3)(b) in tune with the definition clause. The word goods must, therefore, in our opinion, receive the same meaning as defined under section 2(d) and any attempt to give the commercial meaning to that word would be illogical and unwarranted. We must, therefore, reiterate the view taken by this Court in Samyukta Karnataka v. Commercial Tax Officer (W.P. No. 224 of 1964 disposed of on July 16, 1964) which has stood the test of time for two decades. In the result, the rule is discharged and the writ petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1984 (8) TMI 298 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ts and circumstances of every case, they have not in the present case applied their mind judiciously nor have they taken all the relevant circumstances into consideration for imposing the penalty of Rs. 2,000 which consequently cannot be sustained in law. 11.. In the result this petition is allowed with no order as to costs. The impugned orders annexure A passed by the Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Indore, and the impugned order annexure C passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax, Indore, are quashed. It is declared that the iron hoops (iron strips) are declared goods and the respondents have no authority or power to levy tax at a rate more than 3 per cent. The respondents are further directed not to levy tax at the enhanced rate of 7 per cent and treat the sale of the iron hoops as sales of declared goods, entitled to levy of concessional rates. The petition is disposed of accordingly. The amount of security deposit, if any, on verification be returned to the petitioner.
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1984 (8) TMI 297 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y power to take ex Parte decision in the matter of tax liability of the dealer in case of noncompliance with the notice for making available for inspection of accounts, registers, vouchers and other documents, required by him under section 13(1)(c) of the said Act. I, therefore, find that the impugned notice is bad in law and is in excess of power conferred by section 13(1)(c) of the 1954 Act in so far as it requires the dealer to appear personally and produce documents and holds out a threat that an ex Parte decision would be taken against him if he does not comply with the notice. For this reason the impugned notice must be struck down. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute to the extent indicated below. The purported notice dated 26th March, 1984 (annexure A to the writ petition), is quashed. The respondents are directed not to give effect to the said notice. There will be no order as to costs. Let appropriate writs be issued accordingly.
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1984 (8) TMI 296 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oposed there, would also govern the said F.M.A. No. 666 of 1977. Thus, F.M.A. No. 666 of 1977 is also allowed and the judgment and order dated 1st September, 1972, as made in Civil Rule No. 4244 (W) of 1968 are set aside. There will be no order as to costs. We must also hold that the explanation to section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code not having a retrospective effect prior to the period of the incorporation of the same, the submissions on res judicata or application of principles analogous thereto were available in this case to Mr. Mukherjee and that too as the orders or the proceedings as impeached, were initiated and completed earlier than 1976, when the explanation to section 141 as mentioned hereinbefore was added. On the prayer of Mr. Mukherjee, we keep it on record that if the said company now files separate account sales statements and declaration forms in terms of this judgment, the authorities should reconsider their case. AMARENDRA CHANDRA SENGUPTA, J.-I agree.
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1984 (8) TMI 295 - SUPREME COURT
Whether under sec. 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961, having regard to its scope, a suit in the nature of a petition under sec. 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 could be stayed ? If, so whether the Ist Respondents have made out a case for staying the Appellants' suit No. 832 of 1982 ?
Whether the three claims referred by the Ist Respondents to the Court of Arbitration of the 2nd Respondents are beyond the scope of the Arbitration Clause being Article XVII contained in the Contract dated August 24, 1964 or they are "arising out of or related to" the said Contract ?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The issue pertained to the arbitrability of the three claims under the Arbitration clause in the contract and depended upon the proper construction thereof in light of the conduct of the parties and surrounding circumstances and no prejudice was caused to any of the parties as both Renusagar's application for injunction and G.E.C.'s stay petition under sec. 3 were heard together and parties did put before the Court-Trial Court, the Appeal Court and even before us the entire material such as each wanted to rely upon and sought a decision on the concerned issue and we are satisfied that the finding recorded by both the lower courts on the issue is correct; and in that view of the matter the prayer for injunction restraining arbitration sought by Renusagar could not be granted and was rightly refused.
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1984 (8) TMI 294 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... pposite party has controverted this claim and states that there is no stipulation between the parties regarding payment of interest. Learned counsel for the petitioner does not dispute that there is no agreement for the payment of interest but he claims it on the basis of bills submitted (annexures P-1 to P-4 annexed to the petition). This claim thus being hotly disputed, no winding up orders can be passed on its basis. The petition is dismissed. No costs.
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1984 (8) TMI 293 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Shares warrants and entries in register of members, Restriction on acquisition of certain shares, Powers of Court to rectify register of members
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1984 (8) TMI 278 - HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
Government company ... ... ... ... ..... rivate Limited and, on a consideration of all these relevant factors, we hold that the Jammu and Kashmir Industries Private Limited is an instrumentality or an agency of the Government. In the said company, as is apparent from the articles of association, the voice is that of the Government and the hands are also of the Government. We, accordingly, hold that the company being an instrumentality or the agency of the State, is an authority within the meaning of article 12 of the Constitution and is, as such, amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this court. For what we have said above, we hold that in view of Ajay Hasia s case, AIR 1981 SC 487, the Full Bench judgment of this court in Abdul Ahad s case, AIR 1979 J and K 57, is no longer good law and a writ petition is maintainable against the Jammu and Kashmir Industries P. Ltd. The writ petition shall now be listed for further proceedings before a learned single judge of this court. Mir J. mdash I agree. Rizvi J. mdash I agree.
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1984 (8) TMI 277 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
Power of court to rectify register of members ... ... ... ... ..... ent was not good law in view of the earlier judgment of a larger Bench in N.M. Verma v. Upendra Narain Singh. On a close perusal of the same, I find that the general principles of construction spelt out in the aforesaid case can in no way detract from the view expressed in Upendra Kumar Joshi v. Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. 1983 54 Comp. Cas. 1 (Pat.) FB and the submission on this score is not at all well conceived. We would wish to record our unhesitating concurrence with the view in Second Appeal No. 646 of 1982. To finally conclude, it is held that section 155(4)(b) of the Act in no way prescribes a Bench of three or more judges for hearing an appeal thereunder but merely describes the High Court in which an appeal may arise. Consequently, the present appeal can lie before a Division Bench and not a Full Bench of three or more judges. In the light of the above, it is directed that this appeal would now go back before a Division Bench for its decision on merits.
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1984 (8) TMI 276 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Acquisition by Central Government of foreign exchange ... ... ... ... ..... for purposes of deciding the claim for exemption. We have to observe that no foundation was laid or facts brought on record for any such conclusion either before the original authority or before the Appellate Board nor was it urged in this manner before any of the authorities under the Act. On the other hand, we agree with the findings arrived at by the Appellate Board and the reasons given for the said conclusions. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs of this appeal. After the judgment was pronounced, Shri Shivashankar Bhat, Central Government Standing Counsel, made an oral application for issue of a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court against our judgment. In our opinion, the case involves interpretation of section 2(p )(iii) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, as applicable to foreign nationals and this is a question of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Hence, we direct issue of necessary certificate.
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1984 (8) TMI 275 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Winding up – Circumstances in which a company may be would up ... ... ... ... ..... rospects of a newly set up industrial unit and be capable of destabilising it. One of the parties has already taken the matter to the arbitral forum and the other party is likely to follow suit. The safeguards which the German company seeks to protect its interests by the preservation of the assets of the company, inter alia, by restraint on alienation of any part of its assets, could be sought by the German company from a court of competent jurisdiction in view of the pendency of arbitral proceedings. Any such direction by this court could be misconstrued and have an adverse effect on the financial arrangement that the company may have had with the financial institutions. Having regard to all the circumstances, it is a fit case in which the petition should be adjourned sine die, as it is, with liberty to the German company to seek its revival, and to the company to seek its dismissal, on the outcome of the proceedings in arbitration between the parties. I direct accordingly.
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1984 (8) TMI 274 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Meetings and proceedings – Explanatory statement to be annexed to notice ... ... ... ... ..... as not been explained why he came on the last date even at a time when the meeting was over although he had the chance to come before. (5)The next annual general meeting is going to be held shortly. (6)The conduct of the petitioner is not such as to justify me to grant an order of injunction which after all is an equitable relief. However, I say this without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in the suit. These are the grounds in brief along with other grounds which I stated hereof and which appeared to me as impediments in granting any order of injunction. In view of the aforesaid, I am constrained to say that this application has little merit in view of what has been stated before. I pass no order in this application. It is made clear, however, that this is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in the suit or in any other proceedings that the petitioner may be advised to take. Costs of the application would be costs in the cause.
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1984 (8) TMI 273 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Accounts - To be kept by company ... ... ... ... ..... hat the impuged orders have not considered this particular absence of specific averment as contemplated under section 209(6)(d) of the said Act, but in view of lack of specific averment as indicated above, it is not necessary for me to consider whether the learned Magistrate was right in discharging the accused due to lack of the specific averment in the petitions of complaint that these accused persons were authorised by the board of directors of the company to discharge the particular obligation which they have failed to discharge and, therefore, are not officers in default as laid down in section 5 of the Companies Act. Since I have already held that on the face of the petitions, there is lack of specific averment as discussed above, in exercise of my revisional jurisdiction I find no illegality in the fact that the accused persons have been discharged in these cases. These petitions accordingly fail and all the rules are discharged. Let the records be sent down forthwith.
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1984 (8) TMI 243 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
Winding up – Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... nced and notices to the opposite side have been issued. This procedure has been adopted in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 446, ibid, which authorises a court which is winding up a company to entertain or dispose of any suit or proceeding by or against a company which is in the process of being wound up. Once that trial has commenced in the ordinary course of things, it should come to a conclusion. The decision to adjourn the trial of the ejectment applications filed by the appellants sine die is not in consonance with the orders dated August 5, 1983, transferring the ejectment proceedings from the Rent Controller to the High Court and further orders for their trial. The interests of justice require that the matter should not be kept in abeyance. We, therefore, allow these appeals and set aside the impugned orders. Parties are directed through their respective learned counsel to appear before the learned single judge on November 2, 1984. No costs.
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1984 (8) TMI 242 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the winding up proceedings were pending or had come to an end when the Appellate Bench froze the winding up order by keeping it in abeyance?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The High Court was in error in rejecting the application made on behalf of the appellant-company for directing the provisional liquidator to prefer claims petition on the materials and expenses to be furnished by the company. The amounts realised by the provisional liquidator on filing claim petitions shall be handed over to the company and the appellant-company is under an obligation to use, spend, and appropriate them in the implementation of the scheme under the supervision of the court.
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