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Case Laws
Showing 201 to 220 of 241 Records
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1985 (4) TMI 41 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Claiming Depreciation, Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... yment of the remaining amount of the hire purchase price and taxes, if any, and obtain a receipt in respect thereof from the owners of the machinery in order to become the owner of the machinery. Thus, without payment of the full purchase price, the assessee-firm could not have become the owner of the machinery in question and the title to the machinery did not pass to the assessee-firm during the accounting period relevant to the assessment year 1972-73 because the full price of the machinery had not been paid to the Corporation. In this view of the matter, we hold that the assessee-company was not entitled to claim depreciation allowance under s. 32(1) of the I.T. Act in respect of crankshaft machine during the assessment year 1972-73. The view taken by the Appellate Tribunal in this respect appears to be justified. We therefore, answer the reference in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee-firm. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1985 (4) TMI 40 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Pension, Salary ... ... ... ... ..... tions. Even if pension is not a deferred payment of salary, since the pension in this case is deemed to be salary under section 17 and is sought to be taxed under section 15, it must be held to be exempt under the Privileges and Immunities Act, whether received by the official himself or his heir or nominee. It is the nature and character of the receipt and not the character of the recipient that would determine the question whether the receipt is exempt from taxation. What would have been exempt from the hands of the deceased official would necessarily be exempt in the hands of the widow. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the pension paid to the widow of the deceased employee of the. United Nations under article 35 of the Rules and Regulations of the Pension Fund is exempt from income-tax. In that view of the matter, we answer the question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. DIPAK KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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1985 (4) TMI 39 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Firm, Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... al to the business of the factory and, therefore, the expenditure incurred on account of shifting must be treated to be of revenue nature. It is true that it is connected with the business of the factory but a distinction has been made in regard to the expenses which are of enduring nature and the activities which are of recurring nature. In the instant case, we have no doubt that the advantages from the shifting of the head office, for the reasons indicated in the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, were of enduring nature. The Tribunal was, therefore, not justified in allowing legal expenses as they were not revenue expenditure in nature. For the reasons stated above, in our view, the Tribunal was not justified in allowing the deduction of legal expenses over the shifting of the headquarters describing it as of revenue nature. The reference is, therefore, answered in favour of the Department and against the assessee. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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1985 (4) TMI 38 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to be supplied and used in the contract, then there could be no profit involved in respect of that material in estimating the tender or contract price. As noted in these cases, the facts may differ in different cases. In our view, these judgments do not differ from the Supreme Court s view and if they do, they were impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court. In the present case, we are dealing with an M.E.S. contractor, where it appears that the Government had supplied some material for incorporation in the works at a fixed price, which was adjustable against the contract. In such a case, the tender price would not include any profit on the material supplied by the Government itself as it was incorporated in the works. It clearly appears that this case is fully covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court. Hence, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. Parties to bear their own costs as it is a covered case.
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1985 (4) TMI 37 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Rectification ... ... ... ... ..... ssessment of an assessee which was barred under the 1922 Act. It was observed there that unless a statute expressly provides or there is a necessary implication, retrospective operation should not be given to the statute so as to affect, alter or destroy any right already acquired or to revive any remedy already lost by efflux of time. In the present case, the situation is an unfortunate one because the carried forward loss for 1949-50 has been allowed to be adjusted against the income of 1950-51 and 1951-52. On reassessment, the loss for 1949-50 has disappeared, but yet the assessee has got the advantage of the same. However, if the remedy is lost due to efflux of time, we cannot help the same. Consequently, we have to answer the question referred to us in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. However, we do not think we would be justified in awarding costs in favour of the assessee and, accordingly, we allow the parties to bear their own costs.
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1985 (4) TMI 36 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Procedure For Application For Reference ... ... ... ... ..... n should have been presented in the court and should not have been sent by post. In our opinion, in view of the office report, this application is not entertainable inasmuch as in place of being presented in court, it has been sent by post which is not permissible under the Rules of the court This application is accordingly dismissed. The applicant may be informed of this order on the address stated above by registered post.
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1985 (4) TMI 35 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Entertainment Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... re of entertainment expenses within the meaning of section 37(2B) of the Act and, as such, are allowable for the assessment year 1972-73. We further hold that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was also right in allowing a sum of Rs. 7,567 which were incurred by the assessee for providing tea, cold drinks, etc., to its customers in the reception of the Chief Minister and the Industries Minister and entertainment of guests and the expenses incurred in connection with the entertainment of guests were not in the nature of entertainment expenses within the meaning of section 37(2B) of the Act and, therefore, they were rightly allowed by the Tribunal for the assessment year 1972-73. We, therefore, answer the aforesaid questions Nos. 1 and 2 in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs of this reference. Let the answers be returned to the Tribunal in accordance with section 260(2) of the Act.
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1985 (4) TMI 34 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Benami Transaction, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... pinion Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the finding of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in holding that the property in question was purchased by the minor sons of the assessee and, as such, the income of this property could not be assessed in his hands, is perverse ? In our view, the question has not been properly framed and we would like to reframe the question as under Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that there was no material on record to hold that the transaction of purchase of house property by the minor sons of the assessee was benami and that the income from such property could not be assessed in the hands of the assessee ? We accordingly allow both these applications and direct the Incometax Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur, to state the case and refer the question indicated above to this court for its opinion. The parties are left to bear their own costs of these proceedings.
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1985 (4) TMI 33 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... way of hospitality. The moot question is whether this can be called as entertainment expenditure . This would depend on whether this expense can be described as for purposes of entertaining the purchasers or as part of the business operation of selling cloth in the wholesale market. We think, it is unnecessary to decide whether it is entertainment expense or not, because the Legislature itself has clarified that from April 1, 1976, hospitality expenses are to be treated as entertainment expenditure . It would follow that this type of expenditure before April 1, 1976, could be treated as a permissible deduction. We would, therefore, hold that in spite of the quantum being relatively high, the expense could not be treated as entertainment expenditure in the circumstances of this particular line of business. We would accordingly answer the question referred to us in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department, but leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1985 (4) TMI 32 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Question Of Law, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... ely a finding of fact. In our view, it would amount to an application of the legal principles to the facts found by the Tribunal. As such, we think it is a proper case in which the Tribunal should be called upon to state the case and refer the question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal dated August 31, 1977, to this court. As the question sought to be referred does not appear to us to have been properly framed, we would like to reframe the question as under Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the receipt of Rs. 9,500 by the assessee, by way of reproduction charges for allowing the taking of photographs of 19 paintings, was exempt from tax under section 10(3) of the I.T. Act, 1961 ? We, therefore, direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur, to state the case and refer the above-mentioned question arising out of its order dated August 31, 1977, to this court for its opinion. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1985 (4) TMI 31 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Life Interest In Property ... ... ... ... ..... ence between the two valuations was mainly due to the method adopted for arriving at the net rental of the property. The multiplying factor did not make such difference to the valuation. What is the market value of an asset as on the date of the death of the deceased is essentially a question of fact. It cannot be said on the facts of this case that the Tribunal took into consideration any wrong principle in determining the market value of the premises in question under section 36 of the Act. In the question raised, the principles of valuation have not been questioned. In the premises aforesaid, we answer the question by saying that the Tribunal was not right in equating the life interest of the deceased with fractional ownership. However, the Tribunal was right in applying the multiplier of 12 1/2 times for the purpose of determining the valuation of the premises No. 69, Park Street, Calcutta. The Controller shall pay the costs of this reference. DIPAK KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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1985 (4) TMI 30 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Application For Continuation Of Registration, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... tion. Firstly, the scope of the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is coterminous with that of the Income-tax Officer. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner has plenary powers in disposing of an appeal. He can do what the Income-tax Officer can do and can also direct him to do what he has failed, to do. (See CIT v. Kanpur Coal Syndicate 1964 53 ITR 225 (SC) ). Secondly, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner took note of the fact that for the earlier years the registration was allowed and as such the registration should be continued. In that view of the matter, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was right in not sending the matter back to the Income-tax Officer for fresh determination and the Tribunal, in our opinion, was right in confirming the direction of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. In the premises, we answer the question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. DIPAK KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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1985 (4) TMI 29 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Remuneration ... ... ... ... ..... on draws at the time when he goes on leave and not when the leave is accumulated. So far as the leave encashment is concerned, the employees are entitled to encashment of their privilege leave to the extent of 120 days. Such encashment can be made only at the time of retirement or termination or determination of the services of an employee. If any employee avails of the leave, he will be entitled to the leave salary. If he does not avail of the entire leave, he will be entitled to accumulate to the extent permissible. He will only be entitled to encash such accumulated leave when he retires or his services are terminated or determined. Therefore, neither the leave salary nor the leave encashment benefit payable to the employees can be said to be a present liability. The contention of Mr. Bajoria has no substance and must fail. The second question is, therefore, answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. DIPAK KUMAR SEN.-I agree.
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1985 (4) TMI 28 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Income From Warehousing, Mistake Apparent From Record ... ... ... ... ..... d from warehousing. Other receipts may or may not be exempt under section 83 and on that there may be two views possible. But one thing is certain that so far as the income from warehousing is concerned, the assessee is entitled to exemption which has not been disputed by anyone before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or before the Tribunal. We are, therefore, of the view that the income of Rs. 5,72,323, which indisputably is from warehousing and which comes within the purview of section 83, cannot be taxed. The Income-tax Officer has no jurisdiction to assess such income which is exempt from taxation. This error of jurisdiction is a glaring and obvious error which can be rectified under section 154 of the Act. For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the question in this reference in the negative and in favour of the assessee. However, we make it clear that the claim of exemption of the assessee will be restricted only to the sum of Rs. 5,72,323. DIPAK KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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1985 (4) TMI 27 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... d been exercised by cancelling the registration. The discretion having been exercised, the Tribunal should have been slow in reversing their exercise of discretion. In the instant case, the Tribunal relied on irrelevant considerations in holding that this was an apt case for exercising the discretion conferred by section 186(2) in favour of the assessee. The Revenue was right in exercising the discretion against the assessee and the Appellate Tribunal did not act in accordance with law in reversing that exercise of discretion. In my concluded opinion, therefore, upon the findings of the Appellate Tribunal itself, there was no case for allowing continuation of registration to the firm. The Tribunal was not correct in law in allowing continuation of registration to the firm. The question referred to this court for our opinion must, therefore, be answered in favour of the Department and against the assessee. There shall, however, be no order Is to costs. NAZIR AHMAD J.-I agree.
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1985 (4) TMI 26 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Casual And Non-recurring Receipt, Income, Mutual Concern ... ... ... ... ..... see from the Government in a regular manner was revenue receipt liable to tax or capital receipt. The grant/subsidy had been given with the sole object of enabling the assessee company to carry on their business in a commercial manner so that it would yield profits. On those facts, Kantawala J. observed that the subsidy could not be regarded as capital or non-recurring in nature. The subsidy so received was thus not exempt from taxation. I am in respectful agreement with the decision of Kantawala C.J. I am of the view that profits of the assessee from sales to members and subsidy to it are liable to be taxed as income in the hands of the assessee. For the reasons stated above, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in rejecting the claim of the assessee on both counts. Both the questions referred to this court are, therefore, answered in the affirmative, in favour of the Department and against the assessee. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. NAZIR AHMAD J.-I agree.
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1985 (4) TMI 25 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Firm, Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... on of law can be said to arise out of the Tribunal s order as suggested by the Commissioner of Income-tax in his application under section 256(2) of the Act, as question No. 2. For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the order of the Tribunal rejecting the reference application under section 256(1) by its order dated June 21, 1979, is incorrect to this extent when it held that no question of law arises from its finding that the loss in question was that of a joint venture. We, therefore, direct the Tribunal to state the case and refer the following question of law for the decision of this court Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the loss of Rs. 12,865 which was claimed by the assessee was not a share of loss from an unregistered firm or an association of persons and, therefore, it could not be disallowed ? There will be no order as to costs of this application.
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1985 (4) TMI 24 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Limitation, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... 1980 121 ITR 254 (Ker), in the case of Saraf Trading Corporation v. CIT 1980 123 ITR 159 (Ker) and in the case of Addl. CIT v. Raichand Amichand 1983 144 ITR 754 (MP). Thus, in view of the various decisions mentioned above, it has to be held that as in this case, the limitation was still running on April 1, 1971, the amended section 275 of the Act will be applicable as it enlarged the period of limitation and so the penalties imposed by the Income.-tax Officer on March 23, 1973, were not barred by limitation. In view of my above discussions, I hold that the penalty orders of the Income-tax Officer were not barred by limitation and so the Tribunal was not justified in law in holding that the amended time-limit of penalty under section 275 of the Act was not applicable to penalty proceedings which were pending on April 1, 1971. The question is answered in the negative and in favour of Revenue and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. UDAY SINHA J.-I agree.
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1985 (4) TMI 23 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Penalty, Penalty Proceedings, Precedents ... ... ... ... ..... the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, when the word deliberately concealed found place in section 28(1)(c). Those words were deleted in 1964. The initial owns was thus squarely on the assessee after 1964 when the Explanation to section 271 (1)(c) was enacted. The assessee not having discharged his onus, there was no obligation upon the Department to endeavour to disprove the case of the assessee. In our view, the Tribunal erred in law in relying on the case of Anwar Ali 1970 76 ITR 696 (SC), for setting aside the order of penalty. The assessee produced no material nor was there anything on the record to explain the concealed income of Rs. 15,000. We have, therefore, no doubt that the Tribunal in setting aside the order of penalty on the authority of the case of Anwar Ali 1970 76 ITR 696 (SC), erred in law. The question referred to us for our opinion must, therefore, be answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
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1985 (4) TMI 22 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Revision ... ... ... ... ..... ion 60(2) of the Act. The petitioner has no case that apart from the rejection of his application for revision, the order of the revisional authority contained. any observation which was otherwise prejudicial to the assessee. It is, of course, true that even an order declining to revise an order of assessment may be otherwise prejudicial to the assessee. But, no such plea having been specifically raised in this original petition, it is not necessary for as to deal with that aspect of the matter. On the basis of the above discussion, we have to hold that an order passed under section 34 of the Act, by the revisional authority, declining to interfere, shall not ordinarily be treated as an order prejudicial to the assessee under section 60(2) of the Act except in cases where it is pleaded and proved that prejudice is caused otherwise than by the mere rejection of the application for revision. In the result, the original petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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