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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 244 Records
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1985 (1) TMI 286
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... ... ..... e of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court of India under articles 133 and 134-A of the Constitution and for stay of the operation of our order for two months. Sri Shivaram urges that the questions raised and decided in these cases are substantial questions of law of general importance and they need to be decided by the Supreme Court of India. 2.. Sri S. Rajendra Babu, learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents, opposes the applications. 3.. We are of the view that the questions raised and decided in these cases are all concluded by the Supreme Court and do not involve substantial questions of law of general importance that needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. We, therefore, reject the applications made by the petitioners for the certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court. 4.. We are of the view that these are not fit cases to stay the operation of our orders. We, therefore, reject the oral applications for stay of the operation of our orders.
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1985 (1) TMI 285
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... ... ..... uling of the decision in Bata India Limited s case 1983 54 STC 226, the petitioner-company would have no right to refund of the tax already paid, for the given assessment years. For the reasons aforementioned, Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 4462 of 1978 and 698 to 708, 3318, 3319, 1371, 1292, 2364, 733, 1361, 2405, 2514, 2506, 1486, 1329, 1485, 1441, 1484, 3402, 3355, 1615, 3049 and 1123 of 1984 in which legal proposition dealt by us alone was raised, are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 1397, 3186 and 1309 of 1984 in which an additional point is raised, which is under consideration before the Division Bench in Civil Writ Petition No. 2494 of 1984, are directed to be listed for hearing after the decision rendered by the Division Bench in that case and then to be decided in the light of the Full Bench decision and of the Division Bench decision rendered in Civil Writ Petition No. 2494 of 1984. SURINDER SINGH, J.-I agree. GOYAL, J.-I also agree.
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1985 (1) TMI 284
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... ... ..... e Amending Act was first published on 18th November, 1983 and therefore, as provided in section 5(3) of the General Clauses Act, section 11 of the Amending Act came into force only on 18th November, 1983 and not on 7th November, 1983 as tentatively expressed by the ACCT. We have no doubt, that in making his final order and issuing a demand notice the ACCT will so regulate the same. But, if the ACCT has already made his order and issued his demand, then also it would be proper for him to suitably regulate this aspect, without unnecessarily driving the petitioner in another proceeding to that extent. We hope and trust that all other authorities under the Act also will so regulate this aspect, 38.. As all the contentions urged for the petitioners fail, these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. We, therefore, dismiss these writ petitions and discharge the rule issued in all these cases. But, in the circumstances of the cases, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1985 (1) TMI 283
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... ... ..... a substantial change in identity. Thus, it cannot be said that the strips are transformed into a new commercial commodity and cease to be in the same form. 8.. In view of this Full Bench decision, which is binding on us, we are of opinion that the question referred to above has to be answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. 9.. Our answer to the question referred to above is that under the facts and circumstances of the case, the bailing hoops are iron plates sold in the same form in which they are directly produced by the rolling mill and are therefore declared goods as defined in sub-section (e) of section 2 and covered by entry 5 of Part I of Schedule II of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 liable to be taxed at 2 per cent up to 30th June, 1966 and 3 per cent thereafter up to 1st October, 1978 after which there is an amendment as was submitted by the learned counsel for the parties. The reference is answered accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1985 (1) TMI 282
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... ... ..... on the business of selling cars. He also submitted that no finding has been recorded by the concerned authorities that the second hand car, which was sold by the assessee, was meant for office use. However, we see no merit in both these contentions which are rejected summarily in view of the definition of business refered to above. In fact the burden lay upon the assessee to prove for what purpose the second hand car was purchased and to what use it was put to. In absence of any such evidence it has to be presumed that the second hand car was purchased for the use of the assessee. 5.. In the result our answer to the question referred is thatOn the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal was not justified in holding, that the sale of second hand car will not be covered by the term business as defined in section 2(bb) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958. Thus the reference is answered in favour of the department and against the assessee with no order as to costs.
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1985 (1) TMI 281
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... ... ..... rdships permitted the photostat copies of the documents to be returned to the Revenue for making use of the same. We are in respectful agreement with these views. On the above discussion, we hold that the petitioners are not entitled for the return of copies, notes, if any, already made by the authorities and they are free to make use of them in completing the assessments and for other purposes in accordance with law. In the light of our above discussion, we direct the respective respondents to return all books of account and all other documents seized in the respective cases to the respective petitioners with all such expedition as is possible in the circumstances of these cases and in any event within 10 days from the date of receipt of the order of this Court. Writ petitions are disposed of in the above terms. But in the circumstances of the cases, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Let this order be communicated to the respondents within 7 days from this day.
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1985 (1) TMI 280
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... ... ..... fault on the part of the dealer was intentional and this was affirmed by the learned judge. The issue which was up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Joshi, Sales Tax Officer s case 1977 40 STC 497 (SC) was a different one. There the question whether mens rea was necessary for attracting the penalty under the relevant provision of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, was up for consideration as also the question whether a heavy amount of penalty could be provided for in respect of a default attracting the penalty even though there was no element of mens rea involved. The Supreme Court was not invited to nor did it go into the question about the discretion of the authority in the matter of quantum of penalty. In these circumstances, it is not necessary to deal with that decision in any further detail. On facts found, the decision of the Tribunal is unexceptionable in law. It does not merit interference. The revision fails and is dismissed though without any order as to costs.
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1985 (1) TMI 279
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... ... ..... le of the same bottles liable to tax. It might be as containers or otherwise. There is no presumption that the bottles when used as containers are not the subject-matter of sale. Generally, though not always, when there is a sale of an article, the container and the contents are both sold and the purchasers pay one consolidated price and the price of the containers is usually included in that sale price. 11.. It seems to us, therefore, that the Tribunal was not right in holding that the petitioner having purchased the bottles from unregistered dealers had become the first dealer liable to pay tax. The fact that they were second hand bottles itself is sufficient to hold that there was an earlier sale of the same bottles liable to tax. 12.. In the result the revision petition is allowed. The assessment as confirmed by the appellate authorities is set aside. The tax, if any, collected from the assessee, shall be refunded. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
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1985 (1) TMI 278
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... ... ..... tax authorities will not be entitled to take any steps for the recovery of sales tax on the footing that the hotels who have been approved by the Tourism Department of the Government of India are liable to pay sales tax under item 150 of the First Schedule to the Act. We make no order as to costs in these petitions. 23.. Mr. K.S. Bakthavatsalam, the learned Additional Government Pleader asks for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against our judgment. He also brought to our notice that the validity of item 150 in the First Schedule to the Act is already the subject-matter of a writ petition which is pending in the Supreme Court in W.P. No. 1299 of 1981. In view of the fact that an identical matter is pending in the Supreme Court, it will not be proper forus to reject the leave asked for. Accordingly we grant a certificate under article 134A that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance as required by article 133(1) of the Constitution of India.
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1985 (1) TMI 277
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... ... ..... within the State of Uttar Pradesh to have mentioned the value of the goods, which were being transported, in the challan. In this view of the matter the seizure of the cotton yarn in question, on the face of it, was without jurisdiction. On the same ground the notice requiring the petitioner to show cause as to why penalty proceedings may not be initiated against it is also without jurisdiction. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the respondents are directed not to initiate proceedings for penalty against the petitioner on the basis of the seizure referred to above. They are further directed to release the cotton yarn seized from the petitioner on 10th December, 1983 from vehicle No. UPV 1101 by the Sales Tax Officer, Mobile Squad, Jhansi, forthwith on the production of a certified copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs. A copy of this order may be supplied to counsel for the petitioner within three days on payment of usual charges.
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1985 (1) TMI 276
Appeal - Limitation - Delay in filing ... ... ... ... ..... rsquo ble Supreme Court, we have to see whether in the present case the departmental authorities charged with the duty to implement the law, were vigilant and that the delay has been explained satisfactorily. 10. emsp We don rsquo t find that both these ingredients stand satisfied in all these cases before us. The Department has given only two reasons for condonation of delay, viz., (1) the order of the Collector of Customs (Appeals) required detailed study and (2) that as the appeals involved 12 cases, it required time to prepare the appeals. These are not sufficient grounds for condonation of delay of about two months. The facts of these cases show that the departmental authorities charged with a duty to implement the law were not vigilant enough to take prompt action in filing these appeals. The delay has also not been explained at all. We, therefore, find no justification in condoning the delay in any of these 12 appeals and reject all these 12 appeals as barred by time.
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1985 (1) TMI 269
What is the rate at which the goods which had been purchased earlier and which were in stock with the assessee on 30th June, 1974 were assessable to purchase tax when the purchases were found to be last purchases as a result of events which took place subsequent to 30th June, 1974?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Since the purchases took place before 30th June, 1974 the assessee would, in our opinion, liable to be taxed at the rate prevailing at the time when the purchases were made and since the rate at that time was 3% of the sale price, the High Court was right in taking the view that the purchases made by the assessee prior to 30th June, 1974 were taxable at the rate of 3%.
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1985 (1) TMI 261
Principles for interpretation of statutes ... ... ... ... ..... er the latter provision, where the petition is presented on the ground that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up, the court may refuse to make an order of winding up if it is of opinion that some other remedy is available to the petitioners and that they are acting unreasonably in seeking to have the company wound up instead of pursuing that other remedy . We are, therefore, of the opinion that the respondent must resort to the alternative remedy available to him under the statutory provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, i.e., under sections 163, 167, 210 and 220 of the Companies Act. No other grounds were pressed by the counsel appearing for the respective parties. From the discussions aforesaid, we set aside the order dated August 6, 1984, holding that no prima facie case is made out for the trial under section 433(f) of the Companies Act and no composite petition could be maintainable and tried. Consequently, both the appeals are allowed with costs.
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1985 (1) TMI 254
Meeting and Proceedings – Power of Company Law Board to Order Meeting to be Called ... ... ... ... ..... y of the operation of the judgment and order as follows The meeting will be held as directed by the Company Law Board, the notice whereof will be served on the advocate on record of the petitioners. In the event a new committee of management is appointed in the meeting, the same will function subject to the supervision of the chairman, acting as special officer for twelve weeks. Notice of all meetings of the committee of management will be served on the special officer who will be entitled to attend the said meetings or any of them as he thinks fit. In any event, no decision of the committee of management will be given effect to till it is approved by the special officer. It is made clear that the supervision expected from the special officer will be in respect of finance, properties and assets of the trust association and the special officer will ensure that the same are protected during the interim period. The initial remuneration of the special officer is fixed at 150 gms.
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1985 (1) TMI 253
Meetings and proceedings –Company Law Board’s power to call annual general meeting ... ... ... ... ..... ermediate acts valid and binding till the date of discovery of such incompetence. To accept this argument would lead to a very strange situation in that orders passed by a court, incompetent to entertain the proceedings, would be valid between the date when the proceedings are entertained and the discovery of its incompetence and would not be either binding or operative, after the date of discovery of the incompetence of the court. Either the court is competent or it is incompetent to entertain suits and pass orders. The acceptence of the argument of the learned counsel would render the same court competent up to a particular stage of the proceedings and make it incompetent at the subsequent stages. Under those circumstances, this argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the subsequent order would not make the original order non-est or void is unacceptable. No other point was urged. Consequently, the civil revision petition fails and it is dismissed with costs.
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1985 (1) TMI 252
Winding up – Avoidance of transfer, etc., after commencement of ... ... ... ... ..... ansactions between the company and the bank get validated in the present proceedings, the alleged default and negligence of the concerned bank officers for allowing the overrun to grow would still remain a matter for inquiry by the concerned bank against its officers. Whether the bank should inquire into the same or not is entirely a domestic question of the bank. This court is not concerned with the same. The objecting creditors are not holding a brief on behalf 6f the employer bank with a view to upholding discipline and proper working of various branches of the bank. Under these circumstances, even the last objection put forward by the objecting creditors must be repelled offhand both on the ground that it is irrelevant as well as on the ground that it is beside the point and does not have any impact on the moot question as to whether these applications should be granted under section 536(2) or not. Even otherwise, there is no substance in the said objection as seen above.
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1985 (1) TMI 251
Winding up – Circumstances in which a company may be would up ... ... ... ... ..... these proceedings, the situation would, in any way, be improved and, therefore, though we are not very anxious to affirm the winding up of the company, we feel that putting off the final decision will only be putting off the evil day and in the process putting the creditors and the workmen to further loss and difficulty. That would only tend to reduce the distributable surplus of the company as necessarily passage of time would increase the liabilities of the company without there being any corresponding increase in the assets. There is a plea that the learned single judge ought to have disposed of the petition by a speaking order. Perhaps the learned judge thought that the circumstances were so eloquent that no further exposition of the situation by the learned single judge was called for. Whatever that be, we have considered the circumstances and we see no reasons to cancel the order for winding up passed by the learned single judge. Hence, we dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1985 (1) TMI 226
Demand for Modvat - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... from 21-11-1972, checked and attested by the Inspector of Central Excise. This shows that credit of the amount of Rs. 2,03,218 was taken on 22-11-1972 (Shri Inbarajan explains that the date of 6-11-1972 previously mentioned by him was the date of the sanction order from the Chief Accounts Officer. However, the substance of their plea on limitation is not changed by the difference in the date). 3. emsp In view of the evidence now before us we asked Shri Tayal whether he had any submissions to make regarding the plea of limitation raised by the appellants. Shri Tayal stated that, having regard to the decision of the Tribunal in other similar cases holding that the time limit would run from the date of credit, he would not have any further submissions to make in this regard. We find that there is substance in the plea of the appellants that the show-cause notice was time-barred. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the demand for the aforesaid amount of Rs. 2,03,218/-.
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1985 (1) TMI 225
Classification - Dutiability of defective tyres - Penalty - Confiscation ... ... ... ... ..... normal course duty is payable by the manufacturer, in the circumstances of this case it was paid by the purchasers of the goods, namely M/s. Vijaya Traders. In the view that we have taken, the duty was rightly payable on the goods. The question of M/s. Goodyear reimbursing M/s. Vijaya Traders for the amounts paid by them as duty is one which has to be settled between them. The position remains that duty was rightly payable on the goods and there is no question of giving any relief in this regard, except that duty on tractor tyres, if any comprised in the confiscated goods, should be calculated at the appropriate lower rate as applicable under the tariff. Apart from that, M/s. Vijaya Traders are not entitled to any relief. 30. emsp In view of the above conclusions, we uphold the order of the Collector and dismiss both appeals except to the extent of relief granted under our observation in Para 29 above regarding calculation of duty on tractor tyres among the confiscated goods.
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1985 (1) TMI 224
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... ... ..... voice dated 1-9-1962 gives values of the various items separately. Therefore, the assessment of these items on merits was correct. 12. The appellants have also raised the question of depreciation which they claimed from 2-9-1982 to 10-12-1982. The argument is that each three months of the year beginning from January should be taken as one quarter and as the period under reference covers two quarters the appellants should be given depreciation as if the car has been used for two quarters of a year, that is to say, six months. No law or any rule under which the appellants are entitled to such depreciation has been cited before us. Also, we are of the opinion that the period during which the car was in transit on a ship cannot be taken as the period during which the car was in use. In the absence of any proof of entitlement to such reduction in value on account of depreciation, we reject this ground also. 13. In the result all the four appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed.
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