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Showing 81 to 100 of 211 Records
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1985 (10) TMI 132
Capital Gains, Mode Of Computation ... ... ... ... ..... acquire the full title or complete title over the property can be legitimately called as expenditure incurred towards the cost of acquisition of the capital asset. In our opinion, acquiring part interest in the asset also comes under incurring expenditure towards cost of acquisition of capital asset. Therefore, viewed from any angle it appears to us that this amount of Rs. 1,29,020 should not be considered while computing the capital gains in the hands of the assessee. 9. As regards the deductibility of interest of Rs. 3,825 payable to Smt. A. Polamma, no argument worth the name was advanced by the learned counsel for the assessee. Therefore, we do not see any reason to interfere with the orders of the lower authorities as far as the deductibility of the amount of Rs. 3,825 is concerned. 10. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above and we direct the ITO to compute the amount of capital gains afresh in accordance with our findings given above.
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1985 (10) TMI 131
Firm, Registration, Validity Of Partnership ... ... ... ... ..... . Cyriac was not a major on the date of execution of the original partnership deed could not prevent it from being registered. Thus, the ITO was not justified in cancelling registration. The above ratio squarely applies to the instant case, as the facts are identical in both the cases. We respectfully follow the above decision. 7. In our view, the ITO was justified in granting registration to the assessee-firm for the assessment year 1979-80 and allowing continuation of registration for the assessment year 1990-81. We are unable to agree with the reasons given by the Commissioner in his order. We cancel the order of the Commissioner passed under section 263 for the assessment years 1979-80 and 1980-81 directing the ITO to take the status of the assessee as unregistered firm. We restore the orders of the ITO granting registration for the assessment year 1979-80 and allowing continuation of registration for the assessment year 1980-81. 8. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1985 (10) TMI 130
... ... ... ... ..... 1 (SC), R. Ramanathan Chettiar vs. CIT (1985) 152 ITR 493 (Mad) and CIT vs. Trustees of H. E. H. The Nizam rsquo s Wedding Gifts Trusts (1984) 40 CTR (AP) 88 (1985) 154 ITR 573 (AP) and the authorised representative for the assessee relied upon the decision in Jayanti Lal, A. Shah vs. CIT (1985) 46 CTR (Bom) 189 (1985) 156 ITR 448 (Bom). 4. We have carefully examined the decision relied upon by the authorised representatives for the parties and also the materials on record, facts and circumstance of the case. On such consideration we are of the opinion that the AAC was correct in coming to the conclusion that the silver utensils were personal effects hold for personal use of assessee and members of his family and as such did not constitute capital assets as defined in s. 2(14) of the Act and hence tax for capital gain was not to be paid on sale of the said silver utensils. As such the order of the AAC does not warrant any interference. 5. As a result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1985 (10) TMI 129
Chargeability Of ... ... ... ... ..... Judicial Member has pointed out in his order that even though there were rulings to the contrary by the Allahabad High Court, there was no justification for the deletion of this sum. The submission made on behalf of the assessee in this regard was that it is not open to the learned Judicial Member to it be that disregard the finding nature of the jurisdictional High Court (sic) unless there were distinguishing facts. Not having pointed out any distinguishing facts, the learned Judicial Member was bound to follow the decisions of the Allahabad High Court as was done by the learned Accountant Member. It is in view of the facts as stated above and in view of the binding nature of the Allahabad High Court decisions, I am persuaded that the view taken by the learned Accountant Member is correct both on law and in facts. I am, therefore, in agreement with that view. 5. Now the matter will go back to the regular Bench for deciding the appeal in accordance with the majority opinion.
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1985 (10) TMI 128
... ... ... ... ..... truction (P) Ltd., it could not be aggrieved by the decision given by the Bench and, therefore the second question as proposed by the CIT ceased to be a referable question of law. I also do not find any reason given by the learned Judicial Member as to how he arrived at the conclusion that question No. 2 was definitely a referable question of law. With the acceptance of the Special Bench decision by the Department that question ceased to be a question of law needing an opinion of the High Court. An opinion of case High Court is needed only when there is dispute subsisting. When no dispute subsists or survives there is no need for an opinion. I am, therefore, in agreement with the view expressed by the ld. Accountant Member that the second question is not a referable question of law and, therefore, no reference be given on that question. 4. The matter will now go back to the Bench, which heard the reference application originally for disposal according to the majority opinion.
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1985 (10) TMI 127
... ... ... ... ..... e that in the case before the Madras High Court there is not even a dissolution deed executed. Yet from the facts of the case and the assessments made in the form of return, the High Court inferred that there was a dissolution of the firm whereas in the present case before there was a dissolution deed executed, which put an end to the relationship of partnership between the partner. Thus, the judicial opinion though divided, the majority view was in favour of the view that in the case of dissolution of a firm either by the death of a partner or by the act of parties, that firm comes to an end and if another firm is constituted even though by taking some of the old partners, that new firm would be a separate and distinct firm from the old firm and that would be a case of one firm by another firm and not a change in the constitution of the firm. 35. Now the mater will go back before the Original Bench which heard the appeal for deciding the matter according to majority opinion.
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1985 (10) TMI 126
Capital Or Revenue Receipt ... ... ... ... ..... uthorities and not to the Tribunal. We, however, do not agree. The reference to the income-tax authorities in the above decision has been made because it were they, who had acted against the above principle. But the said principle is equally valid for the appellate authorities, including the Tribunal, for it is a wholesome principle of guidance while interpreting an All India Statute. We are, therefore, bound to follow the above decision of the Hon ble Calcutta High Court. The position being, thus, self evident, there is no justification, in our opinion, to refer the matter to a Special Bench of the Tribunal as urged by the learned counsel for the assessee. 12.2 Inview of what we have stated above, we refrain to go into the wider question raised by the learned departmental representative regarding the legal basis or lack of it, of such an action. 13. Inthe light of the discussion above, we confirm the order of the learned Commissioner (Appeals) and dismiss the present appeal.
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1985 (10) TMI 125
Capital Gains, Chargeability Of ... ... ... ... ..... of the deed of transfer to the secretary, is subject to all the liabilities and entitled to all rights which belong to a shareholder or a stockholder, and, in my opinion, until the requisite formalities are complied with, he continues the legal proprietor of the stock or shares subject to that proprietorship being divested, which it may be at any moment, by a compliance with the requisite formalities. Therefore, when the transfer of shares was registered in the year 1977 it will relate back to the original dates when the transfer deeds were executed by the assessee to Subramaniam and Co. If that is so the assessee cannot contend that there is no transfer of shares in the case of the 4 assessee for the purpose of section 45 in the assessment year 1978-79. In that view of the matter, we uphold the order passed by the first appellate authority on this point and dismiss the appeal filed by the assessee. 19 to 21. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues.
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1985 (10) TMI 124
... ... ... ... ..... e sale proceed of the shares of Bharat Commerce (I) Ltd. was invested in Unit Trust of India. On behalf of the Revenue, the order of the authorities below were supported. 4. After taking into consideration the facts of the case as above, I am of opinion that the benefit of doubt with regard to the factual position should be given to the assessee, as it is not possible on the basis of the available records to show as to out of what sale proceeds the unit trusts in question were acquired. When this be the position, the assessee should be given the benefit of appropriating the sale proceeds of different assets to the purchase price of the unit trusts. The assessee has chosen to co-relate the sale price of Bharat Commerce (I) Ltd. shares with the purchase price of unit trust. This is probable and, therefore, I would grant the embedded in the sale price of Bharat Commerce (I) Ltd. which deserves to be exempted in terms of s. 54E(1)(a). 5. In the result, the appeal stands allowed.
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1985 (10) TMI 123
... ... ... ... ..... hat the ruling of the Orissa High Court in the case of CIT v. N.C. Budharaja and Co. 1980 121 ITR 212 is directly on the point at issue, i.e., under section 80HH, but in view of the later decision of the Bombay High Court in Shah Construction Co. Ltd. s case and also the decision of the Full Bench of the Tribunal, we are unable to follow the Orissa High Court ruling in this regard in spite of the fact that the learned counsel pressed us to follow that ruling in view of the Bombay High Court decision in CIT v. Smt. Godavaridevi Saraf 1978 113 ITR 589. We, therefore, hold that the Commissioner (Appeals) was in error in holding that the company was entitled to section 80HH deduction. We set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and restore that of the ITO. 8. In the light of out above discussion, the cross-objection filed by the assessee becomes infructuous. 9. In the result, the appeal filed by the department is allowed. The cross-objection of the assessee is dismissed.
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1985 (10) TMI 122
Method Of Accounting, Valuation Of Stock ... ... ... ... ..... e contentions of the revenue in the present case. We may further point out that this decision of the Madras High Court was followed by the Kerala High Court in the case of Forest Industries Travancore Ltd. v. CIT 1964 51 ITR 329 and also in CIT v. Carborandum Universal Ltd. 1984 149 ITR. 759 (Mad.). No material has been placed before us by the revenue to show that the method of valuing the obsolete stocks and writing them off in its accounts, followed by the assessee in these three years, was not bona fide and that this method had not been followed by the assessee in the subsequent assessment years. We, therefore, respectfully follow the decisions quoted above and hold that the Commissioner (Appeals) was right in accepting the assessee s contentions and in deleting the additions made by the ITO on account of obsolete stocks written off by the assessee in its books. Accordingly, we confirm the orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) in all the three years and dismiss the appeals.
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1985 (10) TMI 121
Agricultural Land, Capital Asset ... ... ... ... ..... matter must go back to the AAC. 17. After examining in detail the materials placed before him, the Commissioner (Appeals) held in paragraph 7 of his order that the assessee s case fully satisfied the three conditions pointed out by the Tribunal in paragraph 16 of their order to qualify for depreciation. He, therefore, held that the assessee-company was entitled to depreciation on the basis of the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT v. Elecon Engg. Co. Ltd. 1974 96 ITR 672. 18. Before us, the only submission made on behalf of the revenue by Shri Roy Alphonso is that the revenue seeks to keep alive this issue since the matter has been taken on further appeal to the Supreme Court by the revenue from the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Elecon Engg. Co. Ltd. s case. We, therefore, respectfully follow the said decision of the Gujarat High Court and confirm the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) on this point also. 19. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1985 (10) TMI 120
Additional Income-Tax On Undistributed Profits ... ... ... ... ..... cumstances cannot be said to be a reasonable act from a prudent businessman s point of view. We, therefore, hold that the ITO was justified in levying additional tax under section 104(1). 6. The last submission was that the additional tax should not have been calculated at the rate of 50 per cent of distributable income but at the rate of 37 per cent thereof because the assessee was not an investment company but a trading company. This point does not appear to have been considered by any of the authorities below. The question whether the assessee came within the ambit of investment company or trading company was a mixed question of fact and law to be decided on materials on record. It is proper that this question is decided by Commissioner (Appeals). We, therefore, restore the matter to him with direction to decide this question in accordance with law after giving reasonable opportunity to parties to produce relevant material on record. 7. In the result the appeal is allowed.
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1985 (10) TMI 119
... ... ... ... ..... nded for temporary period due to acute financial difficulties. We are, therefore, of the opinion that set off under s. 72 was allowable. We accordingly direct the ITO to allow the same. 9. Before parting we may mention that the learned counsel for the assessee had raised an alternate ground in the course of arguments to the effect that business of commission against the profits to which set off of loss in bookmaking business is sought constituted the same business as business of Bookmaking inasmuch as there was unity of management and control. Reliance was sought to be placed on certain decisions to which we need not refer. We are of the opinion that the assessee is not entitled to raise this ground before us which requires investigation into facts as this was never raised before either of the two authorities below and there was no justifiable raison for not raising that point at earlier stage. We, therefore, decline premission to raise this point. 10. The appeal is allowed.
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1985 (10) TMI 118
Acquisition Of Immovable Property, Appeal Against Order ... ... ... ... ..... in the circumstances of the case. Even if it can be assumed that the market value is higher than the apparent consideration there is only a rebuttable presumption and all that was required to rebut it was a denial by the appellant that he has not paid anything more than what was stated in the document. In the circumstances, in the absence of any specific evidence of understatement of consideration and in view of the undependable estimate of the market value made by the Valuation Officer there is no relevant material on record for the IAC to be satisfied that either the fair market value exceeded the apparent consideration by more than 15 per cent or that the consideration for such transfer had not been truly stated in the instrument of transfer. We are, therefore, convinced that in any view of the matter the order of acquisition made under section 269F(6) was untenable and cannot be sustained. We have, therefore, no hesitation in cancelling that order. The appeal is allowed.
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1985 (10) TMI 117
Reassessment, General, Non-Disclosure Of Primary Facts ... ... ... ... ..... nd correct particulars of income. In fact, in IT Appeal No. 126 (Bang.) of 1983 dated 11-12-1984, we held that the reopening of the assessment was bad. It is not for the assessee to indicate what conclusions are to be drawn from the materials disclosed by it before the ITO. If the material is there and the ITO fails to draw the correct conclusions, it is not possible to say that there was failure on the part of the assessee to disclose primary materials necessary for the completion of the assessment, e.g., the Supreme Court decision in the case of ITO v. Lakhmani Mewal Das 1976 103 ITR 437 further reiterated in ITO v. Madnani Engg. Works Ltd. 1979 118 ITR 1. On these grounds, we hold that the reopening under section 147(a) was not valid. 6. The assessee s appeals are allowed. 7. We have held in our earlier orders that on merits, the interest on sticky loans cannot be included in the total income of the assessee. 8. The appeals filed by the revenue are, accordingly, dismissed.
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1985 (10) TMI 116
... ... ... ... ..... lief under s. 80U of the Act, because Circular No. 375 has allowed relief under s. 80U even to the individual, who are suffering from deafness, dumbness and mental retardation. Mental retardation and deafness are curable and there are instruments, which removes the defnness and an individual, who is suffering from deafness can hear by the use of hearing-aid. Therefore, if a victim is suffering from parkinsonism, who has lost power of speech and is belonging to legal profession, then such victim (advocate) is entitled to s. 80U relief due to the effect of reducing substantially the capacity of the assessee (advocate) to engage in the gainful occupation. In view of the above discussion and reasons thereto, I hold that the assessee is entitled to relief under s. 80U on the totality of the facts and the circumstances as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders of the authorities below are erroneous in law and facts and as such are set side. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1985 (10) TMI 115
... ... ... ... ..... AC has noted above that lessee Shri Charanjit Singh has taken the land on lease not only from the assessee but also from Shri Bajrang Dass and Smt. Mohini Devi. Looking to the area of land taken on lease and on reading the agreement, the AAC held that the predominant purpose for which the lease had been executed in each case was to allow use of land to excavate earth,. for the manufacture of Kacha bricks. This reading of the AAC of these agreements read as a whole is found to be correct by us. This being so, the AAC has rightly applied the ratio of the Gujarat High Court decision in the case of Amrit Lal Chhagan Lai and Anr. vs. CIT (1972) 84 ITR 677 (Guj) and the Supreme Court authority (1961) 41 ITR 506 (SC) considered therein. Consequently, we uphold his decision that the amounts received by the assessee in each year from the lease of the land were in the nature of capital receipts not liable to tax. 6. In the result, all the appeals of the Revenue fail and are dismissed.
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1985 (10) TMI 114
... ... ... ... ..... and expenditure for the parties to the litigation. It is indeed incongruous to hold that even though on the same facts the trust income is exempt for the successive asst. yr. 1978-79 to 1982-83 and in the proceedings asst. yr. 1978-79 to 1982-83 and in the preceding asst. yrs. 1971-72 to 1976-77, it is not so for the asst. yr. 1977-78. To encourage discussion and litigation on such issues will only mean avoidable harassment to an assessee and to allow the perpetuation of time and money consuming litigation for an assessee. It should also be the duty of the Revenue to cut litigation and save public expenditure and time. It will be sufficient for us to allow the appeal of the assessee on the principle of consistency and revenue s own conduct. We uphold the assessee s claim for exemption of its income under s. 11 of the IT Act and allow the appeal. 4. The assessee had moved a Stay Application but as to appeal itself is decided it has become infructuous and is dismissed as such.
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1985 (10) TMI 113
Business Disallowance, Advance Tax, Interest Payable By Assessee ... ... ... ... ..... so a reading of the provision as a whole will indicate that that situation can arise only when the advance tax payable under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) has, in fact, been computed in the manner laid down under section 209 and not in a situation like that in the case of the assessee. The test of mere liability to pay advance tax alone is not sufficient to bring the assessee within the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 209A. When this is so the provisions of section 215 will also not operate because that section requires in the opening sentences quoted above that an assessee has paid advance tax under section 209A on the basis of his own estimate or revised estimate. Proceeding on this footing, it must be held that interest under section 215 could also not be levied in the assessee s case and the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is erroneous and has to be reversed. The levy of interest under section 215 is cancelled. 9. The appeal of the assessee gets allowed.
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