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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 218 Records
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1985 (12) TMI 350
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... ... ..... d against them would not be illegal. There is no bar in law for making an order of assessment against the principals, in such a case, unless there is already an order of assessment against the commission agents in respect of the same turnover. This view is in conformity with the view of the Division Bench of this Court in State of Mysore v. F.D. Malladad and Bros. 1969 23 STC 230. 3.. Sri B.V. Katageri, learned counsel for the appellant, however, argued that another Division Bench of this Court had taken a contrary view in Kabaddar, Hubli v. State of Karnataka (S.T.R.P. No. 92 of 1973 decided on 2nd January, 1974). We have gone through that order. In that order there was no order of assessment passed against a principal which had been set aside by an authority under the Act, either in appeal or in revision. Hence, no assistance can be derived by the assessee from the aforesaid decision. These two appeals fail and they are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 one set.
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1985 (12) TMI 349
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... ... ..... he aforesaid question has been referred to us for our opinion. 3.. The short question that arises for consideration in this case is whether seeds of dhania and matar fall within the category of goods described as seeds of vegetable. It is now well-settled that the word vegetable in taxing statutes must be construed as understood in common parlance and that it must be given that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it see State of West Bengal v. Washi Ahmed 1977 39 STC 378 (SC) . So construed, the Tribunal in our opinion was justified in holding that seeds of dhania and matar are seeds of vegetable and, therefore, subject to exemption from tax in terms of the notification in question. 4.. We accordingly answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the department. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of the reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1985 (12) TMI 348
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... ... ..... buying and selling would not detract such activity from its real nature which must be of service only. In the instant cases the object of the insurance company which has been nationalised by passing of an Act under article 39 of the Constitution of India is to provide service to its customers by insuring their vehicles against theft, accident, fire, etc. The nature of activity itself clearly indicates that it does not engage itself either in buying or selling. In view of the facts stated earlier I am of the opinion that the applicant is not a dealer within the meaning of section 2(c) of the Act and its activity does not come within the purview of business as defined in section 2(aa) of the Act and as such no tax could be levied on the transaction of sale of salvage made by the assessee which is purely occasional. In the result the revisions succeed and are allowed. The order passed by the Tribunal is set aside. However, there will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1985 (12) TMI 347
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... ... ..... ales tax is payable on the sale of gunny bags. The direction in respect of ajwain, sua and methi and setting aside of penalties under section 7AA of the Act recorded in favour of the dealer-assessee having not been assailed by the learned counsel for the C.T.O. are also maintained. As no finding has been given by the Board in respect of each of the assessment years in the light of the provisions adverted above they are, accordingly, set aside and the Sales Tax Tribunal constituted under section 2A of the Act (inserted by the Amendment Act) is directed to redecide the seven revisions which were filed by the dealer-assessee against the orders of the Deputy Commissioner only to the extent indicated herein above. The applications under section 15 of the Act which have been considered as revisions under section 13(10) of the Amendment Act are disposed of accordingly. In the circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs of these cases. Ordered accordingly.
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1985 (12) TMI 346
Winding up - Appointment and powers of provisional liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... e company henceforth. Respondent No. 2 is, therefore, directed to give an undertaking to that effect within a period of three weeks from today. He is further directed to submit the quarterly statement of accounts of the company as also the progress made by the company in the matter of production and other activities and affairs of the company. The first quarterly statement shall be furnished by respondent No. 2 by March 31, 1986, and he shall so continue to furnish after every three months until further orders. Respondent No. 2 is also directed to keep a proper and detailed account of the affairs of the company. Respondent No. 2 shall within three weeks from today furnish a list of movable and immovable assets as also a list of liabilities of the company till this date. The respondents shall not alienate or in any way dispose of the movable or immovable assets of the company until further orders. With these observations, the application, I.A. No. 1264 of 1985, is disposed of.
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1985 (12) TMI 345
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... m or a vague allegation that the ITR has not acted properly towards the agent avail against the above acknowledgment. By the affidavit and statements of October 7, 1982, and February 28, 1984, the PCC has clearly acknowledged its liability to pay amounts to the ITR and these, in my opinion, will clearly enable the petitioner to claim further extension of the period of limitation. The petitioner s claim is, therefore, within time now so as to justify a winding-up order. For the reasons discussed above, I have come to the conclusion that the respondent company (PCC) should be wound up by court. I order accordingly. The official liquidator is appointed as the liquidator of the company. He will take charge of the assets and account books and documents of the company and proceed to wind up its affairs in accordance with the law. Notices and certified copies of this order of winding up shall be immediately communicated to the Registrar of Companies, Delhi, as required by the rules.
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1985 (12) TMI 344
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... ly disputed by the respondent-company and it has been alleged that unless there is prima facie proof that they could acknowledge any liability on behalf of the company, the same has no value in the eye of law. Neither is there any allegation in the petition that the Financial Controller had any authority to acknowledge liability on behalf of the company nor is there any prima facie proof that the board of directors had authorised the said officer to issue such a credit note. The defence of the respondent against the claim on account of the security amount and interest thereon also, therefore, cannot be labelled as without any prima facie merit and needs a regular trial before it can be accepted or rejected. The company has, thus, prima facie established that it has a good defence and the petitioner is not entitled to recover any amount on account of security deposit or damages, etc. This petition, therefore, must fail and is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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1985 (12) TMI 343
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts, Winding up - Application for ... ... ... ... ..... stion is at large. In further proceedings, it is open to the court to consider whether such a purchase should be ordered and, if so, of what number of shares and, at what price. It may also decide that it cannot be done and dismiss the winding up petition. It is not possible or correct at this stage to anticipate the shape or form of the order that may be ultimately passed, particularly in the context of the fact that the shares held by the petitioners have got subsequently augmented by the order of Khanna J. in C.P. No. 25 of 1982 (which is at the moment under appeal). All that one can say now is that the court cannot pass a winding up order in view of the restricted nature of the admission order and the concession made by the petitioners. For the reasons discussed above, I overrule the objections raised by Sri Mittal and decline to dismiss C.P. No. 35 of 1981 at this stage. The pleadings being complete, the company petition may now be listed for hearing on January 29, 1986.
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1985 (12) TMI 319
Winding up - Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... lous attack on the official liquidator and charging him with dereliction of his duties. This Company Application No. 282 of 1985 is hence nothing else but an abuse of the process of the court and must stand dismissed. In so far as Company Application No. 237 of 1985 is concerned, Mr. Shah, learned counsel for the applicant stated that he does not wish to argue this matter inasmuch as he is adopting Mr. Vishwanath s arguments canvassed in Company Application No. 282 of 1985. In view of this submission of Mr. Shah, Company Application No. 237 of 1985 also stands dismissed. In the result, Company Application No. 282 of 1985 is dismissed. The applicant will pay the costs of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in separate sets. Company Application No. 237 of 1985 is also dismissed and the applicants therein will pay the costs of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in different sets. In so far as Bank of India who are respondents No. 3 in both the applications are concerned, I make no order as to costs.
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1985 (12) TMI 318
Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... e appellate stage, the present petitioner was not made a party and the petition was dismissed on an agreement of the parties to the appeal. Although the present application was pending, the present petitioner got no opportunity to seek permission to pursue the main petition at the time when the same was allowed to be dismissed. If the provisions of rule 101 are interpreted in the manner suggested by learned counsel for the respondents, then the petition, like the present one, would always be rendered in fructuous by adopting a similar course as was done in the present case. I am, therefore, of the view that the cause of action would be available to the petitioner even after the earlier petition has already been dismissed at the behest of the main petitioner. For the reasons recorded above, this application is allowed and the petitioners are substituted as creditors in the main petition. The petitioner is directed to file the amended petition before January 31, 1986. No costs.
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1985 (12) TMI 317
Oppression and Mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... r hearing in respect of other prayers on February 3, 1986. (ii) CA No. 551 of 1985 The scope of Khanna J. s order has been explained as having allowed the amendment regarding the shareholdings of P-2. For hearing regarding the other amendments prayed for, the application may be listed on February 3, 1986. (iii) CA No. 743 of 1985 Allowed in part as discussed above. (iv) CA No. 744 of 1985 Dismissed. (v) CAs Nos. 745 and 746 of 1985 Allowed as discussed above. (vi) CAs Nos. 773 and 774 of 1985 Dismissed. (vii) CA No. 869 of 1985 Allowed as discussed above. The result is that the proceedings before Shri Deshpande will now be resumed from the stage where they were left earlier. It is clarified that Shri Deshpande will proceed as an arbitrator and file his award in court within four months of the date on which he resumes proceedings. The parties may report before him for necessary directions on January 20, 1986, at 5.00 p.m. or such later date and time as may be intimated by him.
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1985 (12) TMI 316
Winding up - Circumstances in which a company may be wound up ... ... ... ... ..... y Petition No. 142 of 1984, and in view of this, Company Petition No. 388 of 1985 is admitted. In the result, Company Petition No. 142 of 1983 is made absolute in terms of prayers (a), (b ) and (e). Official liquidator attached to this court is appointed liquidator of the respondent-company. Official liquidator to take possession forthwith of the assets, properties and effects of the company during the course of the winding up. Petitioners in Company Petition No. 142 of 1983 to advertise the winding-up order within fourteen days from December 21, 1985, in the same newspapers in which notice of hearing of the petition was advertised and submit the bill of costs within a week thereafter. In so far as Company Petitions Nos. 366 of 1983 and 388 of 1985 are concerned, in view of the winding-up order passed in Company Petition No. 142 of 1984, there will be no order on these petitions. The petitioners will, however, be at liberty to pursue their claims with the official liquidator.
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1985 (12) TMI 315
Circumstances in which a company may be wound up, Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts
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1985 (12) TMI 290
Officer who is in default – Meaning of, Annual Return – Penalty for not filing, Balance sheet - Default in filing copies of
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1985 (12) TMI 289
Company – Incorporation of, Membership of, Shares – Allotment of , Shares warrants and entries in register of members, Shares warrants and entries in register of members, Transfer to shares – Power to refuse registration and appeal against refusal, Share capital - Further issue of, Meetings and proceedings - Annual General Meeting, Extra Ordinary General Meeting, Removal of Director, Oppression and mismanagement, Principles for interpretation of statutes, Regulation of export and transfer of securities, Restrictions on establishment of place of business in India, Supplemental provisions
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1985 (12) TMI 274
Appeal - Adjournment ... ... ... ... ..... the hearing. 4. emsp Both Shri Varma for the appellant and Shri Vinnet Ohri, for the respondent drew our attention to Order No. 448/84-D, dated 1-8-1984 in Appeal No. CD(SB)(T)595/80-D filed by the same appellant and involving a similar issue. Neither advanced any arguments or made any submissions. 5. emsp We have persued that order cited before us. The issue therein was similar to the one before us in the present case. After considering the matter at length and discussing the case-law having relevance to the issue, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the additional duty of excise imposed with effect from 4-10-1978 by the aforesaid Ordinance was liable to be charged as additional duty of customs on imported goods which were cleared from the bonded warehouse in terms of Section 68 of the Customs Act on and after 4-10-1978. The ratio of the said decision fully applies to the facts of the present case. The impugned order is, therefore, confirmed and the appeal is rejected.
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1985 (12) TMI 272
Review show cause notice - Amendment of - Demand - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... y is dated 18-7-1980 whereas exports actually took place much prior to that, between 24-10-1978 and 15-12-1978. These exports being under bond, under Rule 13 of the Central Excise Rules are subjected to examination by the departmental officers in the relevant AR 4-A forms which have to bear even a certificate by the Inspector of Central Excise, to be counter-signed by the Superintendent of Central Excise relating to the export under bond. This being so and as the exports had been effected by the respondent with the full knowledge and supervision by the Central Excise department, it is difficult to sustain a plea now made regarding suppression of the exports by the respondent and that the department becoming aware of this only as a result of audit scrutiny. In the circumstances, we hold that the extended period for the recovery of the amount from the respondent cannot be invoked by the department and the miscellaneous application as well as the appeal are accordingly rejected.
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1985 (12) TMI 271
Demand - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... to sustain this ground in view of the decisions on the criteria for applying extended period and also considering the documentary control over the manufacturing unit that the department has such grounds, as expressed by the Assistant Collector and also reiterated by the Government of India in our view, cannot stand. It is also further observed that the Government of India, in their notice have altered the amount of duty to be recovered from the amount that is shown in the show cause notice issued in the adjudication proceedings before the Assistant Collector and thereby the contention that this notice goes beyond the show cause notice and adjudication order has also a lot of force. In the result, having regard to the circumstances of the case, on the issue of time bar we find ourselves in agreement with the Appellate Collector that there is no case for the department to take the plea that there has been suppression of facts by the assessee and accordingly, reject the appeal.
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1985 (12) TMI 270
Valuation - Related persons ... ... ... ... ..... d out that under Rule 173C(10) the Assistant Collector had a right to direct the appellants to file a fresh or amended price list if any alteration becomes necessary for any reason. We do not accept the contention of the department that the present case is not one of review of the order already passed. On the present facts we cannot say that it is merely an alteration of the approved price list, but something which affects the very basis of the assessment. In effect, it is review of the earlier order. Since the statute does not give such a right to the Assistant Collector, he has no jurisdiction to review the order already passed. In the light of the rulings supported by Shri Sorabjee, we accept the contention that the show cause notice which purports to be the review of the earlier approval of the price list, is not permissible in law. 15. In the light of the above discussions, the impugned orders cannot be sustained and are set aside and the appeals are, therefore, allowed.
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1985 (12) TMI 269
Excess rebate paid erroneously ... ... ... ... ..... aim passed erroneously as a result of misconstruction or mistake in interpreting the relevant notification. Following the ratio of the said decision, the demand notice in the present case must be deemed to be hit by limitation under Rule 10. 7. In view of the above finding, it is not necessary to go into the other contentions raised before us. 8. In the result, the impugned order of the lower authorities is set aside and the appeal is allowed with consequential relief to the appellant. 9. Before we part with this case, we must mention that the respondents has filed a memorandum which he has chosen to call ldquo memorandum of cross-objections rdquo . Since the impugned order did not result in any relief to the appellant, there cannot possibly be any ground to file a cross-objection. Besides, on perusing the memorandum it is seen, it amounts to no more than para-wise comments on the appeal memorandum. Such a memorandum can by no means be called a memorandum of cross-objections.
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